I. Rome and the Allied Communities

The importance of the Italic allies to Roman warfare cannot be overstated, as they provided the res publica Romana with a recruitment base un-matched by any of its rivals. Earlier works have argued that the impressive manpower reservoir was created by continuous and systematic expansion, which refrained from immediate exploitation of defeated foes in favour of a long-term cumulative strategy.Footnote ⁵ This strategy integrated the recently conquered populations into the Roman military apparatus in order to acquire and exploit further resources from the periphery. Once established and operational, such a system might indeed have promoted integration and cohesion among its participants through the allocation and redistribution of land and plunder and could have been strengthened and extended to include further groups by its potentially indefinite use.Footnote ⁶ However, this explanation neglects the difficulties encountered in the initial genesis of such a system, since basically all the non-Roman troops – and also some ‘forcefully enfranchised’ units – had until recently been fighting against, and suffering from, the aggression of the very power now seeking to employ them. At best, the immediate mobilisation of recently conquered – and in themselves diverse and divided – foes was a risky business; at worst, the doubtful loyalty of such units could have proved disastrous on the battlefield.

Therefore, scepticism towards the immediate and rather abrupt initiation of a Romano-Italic alliance in the aftermath of the Latin War in 338 seems legitimate.Footnote ⁷ Apprehension about an early and frictionless employment of allied troops may be further substantiated by the description of the battle of Asculum in 279. Possibly drawing on the memoirs of Pyrrhus himself, both Dionysius and Frontinus describe an order of battle different from that of Polybius, in which we find the allied contingents regularly interspersed within the Roman line, instead of being concentrated on the army’s wings.Footnote ⁸ Similar inconsistencies and curious side-notes in the historiographical tradition also point to a complicated start to the relationship between Rome and its new ‘allies’, something which has been more or less obscured by the views of later authors on Italic integration.Footnote ⁹ It has been argued as well that the more systematic organisation of the allies, as described by Polybius, only took shape in the course of the Second Punic War.Footnote ¹⁰ Consequently, the deployment at Asculum, as Dionysius and Frontinus describe it, can be plausibly seen as a fortunate snapshot capturing an intermediate and still evolving stage of the Romano-Italic army at a comparatively late date and suggesting that there was a much longer process of evolution.

II.1 The Aftermath of the ‘Latin War’ and its Impact on Roman Politics

Any deliberation on the nature of the Roman alliance system must include the Latin War, which is actually a purely modern designation and one which obscures the fact that Rome confronted a heterogeneous coalition of its neighbours.Footnote ¹¹ Moreover, the campaigns of the years 341-338 were only the climax of a long-standing and increasingly contentious relationship, escalating in the fourth century after a period of mutual assistance, which is recalled in the tradition of the foedus Cassianum.Footnote ¹² The ferocity of this conflict has to be stressed due to the implications it has for the resulting peace settlement, which was not simply a solution to short-term differences, but instead fundamentally reshaped the power structures in Latium.Footnote ¹³ The importance of the final confrontation is highlighted by the many religious elements in the literary tradition – for example, the description of the war as a bellum pium, or the devotio of the consul P. Decius Mus in the decisive battle.Footnote ¹⁴ It is therefore not surprising that the victors should have also made quite an impression on politics in Rome. The consuls C. Maenius and L. Furius Camillus, who secured the final victory in 338, were honoured to an unprecedented and monumental degree, with equestrian statues in the Forum Romanum and with the decoration of the speaker’s stage of the Forum with the rams of captured Antiate ships, thereby giving the rostra its name. Both consuls were granted extraordinary honours, which were deeply inscribed in the monumental memory of the central political space of the Roman people.Footnote ¹⁵

