The Khalsa's mandate of heaven

When Guru Gobind Singh created the Khalsa he did not trigger a public debate on the role of temporality in Sikhism. Ever since the early seventeenth century Guru Gobind Singh's lineage had operated imperial-style courts.Footnote ²⁰ From the time of Guru Hargobind (r. 1606–1643) the Sikh Gurus had become gentrified and abided by the norms of a patrimonial feudal lord.Footnote ²¹ The Sikh community would have been accustomed to the image of the Guru as a warrior king. The Gurus already adhered to the etiquette of sporting unshorn hair and beards, carrying arms, practising martial arts, and not associating with disreputable characters. They not only subscribed to this code, but maintained a standing army as well. They also had a frosty relationship with the Mughal state: most prominently due to the executions of Guru Arjan (r. 1581–1606) on the orders of Jahangir (r. 1606–1627) and Guru Tegh Bahadur (r. 1663–1675) on the orders of Aurangzeb (r. 1657–1707).Footnote ²² Neither execution, however, directly resulted in the Sikh Gurus revolting against Mughal rule.

Guru Gobind Singh inherited his predecessors’ substantial financial base. In an early eighteenth century Persian history, Muhammad Qasim stated that Guru Gobind Singh had equivalent wealth to a mansabdar (Mughal officer) of 5,000 zat (rank).Footnote ²³ Moreover, he possessed a considerable army and was an individual with enormous political power in the Bilaspur region. His political power eventually began to challenge the local hill kings; hostilities reached such a point that several local battles occurred between the Guru's forces and the local kings.Footnote ²⁴ These battles attracted the attention of the Mughal officers in Lahore Province when the local kings asked for assistance in quelling Guru Gobind Singh's supposed threat to their power. There is no evidence to suggest that Guru Gobind Singh harboured any ambitions to conquer his local rivals or to establish his authority in the region. But undoubtedly the Guru's court was growing in stature and to the local kings a threat was implied by his growing eminence.

The clash between Guru Gobind Singh and the hill kings was an example of a small-scale zamindari conflict in the context of late seventeenth century Mughal India.Footnote ²⁵ But the conflict did escalate to the extent that Guru Gobind Singh and his Sikhs felt they were being unjustly treated by the Mughal state. It appears Guru Gobind Singh was willing to settle this local dispute with the hill kings and the Mughals through arbitration. However, his opponents felt the Guru's threat was minimal and military action would eventually force him to concede to their terms. By underestimating Guru Gobind Singh's military capabilities, this local dispute was transformed into a conflict that spread across the Punjab region.

It was in this atmosphere of conflict with the hill kings and Mughals that Guru Gobind Singh created the Khalsa in April 1699. After the creation of the Khalsa the conflict with the Mughals grew in intensity as Guru Gobind Singh's armed forces became more resistant, ambitious, and vehemently anti-Mughal.

The formation of the Khalsa was not unique in the sense that it was a ‘militant’ organization added on to a ‘peaceful’ religious community—the Sikh Gurus already had warriors under their command. The Khalsa was unique for two reasons: first, Khalsa Sikhism encouraged all Sikhs to join the fraternity regardless of their background, and second, Khalsa Sikhism had a coherent vision of sovereignty and soldierliness. By contrast, the pre-Khalsa Sikh army was recruited from the military labour market and its main duty was to protect the Guru. Now all Sikhs were encouraged to become warriors engaged in a struggle against Mughal tyranny.

In the Sri Gur Sobha Sainapati contextualized the role of the Khalsa as the warriors of righteousness (dharma) created by Guru Gobind Singh in order to establish justice in a society that was becoming increasingly unjust. In Sainapati's narrative the history of humanity had been a tale of good and evil wherein men with power such as kings regularly violated the universal laws of justice and consequently God sent divine agents (avatars) to destroy the unrighteous and re-establish justice. Sainapati was without any doubt that Guru Gobind Singh was an avatar sent by God to restore righteousness. His opinion was not unusual since this image of the Guru as an avatar was widely accepted in pre-colonial Sikh literature.Footnote ²⁶ Sainapati related how God had called Guru Gobind Singh into his court prior to the Guru's birth and specifically assigned him the task of forming a panth (spiritual way) dedicated to spreading goodness (sumatt).Footnote ²⁷ In a later verse Sainapati says: ‘The Guru is Gobind [i.e. God] and Gobind is the Guru: the Lord of Action; The Guru has come to this world to save it and the entire world knows this truth.’Footnote ²⁸ The Khalsa thus had a mandate from heaven to rule and for Sainapati their triumph was only a matter of time.

