This is an uncommon book: It is neither a monograph nor a sum of five biographies, but rather a collection of quotations, commentaries, and ideas not only on basic and applied sciences, but also on politics, religion, life and human traits, environmental issues, and the future.

The book joins five prominent personalities (John von Neumann, Theodore von Kármán, Leo Szilard, Eugene P. Wigner, and Edward Teller) of the mid-20th century as Jewish-Hungarians in the fields of mathematics and computers, who completed higher education in Germany and as refugees emigrated from the anti-Semitic Horthy and Nazi regimes to America.

All five Martians became eminent players in fundamental sciences, but their wisdom remained open to top-level applications. For von Neumann, the axiomatization of set theory was as challenging as finding optimal conditions for blowing up high explosives. Von Kármán provided theoretical foundations for building bridges and also for constructing the best bomber aircraft. Wigner created the most elegant theories on the atomic nucleus and also directed engineers to build the world’s first nuclear reactors. Szilard transferred his pioneering information theory to the concept of nuclear chain reaction and the critical mass. Teller was first a materials scientist, then a nuclear physicist, shifting his focus from fission to fusion.

All of them participated substantially to the discovery, design, and building of the atomic bomb. They were also deeply involved in politics, particularly during the Cold War, by strongly sustaining the need for weapons supremacy of the United States and being active members of the decision-making groups of the American security system. The Martians stressed that the time element was more crucial here than in fundamental research. They contributed to the recognition of science as a deciding factor on the national and international scene, thus leading to a massive increase of the influence of scientists in government and industry.

After World War II, the United States decided to keep nuclear science secret but to allow computer science to become public. According to von Neumann, this led to surprising results: “Nuclear matters remained classified, but espionage transmitted a great deal of vital information from this area to the Soviets, and the Soviet Union caught up soon with the United States. In contrast, there was less classification in computer science, yet the Soviet Union stayed behind eternally in this area.” Von Neumann’s observations are still confirmed today.

Reviewer: Aurelia Meghea is Emeritus Professor at the University Politehnica of Bucharest, Romania.