It would be reasonable to assume that this huge symbolic recognition of military success would be accompanied by a growing dominance of military prestige and virtues in elite competition and the political arena in Rome. However, the public display of the consuls’ achievements does not seem to have resonated long with the citizens, since C. Maenius and L. Furius Camillus do not appear at all among the magisterial elite in the following years. Far more successful were the consuls of the preceding year (339), especially Q. Publilius Philo. This is all the more surprising, since Livy describes the consulship of Philo and his colleague, Ti. Aemilius Mamercinus, very unfavourably and in stark contrast to the heroic narrative of the Latin War, claiming that they concentrated more on their own political gain than on reducing the last Latin strongholds.Footnote ¹⁶ Their actions included the passage of the leges Publiliae Philonis, which allegedly targeted the aristocracy and met with stiff resistance.Footnote ¹⁷ Nevertheless, the two troublemakers managed to rise to even more eminent political positions in the years to come.Footnote ¹⁸

A closer look at these unlikely careers may shed light on the paramount topics in Roman politics in the 330s. Livy provides some details on the strategy of Publilius and Aemilius: they promised the plebs very generous land allotments in Latium, even though such distribution of conquered territory had already been approved in 340. It seems that the outcome of the war was fairly clear after the decisive victory of Decius and Manlius, which had shattered the enemy coalition and prompted a debate on how to proceed with the anticipated booty. Publilius and Aemilius went out of their way to satisfy the demands of the citizens, who, according to Livy, spurned the meagre allotments that had been promised to them the year before.Footnote ¹⁹ As there had been no major territorial gains since the establishment of the Pomptina and Publilia in 358, the desire for land assignations can be assumed to have been a major topic in Roman politics well before the actual conclusion of the war.Footnote ²⁰ Furthermore, it is quite striking that both the plebeian parvenu Publilius and the established patrician Aemilius developed parallel strategies in order to promote their political careers, apparently based on popular support and in opposition to a substantial part of their fellow nobles.Footnote ²¹ The Livian allegation, that Publilius and Aemilius acted seditiosis tribunatibus similem, is probably not far from the mark and indicates something of the increasing political role of the citizens in the electoral framework and in the legitimisation of the Roman elite’s hierarchy.Footnote ²² This seems to have caused a reinvention of political strategies in some of the elite’s circles and the emergence of a very competitive approach, focused on the immediate and individual exploitation of potential opportunities to gain electoral support, in order to monopolise the magistracies. This would have been all the more attractive and severe, if aristocrats lacked the prospect of exerting permanent political influence beyond the annual magistracies in the form of lifelong admission to the Senate. This, in turn, would imply an impaired capacity for long-term strategic planning (see below). Although only fragments of this process of realignment within the aristocracy can be perceived, it should nevertheless caution against over-schematisation of the political elite at that time.

II.2 Pacification withoutIntegration

Given that the situation was fraught with heightened potential for elite competition arising from the citizens’ demand for land distribution, it is, in my view, very unlikely that the interests and the integration of the conquered people of Latium, Latium Adiectum, and Campania were a top priority in Roman politics. The main interest almost certainly focused on the momentary chance to win the electorate by pandering to its wishes. This assumption is supported by the rather heavy-handed treatment of at least some of the defeated. At Velitrae the walls were razed, its senate deported, and the confiscated land was distributed among Roman citizens.Footnote ²³ Antium had a Roman colony imposed on it, while the original city seems to have been deliberately weakened, which created chaotic conditions.Footnote ²⁴ Tibur and Praeneste – the most powerful cities after Rome – lost part of their territory and received separate treaties that effectively isolated them from the remaining Latins. From 338 onwards, the term ‘Latin’ only applied to the former Latin colonies of Setia, Signia, Norba, Circeii, Ardea, Sutrium, and Nepet, which all got away without severe punishment. Tibur and Praeneste were effectively ‘de-Latinised’ and became civitates foederatae. Similarly, the citizens of Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, Pedum, and Tusculum were forcefully incorporated in the Roman citizen body, but unlikely as contented equals; the Tusculans, after all, had a history of repeated revolt.Footnote ²⁵ This decision was probably also due in part to geographical considerations, as the handling of Nomentum and Pedum served to isolate Tibur and Praeneste, while the other three acquisitions (Lanuvium, Aricia, and Tusculum) finally created a direct territorial connection to the citizen districts of the Pomptina and Publilia. In contrast, other communities received limited citizenship, namely civitas sine suffragio.Footnote ²⁶ Fundi, Formiae, Suessula, Capua, Cumae – and also Acerrae in 332 – received this dubious status (dubious because cities usually refused it, if they were given a choice).Footnote ²⁷

