Stephen Renner has produced an ambitious and much-needed study of the origin and wartime experience of the Hungarian Air Force. The title derives from a 1921 statement by a Hungarian officer who foresaw that without an Air Force, “a broken-winged Hungary will fall behind the other peoples of the world” (v). Even with an Air Force, in the period in question, Hungary was perennially broken-winged. After attaining independence when the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, Hungary sought to create military forces that were a necessary part of independent-state identity, to protect its new borders against hostile neighbors like Romania and Slovakia, and to aid in the reacquisition of territories ceded to its neighbors in the Treaty of Trianon.
This book consists of seven chapters, chronologically arranged and thematically designated, followed by a brief conclusion. “Legacy” summarizes the experience of Hungarian aviators through 1918. Renner illustrates the “ways in which aviation was ‘an instrument of national prestige’ in Hungary just as in larger states” (9). The chapter “Upheaval: 1918–1919” makes the key point that “Hungarian airmen became accustomed to operating at a disadvantage” (43). Like its former allies, Hungary was banned from maintaining significant military forces. “Evasion: 1920–1927” details the ways in which Hungary adopted clandestine measures to circumvent the Treaty of Trianon. In the case of the Air Force, that included masking military aviation under the cloak of civilian activities such as transport and weather reconnaissance.
“Theory: 1927–1937” examines the theoretical debates over Douhet's concepts of strategic bombing. “Reality: 1927–1937” covers the same timeframe and shows the practical limitations that forced Hungary to accept whatever aircraft it could get: primarily older Italian models. A pattern of “late delivery and uncertain quality” (145) became the norm, which led Hungary into a closer relationship with Germany. “Independence: 1938–1940” covers the brief apex of Hungarian military aviation. Unfortunately, “recruitment was still too low, airplanes too few, accident rates too high, and combat readiness too shaky” (233), problems that became serious obstacles to offensive action.
The final chapter, “War: 1941–1945,” details the decline of Hungary's Air Force that began in 1941. There were a few early successes in the war, such as air operations that assisted in the capture of Nikolayev from the Soviets. As with its army, the Air Force was subsumed under German control and for all intents and purposes operated as an auxiliary to the Luftwaffe. The Hungarian Air Force was a minor player in the immense air war of 1939–45. The improved capabilities of Soviet aviation, increased Allied bombing attacks, and the steep decline in quality and quantity suffered by all Axis forces resulted in a futile fight to the last airfield.
Broken Wings is primarily institutional and political history. Colonel Renner (currently Dean of Students at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University) earned his PhD at Oxford and was an Olmsted Scholar at the Budapest Institute of Graduate Diplomatic and International Studies. Renner has produced the best and only study in English of the Hungarian Air Force in this period. The author provides a great deal of geopolitical context, necessary perhaps for readers who are unfamiliar with the era, though aviation historians may find themselves skimming to get to where the Air Force comes in. The production qualities are excellent, with an attractive cover and dust jacket, clean editing, a good index, and an essential list of abbreviations. The only thing missing is a good map or two.
This book is a notable achievement. Renner brings to light the story of a small but determined military aviation force, operating under extreme limitations, which tried to do its duty in turbulent times. Hungary faced insurmountable obstacles to creating a powerful Air Force. Funds, lack of industrial capacity, reliance on foreign imports, and low levels of realistic training were all examples of how “circumstances constrain action” (303). Renner suggests that Hungary might have done better to focus on a few standardized types of aircraft and a few specific tactical missions, which might have improved maintenance, repair, and pilot performance. Hungary's aviation ambitions were a case in which its reach greatly exceeded its grasp. The efforts of the Hungarian Air Force to restore Hungary's national military capabilities and national pride came to naught, but serve as a useful case study of Hungary's blighted experience.
