Revolutions in semiconductor device miniaturization, bioelectronics, and applied neural control technologies are enabling scientists to create machine-assisted minds, science fiction's “cyborgs.” In a paper published in 1999,1
McGee EM, Maguire GQ. Implantable brain chip? Time for debate. Hastings Center Report 1999;29(1):7–13.
Advances
Presently, pacemaker-like brain implants help Parkinson's patients and those with essential tremors.2
Ditlea S. Cyborgs of New York. The Daily News 2004 Jun 8:1.
Vince G. Brain “Pacemaker” has long-term effects on depression. New Scientist 2001;10(5). Available from: http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=1665. Accessed January 29, 2005.
Study of an implantable functional neuromuscular stimulation system for patients with spinal cord injuries. ClinicalTrials.gov Available from: http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/show/NCT00004445. Accessed January 29, 2005.
Headlam B. The mind that moves objects. The New York Times Magazine 2000 Jun 11:63–4.
Artificial vision system for the blind announced by the Dobelle Institute. Press Release. Science Daily http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases[setmn ]2000[setmn ]01[setmn ]000118065202.htm. Accessed January 15, 2001.
Port O. Artificial eyes, turbine hearts. Business Week Online, March 20, 2000. Available at: http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_12/b3673025.htm. Accessed March 5, 2007.
Initial work on linking the brain directly with both local and remote manipulators has been demonstrated by neuroscientists at Duke University, who trained a monkey to control a mechanical arm just by thinking.8
Lemonick M. Robo-monkey's reward. Time 2003 October 27:45–7.
Barker A. Approval sought to test brain implant [in humans]. Available at: http://www.bio.net/bionet/mm/neur-sci/2003-November/055874.html. Accessed March 5, 2007.
Cyberkinetics. Available at: http://www.cyberkineticsinc.com/content/index.jsp. Accessed May 29, 2005.
Hooper S. Brain chip offers hope for paralyzed. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/10/20/explorers.braingate. Accessed January 4, 2005.
Extension of the human senses group. Available at: http://ic.arc.nasa.gov/projects/ne/ehs.html. Accessed February 10, 2004.
Zimmer C. Mind over machine. Popular Science 2004;Feb. Available at: http://www.popsci.com/popsci/medicine/59b5c4522fa84010vgnvcm1000004eecbccdrcrd/4.html. Accessed March 5, 2007.
Efforts to decode the information processing system that is the brain were jump started by the discovery of Miguel Nicolelis and John Chapin that electrodes with flexible tips did not damage the brain and that enough information to recognize commands could be produced by decoding only a small number of the neurons in a brain.14
See note 13, Zimmer 2004.
Graham-Rowe D. The first brain prosthesis—an artificial hippocampus—is in development. New Scientist 2003;19, Mar 12. Available at: http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn3488. Accessed May 2004.
Researchers at Caltech have recently succeeded in using implanted electrodes to detect activity in monkeys' “parietal reach region,” where higher-level thoughts such as “get the key and use it” are generated.16
Graham-Rowe D. Brain implants “read” monkey minds. New Scientist 2004 Jul 8. Available at: http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn6127. Accessed August 10, 2004.
Begley S. Prosthetics operated by brain activity move closer to reality. The Wall Street Journal Science Journal 2004 Jul 9:B1.
Fitzpatrick T. Human subjects play mind games. Available at: http://news-info.wustl.edu/tips/page/normal/911.html. Accessed March 5, 2007.
Therapy/Enhancement
A distinction, the therapy/enhancement distinction, is commonly made between interventions that are therapeutic in their intent, used to treat disease or disability, and interventions to enhance or improve on normal species function or to bestow entirely new capacities, nonhealth related improvements—the therapy/enhancement distinction.19
Parens E. Is better always good? The enhancement project. In: Parens E, ed. Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 1998:1–28.
Flynn Effect. In: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flynn_effect. Accessed April 17, 2005.
Used for therapy, implantable brain chips are seemingly noncontroversial, enabling those who are paralyzed or naturally less cognitively endowed to achieve on a more equitable level. The issues that arise with therapeutic use of implanted brain chips primarily involve questions of equity, access, and the costs of implementing this technology. However, these concerns will be complicated by the technology's ability to initiate a constantly changing standard of normalcy. This will be made all the more difficult to restrain, as the derivative of change will be positive—thus providing strong feedback leading to increasingly greater expectations.