While the peoples of wider Latium and Campania were by no means treated as a monolithic bloc, it has to be noted that the system imposed on them was not overly complex. The one common element is the confiscation of land for Roman settlers, which clearly shows that this was a priority in contemporary Roman politics. With the notable exception of those communities that were incorporated into the Roman citizen body, the Roman reorganisation of the conquered territory was characterised by a surprising lack of profound change. The remaining ‘Latin’ colonies retained their status, which became a legal rather than an ethnic category and hence one defined by Rome. While these remaining communities of Latin status may have been granted greater autonomy, they were now geographically split up and collectively too weak to pose a danger to Roman rule, especially with the expulsion and isolation of Tibur and Praeneste from this group. Similarly, the enforced conferment of civitas sine suffragio did not entail a large-scale effort of reorganisation or integration, but simply imposed Roman jurisdiction over the communities concerned, ensuring their compliance without upsetting the political balance in Rome, as these new ‘citizens’ did not possess the right to vote in the political assemblies.

Apparently, Roman politics concentrated on mollifying the electorate and on implementing mechanisms and treaties which aimed more at controlling and isolating rather than integrating the different polities under Roman rule – a suggestion already advanced by Toynbee, who interpreted the Roman measures of 338 mainly as designed to prevent the resurgence of a dangerous coalition in wider Latium and Campania.Footnote ²⁸

II.3 Dominion without Order

The restructuring of the political landscape of Latium was thus largely dictated by Roman domestic interests, which can hardly have created an atmosphere of mutual cooperation. Concerning the situation of the communities now under Roman dominion, the events of the year 330 are instructive. In this year a certain Vitruvius Vaccus of Fundi raided the Latin towns of Setia, Norba, and Cora with troops from Fundi and Privernum.Footnote ²⁹ However, as soon as Roman forces reacted, Fundi immediately capitulated and was harshly punished, according to Claudius Quadrigarius.Footnote ³⁰ Privernum was besieged and captured the next year; its walls were razed and a garrison was installed, while Vaccus was taken to Rome and sentenced to death. Furthermore, Privernum’s senate was deported trans Tiberim and the confiscated land was distributed to Roman settlers. Although the evidence is slim, some traces of the incident must have survived in the urban memorial landscape, because a shrine was dedicated from the confiscated property of Vaccus on the Palatine to Semo Sangus, next to the temple of Quirinus, and Cicero could still identify the meadows of Vaccus on the Palatine, a lasting monument that reminded everyone of this act of treachery.Footnote ³¹

This episode provides some valuable information, as Fundi had apparently received citizenship without the right to vote at the conclusion of the Latin War.Footnote ³² Furthermore, a prominent member of its aristocracy had evidently moved to Rome and even owned some exclusive property on the Palatine, which suggests a close connection with the city.Footnote ³³ However, neither the limited citizenship nor the connection between the Roman and Volscian elites guaranteed a smooth coexistence, indicating that the status of the non-(or half-)naturalised people of wider Latium remained ambivalent even years after the end of the Latin War. The fact that the harsh treatment of Privernum after its capture coincided with the grant of civitas sine suffragio highlights the negative connotation of this special right. The whole episode suggests that there was significant tension involved in the pacification and integration of the peoples of Latium by Rome.

This problem seems to have remained unresolved even in regard to the forcefully enfranchised communities, since the year 323 saw the tribune of the plebs, M. Flavius, put forward a motion to kill all the male inhabitants of Tusculum and to sell all the women and children into slavery. It is noteworthy that no tribune of the plebs opposed this initiative. Although defeated, the motion did win the approval of the tribus Pollia, leading to a lasting enmity between its members and those Tusculans in the Papiria.Footnote ³⁴

Although the Tusculans were accused of having stirred up unrest among the Privernates and the Volscians in general, the modern consensus is that it was the election of the Tusculan noble L. Fulvius Curvus for the consulship in the same year that had triggered the violent proposal of M. Flavius, which aimed at interfering with the result by demonstrating the inferior status and background of the elected consul.Footnote ³⁵ The Fulvii were to become a prominent part of the Roman nobility, but the events of 323 show that no clear strategy or set of rules had been conceived, even after 15 years, to integrate the losers of the Latin War, regardless of the status conferred on them in its aftermath.Footnote ³⁶ What does become clear is that a process of negotiation was taking place within the Roman elite at that time, as some of its members were apparently advocating the integration of, and cooperation with, the newly enfranchised citizens and maybe even some non-Roman elites, while others opposed this move and were prepared to use ‘terror tactics’ to ensure the compliance of the recently conquered and to keep Roman politics exclusive.

