This slim book is a revised PhD dissertation by an assistant professor of international relations at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, who apparently was formerly an official in the Thai Foreign Ministry. Panaspornprasit frames his work as a case study in interaction between a great power and a small state, emphasizing the role of influence in such relationships. In this sense, the book can be seen as a continuation of the theme of the series on the role of influence in superpower–client state interaction in the Middle East, edited some years ago by Al Rubinstein.
The organization is straightforward and chronological. The author begins by tracing the pre-1961 background to U.S.–Kuwaiti relations. These were initiated by American missionaries in Kuwait and then consisted of American private-sector involvement in oil production and development projects. Washington was unable to place a resident consul in Kuwait until 1952, largely because of resistance from Kuwait's protector Britain, which feared that it would set a precedent and make it difficult to refuse missions of other states.
Even after Kuwaiti independence, the U.S. role in Kuwait remained subdued because the country was considered by Washington to be within the British sphere of influence. Thus, Washington remained in the background during the 1961 Iraqi threat to Kuwait. The situation remained fundamentally unchanged, even after Britain announced and carried out its withdrawal from the Gulf from 1968 to 1971.
These opening chapters are followed by detailed examinations of bilateral relations during the Carter, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush administrations. The Carter administration's desire to improve relations with the emirate, which had adopted a nonaligned stance on independence, was hampered by serious differences over Arab–Israeli matters (accentuated by the large Palestinian population in Kuwait). In the end, “Kuwait proved to be less compliant than Washington may have hoped or even expected” (p. 87).
Matters were not much better during the Reagan administration. Kuwait refused a U.S. ambassador designate because of its displeasure over Washington's support for Israel, but by the end of the Reagan era, Kuwait had surprised everyone, including Washington, by requesting the reflagging of its oil tankers to protect them from Iranian attacks. The author contends that both sides exerted influence on the other during this period.
U.S.–Kuwaiti relations continued to be marked by elements of irritation after Bush père came into office, but Kuwait remained “a peripheral interest on the US national interest ranking list” (p. 136). The Iraqi invasion and subsequent liberation of Kuwait formed the catalyst that transformed the relationship into close cooperation. However, Panapornprasit also points out that the state of “co-operative influence” prevailing at this time permitted the “US government … to extract the preferred behaviour from the Kuwaiti government, because of a cold calculation of the benefits to be derived from the co-operation” (p. 137).
The study ends at that point, probably because the author's research seems to have been carried out in 1993–94 and not updated. It would have been fascinating to have the analysis updated through the second Palestinian intifada, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and the Israeli–Hizbullah war. Although Kuwait remains firmly within the American orbit, the strains in the relationship suggest that American influence continues to trump divergent Kuwaiti interests.
This is a competent, well-researched, and readable study. The author has thoroughly combed the literature and published primary material. In addition, research trips to both Kuwait and Washington have enabled interviews with policymakers and scholars in both countries. Additional details were gleaned from State Department records in the National Archives in Washington.
The author recognizes that the United States, apart from the 1990–91 crisis, has considered neighboring Saudi Arabia to be of greater importance than Kuwait, thus reducing relations with Kuwait to the periphery of regional ties. In addition, U.S. policy toward Kuwait has usually been lumped into a more general policy regarding all five of the smaller Gulf Cooperation Council members. This makes focusing on the particular thread of influence in U.S.–Kuwaiti relations that much more difficult to do.
In addition, the author's effort to portray the book as a case study in great power–small state relations and particularly in the role of influence in such a relationship is undercut by a lack of explicit discussion of the relevance of the U.S.–Kuwaiti example to such an investigation. Only in the final paragraph of the book does Panapornprasit explicitly tackle the key question that he posed at the beginning of the book: “under what circumstances is a small state like Kuwait able to influence a great power like the United States?” (p. 2). His answer is that, rather than following the conventional model of the great power exercising unidirectional influence on the small state, Kuwait has exercised a degree of influence in the relationship and “has often risen above its expected ‘station’ in the international order” (p. 143).