More problematical technical, ethical, and social questions are raised by this technology's potential for enhancement and control of humans. Brain implants used to provide vision to the blind are seen as highly desirable devices. Extending their use to provide night vision, X-ray vision, and long-range zoom capacities to the normally sighted raises considerably different issues. Enhancement in and of itself is not necessarily objectionable; vaccines, in vitro fertilization, breast enhancement surgery, and Viagra (used as a recreational agent, rather than to alleviate erectile dysfunction) are all instances of readily accepted and widely sought enhancement technologies. However, brain–machine interfaces will put new forms of stress on privacy, autonomy, and justice, and more importantly, on what it means to be human. Brain–machine interfaces will enable humans to be constantly logged onto the Internet, and this augmented human–system interaction can assist not only those with failing memory, but might even bestow fluency in a new language, enable “recognition” of previously unmet individuals, and provide nearly instantaneous access to encyclopedic databases. It promises to change the capacities of humans to such a degree that they become fundamentally different. Humanity itself, at least those (former) members of Homo sapiens who have access to the technology, will be substantially different.
Ethical Issues
The presence of an interface also raises issues of privacy and autonomy. Nonimplanted technologies are already being used to track children and those with dementia.21
GPS personal locator for children. Available at http://www.childlocator.com. Accessed March 5, 2007.
Digital Angel Corporation. Available at: http://www.digitalangelcorp.com. Accessed on March 5, 2007; Singer G. Study to look at planting identification chips in dementia patients. South Florida Sun-Sentinel February 23, 2007, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/local/sfl-zchip23feb23,0,139269.story?coll=sfla-business-headlines. Accessed March 5, 2007.
Chapin JK, Moxon KA, Markowitz RS, Nicolelis MAL. Real-time control of a robot arm using simultaneously recorded neurons in the motor cortex. Nature Neuroscience 1999;2:664–70.
See note 17, Begley 2004:B1.
Brain Chips and Cloning
Among the most complex of the ethical uncertainties is that raised by the prospect of combining brain chips and cloning. Cloning involves the asexual reproduction of genetically identical individuals. If the nuclear DNA from a woman were put into her own egg, the resulting child would be a complete replication of the woman.25
Elliot D. Uniqueness, individuality, and human cloning. Journal of Applied Philosophy 1998;15(3):218.
Insofar as the self is identified with a particular body, the clone duplicates the self. Cloning the self would ensure a certain type of immortality—genetic. However, insofar as the self is other than the genetic body, fully replicating the self requires more than biological identity. In 30 years, it may be possible to store the data representing all of a human being's sensory experiences in a storage device implanted in the body. These data could be collected by biological probes receiving electrical impulses and would enable a user to recreate experiences or even to transfer (transplant) memories from one brain to another. Another technique for achieving this goal is to implant a chip behind the eye in order to record all of a person's thoughts, sensations, and experiences. British Telecom's Artificial Life Team is working on this device, called Soul Catcher 2025, as it is estimated that it will be ready for use in 2025. Dr. Winter's claim is that “by combining this information with a record of the person's genes, we could recreate a person physically, emotionally and spiritually.”26
This'll chip away at the cost of storage for personal archives, but the arrangement and description could be a bit time-consuming. Archives Society of Alberta 1996;16(2). Available at: www.archivesalberta.org/vol16_2/brain.htm. Accessed January 7, 2005.
Gemmel J, Bell G, Lueder R, Drucker S, Wong C. My life bits: Fulfilling the memex vision. Microsoft Research. Available at: http://research.microsoft.com/∼jgemmell/pubs/MyLifeBitsMM02.pdf. Accessed January 7, 2005.
Schachtman N. Pentagon kills lifelog project. Wired News Feb 4, 2004. Available at: http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,62158,00.html. Accessed March 5, 2007.
It is an open question whether brain–machine interface technology will in the near future enable uploading our memories to a chip. Some researchers argue that as we develop capacities to scan the brain, research that is ongoing, we will learn to scan the brain in order to download it, thus not even needing to store the raw data as it is generated. It is theoretically possible that we will map the locations and interconnections of neurons and synapses and eventually be able to transfer an analog of the brain and its memory to a digital-analog computer.29
Kurzweil R. The coming merging of mind and machine. In: Fritz S, ed. Understanding Artificial Intelligence. New York: Warner Books; 2002:90–9.
McCullag D, Kurzweil R. Rooting for the machine. Wired News 2000 Nov 3. Available at: http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,39967,00.html. Accessed January 31, 2005.
Pearson I. The future of human evolution. Available at: www.bt.com/sphere/insights/pearson/human_evolution.htm. Accessed January 28, 2005.
In this eventuality, psychological continuity of personal identity could be immortalized in a series of cloned selves, bestowing immortality, and raising anew philosophical questions regarding personal identity. If all that is required for the persistence of personal identity is the sustaining of memory and physical continuity,32
Olson ET. Personal identity. In: Zalta EN, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2002 ed.), Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/identity-personal/. Accessed April 17, 2005.