The tensions surfacing in these two episodes – one of them well into the Second Samnite War – indicate that the Roman victory had not resulted in the establishment of an integrative or constructive system of alliances conducive to the levying of non-Roman troops. The two high-profile cases discussed here instead point to the res publica Romana struggling with the question of how to organise and allocate rights within the new Roman dominion.Footnote ³⁷

III.1 The Unintended Samnite War

The argument against swift military mobilisation and cooperation is also supported by a closer look at military action between 338 and the outbreak of the Second Samnite War, which does not conform to conventional wisdom concerning annual warfare and expansion.Footnote ³⁸ The ‘campaigns’ are almost exclusively located in the already subjugated Volscian territory and are accompanied by the first establishment of ‘Latin’ colonies under exclusive Roman supervision.Footnote ³⁹ Roman activities appear to be mainly defensive or ‘policing actions’, and this suggests a policy still focused on stabilising the gains of 338.Footnote ⁴⁰ The argument for this type of military action after the Latin War is further fortified by Grossmann’s meticulous analysis of the outbreak of the Samnite War in 327, in which he emphasises the account of Dionysius. Unlike Livy’s version, Rome was, according to Dionysius, at first only involved as a third party after its Campanian allies had been attacked.Footnote ⁴¹ Dionysius’ version also reports one consular army taking up a position among the Volscians in the Liris region, i.e. in territory under Roman control; there is no mention of an immediate attack upon Samnium, as there is in Livy.Footnote ⁴² Furthermore, both authors include intense diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully, which corresponds to the unspectacular settlement where the Samnite and Nolan troops were allowed to depart and Neapolis received a favourable treaty with Rome. Having rectified the situation in favour of their Campanian allies, the Roman war effort seems to have petered out. Salmon has convincingly argued that the reports of military successes by Livy for the next years are likely grossly exaggerated and that military operations probably assumed the character of petty border raiding.Footnote ⁴³

The bloodless episode of Neapolis suggests that Rome was anything but a belligerent aggressor.Footnote ⁴⁴ Apparently parts of the Roman elite and populace had no great interest in further military adventures, a theory arguably supported by Diodorus’ note on the year 317 that they had achieved nothing worthwhile to report in their ninth year of the war.Footnote ⁴⁵ Although he omits the disaster at the Caudine Forks, this reading of Diodorus’ entry remains valid, as the overall consequences of this defeat were negligible. Apart from the evacuation of Fregellae, the terms imposed were rather lenient and did not affect Roman citizens.Footnote ⁴⁶ The ready acceptance of the peace settlement again indicates the weak preference for continued warfare, especially if it did not directly impair Rome’s core territory.

The negligible effect of the Caudine Forks also became apparent in the Roman policy of the following years. One of Rome’s most puzzling actions was the establishment of the new tribus Oufentina and Falerna in 318. This is the only known instance where tribus were organised after a major military defeat; on top of that, they were established in the volatile Volscian ‘hot zone’ between Latium and northern Campania.Footnote ⁴⁷ The motivation for this move remains elusive, but it was a continuation of the Roman policy – of distributing the rich allotments within the dominion – that was established by the victory in the Latin War.

