“Nationalism is one of modern history's great surprises” (back cover): why has the nation risen to such unprecedented political importance in what should have been the age of the individual? This question has continued to trouble scholars of nationalism and it provides the starting point for Bernard Yack's impressive new book, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community. Most theorists have answered the puzzle by arguing that nationalism is something other than it seems: it is either an intruder from the premodern world (see Steven Grosby, “The Verdict of History,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 17, no. 1 [1994]: 164–71), or it is a purely modern phenomenon (see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism [Cornell University Press, 1983]; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 [Cambridge University Press, 1990]). Yack however contends that there is something wrong with our understanding of community and modern society.
One of the key objectives of the book is therefore to develop a broader and more flexible theory of community, “one that treats community as a generic component of human association, rather than a special product of traditional family and village life” (2). Yack does not deny that nations are imagined or constructed, but he argues that they are “imagined or constructed by people trying to make sense of intergenerational connections that they have received rather than chosen” (89). The nation therefore does not owe its existence to natural necessity or human choice; it develops out of the contingencies of history and human development.
Yack consequently views the nation as a relatively old phenomenon. Nationalism, however, is relatively new, so what, he asks, has changed? What has made nationalism such a powerful force in the modern era? Yack finds the answer in the doctrine of popular sovereignty, which has politicized and thereby intensified our attachments to national communities. The doctrine of popular sovereignty lacks a consistent answer to the nature of the prepolitical community from which legitimate authority is derived and therefore “opens the door to the identification of political with national community” (146). Yack thus observes that the spread of nationalism has followed the spread of popular sovereignty: from the French Revolution to the East European Revolution two hundred years later.
Theoretically Yack sets out to go beyond “the oft-rehearsed debate between primordialists and modernists” (back cover), but it could be argued that he effectively places himself in the middle by arguing that nationalism contains both something old and something new. Nationalism is not an anomaly in the modern era; its power is a product of distinctly modern developments, but it is based on an older phenomenon. Yack's new conception of community, however, enables him to explain the emotional power of nationalism—with which modernists often struggle—without resorting to static premodern attachment. Moreover, by linking the rise of nationalism to the spread of popular sovereignty Yack also argues that nationalism cannot easily be eliminated.
Nationalism is therefore seemingly here to stay. Is this a problem? Yack dismisses the association of nationalism and the unleashing of tribalism and irrational passions, but he acknowledges that there is a moral problem with nationalism. By combining beliefs about justice with feelings of communal loyalty, nationalism deepens our hostility toward members of rival communities. Yack examines different solutions to this problem, but rejects both the possibility of normalizing nationalism (through civic nationalism or by making national self-determination a general right) or eliminating it (through cosmopolitanism). Instead, he argues, we have to learn to live with it. For this to happen, people must stop viewing national self-determination as a basic right, while at the same time recognizing the injustices created by the principle of popular sovereignty.
These arguments are both compelling and provocative and the book fills an important gap in the political-theory literature which has hitherto tended to ignore nationalism. The debate between primordialists and modernists has, in my view, largely run its course (especially owing to the dearth of self-confessed primordialists), but Yack's highly plausible explanation for the recurring power of nationalism in the modern era answers a number of the questions that continue to preoccupy scholars. The link between popular sovereignty and the rise of nationalism has been made before, but Yack's argument is more developed and goes deeper than most. While these arguments are perhaps not that new, Yack puts meat on them, and he explores their consequences; the result is a powerful thesis that cannot easily be ignored.
This is an excellent and far-reaching book but it is also very abstract and as a nontheorist I was at times missing a discussion of empirically highly relevant subcategories. For example, Yack emphasizes that there are also illiberal and antidemocratic interpretations of the doctrine of popular sovereignty which therefore does not entail a commitment to democratic government. Yet this leaves us with the question whether nationalism becomes particularly prominent when combined with democratic government—for example, owing to the effect of majority rule on the position of minorities. Such a question is highly pertinent in light of the ongoing theoretical and empirical debates over the link between democracy—and especially democratization—and the outbreak of intercommunal conflict (see Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War [MIT Press, 2005]). The doctrine of popular sovereignty has conquered the world—for now at least—but democracy has not yet and its link with nationalism is therefore of great practical importance. To some extent this objection, or call for further analysis, misses the point: Yack's book is primarily a book about ideas, not about political structures. His solution to the moral problem with nationalism is similarly based on changing the way people think—about national self-determination and about injustice. This may have left me with a number of further questions (How do we do this? What structures will help effect this change?), but answering these questions is not the purpose of Yack's book. Even if the book therefore does not answer all questions (which book does?), it presents ample food for thought and I highly recommend it to anyone puzzled by the continued power of nationalism.
