The past decade has been exciting for scholars of Cicero's philosophical works. New commentaries, editions and monographs now routinely interpret Cicero as a sophisticated philosophical critic, in contrast to older approaches which viewed him as a muddled source for the lost doctrines of Hellenistic philosophers. A. and B. have contributed to this ongoing reappraisal by offering an impressive selection of essays on Cicero's De finibus, a critical text for Hellenistic and Roman ethics. The collaborators, whose papers originated in the 12th Symposium Hellenisticum in 2010, are all distinguished specialists. The result is a rich collection which consolidates earlier work and opens up new lines of inquiry. This volume is mandatory reading for specialists in Cicero's philosophy; required, too, for historians of Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, who often rely on Cicero for evidence. This is, however, a book for specialists: the rigorous philosophical focus and the technical nature of the papers may be too much for Classicists with more general interests.
The volume consists of nine papers and a short introduction. Chapter 1 covers Cicero's general epistemological stance; Chapters 2–4 the Epicurean material in Books 1–2; Chapters 5–6 Cato's exposition of Stoicism in Book 3; and Chapters 7–9 the Antiochean material in Books 4–5. I limit what follows to a brief sketch of the contributors' main goals, along with a few criticisms and suggestions for future research.
C. Brittain analyses the structure and argumentation across the dialogue's five books in order to identify the work's general sceptical outlook. In contrast to the standard view – which reads Cicero as a ‘mitigated Philonian skeptic’ who endorsed Antiochus' ethics as plausible – Brittain argues that the epistemological undergirding of Fin. reflects the more radical scepticism of Philo's Academic predecessor, Carneades. Brittain brings out a number of subtle criticisms of Antiochus' ethics throughout the dialogue and offers a sensitive literary analysis of the diverse settings, characters and dates of the various books – all of which, Brittain argues, reflects a deep uncertainty, not a preference for Antiochus. Brittain makes a strong case, but I am sceptical about his further suggestion (pp. 12–13) that radical scepticism characterises Cicero's philosophica more generally. Indeed, the strong Stoicising content of De officiis or the Tusculanae disputationes would seem to suggest a mitigated scepticism.
In Chapter 2, J. Warren analyses the Epicurean account of pleasure in Books 1–2. The paper is essentially a justification of Cicero's criticisms. In particular, Warren agrees with Cicero that it is difficult to defend the claim that the absence of pain is the highest pleasure. Not only does this fly in the face of common intuitions about pleasure as stimulation or feeling, but Torquatus' earlier appeal to hedonistic infant behaviour (to establish pleasure as the telos) seems to describe kinetic stimulation, not the absence of pain. Warren closes by showing how modern attempts to dissolve these problems still fail to meet Cicero's objections. P.-M. Morel examines in Chapter 3 Torquatus' presentation of Epicurean virtue ethics and asks why the debate is structured according to the four cardinal virtues. Epicurus, after all, gave a unitarian account of virtue rooted in phronēsis; also surprising is that Torquatus discusses the hedonistic calculus of enduring pain for long-term pleasure under temperantia, not sapienta. Morel argues that Torquatus' presentation is dialectical: he accepts the traditional virtues to show that Epicurean ethics can find room for them. This seems right: Torquatus is concerned to show that his school can justify traditional Roman mores. That said, I wonder if this strategy is older than Fin.: fragments of Epicurus suggest that he offered redefinitions of cardinal virtues other than phronēsis (e.g. courage: Diog. Laert. 10.120; justice: KD 33). Next, D. Frede asks how Epicurus' egoistic hedonism could find substantial value for friendship and considers what such a friendship would look like. She plausibly suggests that Epicurean friendship – or rather shared activities with a friend – should be classified as a natural but unnecessary kinetic form of pleasure. The paper is thought-provoking, but left me wanting more discussion of specific problem texts on friendship (e.g. the textual crux in VS 23). I would also have liked a discussion of Philodemus' On Household Management, an overlooked text which offers our clearest example of what an everyday Epicurean life or friendship would have looked like.
Chapter 5 leaves Epicurus for the Stoicism of Book 3. M. Graver offers a wide-ranging paper on Cicero's translation of the Greek to kalon as honestum. Often rendered as ‘moral goodness', Graver forcefully argues for ‘the honorable’ and stresses how Cicero's translation functioned effectively in his Roman context. At the same time, she provides a valuable discussion of the Greek Stoic background as well as an analysis of how, on the Stoic view, a gap develops between what is truly honourable and what is typically honoured in society. In Chapter 6, B. Inwood examines the so-called ‘cradle argument’ – the appeal to infant behaviour for insight into our natural ethical commitments. Since both Stoics and Epicureans appealed to infant behaviour, how can Cato claim his interpretation is correct? Inwood focuses on the metaphor of nature speaking (vox naturae) and, with the help of fragments of Chrysippus and Hierocles, identifies several critical assumptions behind such expressions. First, nature is conceived of as an agent acting in the world; second, it is foolish to imagine that nature undermines herself by creating animals who cannot take care of themselves. Inwood suggests that while these assumptions do support Cato's claims about our impulse for self-preservation, they are hard-pressed to justify our social nature and obligations. This paper is important: it advances J. Brunschwig's seminal discussion of the cradle argument (in M. Schofield and G. Striker, Norms of Nature [1986]) and opens up possibilities for studying the metaphor of ‘nature's voice’ in other authors, such as Cicero's contemporary, Lucretius (e.g. DRN 3.931–2).
Chapters 7–8 cover Cicero's Antiochean critique of Stoicism in Book 4 and provide a re-evaluation of the most neglected book of the treatise. First, A.M. Ioppolo takes as her point of departure Antiochus' charge that the Stoic distinction between moral goods and preferred indifferents is purely verbal. She traces the origins of this argument to the heterodox Stoic Aristo and offers a complex picture of its fortunes before and after the rise of Academic scepticism, touching along the way on the history of the various Stoic telos-formulas and the Carneadea Divisio. Such a detailed reconstruction from fragments is open to objections, but the paper is certainly learned and engaging. In Chapter 8, T. Benatouïl focuses on Book 4's organisation and structure. Responding to charges that the book is repetitive or poorly structured, Benatouïl shows how Cicero's critique operates at different levels, first attacking Stoic ethics from the perspective of the ‘Old Academy’, then moving on to argue that the Stoic ‘two-tier’ system of value is internally inconsistent. The final essay, by C. Gill, analyses Antiochus' distinctive theory of oikeiôsis in Book 5. Gill's analysis is sensitive and draws out the comparative advantages and disadvantages of Stoic and Antiochean oikeiôsis. Gill argues that Antiochus can claim a more continuous story of ethical development – no need to jettison health from the list of moral goods like the Stoics – but struggles when it tries to privilege virtue while also making a distinction between a beata and a beatissima vita. Like Brittain, Gill also argues against reading a preference for Antiochus into Cicero and sees the conclusion of the dialogue as open-ended.
The volume is well-produced, with only minor errors that do not obstruct understanding. The limited index could be better (e.g. an entry for Panaetius). A. and B. should be congratulated for producing an important book on a key text in ancient philosophy.