Annual warfare and schemes for further expansion do not seem, therefore, to have been a regular feature of Roman policy at this time. As a result, large-scale recruitment of additional non-Roman troops for military campaigns by Rome in the 330s and 320s is doubtful, as there was simply no need for them.Footnote ⁴⁸

III.2 Reverses, Rebellions, and Reforms

This situation was to change with the foundation of the new tribus which seems to have caused a major rebellion – possibly inspired by the recent military setbacks – among the Volsci, which Salmon believes to have been the precursor for reigniting hostilities with the Samnites in 316.Footnote ⁴⁹ The next year (315), the Samnites invaded the Liris valley and smashed a Roman force at Lautulae, near the pass of Tarracina.Footnote ⁵⁰ This defeat proved to be more serious than that of the Caudine Forks, since the Samnites advanced into Latium proper, ravaged the Roman citizen districts in the Pontine Region, and even reached as far as Ardea and destroyed it.Footnote ⁵¹ At the same time, Rome’s allies became restive: Roman settlers at Sora were massacred, the Aurunci rebelled, Capua wavered in its allegiance and Nuceria joined the Samnites. The regions outside Latium Vetus had thus violently broken free of Roman control.Footnote ⁵² The situation was aggravated further when the southern Etruscan city-states joined the fight in 312. Consequently, the military pressure on Rome should have built up past the breaking point. Contrary to expectations, however, the tide of war increasingly turned in Rome’s favour in the last decade of the century and in 304 the Samnites were the last opponents to sue for peace.Footnote ⁵³

This rapid recovery requires an explanation, especially since external invasion was made worse by internal revolts. As a result of the setbacks, the consular army seems to have been enlarged to two legions each – a reform generally connected to the law of 311, which granted the people the right to elect the majority of military tribunes.Footnote ⁵⁴ The increase in numbers can partly be explained by the expansion of the Roman citizen body in the fourth century and partly by the practice of increasing the numbers of light and medium infantry, hence including more soldiers from the middle and lower classes in exchange for greater political participation.Footnote ⁵⁵ In particular, the extension of the social base of men liable for military service clearly indicates that these military reforms should not be treated as isolated phenomena, but instead in the wider context of socio-political reforms at that time.

Viewed from this perspective, the literary tradition yields some interesting information on the political repercussions of military defeat. Most prominent among these are the quaestiones Maenianae. C. Maenius was made dictator quaestionibus exercendis in 314, with the task of investigating the rebellious elements of the communities under the Roman dominion.Footnote ⁵⁶ However, he eventually also accused leading Roman aristocrats, including Q. Publilius Philo, of having plotted to gain the highest offices against the interest of the state. Although it is reported that most of the accused went unpunished, the fasti consulares hint otherwise, as the composition of the magistrates shifts significantly; formerly prominent politicians like Q. Publilius Philo disappear, while long-absent and even hitherto unknown aristocrats gain prominence.Footnote ⁵⁷ Although it is not possible to recover the exact details of the changes that took place, it is obvious that some development must have caused this massive shift within the elite. The military setbacks and the resulting enquiries, along with legal procedures against prominent members of the established elite, would constitute a plausible background for such a change and the corresponding upgrading of the Senate to a central institution conferring lifelong membership to accommodate the different interests.Footnote ⁵⁸ The literary tradition also points in this direction, as the emergence of these ‘new men’ was accompanied by a number of episodes involving conflict between them and the established families.Footnote ⁵⁹ These episodes are usually depicted as conflicts between the patricians and the plebs by later republican authors, which may be anachronistic since there had been little trouble in acknowledging powerful plebeian politicians like Q. Publilius Philo, M. Popilius Laenas, or C. Marcius Rutilus. Cels-Saint-Hilaire has convincingly argued that it was instead the recent imposition of citizenship on non-Roman peoples which caused such resentment.Footnote ⁶⁰ Furthermore, both aspects – the growing importance of the Senate and the decline of hitherto powerful aristocrats in favour of ‘new men’ – are intensely memorialised in the political career of Appius Claudius Caecus, which left a strong impression on the Roman collective memory.Footnote ⁶¹ This intense commemoration is presumably connected with the fact that the citizen body experienced a number of profound and lasting reforms. These changes were accompanied by, and connected with, massive construction projects within the city of Rome and its hinterland. The political implications are clearly indicated by the renovation and improvement of the Forum Romanum and its political centre, the Comitium.Footnote ⁶² The conscious restructuring of the epicentre of Roman politics at a time when the body politic experienced a phase of reorganisation can hardly have been a coincidence. The support, or at least acquiescence, of the populus for the reforms was also secured by heavy investment in the infrastructure of the city of Rome and the tribus (most prominently the Aqua and Via Appia).Footnote ⁶³