The Khalsa's unique status as an army of righteousness destined for sovereignty was not simply based on their military skill but also on their ethical code. For Sainapati the Khalsa Singh was unlike any other contemporary warrior because he was virtuous and accordingly engaged only in just war. When discussing the creation of the Khalsa, Sainapati tells us that the Guru told his Sikhs: ‘Cleanse the senses (man), speak (bach) truthfully and act (karm) justly, then the goddess (Bhavani) will protect you and you will reside in an ocean of happiness (sukh sar).’Footnote ²⁹ The Khalsa Singh would receive the protection of the Guru and goddess if he acted ethically and morally, but if he faltered in his conduct, this divine protection would cease and he would have to seek repentance (tanakhah) from his brothers-in-arms. Indeed, in the early modern era Khalsa Sikhs spent much of their time debating their conduct and in their normative literature they often referred to their adab (Persianate civility) and their adhikara (Hindu social rights).Footnote ³⁰ Sainapati was one of the first authors of the period who clarified the ideal conduct of a Khalsa Singh. In his text he set out that a Khalsa should keep his hair and beard unshorn; never associate with people who shave their hair (sir-gum); avoid five reprobate groups, although Sainapati does not make it clear who comprises these groups; no longer make offerings to the masands (Sikh officers tasked with collecting donations from Sikh communities); not consume tobacco (hukka); and not perform the tonsure rites (bhaddar) after death.Footnote ³¹ In addition, Sainapati explains that a Khalsa Singh must continue to practise spiritual activities such as nam jap (meditation).Footnote ³²

Sainapati gives particular emphasis to two injunctions, namely the hukka and bhaddar. He makes an ardent plea for Sikhs to give up these customs:

The stress placed on these customs is intriguing. Sainapati was well aware that certain sections of the Sikh community were strongly attached to such customs and they would abandon them reluctantly, if at all. This is all the more fascinating because Sainapati did not make the same effort to convince his audience of the other injunctions which suggests that those were uncontroversial. Sainapati continues his narrative of events with an explanation of exactly why the hukka and bhaddar were so controversial in Sikh society.

Sainapati then goes on to discuss how Delhi's Sikh community began a public discourse on the formation of the Khalsa and its implications for their everyday lives.

Sikh public philosophy: early eighteenth century Delhi (circa 1700)

After the dramatic events of that historic Baisakhi day, Sikh missionaries and congregants returned home with news that the Khalsa had been formed. Sikhs who had not witnessed the events with their own eyes would have been eager to hear first-hand accounts. The news that Khalsa membership required the adoption of a new civil code, different from earlier Sikh practices, must have spread quickly among Sikhs across India. Sainapati describes how Delhi's Sikh congregation reacted to the innovation with mixed feelings:

The Khalsa's creation seems to have divided Delhi's Sikh community along caste lines. It appears that the congregation gathered in a Sikh temple to collectively discuss the issues they had with Khalsa Sikhism. A section of the congregation appears to have readily accepted the Khalsa's code of conduct and was initiated into the fraternity there and then. But Sainapati specifically says that the Khatri and Brahman Sikhs of the congregation were troubled by this new development because of the implications Khalsa membership would have for their ancestral traditions (kula karm). They complained among themselves that they would suffer social and religious dishonour if they were not able to perform the tonsure rites. While they were willing to keep their hair uncut at all other times, at times of death they felt it was necessary to cut their hair. Moreover, Sainapati informs us that many Sikhs abandoned their families to join the Khalsa; possibly this might indicate that certain Khatri and Brahman Sikhs acted against the wishes of their relatives and were initiated. However, according to Sainapati's narrative, this first meeting led to a division into ‘pro-Khalsa’ and ‘anti-Khalsa’ factions.

The conflict between pro-Khalsa and anti-Khalsa factions grew more intense in following meetings as the rival Sikhs began fiercely debating with each other, even physically assaulting one another. For instance, Sainapati describes how a Khatri man was forcefully ejected from a temple by Khalsa Sikhs because of his anti-Khalsa sentiments:

The Khatri man was clearly perplexed by the strong emotions the Khalsa had evoked in his fellow Sikhs. Sainapati further informs us that the Khatri Sikh continued to talk with a Khalsa Sikh he had met, afterwards going to the Khalsa Sikh's home for a meal.Footnote ³⁶ By the end of the meal the Khatri Sikh was fully convinced by the Khalsa Sikh's reasoning and became a Khalsa believer. This incident highlights how the Khatri community was not inherently anti-Khalsa and that many Khatris were open to joining the Khalsa. It also shows how not all Khalsa Sikhs were opposed to conversing and dining with non-Khalsa Sikhs.

