This is an ambitious book by Harold James, for many reasons. First, it is a detailed reconstruction of the history of three of the most important European dynasties in the steel industry, over two hundred years. The research is based on a vast array of sources, primary and secondary, and succeeds in giving a complete account of the complex and dynamic relationships between the stories of the families and those of the three business groups from the first industrial revolution to the present times. Second, the story told here is a comparative one. The three dynasties are analysed inside their national contexts (respectively France, Germany and Italy), and confronted in terms of their linkages with institutions and policies, of technological evolution, of strategies and market relationships. Not surprisingly, the comparative effort highlights many differences, but also a high number of similarities, as far as for instance the entrepreneurial creativity of the first generation is examined, the relationships with the state and the political power, the management of succession, the training of new generations, the strategies of growth and expansion of the business activity. The three families, active in an industry that is crucial for economic modernisation (strategic also in political terms in a nationalistic period), are true ‘microcosms’ which allow us to read in a creative way the economic history of three continental leaders, and the way in which business relationships have been managed and structured in order to achieve a stable level of economic development and growth. The stories collected inside the book are in fact clear examples of that ‘relationship-based’ model typical of continental Europe, different from the ‘market-based’ alternative provided by Anglo-American capitalism. Last, but not least, the comparative story of these ‘steel’ dynasties allows the author to suggest some relevant generalisations concerning the role, structure, potentialities, strengths and weaknesses of (large) family firms. Actually, this is the most fascinating aspect of the book itself. Obviously – and James is well aware of this – to draw generalisations from three specific cases is probably too ambitious a task. In any case, these stories at least suggest some themes and issues to be carefully considered by those who are interested in the role played by family firms in modern economies. The stories of the Wendels, Haniels and Falcks help to shed light on the complex relationship which over time is established between a social institution, the family and the economic activity – the family firm is, in economic terms, as the author himself claims, an organisation characterised by the legal, intergenerational transfer of property rights. The interrogatives posted by Harold James in his problematic introduction to the book are thus crucial. What is the relationship between the pervasiveness of family control, especially in Europe, among large firms and the ‘wealth of the Nation’? Or, put in another way, is there a stable relationship between governance models and performance? And, linked to this, what is performance really? Family firms may ‘under-perform’ the market in terms of short-term return, over-performing it in terms of longevity, given the tendency to treat the firm as a family property which has to be preserved. After many years during which economic theory claimed the superiority of the public, managerial company able to perform better in terms of ‘shareholder value’, the scandals provoked by mismanagement and bad governance have more recently emphasised the virtues of commitment, social responsibility and trust which are generally considered as typical of family control.

Another relevant question put by the author concerns the ‘abnormal’, persistent family control across Europe, explained by the presence of specific conditions, and above all the difficulty experienced by both the market and the state to create the conditions of efficient economic development. In this relatively uncertain framework, in some cases (such as the Italian one) worsened by the practical absence of efficient stock and financial markets, the family ownership played an essential role in risk management. In putting forward this explanation, the author explicitly refers to recent theories on the political determinants of corporate governance, which identify in the social-democratic European tradition the main explanation of the incentives to a high degree of concentration of control.

Finally, the stories collected in the book introduce another important issue, which is the process of evolution, or life-cycle of the family firm. As a multigenerational artefact, the family firm evolves across generations, as well as the entrepreneurial attitude of the leaders. The survival of the firm is thus linked not only to the ability of the family to select the right leader, but also to identify adequate structures for managing growth when a proper leadership is absent, or expresses different values and attitudes. The appointment of loyal managers working side by side with ‘professional ownership’ – something similar to the concept of ‘open family firm’ – has in many cases proved to be the best solution in order to create enduring longevity for the company itself.

In the end, this book is an essay in social, economic and business history the scope of which goes beyond a simple comparative perspective. The themes introduced and analysed by the author offer an important contribution to our still imperfect knowledge of the role played by families in modern economies, and especially of the interaction between the social, intimate sphere and that of economic activity. The relevance which (surprisingly?) family firms have gained with the outbreak of the third industrial revolution and of the process of globalisation, accompanied by an intense wave of privatisations in western and eastern economies, make all these questions more relevant, and a matter for further and careful reflection.