Thomas Spragens's Capitalism and Democracy: Prosperty, Justice, and the Good Society states that its main purpose is “to identify the major issues and to clarify the most important arguments of the opposing sides of the free-market-versus-welfare-state debate” (9–10). Spragens identifies three major questions on which there is sharp disagreement in this debate. First, do free markets maximize prosperity, or do they create damaging outcomes that require government intervention to control? Second, do market economies produce distributions of income and wealth that are morally acceptable? Third, is a society characterized by free markets and limited government desirable, or does it violate democratic ideals?
Spragens devotes one chapter to each of these three issues, followed by two chapters that assess the issues. Ultimately, he concludes that a society that values freedom, economic growth, and efficiency must rely heavily on market institutions, but that the workings of a market economy must sometimes be constrained by a democratically elected government. That sounds very much like an argument in support of the status quo.
Spragens does a good job of explaining why a market economy works so well to allocate resources efficiently and to produce prosperity for everyone. He also does a good job of explaining why sometimes markets may not work so well, opening the possibility that government oversight may improve things. He offers standard economic arguments, both for free markets and for government intervention, clearly explained and very balanced. Markets do not always allocate resources as well as abstract models would suggest, but Spragens recognizes that government also can fail to allocate resources efficiently.
The book's discussion of whether market outcomes are morally acceptable reviews arguments on both sides, but seems slightly less balanced. The strongest moral justification for the reward structure of a market economy is that it compensates people in proportion to the value they create for others. Market transactions reveal, in dollar terms, how much people value the economic activity of others. Spragens spends more space explaining two weaker arguments. One is that markets reward people for the effort they exert to produce. But markets do not reward effort; rather, they reward the value that is created by that effort. The other is that market rewards come in proportion to people's moral character. While he provides references to support this argument, few advocates of a laissez-faire economic policy would actually assert this. The only strong moral justification for market compensation is that it rewards people for the value they create for others.
These arguments have obvious counterarguments. The value people produce for others is heavily dependent on luck. Being born with qualities that enable people to succeed, such as intelligence and athletic ability, is unrelated to moral worth. Being born into the right family offers some people opportunities denied to others. The same is true of being born in the right location at the right time. People born in the United States have advantages not available to those born in third-world countries. The circumstances of people's birth have a substantial influence on their economic success later in life.
In addition, market rewards may not correspond with what people consider moral worth. People can prosper by selling cigarettes. People with athletic ability can become rich playing games, while teachers, firefighters, and others who produce valuable services for others are compensated much less well. Market value and moral worth are, at best, imperfectly correlated.
People on both sides of the debate favor equal opportunity, but Spragens notes that they view equality of opportunity differently. Free market advocates view equal opportunity as institutional nondiscrimination, whereas reform liberals see many other sources of unequal opportunity. In addition to sources of good luck already mentioned, some people suffer misfortune through no fault of their own.
These arguments look at whether a market economy produces a just outcome, but Spragens observes that market economies create more for everyone. Even if some people are luckier than others, and people are not compensated in proportion to their efforts or moral worth, the greater productivity of a market economy provides a “non-justice” moral justification for a market allocation of resources.
Having focused heavily on capitalism in the book's early chapters, Spragens turns to democracy, emphasizing that there are many different views about the concept. An older tradition of democracy views it as self-rule—government by the consent of the governed. A more modern individualistic view envisions democracy as freedom from state coercion. Spragens describes five different conceptions of democracy, concluding that they “lead to divergent views about the proper role of the capitalist marketplace in a democratic society” (150).
Having reviewed the arguments for free-market capitalism versus the welfare state, Spragens devotes a chapter to explaining why there are “no slam-dunk answers.” On the economic front, while we may have a clear goal of enhancing the productivity of the economy, economic knowledge is limited enough that there are no clear answers to what economic policies best lead to this result. On the moral front, there are incompatible views on what constitutes a moral society so that “it is simply impossible for any political society to achieve such perfectly just outcomes” (173). Noting that people have many competing ends in their lives, Spragens says “there is no incontestable way to adjudicate or to ascertain the right or best balance among these multiple and contending goods” (186).
After presenting the best arguments on both sides of the issue, Spragens offers in his final chapter his “reasonable judgments.” Unsurprisingly, having presented compelling arguments on both sides, he concludes that “we need both strong markets and strong and competent government” (230). He applauds the virtues of free markets, but also enumerates the benefits of many government interventions. While he does not say so explicitly, it appears that the status quo conforms closely with his vision of the good society. At least, he offers no arguments for moving away from the status quo.
I would have liked to have seen Spragens explicitly conclude that the status quo is a good compromise, if that is what he thinks. As it is, even though the book's final chapter is titled “Toward Reasonable Judgments,” the chapter offers no actual judgments; it simply recounts the virtues of free markets and government interventions to mitigate some of their effects. Perhaps this ambiguity at the end of the book is its main point. There are good arguments on both sides of the free-markets-versus-welfare-state debate.