Brock DW. Human cloning and our sense of self. Science 2002;296:314–7.
A multitude of other questions emerge when contemplating this eventuality. When would the chip be implanted? Or enabled? What would it be like to be an already aware individual with an ongoing history imprisoned in a child's body? Would the cloned, implanted entity feel like a unique person? Who would the clone be? These are similar to questions about brain transplants and personal identity considered in a dialogue between Derek Parfit and Godfrey Vesey in 1974, in which Parfit argued that there “isn't anything more to personal identity than what you call psychological continuity in a one-one case.”34
Parfit D, Vesey G. Brain transplants and personal identity: A dialogue. In: Burr J, Goldinger M, eds., Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; 2000:440.
The question “What is man?” has no definitive answer. Yet, mind is surely the most salient feature of Homo sapiens. Once memories can be transferred from one brain to another or perhaps even several others—even to a computer or other species—questions regarding personal identity, the nature of memory, and the meaning of memory will be even more insistent. Neuroscientists, who hold that the mind is essentially computational, that consciousness is an emergent property of complicated information patterns, are comfortable with the notion of uploading the mind to a chip. For they are essentially materialists or physicalists who posit mind as the result of physical processes and challenge the view of dualists who believe that mind is nonphysical, spiritual. Derek Parfit proposes that “on the Reductionist View, each person's existence just involves the existence of a brain and body, the doing of certain deeds, the thinking of certain thoughts, the occurrence of certain experiences, and so on.”35
Parfit D. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1986:211.
At the moment, human intelligence is superior to that of machines, at least in terms of general intelligence. But, as machines improve, they will successfully compete with humans and, given sufficient time, surpass humans. Several researchers in a variety of articles and books have projected the coming superiority of artificial intelligence.36
Bostrom N. When machines outsmart humans. Futures 2000;35–7:759–64. Available at: http://www.nickbostrom.com. Accessed March 6, 2007; Kurzweil, R. The Age of Intelligent Machines. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1990.
We are re-evolving artificial minds at ten million times the original speed of human evolution, exponentially growing robot complexity. Currently, a guppylike thousand MIPS and hundreds of megabytes of memory enable our robots to build dense, almost photorealistic 3D maps of their surroundings and navigate intelligently. Within three decades, fourth-generation universal robots with a humanlike 100 million MIPS will be able to abstract and generalize–perhaps replace us.37
Moravec R. Robots, Re-Evolving Mind. Kurzweil AI net. Available at: http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0145.html?m%3D3. Accessed March 5, 2007.
Based on the speed with which computers are gaining processing power, already existent input/output technologies, and the research potential for understanding the principles of operation of the human brain and copying its workings (either through computational neuroscience or emulating “the scanned brain on a computer by running a fine-grained simulation of its neural network”38
See note 36, Bostrom 2000.
See note 29, Kurzweil 2002:99.
Regulatory Procedures
Because of the enormous potential impact of cybernetics, this area of scientific development must be closely linked to ethical guidelines. Developments in cybernetics should be openly debated with accountability to the public, especially for investment of public funds. Advances that can impact society so intensely require public scrutiny. Procedures should be established for evaluating safety and efficacy and for consideration of the need for equitable distribution of the benefits of this new technology. Some call for outright bans, citing the “precautionary principle” on the development of technologies that have the potential to significantly change human nature. Using language that speaks of hubris, and the “giveness” of humanness, they challenge developments that would threaten the “dignity of the naturally human way of activity.”40
Kass L. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Regan Books; 2003:292.
Annas GJ. The man on the moon, immortality and other millennial myths: The prospects and perils of genetic engineering. Emory Law Journal 2000;49(3):778–80.
Now is the time to consider whether and, if so, how to regulate, rather than ban, the enhancement uses of this technology. Presently, before a medical device can be marketed in the United States it must meet the requirements of the Food and Drug Administration. Implantable brain chips would be listed as Class III devices because they are implanted and may present a potential risk of illness or injury. Clinical trials will be used to establish the efficacy of the device and its safety. As with the development of the Activa Dystonia Therapy System, which was approved in April of 2003 for treatment of a movement disorder, the expedited development of therapeutic uses of brain implants may proceed under a humanitarian device exemption process. The development of brain implant technology in the United States is, then, already subject to a layer of governmental scrutiny. Whether this scrutiny is adequate to the task of reviewing brain implants is questionable; even required postmarket safety reviews of devices are rarely done.42
Kerber R, Globe Staff. 22% of medical device follow-up studies left undone. The Boston Globe 2004 Dec. 24.
