The title, Squandered Opportunity, encapsulates this book's entire premise. Without turning a page, Thomas Juneau's unequivocal conclusion in relation to Iran's foreign policy “performance” is spelled out. The problem with such a title is that the author's determinism robs the reader of the prospect of finding nuance and balance in what she/he is about to read. This is the holy grail of scholarly analysis—and it has been particularly absent in scholarship on contemporary Iranian politics. During the George W. Bush years, with the saber-rattling and the sanctions regime, the study of Iran sank into a cynical quagmire of presumptive, think-tank-grade material that was largely agenda-driven. It was an almost orthodox discourse that became less popular with the moderate president, Hassan Rouhani's ascent to power and the subsequent watershed nuclear deal. Interspersed in this sensationalist literature was a steadily growing oeuvre of literature, debunking myths on Iran in a theoretically-rich, analytically robust, and often critical manner.
This book does not lie entirely in this out-dated body of work. Its redeeming quality is the survey of classical international relations (IR) literature (inter alia, E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, John Mearshimer, Kenneth Waltz), with a focus on the foundations of neoclassical realism, under which Juneau painstakingly attempts to subsume Iran. This comes at the cost of an increasingly abstract analysis (one could also lump North Korea or Russia under the rubric of Juneau's arguments). For example, in the first chapter, Neoclassical Realism, from page 17 to 31, there is no mention of Iran; and in the second chapter, From Power to Foreign Policy, there is no reference to Iran from page 33 to 44. Juneau could have interwoven Iran into the discussion to avoid presenting the chapters as a literature review. His theoretical discussion would have benefitted from a brief regional historiography at the very least, or some reference to critical IR theory/post-colonial critique at the very best.
The book also suffers from unsubstantiated claims. That Iran's foreign policy performance has been “suboptimal” is repeated throughout the entire book. Inaccuracies abound: for example, “[Iran] wants to join the nuclear club” (11), or “Iran's actions, moreover, have led to negative consequences: its rejectionism, in particular, has contributed significantly to its isolation” (10). I ask whether Juneau missed the advent of the nuclear deal or reformist president, Mohammad Khatami's entire era of the “Dialogue of Civilisations” (1997-2005) in which he offered an olive branch to the West, in five of the years that the serve as the books periodization (2001-9). Incidentally, Juneau does not provide a rationale for the book's periodization, although he does state that Iran faced a favorable environment following the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.
As a university press publication, this book woefully lacks breadth. In chapter 4, Domestic Pathologies, the author does not present essential background information on Iran's century-long quest for democracy or its historical grievances—in particular, the American-supported coup toppling democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. Nor does he discuss the era between 1953 and 1979 during which American-backed Mohammad Reza Shah ruled as a dictator and how that left an indelible imprint on the nation's psyche. Nor does he mention US regime change efforts from 1979 to present day. He also fails to account for the subtle shifts in Iran's foreign policy behavior over the years (for example, the discarding of Pan-Islamism in the early post-revolutionary years, Khatami's voluntary suspension of nuclear enrichment in 2002, or Iran's indirect collaboration with the US in the war on terrorism). Juneau does not explain how Iran's revolutionary discourse has been shaped nor does he explain the drivers behind Iran's strategic preferences—beyond soundbites such as “Iran wants to limit US influence” and the like. If Juneau did cover these key vectors, Iran's foreign policy would have to be gauged differently, in which case it would not fit so neatly within the framework of neoclassical realism, as Juneau asserts.
Instead, the book is premised on old myths. For example, chapter 7, Iran's Nuclear Program is built on the unreferenced, opening sentence, “In 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed that Iran was more advanced with its covert nuclear program that had been previously assumed” (169). Then on page 172, Juneau specifies the opposition group as the “Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK),” which was listed as a terrorist group. This is disappointing for a university press publication. With the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015, the narrative that Tehran is pursuing a weaponization program is outdated. Note, that the breakthrough interim deal was signed in November 2013, most likely before the book went to press.
One cannot help but ask, what is Juneau's overarching objective in writing this book? The quest to desperately pigeon-hole Iran within a theoretical paradigm? If so, then why solely theory that is crafted by West-based scholars? If Fareed Zakaria (whose expertise is US foreign policy) is repeatedly referenced, then why is there no mention of the works of the late Fred Halliday whose area of concentration was the region under analysis? That brings us to another major weakness. Conspicuously absent in the book is literature on Iranian/Middle Eastern politics and international relations (for example, Anoushirvan Ehteshami, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, and Raymond Hinnebusch). IR theory as a strictly Anglo-American social science has long been discarded in Middle East studies as a rusty and outdated toolbox. A host of post-Western IR scholars, such as Branwen Gruffy Jones have come to the fore, offering a fresh and balanced corpus of knowledge. No such scholar is mentioned.
This is not to say that Juneau does not exhibit analytical rigor. His work merits praise in its meticulous presentation of hypothetical models (12–13), which he revisits in the later stages of the book. However, in the end, these hypotheses serve merely as a checklist for the problematic conclusions Juneau has made throughout the book. Thus, what could have been the author's strength is ultimately manifested as a weakness. Juneau would have been better off moving beyond exhausted categories and labels of the past and using his analytical acumen more daringly in uncovering the limitations of IR theory in deciphering Iran's foreign policy.
