I am gratified that those who responded to my essay were prompted to formulate thoughts of their own. I appreciate the contributions, and I have no significant disagreement with the comments.
Although Robert Keohane takes me to task for not dealing with issues such as how war affects politics and for not discussing the work of internationalists and comparativists, this was neither the purpose nor purview of my essay. Distinguishing subfield reactions to perestroika would, however, be an important element of any full analysis of the movement.
Kristen Monroe is quite correct in emphasizing the many professional and disciplinary changes effected by perestroika, and I believe that these changes were salutary and responsive to growing concerns within the field. My argument was that perestroika was limited by its lack of historical perspective and particularly by a failure to recognize the extent to which it was replaying themes from the 1960s but still assuming that methodological pluralism and ecumenism were an adequate answer to problems such as the relationship between political science and politics.
David Laitin’s provocative essay claims that the difference between the political contexts of the 1960s and the beginning of the twenty-first century indicates a need, at the present time, to adopt what Max Weber claimed was an ethic of responsibility rather than pursuing an ethic of conviction or ultimate ends. For Weber, these were, however, not so much alternatives as complementary elements of a properly conceived vocation of politics. If one assumes that this ethical balance also applies to the vocation of studying politics, one might reasonably be skeptical about whether the contemporary political context indicates that the discipline should simply settle down to the “slow boring of hard boards,” even though that might well be the place to start.
James Farr reminds us that part of what inspired the creation of political science as both a discipline and profession was a commitment to civic education. Farr has examined the history of this vision, including both its past aspirations and deficiencies, and it would seem that it might be propitious to consider once again how political science pedagogy might offer the possibility for a connection to political life as well as a way to pursue a democratic science of politics. Thinking about the role of civic education also might prompt us to remember that individuals as ideologically diverse as John Burgess and John Dewey recognized that democracy requires a measure of unity among democratic citizens, which goes beyond the pluralist image of an underlying consensus about the rules of the game.
I agree with Sanford Schram that the concerns of perestroika were laudable and that the discipline is better off after perestroika, but despite some affinities and shared sentiments between perestroika and Schram’s vision of “making political science matter,” I am not convinced that these involve the same spirit and strategy. The concern with making political science matter seems to me to more closely reflect the Progressive belief of the founders of the American Political Science Association that political scientists can significantly intervene in the public arena and enhance the quality of political judgment and that it is possible to join scientific investigation to democratic purpose.
While I am sympathetic to Anne Norton’s concern about political science’s alienation from politics, I am less sanguine about her claim that political theory has remained a redemptive beacon. It may be instructive that four decades after Sheldon Wolin proposed the “vocation” of political theory as an antidote to the apolitical “methodism” of mainstream political science, he concluded that we were now faced with a condition of “overtheoretization” and “multiplicity” that requires an “invocation” of what has been lost. He worried that the “proliferation” of theory reflected the disintegration of the political itself and that the vocation was in danger of losing touch with the “‘real’ political world,” and that it might “lapse into dilettantism” or “harden into professionalism” and become an array of diverse “postpolitical” perspectives. I am also sympathetic to Norton’s claim, like that of Laitin, that maybe we could find a new unity of purpose in the “slow drilling of hard boards” that serious study of politics requires. Although Norton believes, maybe quite correctly, that our problems are in part the legacy of Weber’s distinction between facts and values, it is important to remember that Weber’s argument, like those of others involved in the origins of the modern social sciences, was that it was necessary to separate facts and values in order to get them back together on a proper footing and that the authority of science was the answer. The tragedy was that along the way, as Easton had noted in 1969, political scientists had begun to forget why they were pursuing the authority of science. It would, parenthetically, be interesting to know who would exemplify the “scholar-activist” for whom Norton has “nothing but contempt.”
One lesson we might derive from reflecting on the perestroika controversy is how it once again illustrated the distorting character of the categories in which some of the debates in the field still tend to be cast. They remain mired in a tired and obsolescent discourse about such things as positivist and scientific approaches versus qualitative and interpretive studies. We might have learned by now that there is no such thing as a positivist approach to inquiry and that science cannot simply be identified with an attribute such as quantification. Positivism is a largely discredited philosophical argument about the nature of scientific explanation, and even if it were not discredited, the philosophy of science is not the foundation of scientific inquiry. Similarly, interpretation is not a method. There are various philosophical accounts of interpretation, but all political inquiry, from rational choice analysis to history, is interpretive. While natural facts are specified and identified in terms of the theories of natural science, social inquiry is directed toward discursively and theoretically autonomous phenomena. We can, and should, argue about what is the best approach to interpretation, and this is where the issue of pluralism is relevant. In choosing a language of interpretation and representation, it is dangerous, as Weber emphasized, to limit inquiry to one ideal-type. It is necessary to formulate models that are adapted to the historical and cultural particularities under investigation.
A problem with the contemporary ethic of pluralism in inquiry is, however, that just as in the case of its manifestation in post-behavioralism, it often tends to suppress critical discussion and to divert attention away from basic theoretical issues about the nature of politics and political inquiry. Without pluralism, there would be a lack of contestation and progress, but it is mistake, in both science and politics, to assume that the existence of pluralism indicates a self-correcting mechanism. To criticize pluralism, in either politics or the study of politics, is not to endorse its opposite but only to recognize its limitations.