Sainapati continues his narrative by discussing how the abovementioned Khalsa Sikh was chastised by his Khalsa brothers for breaking his code of conduct by socializing with the ‘shaven head’ (sir-gum) Khatri man:

Clearly a significant section of the Khalsa Sikhs had a fundamentalist belief in maintaining their code of conduct—but perhaps this incident simply reflects the zeal of recent converts.

The conflict between the two factions continued to concern Delhi's Sikhs and another meeting was convened at a Sikh temple:

The two factions seem to have reached a stalemate as both sides were unable to successfully resolve their dispute. The conflict was growing in hatred.

The party of Sikhs which had stormed out of the last meeting then decided that the factional dispute had to be resolved. They decided to hold another meeting at Darapur market; the choice of a bazaar instead of a temple is interesting and possibly reflects the mercantile interests of the anti-Khalsa faction. Indeed, the anti-Khalsa party was led by two wealthy Khatris who proposed a truce of sorts:

The meeting concluded with a consensus that the two factions would let their differences stand until further evidence about the finer points of the Khalsa's ethical code was obtained from the Guru's court. There seems to have been a general desire that local relationships should not be disrupted. But it is important to note that the two wealthy Khatri leaders had raised objections in particular to the injunctions against hukka and bhaddar.

The dispute continued to preoccupy Sikh minds. Sainapati informs us that the anti-Khalsa party held a private meeting:

For at least some sections of the anti-Khalsa faction the Khalsa's ethical code was nonsense and they had no intention of abiding by it, regardless of the fact that it was Guru Gobind Singh who had prohibited bhaddar and hukka. Sainapati described these Sikhs as empiricists (khulasa).Footnote ⁴¹

The early debates among Delhi's Sikhs appear to have been largely confined to theoretical debates regarding conduct. But as the rival factions hardened into parties that either accepted or rejected the Khalsa, the debates began to impinge upon the everyday lives of Delhi's Sikhs. At the meeting at Darapur market, the community had been eager to avoid the disintegration of local relationships, but it appears these local ties immediately came under pressure as the divide between Khalsa and non-Khalsa became distinct. Sainapati describes how the death of a Khatri Sikh sparked a backlash by certain sections of the Khatri community against Delhi's Khalsa Sikhs:

The worst fears of the Khatri panchayat were confirmed when their fellow Khatris decided to abandon the tonsure rites. At the outset of this public debate certain Khatri leaders had feared exactly this outcome: that the Khatris would abandon their caste rituals and consequently in the long run the Khatris would become extinct. The Khatri leadership in Delhi decided to avoid any future incidents of Khatris abandoning bhaddar by eliminating Delhi's Khalsa Sikhs or at least impoverishing them to such an extent that no Sikh would remain Khalsa nor would any Khatri see the Khalsa as honourable. The financial assault planned by the Khatri leadership reveals the dominant economic position held by the Khatri elite in Delhi. It is likely that many Khalsa Sikhs had business relationships with Khatri Sikhs and were dependent upon these relationships to support their livelihoods. The Khatri elite appear to have had the capacity to disrupt their business relationships with Khalsa Sikhs, in the short term at least, in order to assert their supremacy.

Sainapati informs us that, true to their word, the Khatri leadership ‘closed all the markets’ (sab bajar band kari dina) to Khalsa Sikhs.Footnote ⁴³ In response the Khalsa Sikhs petitioned the local commander (hakam) to reopen them.Footnote ⁴⁴ The Khatri panchayat then attempted to dissuade the hakam from helping the Khalsa Sikhs by telling him that Khalsa Sikhism was inherently anti-Mughal and that it was not in his best interests to encourage the Khalsa:

The Khatri leadership highlighted how Khalsa Sikhism was unique and unlike early Sikhism: the Khalsa Sikhs were devoted to their Guru and did not submit to the Mughal emperor; they even audaciously called themselves Khalsa, a possible play on the Mughal administrative term khalisa (crown lands). They argued that while the Khalsa was not subordinate to Mughal authority, but the Khatri elite certainly were.

The Khatri panchayat, uncertain about the effectiveness of their intervention, then decided to bribe the hakam by giving him his ‘expenses’ (kharch).Footnote ⁴⁶ The local authorities accepted the bribe and began verbal and physical assaults on the Khalsa Sikhs.Footnote ⁴⁷ Moreover, the Khatri leadership hired factionalists (dharie), highwaymen (bat parie), and local people (nagar ko apar log) to inflict further injuries on the Khalsa Sikhs.Footnote ⁴⁸

Eventually, however, the local authorities changed their policy and reversed the Khatri trading ban. For Sainapati the explanation for this period of persecution coming to an end was due to the grace of God.Footnote ⁴⁹ It is unclear why exactly the local authorities felt the ban was no longer enforceable, but it is most likely that it was unsustainable and had a negative effect on local commerce and tax collection.

