Since the tragic events of September 2001 and because of an increasing interest in terrorism, several books on the Lebanese Hizbullah have been published (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002; Hamzeh, 2004; and Harik, 2004). Books on tangential issues have also appeared, such as Avi Jorisch's volume on Hizbullah's al-Manar television station (Jorisch, 2004) and Sankari's recent work on the so-called spiritual leader of Hizbullah Ayatollah Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah (Sankari, 2005). A new book written by the deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, offering insights into the inner workings of the party, also came out in fall 2005.
Judith Harik's book did not then emerge into a void. Much of the information she provides on the background of the party overlaps with information presented in the excellent book written by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb. However, Harik's thesis is different. She argues that while “Hezbollah … has transformed itself from a radical, clandestine militia to a moderate, mainstream political party with a resistance wing” (p. 1), it is still perceived by the United States as a terrorist organization, especially after 9/11. Harik contends that “Hezbollah [has] developed two major strategies to combat these charges [of terrorism] and that the deliberate implementation of these strategies … has allowed the party to change its terrorist face” (p. 2).
Harik begins with a reading of the historical and ideological background for the emergence of Hizbullah in war-torn Lebanon (chapter 1) then clarifies the reasons behind the alliance that brought Hizbullah, Iran, and Syria together (chapter 2). She then explains how the signing of the Taif accord and the subsequent institutionalization of Syrian interference in Lebanese politics “guarantee[d] Jihad” (p. 46). She quickly skims over the divisions entailed by this compromise within the ranks of the party (chapter 4) and describes how Hizbullah came to be accepted by “various secular and non-Muslim Lebanese groups” (p. 70). This policy of infitāḥ (opening) vis-à-vis Christians was an “essential part of successfully playing the Lebanese political game” (p. 77) and “helped defeat Israeli efforts to split support for the resistance along confessional lines” (p. 78). Chapter 6 gives an extensive description of Hizbullah's charitable networks, and chapter 7 explains how that investment in welfare organizations translated into electoral gain at the grass roots level, especially in the southern suburb of Beirut.
Harik then describes “the military policy developed by Syria and played out by Hezbollah and the Lebanese government” to provide support for the party and “thwart Israel's battle strategy” (p. 111). She then shows how this policy led to a recognition in 1996 by the international community of Hizbullah's “right to continue its resistance activities” (p. 122) through the “April Understanding” that followed Operation “Grapes of Wrath.” Harik then illustrates how the self-declared Israeli security zone in South Lebanon collapsed and how Hizbullah was consequently perceived as having defeated the previously invincible Israeli Army (chapter 9). She demonstrates how the 2000 legislative elections paid off for Hizbullah even if it could not compete with Amal, its Shiʿa rival, and how the party started turning its attention toward Palestine after the start of the intifada in 2000 (chapter 10). Harik then discusses the showdown between the United States and Israel on the one hand, and Lebanon and Syria on the other hand, over Hizbullah and whether it is a terrorist organization or a resistance force (chapter 11). She argues that after September 11, “America's war on terrorism seemed to incorporate Israel's” (p. 177) and that the United States started to put pressure on the Lebanese government to curtail Hizbullah. This led to a unified Lebanese stance behind the party with Syrian backing (chapter 12). Harik concludes “United States policymakers well know that Syria alone can pull the plug on Hezbollah. This the Assad government will not do, however, unless there is something to be gained from it” (p. 201).
Although Harik's book is well written and a welcome addition to the new scholarship on Hizbullah, it remains a fairly descriptive volume. The book fails to provide a theoretical contribution to our understanding of how Islamic movements can become mainstream political parties. A second weakness is the dearth of references to published research in Arabic about the party and the very sporadic use of available primary sources, such as speeches by the party's leadership or the different publications of Hizbullah and its affiliated welfare organizations, in addition to information available on the party's Web sites, for example, moqawama.org and the now defunct nasrallah.net and hizbullah.org. A third weakness is the relatively small number of interviews conducted by the author. This is particularly surprising as the author resides in Lebanon and should therefore have easy access to the party's leadership. Access to the representatives of Hizbullah in parliament, for example, is fairly simple. The presentation of this book is also marred by problems in the transliteration of Arabic words and by copyediting problems.
It is this reviewer's opinion that, although this book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Hizbullah, it might not be very useful for researchers looking for new insights into the integration of Islamist parties in the political arena. This volume remains, however, a good introduction for newcomers to Lebanon and Hizbullah. It is also a good book to assign to undergraduate students in a course on political Islam to further their understanding of Islamism in its Shiעa form outside Iran.
