This book broadly analyzes the formation and maintenance of interstate coalitions and alliances. Daniel F. Baltrusaitis addresses the question of why some states join, while others do not. More interestingly, the book looks at variation in types of support for international coalitions: Why do some states support postintervention efforts, for example, while others commit forces at the onset? As would be expected, the author takes on the “traditional” explanations of state security decisions and collective efforts, such as national interests, alliance commitments, and collective action problems. He finds, consistent with most foreign policy analysis research, that these general factors are deficient in their ability to explain variation and nature (such as effort levels and timing) in state choices. Instead, this book contends that domestic-political factors, including configurations of decision-making authority and historical learning, are key to an understanding of decisions made in an alliance context.
The theoretical story, however, is more nuanced, as the author argues that it is the interaction of national interests, domestic factors, and international norms that drives the dynamics of international coalitions. He modifies a previous “burden sharing” model (from Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger's 1997 edited volume Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War) by adding a typology of domestic-political structure as the filter through which cognitive, international, and other domestic-political factors predict and explain levels of alliance contributions. Four types of domestic structures are proposed in a two-by-two matrix based on the centralization of executive power and the degree of executive autonomy from the legislature.
One strength of this book lies in its multilevel approach, but Baltrusaitis does miss an opportunity to more theoretically engage with the literature he uses as his foundation. His discussion of legitimacy, for example, could contribute to constructivist approaches, as could his use of historical learning to psychological approaches. His typology relates to both weak/strong state research and the decision unit approach. The book acknowledges many of these connections but could say more about the added value of his approach and empirical research.
The Iraq war and the “coalition of the willing” is the context for the book's investigation. Baltrusaitis argues that state contributions to the Iraq intervention were particularly variable (especially compared to participation in the 1991 effort in Iraq), presenting an interesting puzzle for burden-sharing research. The conclusion does point out that ad hoc and hybrid coalitions are likely to be increasingly employed (such as in Afghanistan) and, thus, this research has implications beyond Iraq.
The real contributions and most interesting aspects of Coalition Politics and the Iraq War lie in the three case chapters, on South Korea, Germany, and Turkey. Choices made by each of these countries challenge many traditional expectations of alliance behavior and foreign policy. Why did South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun, who was elected partly because of his opposition to the United States and its policy in Iraq, provide a significant troop contingent to the U.S.-led effort? Why did Germany, a strong U.S. ally, play a leadership role in the diplomatic opposition to the United States yet provide robust military support nevertheless? And why did Turkey, also a faithful U.S. ally with significant national interests in the future of Iraq, turn down an economic aid offer and deny the United States the use of Turkish soil for a northern front in the intervention? Baltrusaitis provides answers to these questions with richly detailed process-tracing case studies that focus on threat perceptions and national interests, alliance dependence, collective action dynamics, historical learning, domestic structures and politics, and concerns about the international legitimacy of the Iraqi invasion.
The case studies concentrate on the role of domestic structures, classifying the political authority into the author's typology. He concludes that South Korea's centralized executive with autonomy from the legislature allowed President Roh to recognize the importance of South Korea's dependence and pragmatically to change course and ally with the United States. Baltrusaitis classifies German authority as centralized, due to the national elections, but not autonomous from the legislature and societal pressures. As such, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was able to “commandeer the foreign policy process” (p. 208) and use the public's opposition to the policy to get reelected. Once in office, the author argues, German leaders were able to provide support to the United States that did not require parliamentary approval. Turkey is portrayed as a “weak” state in the sense that the executive is decentralized (with the Justice and Development Party barely in power and divided) and not autonomous (since the decision needed parliamentary approval and public opinion had become increasingly important, with partisan realignment). Because of this weakness, the Turkish leaders, who might have responded to U.S. pressures and promises, allowed members of parliament to vote their conscience, and the Grand Assembly rejected Turkish involvement.
Baltrusaitis concludes that domestic political structures explain the variation in support for the war across these three countries—the more centralized offered the most support, the weakest politically offered the least. Overall, the cases are detailed and well researched, but his interpretations do raise some questions. This is most important with regard to the book's characterizations of the domestic political structures and dynamics of each country, since this is the crux of the theoretical argument. In the Turkish case, for example, one could argue that the Justice and Development Party's control of a parliamentary majority and the strong leadership in the party and traditional deference to the cabinet would make the country more of a strong state (Type I in this book's framework) than a weak one (Type IV), as categorized. That the party leadership decided to let party members vote was a choice (and some argue that this was based on misperception of how the vote would turn out), rather than a constraint. In the German case, it is difficult to see the government as centralized, given that it was a coalition cabinet. Indeed, Baltrusaitis does not give much attention to the role of the junior coalition partner, the Greens, as a key driver in the national debate on the Iraq war in the lead-up to the German national elections.
More critically, the cases reveal important factors that are undertheorized in this book. One such factor is leadership and leader characteristics. President Roh's change of heart and pragmatic consideration of the Korean-U.S. alliance, Chancellor Schröder's beliefs on Iraq and the alliance with the United States, and Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan's mishandling and misperceptions of party politics all seem vital to these states' choices in the Iraq war. Baltrusaitis misses an opportunity here to employ research on leadership style and beliefs (e.g. Margaret Hermann's work on leadership trait analysis and Stephen Walker and Mark Schafer's research on operational codes) to develop underlying mechanisms for assessing when leaders will respect or challenge constraints in their international and domestic environments.
Despite some missed opportunities, this book is an excellent addition to comparative foreign policy research. It points out the variation in real-world policies that many theories of international relations continue to ignore, and it explains puzzling choices through multiple theoretical lenses and with in-depth empirical decision-making analyses.