The Sikh community in Delhi seems to have settled down following the cessation of the trading ban. Sainapati informs us that Delhi's Sikhs began a process of reconciliation; he states that the Sikhs gathered once again in the congregation (sangat) and ‘many came to have their sins (gunah) pardoned (bakhshaee)’.Footnote ⁵⁰ The reunified Sikh community then even proceeded to Anandpur to do Guru Gobind Singh's darshan (homage).Footnote ⁵¹ But it is interesting to note that Sainapati only says that ‘many’ (ketan) sought forgiveness for their gunah (sins), meaning that a faction of the anti-Khalsa party no longer wanted to be part of Delhi's Sikh community. As Sainapati's account illustrated, the division between the two parties was not always clear-cut and friendships between Khalsa and non-Khalsa Sikhs did exist. And it appears that those anti-Khalsa Sikhs who sought forgiveness were those who had ties of affection both with the Khalsa Sikhs and, more generally, the Sikh religion—Sainapati emphasizes the het (love) between the Sikhs and their desire to do Guru Gobind Singh's darshan.Footnote ⁵²

That said, there was still a social boundary between the two sides. The non-Khalsa Sikhs comprised mainly the Khatris and a smaller Brahman contingent, which, as we have seen, had a prominent and powerful influence over Delhi's commerce. By contrast, the Khalsa Sikhs, while not specifically identified with caste titles, were composed of those who were detrimentally affected by the Khatri trading ban which indicates that they probably came from a range of caste groups that were professionally connected to Delhi's commercial markets.

An important question is: why was there such sharp social division in the early eighteenth century Delhi Sikh community? In order to answer this we must understand the social composition of this community and explore the extent to which the Mughal system impinged upon the lives and aspirations of Delhi's Sikhs.

Sikh society in early eighteenth century Delhi

Sainapati identifies two major caste groups in Delhi's Sikh community—the Khatris (who also had a small Brahmin contingent within their ranks) and the ‘others’. It appears that prior to the creation of the Khalsa all these caste groups were part of a Sikh commercial society in Delhi.Footnote ⁵³ The various caste groups had an established routine of gathering together in a Sikh temple, undoubtedly praying together, and consequently forming professional networks. Even at the height of the dispute between the rival parties, it was generally desired that the long-established socio-economic relationships between the two should be maintained. Sikhism, it seems, helped both to create a moral community and to facilitate business transactions in Delhi. The role of Sikhism in creating social and/or professional assemblies (sabha) does not appear to be unusual—in late eighteenth century Benares, Khatris and Punjabi Saraswat Brahmins had similar assemblies to deliberate on matters of morality and business, and both parties were partly bound together by a deep attachment to Sikhism.Footnote ⁵⁴ It is possible that this Benares sabha emerged in the seventeenth century and that other Sikh sabhas existed in this period in towns and cities where Sikhs resided in large numbers such as Patna and Lahore.

The reason why it was specifically in Delhi that this debate erupted along caste lines, rather than in, for instance, Benares or Patna, is because Delhi's Sikh community probably had greater caste diversity and disparities in comparison to other urban Sikh sangats (congregations). While no detailed study has been conducted on the early caste composition of the Sikh community from the early sixteenth century onwards, it is generally agreed that the early Sikh community in Punjab was largely composed of Khatris and Jats, with a notable artisanal contingent.Footnote ⁵⁵ It is reasonable to suggest that Sikhism spread to major cities outside of Punjab along the Khatri trading networks because the key cities in which Sikh sangats emerged during the time of the Sikh Gurus were Delhi, Mirzapur, Benares, and Patna.Footnote ⁵⁶ These sangats were concentrated in essentially Uttar Pradesh and follow the Gangetic trade route. It appears that the Khatris established Sikhism as the religion of their merchant culture.

The Sikh Gurus, as discussed below, established a system of masands (administrative officers) in the mid-sixteenth century to act as preachers and charity collectors to sangats across North India. The masands outside of Punjab were the points of contact between the Guru and his Sikhs; the masands would usually communicate messages from both sides and collect donations from the sangats. The masands, it seems, were not encouraged to convert new Sikhs in these various cities; instead they were employed to assist the existing sangats. Accordingly, in these cities sangats remained largely composed of Khatris. A telling example of this Khatri dominance is found in Guru Tegh Bahadur's Hukumnama (letter of command) to his Benares sangat in which he says, ‘The Guru shall protect (guru rakhega) [the congregation] in the province of Benares; your businesses shall prosper (karbar hove).’Footnote ⁵⁷ The emphasis on karbar (business; trade) indicates a Khatri base.

