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City limits to partisan polarization in the American public

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2021

Amalie Jensen
Affiliation:
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
William Marble
Affiliation:
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Kenneth Scheve*
Affiliation:
Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Matthew J. Slaughter
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: kenneth.scheve@yale.edu
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Abstract

How pervasive is partisan sorting and polarization over public policies in the American public? We examine whether the barriers of partisan sorting and polarization seen in national politics extend to important local policies that shape economic development. To describe the extent of partisan sorting and polarization over local development policies, we employ conjoint survey experiments in representative surveys of eight US metropolitan areas and a hierarchical modeling strategy for studying heterogeneity across respondents. We find that strong partisans are sorted by party in some of their policy opinions, but rarely polarized. The same voters who disagree about national issues have similar preferences about local development issues suggesting a greater scope for bipartisan problem solving at the local level.

Information

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association
Figure 0

Figure 1. National policy opinions by partisan identification. This plot shows differences in opinions between Strong Republicans and Strong Democrats across a range of national policy issues. The estimates are based on a regression of an indicator for choosing a conservative response to each policy measure on a set of dummy variables for partisanship and a number of sociodemographic characteristics. The bars indicate robust 95 percent confidence intervals. Across all issues, Strong Republicans are at least 10 percentage points more likely to hold a conservative opinion, after controlling for other covariates.

Figure 1

Table 1. Conjoint dimensions and attribute values for local development plans

Figure 2

Figure 2. Split-sample results. CAMCE estimates show differences between Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans. Points show coefficient estimates from separate OLS regressions, and bars show robust 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 3

Figure 3. Estimated individual-level marginal component effects. The lines show a kernel density estimate of the posterior means of the IMCEs, while the dots show the average of the posterior means. Estimates are from the hierarchical model with sociodemographic covariates predicting IMCEs.

Figure 4

Table 2. Comparison of partisan CAMCEs

Figure 5

Figure 4. Simulated partisan marginal component effects. Distribution of predicted individual-level marginal component effects, assuming everyone is a Strong Democrat or a Strong Republican, holding other covariates fixed at their observed values. Lines show posterior means of kernel density estimates applied to 500 samples from the posterior; points show posterior means. Percentages refer to the posterior probability that the partisan means have different signs. The omitted default category for each dimension is the status quo.

Figure 6

Table 3. Summary of results

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