“They are misled by wrong ideology” (p. 333), a young Chinese interviewee told Yida Zhai, explaining survey data evincing fears and misgivings about China’s rise from young people elsewhere in Asia. To the interviewee, it was seemingly self-evident that the Chinese government has no aggressive designs; hence indications of the opposite belief could only be the result of being “misled by wrong ideology,” possibly via “manipulat[ive] media coverage that shapes negative evaluations of China’s rise” in US-ally neighbouring countries.
Through his book’s 13 chapters – all previously published articles – Zhai makes it clear that he sharply disagrees with this accusation, but only regarding its direction. Instead, the author believes that it is a significant portion of the Chinese population that is being misled by the wrong ideology: for instance, having inaccurately positive beliefs about China’s governance quality and democratic level (p. 81), or incorrectly considering democracy to be instantiated in positive substantive outcomes rather than a set of procedures and civil/political (but not economic, social and cultural) rights (pp. 171–202). How long, he asks, “can the CCP continue to play the trick of disguising its authoritarian nature and shielding itself from pressure for democratic transition?” (p. 244) – that is, how long can the Chinese government continue to mislead its people through indoctrination into the wrong ideology?
From a political psychological perspective, this is a problematic question. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Or from which ideological perspective can we accurately judge another ideology to be “wrong”? Perhaps the prevailing consensus in China studies is that liberal capitalist democracy is the correct ideology, and others are wrong; but in political psychology, ideology itself is a focus of study. The political psychologist herself cannot disembody her intellect so as to free herself from her own ideology (beliefs about how the world works and how it should work), so the standard practice is to attempt to minimize the influence of one’s own views and write about ideology in a neutral manner. For instance, no political psychology journal would publish the following passage about the US, even if reporting on survey data indicating majority dissatisfaction:
The rhetoric of government of the people proves false given the reality that ordinary people’s dignity is humiliated, and their liberties and rights are violated. They hardly feel they are the masters of government; instead, they are unimportant pawns and can be sacrificed for the sake of the ruling elites. Widening income disparities, rampant corruption, and government officials’ arbitrary power dispel the myth of a government of the people. For most [US] citizens, the [government] is owned by privileged economic elites – never by them.
Yet this is a quote with two word changes I have made (“US” for “Chinese” and “government” for “Party”) from the book (p. 257). (And the related survey data did not evince majority dissatisfaction, let alone feelings of humiliation.)
The author’s main argument is that most Chinese people are in thrall to “political guardianship psychology,” which is defined by 1) an authoritarian orientation, 2) belief in reciprocal rights and duties between a benevolent authority and the people it is meant to serve, and 3) legitimation of popular resistance to government authority (only) when it fails to live up to its duties. Subsidiary points include a people–government relationship similar to that between a child and a parent, higher levels of government being perceived as more trustworthy than lower levels of the hierarchy, and the legitimacy of government being judged not by the procedures it follows but by its substantive outcomes. Political guardianship psychology makes China’s people especially prone to the effects of in-group bias, their self-identity is extraordinarily bound up with the national community, and their sense of individuality is subordinate to the national in-group. It “motivates people to defend their country and government spontaneously and prioritize serving national goals over truth and humanity,” (p. 11), presumably more so than in relatively individualistic countries without, or with lower levels of, political guardianship psychology.
The author’s hypothesis is not falsifiable in the strictest sense – as with the most interesting questions in political psychology – but relevant evidence can be collected to judge whether the weight of that evidence lies in favour or opposition. Throughout the book, the author does so through a comprehensive examination of several waves of the Asian Barometer Survey (primarily; interview methods are also used in one chapter). The virtue of this evidentiary source is its representativeness; the weakness is that the psychologist is limited to the questions asked and must often stretch a single response to encompass a broad trait, belief or concept. For instance, the measurement of “international orientation” in two waves of the survey was a four-point, agree–disagree response to “We should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods” (p. 352). As a reminder that scientists in this area must always be political-economic psychologists, this way of measuring an international orientation conflates global consciousness or identification with all humanity with opinions over Ricardian trade theory – contested today by even mainstream economists.
The journal articles reprinted in this volume suffer, by necessity given the predominant method and data source, from potentially noisy measurements. In the many regression analyses reported, the percentage of variance explained rarely exceeds ten per cent and is often well below; yet the interpretations offered for the relationships found seem at times more confident than the evidence warrants. Experimental and comparative studies would have been most helpful in providing evidentiary support, particularly concerning core psychological aspects of political guardianship psychology, like an acute in-group bias.
The only other flaw in the book is the fault of its publisher: its exorbitant price plus a lack of editorial value added (e.g. by re-editing the journal articles to flow better in book format) means that for students and professors without free access, acquiring the book’s original introduction and the original journal articles separately is likely preferable.
Nonetheless, the book offers a useful collection of analyses of a rich data source, and if its conclusions are contestable, so too are the conclusions of social scientists with contrary ideologies. Hopefully the Chinese studies field is one in which ideologically diverse flowers bloom – likely the only way to minimize the chances of being “misled by wrong ideology.”