Unlike the other Sikh cities mentioned above, Delhi appears to have been different because it had a substantial non-Khatri melange of castes that belonged to the sangat. It is likely that in more populous Delhi the Sikh sangat attracted other mercantile and artisanal castes and therefore the socio-economic spectrum within the Khatri community itself was wider, thus creating internal differences. (The reason why other mercantile and artisanal castes joined the Delhi sangat is considered below.) In contrast, in Benares, for example, the contemporary Sikh community remains predominately Khatri, with a very small minority of other castes.Footnote ⁵⁸ This suggests that aside from Delhi in this period, the sangats in other cities undoubtedly experienced similar challenges when learning of Guru Gobind Singh's innovation, but the potential for communal discord was limited.

Sainapati portrays Delhi's Khatri community in general as being well-connected, organized, with political and economic clout. The Khatris are shown as having a strong attachment to the practice of bhaddar and use of hukka, and largely justified their dislike of the Khalsa's ethical code because of its implications for Khatri caste practices. It must be noted though that while Sainapati often identifies the Khatri community as a monolithic group, he does on occasion show how some Khatris did abide by the Khalsa code of conduct. In particular, Sainapati says it was the Khatri panchayat that orchestrated the attack against Delhi's Khalsa Sikhs, indicating that it was the elites of the Khatri community who most disliked the Khalsa.

By contrast, the ‘other’ Sikhs appear to be a collective of caste groups that seemed to have little power in the region and were unable to resist or reverse the Khatri trading ban. These ‘other’ Sikhs clearly were professionally dependent upon the business and cooperation of the Khatri elites. It is most probable these ‘other’ Sikhs included mercantile castes such as poor Khatris, Aroras, and possibly Alhuwalias as well as artisanal castes such as Tarkhans (carpenters), Lohars (blacksmiths), and various other artisans. It is possible that Jat Sikhs were also represented among the ranks of the ‘other’ Sikhs.

From Sainapati we learn that the Sikh temples of Delhi were a lively arena for debate. The temple offered a place where Sikhs could not only discuss spiritual matters, but also foster professional networks. While the social disparities among them would not have been completely eliminated by the influence of Sikhism, they certainly would have been diminished to an appreciable extent. The creation of the Khalsa caused a severe rupture to these existing commercial relationships. But why did this Sikh commercial society allow itself to disintegrate rather than pull together and protect its commercial interests? An important reason must have been because of differing economic priorities and cultural associations.

What is certain about the ‘other’ Sikhs was their sincere devotion to the Khalsa's ethical code; they had no qualms whatsoever about joining the Khalsa and were willing to endure a campaign of persecution for their beliefs. If we contrast the situation in Delhi with the reaction to the Khalsa in Punjab, we can possibly detect the reason why the ‘other’ Sikhs joined the Khalsa. In the Punjab region the main converts to Khalsa Sikhism were from Jat zamindars and the Jat peasantry, as well as other lower caste groups amenable to military service, such as Tarkhans. In the context of rural Punjab it seems clear that the Jat community joined the Khalsa for a mixture of reasons, including religious faith, social mobility, and the belief that the Khalsa would offer them a zamindari confederation.Footnote ⁵⁹ It is likely that the motivation for Delhi's ‘other’ Sikhs to join the Khalsa reflect these concerns. It is possible Delhi's ‘other’ Sikhs formed a Punjabi diaspora in Delhi with strong socio-economic and cultural ties with rural Punjab. Mercantile groups may have been motivated by a pressing need to maintain local trading networks, whereas artisanal groups needed to maintain kinship ties.

But the Khalsa did not prove as popular among Punjab's urbanites and revenue farmers (ijaradars), which were largely dominated by the Khatri community.Footnote ⁶⁰ It is important to note with regard to caste groups such as the Khatris that the internal diversity in their kinship system made matrimonial alliances a fraught issue and, despite being a monolithic caste group, they were deeply divided with respect to kinship.Footnote ⁶¹ Thus it is possible that certain sections of the Khatri community were more influenced by their Khatri relations in rural Punjab than by their Khatri neighbours in Delhi. It is pertinent to point out that the first of five beloved ones, Daya Singh, was a Khatri from Lahore.

