Every so often a book comes along in the academic world that is truly refreshing in the sense that the author makes a good case for his ideas and does so without any political ideology or political correctness lurking in the background. Alan Lawson's book, A Commonwealth of Hope: The New Deal Response to Crisis, is one of those rare books. Without attempting to bully the reader into accepting his political inclinations nor desirous of impressing everyone with his knowledge of what can and cannot be said today, Lawson simply writes a good historical study of the New Deal. His ideas are straightforward, his evidence is clear, and his argument actually follows logically throughout the narrative.
According to Alan Lawson, the New Dealers developed remedies for the Great Depression based on what they had grown up with in their education and political training, whether it was the muckrakers, T. Veblen, or industrialism and all that it entailed. The New Dealers, especially Franklin D. Roosevelt, were latter day progressives who believed that the Great Depression gave them a chance to revive the old “cooperative commonwealth idea” that had been around in American history since the colonial period. More than that, the author believes that the New Deal became the most comprehensive reform movement in American history and the one that represented the culmination of progressivism. Simply put, Lawson argues that Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal sought to champion and protect the individual, using the federal government as a means to do so.
Demonstrating that the 1920s were the prelude to the greatest economic crisis in world history and showing how the Harding-Coolidge normalcy programs laid the foundation for this world disaster, Lawson portrays Herbert Hoover as one who “embodied classic 19th century Whig attitudes ….” Roosevelt, on the other hand, despite his being a contemporary of Hoover, grew up with a sense of mission and a vision of progressive reform. It certainly did not hurt to have a wife such as Eleanor who also shared these views. Being very pragmatic, Franklin Roosevelt believed in a cooperative commonwealth, progress, and the need for the federal government to assume more responsibility in the economy and to protect American values and beliefs. As early as his gubernatorial administration in New York, Roosevelt had shown what he believed in and what he would do as president.
After his landside victory in 1932, Roosevelt and his Brains Trust (particularly Rexford Tugwell) went forward in proposing, developing, and implementing a planning approach to the Great Depression. Lawson argues forcibly that the New Deal demonstrated its commitment to these goals in the National Recovery Administration, the Wagner Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and a variety of other New Deal programs. Even the Rooseveltian relief programs espoused the cooperative commonwealth theme and a strong commitment to planning. Despite the political and judicial opposition that he consistently faced, Roosevelt never gave up his dream.
By 1937–1938, Lawson argues that the ideas proposed by John M. Keynes were a perfect fit for the New Deal and its goals. The same held true for labor unions, the sit-down strikes of the late 1930s, and the international crisis and the New Deal's response to it. In the end, the New Deal's programs continued on, and their remnants can still be seen clearly in today's political environment. Whereas World War II may have accelerated what the New Deal was doing to bring America out of the Depression, it is Lawson's contention that the New Deal worked and that Franklin Roosevelt's dream of a cooperative commonwealth lived on.
In assessing Lawson's A Commonwealth of Hope, there is no question that this is a good, solid piece of historical research. Lawson read widely in the primary documents collections, investigated autobiographies and memoirs of everyone who did one, and exhausted any secondary materials that might have had any relevance to his interests. In addition to the exhaustive research, the author does a fine job in his written presentation and shows convincingly that he can support his case. There are a few shortcomings, however. Two of the chapters do not flow very well in the narrative, specifically his chapter on “Revival of Spirit” and his analysis of the “International Climax.” His reliance on Rexford G. Tugwell, while understandable, goes too far sometimes in that he gives Tugwell too much influence in the New Deal and too much credit in terms of how far he (Tugwell) had developed his own ideas on planning. Nevertheless, these are relatively minor points. In the end, Lawson has written a solid work on the New Deal. One hopes that this work will not only revive historical discussion of what the New Deal did accomplish, but also stimulate a new wave of studies on a period in American history that was of the utmost importance and had a most profound effect on American life. To Alan Lawson, New Deal historians owe a definite debt of gratitude.