Such deliberation is all the more significant because implantable brain chips can be a positive and transformative step in the evolution of human. The differences in the kinds of humans this future will create need national and international consideration. Although the United States often approaches new technological developments from within an optimistic, ameliorist framework that privileges capitalist innovation and scientific freedom, many areas with social impact are regulated. Unfettered and unregulated scientific activity is a myth; existing regulations govern research on humans, on active infectious agents such as smallpox and Ebola, encryption software, and even research on marijuana.43
Regulations do not do away with violations any more than laws against murder eliminate murder.
Controls need to be pursued on the national and international levels, with self-regulation by the scientific community leading the way. Self-regulation by those involved in brain implant technology should be pursued, in much the way that the Asilomar meeting created guidelines for recombinant DNA research.44
Barinaga M. Asilomar revisited: Lessons for today? Science 2003;287(5458):1584–5. Available at: http://www.biotech-info.net/asilomar_revisited.html. Accessed February 3, 2005.
Fredrickson DS. The Recombinant DNA Controversy: A Memoir. Washington, DC: American Society for Microbiology Press; 2001.
However, inasmuch as the complexity of enhancement techniques makes providing general policy challenging, a new regulatory body needs to be created to deal with the myriad of knotty issues. Such an agency could provide for a public review process at the national level to facilitate the consideration of risk and benefit. In regard to brain implants, issues of safety, privacy and autonomy, and the societal and transformative effects of uploading memories and implanting in third parties are all concerns that need extensive consideration.
Principles and Standards for Adoption
A discussion of standards for enhancement technologies and drugs is long overdue. A principle, which needs to be considered for possible adoption, is that the risk/benefit ratio applied in evaluating the safety and effectiveness of enhancement techniques should be higher than that required for therapeutic interventions. Criterion for the use of this technology in the normal individual for purposes of enhancement should be placed at a higher level than the norms for review of devices to heal the sick. Thus, concerns about risks of infection and brain damage are more pressing when the individual is healthy. In the deliberations concerning brain chips, this safety assessment will be complicated by the fact that researchers have demonstrated that, for the monkeys that have been trained to control robot arms, the brain itself actually changes, with more neurons emerging so that “the brain is assimilating the robot. It's creating a representation of it in different areas of the motor cortex.”46
See note 13, Zimmer 2004.
Dertougos M. Brain implants: A lousy idea. Technology Review Jul–Aug 1999;102(4).
Likely and reasonable initial standards would ensure that enhancement uses of interface technology include provisions for (1) reversibility in the event of adverse events, (2) informed consent, and (3) limited access for initial studies. The requirement of reversibility would guarantee that if unforeseen risks develop there is a possibility of avoiding permanent problems; it is not altogether clear that superior, even perfect memory, would be a good, nor is high intelligence always beneficial. The requirement of informed consent would restrict usage, for enhancement, to adults with decisional capacity. This provision would eliminate the risks that a clone could be precluded by brain chip implantation in early childhood from the development of personal individuality. Utilizing these principles and initially restricting implantation to a small and controlled group would secure time for evaluation of these technologies before widespread implementation. These requirements, although they may serve to secure the safety and autonomy of individuals, are insufficient to deal with more encompassing concerns, which include the relationship between these superhumans and the inferior species that is unenhanced. Nations and world societies have a stake in assessing the costs to society as a whole from the introduction of novel technologies. Fukuyama's concerns about a “future world in which … human homogeneity splinters … into competing human biological kinds,”48
Fukuyama F. Sensible restrictions, Reasononline. 2002. Available at: http://reason.com/debate/eh-debate 031902.shtml. Accessed August 10, 2004.
Nor are such national laws and regulation sufficient to effectively monitor and control technologies that will cross national boundaries. It is necessary and should be possible to create international regulatory bodies for biotechnology developments. As Amitai Etzioni has pointed out, many transnational authorities and structures already exist—the World Trade Organization, the Bank for International Settlements, the World Health Organization's new powers after SARS, and agreements on biodiversity and pollution.49
Etzioni A. From Empire to Community. A New Approach to International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2004.
The scenario envisioned in this paper's analysis where a clone is created and implanted with a brain chip containing all of a previous individual's thoughts and memories could be effectively regulated by national and international bans on human reproductive cloning. However, the effort to pass effective legislation does not appear promising. Presently in the United States, although there appears to be a scientific self-imposed ban and there is a ban on government-funded projects, there is no law outlawing human cloning. Of the 193 countries in the world, 26 have passed laws or moratoriums or have implicitly banned human cloning to replicate an individual.50
Policies on Human Reproductive Cloning and Germline Genetic Engineering. Available at: www.glphr.org/genetic/genetic.htm. Accessed February 6, 2005.
Pearson H. UN ditches cloning ban. news@nature.com. 2004. Available at: http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041122/pf/041122-2_pf.html. Accessed February 5, 2005.
The efforts to regulate this technology should begin and begin soon.