There may be another reason why Delhi's pro-Khalsa Sikhs accepted the Khalsa's code. This may have been the result of their dependency on Sikh institutions for education. Sikhism's written culture and egalitarian principles seems to have fostered Sikh schools in certain parts of Mughal India. The Sikh literati were certainly educated in Sikh temple towns in Punjab, where they would at least have studied Sikh scriptures. By the early eighteenth century the Sikh community had produced several outstanding savants writing mainly in Punjabi and Braj, using the Gurmukhi script.Footnote ⁶² Aside from savants, Guru Amar Das (r. 1552–1574) created the masand (administrative officers) system during his tenure. The masands were of vital importance to the functioning of early Sikh society and they were appointed on the grounds of their piety and literacy. As touched upon above, their primary duty was to assist existing sangats rather than to convert new Sikhs. It is also likely that the masands and other literate Sikhs would have been encouraged by the Gurus to found Sikh schools, known as both taksal (treasury) and dharamsala (temple), in local sangats.Footnote ⁶³ Sikh boys would have been sent to the dharamasala, similar to the madrasas of that era, to study Sikh scriptures. Interestingly, in the Dabistan-i Mazahib the author states that by the mid-seventeenth century the vast majority of masands were Jats, replacing the earlier masands who were mainly Khatris and Brahmans: ‘they have made Khatris subordinate to the Jatts, who are the lowest caste of the Bais [Vaishyas]. Thus most of the leading masands (commanders/officers) of the Guru are Jatts, and the Brahmans and Khatris (comprise the) . . . disciples and followers of the Guru.’Footnote ⁶⁴ From this we can infer that many Jat Sikhs became literate and numerate through the education they received at Sikh schools.

Delhi's Khalsa Sikhs probably were dependent on these Sikh schools, where it is unlikely that their children studied alongside elite Khatri and Brahman children, for a free education. While Sikh schools did not offer a Persian education, in order to assist in the recitation of Sikh texts they must have provided schooling in the Hindavi vernacular and basic numeracy, and such language and mathematical skills would have been important to their future daily lives. However, in other urban Sikh sangats, for example, in Benares, it is probable that Sikh schools were not a significant attraction for the local Sikh population because they were in predominantly Khatri areas; accordingly children would have been educated along more traditional lines. It is possible that Delhi's Khalsa adherents became pro-Khalsa because their teachers were from lowly backgrounds such as Jat masands.

The Khatri community in medieval India rose to a position of prominence as a munshi class of merchants and scribes comparable to the Kayasths.Footnote ⁶⁵ That said, the hierarchical nature of the Khatri community shows that they were not a homogenous group.Footnote ⁶⁶ Nonetheless, as a whole, the Khatris enjoyed a privileged position as a result of the vast trading network stretching from the Caspian port of Astrakhan down to southern India that had been created by Khatri merchant families.Footnote ⁶⁷ In particular, they had a mercantile presence in Punjab and the Ganges valleyFootnote ⁶⁸ and, as we have seen, in Delhi they formed a major commercial bloc.Footnote ⁶⁹ The Khatris’ success was principally due to their early adoption of Persian, the lingua franca of the Indo-Islamic world and their caste structure which enabled them to create a network of communities.Footnote ⁷⁰ Many Khatris also served with distinction in the Mughal system as scribes and political advisers, and many more were bureaucrats.Footnote ⁷¹ The elites of Khatri society were politically and culturally embedded within the Persianate world of the Mughal empire.

Prior to the making of the Khalsa, the Khatri community had supported the temporality of the Sikh Gurus. Why then did they, especially the elite, react so vehemently against the Khalsa's ethical code? In the Khatris’ negotiations with the hakam they had expressed the view that Khalsa Sikhism inherently challenged the Mughal system, which was something that did not sit well with them. In their various meetings they raised the following further objections to the Khalsa: the permanent suspension of bhaddar (tonsure rites), the permanent ban on hukka (tobacco consumption) as well as the implicit challenge to Mughal authority. Let us explore these three issues in more depth.

First, the Khatris objected to the ban on bhaddar (tonsure rites) on the grounds that it was of central importance to Khatri ancestral purity and identity. As Olivelle remarks, shaving is the most widespread practice found in Hindu rituals around hair.Footnote ⁷² As such, the meaning of the ritual shaving of hair is complex and within the complexities there are contradictions. Usually, in the Punjab region, before a cremation all the sons and grandsons of the deceased are shaved.Footnote ⁷³ But in Punjab the tonsure rites are not confined to times of death: the first tonsure of a young boy is also an important rite of passage.Footnote ⁷⁴ The ritual of bhaddar represents a temporary separation from society and is seen as an act of rebirth. The removal of the hair represents also a separation from life and as the hair grows back, the person gradually merges back into his life. The performance of the act purifies the self and removes pollution. Ibbetson explained that the act of tonsure provides an opportunity ‘to swear lasting friendships’ with kinsmen and friends: it is an act that reinforces real kinship and forms fictive kinship.Footnote ⁷⁵