It is difficult to determine the exact nature of the changes occurring in Roman society at this time; however, a careful reading of the evidence makes it abundantly clear that a major political and military upheaval took place. This realignment is unlikely to have been triggered by a peerless and successful policy, but rather by failure and widespread discontent. I suggest, therefore, that the dire military situation had served to discredit the hitherto dominant political groups, allowing for the establishment of a more consensual and joint means of control in the form of a strengthened Senate.Footnote ⁶⁴ The ‘new blood’ appearing in the ranks of this reorganised elite indicates that it also recruited some of its members from newly enfranchised communities and from those of partial citizenship.Footnote ⁶⁵ The setbacks and losses inflicted by the Samnite advance and its repercussions among the peoples under Roman dominion thus had led to a crisis of the Roman political and hegemonic system; this situation boosted reforms and created the necessity as well as the opportunity to gain the support of the allies.

IV. The Making of the Allies

While the military setbacks and political turmoil can serve to contextualise and explain Rome’s shift to a more integrative and constructive relationship with the communities under its dominion, the latter’s motives for cooperation also demand an explanation. For one thing, it is improbable that the Samnites constituted a viable alternative to Roman rule in Latium, especially after the destruction of Ardea; nor did they offer an alternative to cities like Capua, and even less so if Rome’s strenuous efforts managed at least to repel the Samnite advance fairly quickly. Furthermore, Fronda has argued persuasively for a diminishing return on revolts during the Second Punic War due to regional interstate rivalries, which can be assumed to have also existed during the Second Samnite War, thereby preventing a total collapse of Roman influence and control.Footnote ⁶⁶

The military crisis after Lautulae would, therefore, offer a plausible context for the employment of units from non-Roman communities, a use which could actually have been perceived as an opportunity by some cities and their elites to gain advantages for themselves by supporting the Roman effort.Footnote ⁶⁷ Military cooperation would have created ample opportunities for close elite interaction, especially among young Roman and Italian cavalrymen, who made a disproportionally large contribution. The decisive actions of the Campanian cavalry at Sentinum and the Frentani cavalry at Heraclea bear testimony to the allied troops’ devotion and worth, and their contribution was surely not lost on their Roman peers.Footnote ⁶⁸ Gaining favour with the Roman nobiles cemented their own political position in their respective cities, as Roman intervention on behalf of friendly aristocrats at Capua, Arretium, and Volsinii indicates quite clearly.Footnote ⁶⁹ Furthermore, the willing cooperation and military contribution of even a small number of communities would have encouraged – and compelled – others to follow their example.Footnote ⁷⁰ It is probable that communities such as the remaining Latin colonies were at the forefront of this process, while other communities will have been less enthusiastic, even if they had not joined the revolt.Footnote ⁷¹

The main advantage offered by integration into the Roman military structure and networks only becomes apparent when the unfavourable nature of the previously prevailing situation is taken into account. Although the cities of Latium and Campania had been left to their own devices and thus certainly had enjoyed a degree of autonomy, they had also been left without means of political orientation or communication within the power structures imposed by Rome, a situation which did not generate loyalty but instead a violent backlash.Footnote ⁷²

In this regard, the strategic recalibration of Roman policy towards a more benevolent approach was a necessary adjustment which established transparent rules and norms. This allowed the elites of the allied cities to position themselves within the Roman power structure and gave them the means of communicating and interacting with the Roman elite and also even the possibility of gaining entrance to it.Footnote ⁷³ Military service was an effective means to institutionalise inter-elite communication and it also allowed the allied elites to be seen in close contact with the Roman nobility. In addition to this, it provided their communities with an opportunity to release political and demographic tension by sending their young men on campaign and offering them a chance to acquire booty and maybe even the means of establishing themselves as settlers in one of the new colonies.Footnote ⁷⁴ The numerous Latin colonies established after 315 required 30,000-40,000 colonists and are unlikely to have been manned by Roman citizens alone. This would suggest that allied troops could have also expected to gain from military expansion, while at the same time the sending out of colonies helped to broaden the recruitment base of the allied troops.Footnote ⁷⁵ The initiation of large-scale colonisation projects at the time of considerable military difficulties in 315-308 can hardly have been a coincidence. Furthermore, Pelgrom has persuasively argued that these ‘new model’ Latin colonies, which were now dispatched under sole Roman supervision, may have remained under the supreme jurisdiction of Rome, instead of becoming autonomous polities. This would have created closer and more permanent bonds between Rome and these colonies than had been the case with the earlier colonies of the Latin League, resulting in a more privileged position relative to the other allies, the socii.Footnote ⁷⁶

