Willy Wo-Lap Lam outlines the divergence in China between two different dreams of the future, what fears are driving this divergence, and the consequences of these two visions on the world order. Lam mostly examines these questions within China, but also engages with how these differences in China impact the world, with the last question regarding a new world order.

Lam outlines the two governance dreams fighting for dominance in China, namely the dream of gradual liberalization that dominated Chinese politics over the last two decades, and Xi Jinping's dream of Party authority. He argues that Xi's vision is increasingly dominant, and that this shift is driven by fears of two sources of mobilization. First, that domestic groups will link with foreign entities, and second, increasing domestic mobilization across space, citizens and issues. These fears have caused Xi to add more controls to civil society and to develop an AI-enabled surveillance state. Although these are creating a “prolonged winter,” Lam sees opportunities in the future due to a lack of elite unity. He argues that many liberal elites want to continue the pre-Xi slow liberalization process in both politics and economy.

Internationally this domestic divergence leads to two different visions of a new world order. There is something of a cottage industry developing using Thucydides and power transition theory to predict that the rise of China will provoke conflict with the US. However, Lam argues that this focus on power differential misses the more important shift in world view – the goal is not simply to take over the existing world order, but to fundamentally change it. Lam uses a quotation from Admiral Philip Davidson to describe this divergence as more than just a power differential: “those who believe this is reflective of an intensifying competition between an established power in the United States and a rising power in China are not seeing the whole picture. … Rather, I believe we are facing something even more serious: a fundamental divergence in values that leads to two incompatible visions of the future” (p. 198).

Lam is both pessimistic about the possibility of returning to the liberalizing authoritarianism path before Xi Jinping, and optimistic about the ability of civil society and elite actors to continue to pressure and advocate for change. Lam argues that Xi is facing unprecedented challenges to the two main sources of CCP legitimacy – nationalism and economic growth – that will hinder his ability to achieve this domestic and international vision for China (p. 198). Many elites question his aggressive stance toward the US and neighbouring maritime countries, and view trade sanctions that resulted from inept handling of the US as undermining continued economic growth. In this way, domestic elites, civil society actors, and international forces hostile to Xi's shift toward hard authoritarianism have the potential to pressure the CCP and perhaps even halt this shift.

This book offers a good overview of the differing visions for China's future and of the fears driving this divergence. However, I would argue that Xi's vision for China does not entirely seem to be fear-based, but also predicated on his elitist conception of good governance. Based on Xi Jinping's discussions of top-level design principles and governance, he seems to believe that the best governing system is the one that has the “best” people at the top who make decisions that are faithfully carried out by a Weberian bureaucratic “iron cage.” Thus, the shift toward a more authoritarian system seems to be driven both by fears of the CCP losing political control, but also by the concept that a strong, hierarchal system is best positioned to govern modern China.

Although Lam predicts that Xi's vision will face pressure from liberal elites, civil society and international actors such as the US, this book unfortunately was published before the outbreak of COVID-19, so readers can only speculate as to whether these events will help or hinder Xi Jinping. Potentially, the mishandling of donations and medical supplies by the Chinese Red Cross and information suppression by local officials might strengthen elite disunity and motivate civil society to continue efforts to provide grassroots governance models. In fact, a survey of 5,000 citizens done before and after the outbreak of COVID-19 finds that citizens now think that the government needs the help of civil society during disasters (see “Not everyone in China thought the government could handle the coronavirus,” Washington Post, 17 April 2020). Whether this pressure will serve to hinder the progress toward more authoritarianism remains to be seen, as it could also increase Xi Jinping's fears and trigger more investment in the AI-enabled surveillance state. Overall, this book offers an interesting bridge between diverging domestic visions and international consequences that is both pragmatic and optimistic, and is equally accessible for scholars, students and those interested in a changing China.