The Khatri community had two main reasons to maintain the practice of bhaddar: to nurture a connection to Brahmanical society and to maintain a sense of Khatri homogeneity. The practice of bhaddar, like the taking of the ‘scared thread’ (jeneu), was a Brahmanical rite.Footnote ⁷⁶ Pre-Khalsa Sikh practices critiqued such Brahmanical rites, but it appears that this did not prevent Sikhs from engaging in them, and they were socially tolerated within the Sikh community. Had the Khatri community abandoned the tonsure rites, they would have been socially stigmatized in Brahmanical circles and been illegible for any other Brahmanical ritual. The pervasive belief in the pollution and sin that would be incurred by Khatris if they abandoned bhaddar would have been coupled with more pragmatic concerns regarding trade. The Khatri community's commercial success, similar to other merchant castes in the period, was dependent upon the caste-based fellowship of other Khatris across their trading network. These trading networks would have operated on trustFootnote ⁷⁷—but trust could only be maintained if Khatri society possessed a homogenous culture of kinship. If Delhi's Khatris were ostracized from the Khatri trading network, it would have been disastrous for their businesses. And, as noted above, aside from Delhi, the other urban Sikh sangats along the Gangetic route were predominantly composed of Khatris. Therefore, from the Khatri perspective the permanent suspension of bhaddar could potentially destroy their caste structure and with it their prosperous livelihoods.Footnote ⁷⁸

Second, the Khatris objected to the ban on tobacco consumption (hukka). The ban on hukka must not be narrowly construed. Although tobacco had no role in either kinship or social rituals, it could have been seen as being symbolic of wider cultural norms of behaviour associated with Mughal courtly culture. The development of a distinctive Mughal adab (civility) has been well documented,Footnote ⁷⁹ but as O’Hanlon points out, in late seventeenth century Delhi and other North Indian centres there was ‘a complexly stratified urban elite, of greater and lesser amirs, lower ranking mansabdars and merchant households’.Footnote ⁸⁰ The great households of Delhi were the main consumers of luxury commodities and building projects in the area and therefore they would have had personal relationships with merchant houses and bought goods directly from them. Merchant houses consequently would have competed fiercely for clients from Delhi's upper echelons and would have offered a wide spectrum of professional services to elite clients, from the sale of goods to banking and asset management. Accordingly the merchant could not appear uncouth in the presence of an elite customer and would have adopted the habits of their client who, perhaps, considered the smoking of tobacco to be refined. In popular stories of the period two images of the merchant emerge: the ‘frugal merchant’ and the lavish ‘great sahu’. Unlike the ‘frugal merchant’, the ‘great sahu’ was associated with indulgent Mughal behaviour such as smoking the hukka and keeping concubines, and occasionally he was depicted as a Khatri.Footnote ⁸¹ Hence for Khatri merchants the ban on tobacco might have appeared as the first prohibition of many to come that would ultimately destabilize their client relationships.

Third, the Khatris objected to the challenge to Mughal authority implicit in the Khalsa code of conduct. While political change can be positive for commercial enterprises, at the turn of the eighteenth century to any Mughal insider the Khalsa represented another local zamindari movement that would eventually dissipate into nothingness because the Mughal empire would bring them under control. It was easy therefore to regard the Khalsa as nothing more than upstarts largely composed of the Punjabi peasantry. Only in the hearts of adherents such as Sainapati was it believed that the Khalsa's triumph was inevitable. Many elite Khatri families had invested heavily in the Mughal empire by establishing client and courtly relationships over many decades. They had hustled in the marketplaces and sent their sons to learn Persian and the etiquette of a Mughal gentleman—now suddenly the Khalsa Sikhs were criticizing their Mughal dispositions. As Alam and Subrahmanyam inform us, after 1700 there was a ‘veritable explosion’ in the Mughal administrative system of Khatris and other high-caste Hindu scribes.Footnote ⁸² Thus, at the turn of the eighteenth century the Khatri community would have comprised a generation of parents and children embarking on new and exciting professional careers,Footnote ⁸³ and the Khalsa's prohibitions would have undermined both parental and communal aspirations that had been fermenting for several generations.

In addition, we cannot ignore the snobbery that would have existed in elite Khatri society towards the lowly Khalsa Sikhs in Delhi. Many Khatris would have seen themselves as Mughal gentlemen, who were fluent in Persian. Adepts of Persian were known as farsiyat (those with Persian) and the uneducated as bifarsiyat (those without Persian).Footnote ⁸⁴ It is likely that when Khalsa Sikhs spoke, certain members of their society might have commented on their lack of manners and discernment. In turn, many Khalsa Sikhs would have no doubt seen the elite Khatris as snobs. These prejudices would obviously have hindered social discourse on the Khalsa's formation.