However, it has to be stressed that the successful mobilisation of allied troops was a process that took several years, decades even, as the difficulties and defections of the Pyrrhic War make abundantly clear. Military cooperation and acceptance of Roman dominance might have found more support and enthusiasm with some cities than with others, but will have become more pronounced and formalised over the years. Similarly, a number of rebellious actions, such as the revolt of the Hernici in 306, the wide-spread defections to Pyrrhus (including the attempted collusion of Praenestine nobles in 280), and major disturbances among allied troops as late as the Punic Wars, should caution against assuming an over-schematic view of the allies’ loyalty.Footnote ⁷⁷ Likewise, the Roman side will have taken precautions against such rebellious tendencies, such as exerting control over soldiers’ provisions and the staffing of the most important positions with Roman officers.Footnote ⁷⁸ This brings us back to the battle of Asculum and the curious battle order, in which allied units were interspersed among the Roman units. This deployment consciously broke up the Roman battle line and potentially weakened it by regularly incorporating troops of a foreign background, language, and possibly even agenda throughout the battle line. I suggest that this peculiar battle-order was employed to guarantee the loyalty of potentially unreliable contingents by surrounding them with dependable troops. Asculum would thus bear testimony to Roman concerns about the loyalty of their comrades-in-arms, even after several decades of campaigning together.

V. Conclusion

It has been argued that the creation of an alliance system by Rome was an extraordinary achievement requiring a number of preconditions. The most crucial was the willingness to forego the allure of immediate exploitation in favour of a long-term strategy that promised potentially greater and prolonged future benefits. However, the support for such a policy was not won in the aftermath of the staggering Roman triumph in 338, as it was neither attractive nor necessary at that point. Only when Rome was reeling from the setbacks of the Second Samnite War and desperately needed to raise more manpower and avoid further defections did such a policy become more compelling. It was only at this point that both sides had something to gain from mutual cooperation. This meant a significant improvement in the position of the Latins, the socii, and the civitates sine suffragio alike, who stood to gain from inter-elite exchange and from sharing in the booty from joint military campaigns. For those directly involved, i.e. the rank and file of the units, the material benefits would have been the major incentive. The creation and development of this complex network might also explain why there was no slackening of military activity after the Samnite surrender, as there had been in 338. After all, this system, and its integrative and quantitative potential for mobilising troops, both invited and demanded further campaigns to keep the underlying arrangement of the alliance stable, as Cornell has pointed out when comparing the Roman system to a mafia-style organisation.Footnote ⁷⁹ The sharing out of booty – portable, or in the form of colonial allotments – was a major part of the general terms and conditions of the allied contribution, a fact sufficiently elucidated by the example of the infamous Legio Campana, which obviously did not think that unprofitable garrison duty was covered by their contract and thus opted for the creative solution of forcefully occupying the city they had been ordered to protect.Footnote ⁸⁰ Before the age of overseas expansion, the Romans took certain precautions against such disruptive actions by means of the de facto taking of hostages from the Italian elites serving in the large allied cavalry contingent and by a circumspect employment of non-Roman troops.

Despite the incentives and motives for mutual cooperation, the alliance system ultimately relied on the Roman ability to project power and to enforce obedience in these communities and their levies, if necessary, something which is best illustrated by the fact that loyalties became precarious when a viable alternative to Roman hegemony presented itself. Both Roman and Italian soldiers certainly had an interest in successful and profitable campaigns, but it was only one of these groups that fought both for booty and for Rome.