Against these contrasting social backgrounds, it is unsurprising that Delhi's Sikh society was so divided after the Khalsa's formation. The main adherents of the Khalsa movement came from lower caste backgrounds with a narrow regional view of the Mughal empire. In stark contrast, the elite Khatris had a comprehensive view of the Mughal empire. The latter simply could not make calculations based on faith alone—they had to weigh up how their actions would affect their vast trading and services network. The Khatris also could not forget that their most significant clientele were from elite Mughal society. Khalsa Sikhs, on the other hand, were often dependent on Sikh institutions for economic and social support and could clearly see the benefits of a Sikh kingdom in Punjab and even Delhi region for them.

In the first half of the eighteenth century the elite Khatri Sikh community demonstrated their loyalties by actively supporting the Mughals against the Khalsa insurgency. Khatri Sikhs financed military campaigns and worked as diplomats and administrators for the Mughal empire.Footnote ⁸⁵ That said, many of these same Khatri Sikhs did attempt to help the Khalsa as well, such as Diwan Hardyal, who in 1710 apparently attempted to help the Khalsa obtain provisions during the siege of Lohgarh, despite being a prominent member of the royal camp.Footnote ⁸⁶ In fact, in August 1710, Emperor Bahadur Shah ordered all Hindus in imperial service to shave off their beards in order to weed out any Khatris with Khalsa sympathies.Footnote ⁸⁷

But the endeavours of those elite Khatris opposed to the Khalsa bore no fruit in the longer term because by the late eighteenth century Sikh kingdoms effectively ruled the Punjab region. With the change in circumstances Khalsa Sikhs began to express a general disdain for elite Khatri Sikhs in their code of conduct texts, much of which centres on the Khatris’ reaction to the Khalsa in Delhi. Moreover, Khatri narratives seem to respond to this disdain by retrospectively emphasizing their meekness at the moment when the Khalsa was formed and the fact that they were unable to challenge the Mughal empire because of their social standing.

The Musaddi Sikhs in eighteenth century Khalsa Sikh literature

Following the episode in Delhi recorded by Sainapati, the Khalsa Singhs spent the rest of the eighteenth century engaged in warfare and political conquest.Footnote ⁸⁸ By contrast, due to the political insecurity of Punjab after 1710, the Khatri trading community witnessed the movement of trade from the northwest route eastwards to the benefit of the Gangetic route.Footnote ⁸⁹ The markets of Delhi and Panipat experienced a decline at the expense of growing principalities such as Rohilkhand and Awadh. Nevertheless, despite the general economic decline in Delhi, it appears Delhi's elite Khatris continued to prosper as a result of their international trading networks—the old capital marked the starting point of a chain of trading settlements which flowed up into Central Asia and as far as the Caspian entrepôt city of Astrakhan. In addition, the Khatris and their fellow merchant castes coped with these fluctuations in state power by seeking mercantile alliances with each other and thereby creating ‘a unified merchant class’.Footnote ⁹⁰

Throughout this transitional era the Khalsa literati began reflecting on the conduct befitting a Singh and cultivating an image of the Singh as a righteous warrior. Rahitnama (code of conduct) literature became a genre popular among the Khalsa Sikh literati in the pre-colonial period. The rahitnamas of the eighteenth century often discussed the Khalsa Singh's relationship with the musaddi (clerk, scribe, civil servant) Sikhs who represented the elite Khatri Sikh without it being explicitly stated that they were Khatris. The distinguishing characteristic of the musaddi was fluency in Persian and, by extension, fondness for Mughal Persianate civility and employment (naukari) in Indo-Islamic (Turk) courts. The Khalsa Singhs were encouraged to feel antipathy towards the musaddi.

The Chaupa Singh Rahitnama advised Khalsa Sikhs not to forgive certain transgressions of musaddi Sikhs: ‘With respect to the Guru's musaddi Sikhs, they who are employed in Indo-Islamic courts (sarkar Turkan), forgive them for all their transgressions (kurahitan) with the exception of the following three: first, daughter killing; second, tonsure rites (bhaddan), and third, consumption of tobacco (bikhiaa).’Footnote ⁹¹ This seems a rather harsh line as the elite Khatris had opted not to join the Khalsa in order to be able to practise bhaddar and use hukka. Yet under this injunction even non-Khalsa Sikhs were prohibited from bhaddar and hukka. The Chaupa Singh Rahitnama also contains a revealing anecdote:

The Khatri Sikhs were considered inadequate for military service principally because they were familiar with Persian. It was believed that being of a Persianate disposition meant that Khatris were familiar with analysing and debating ideas, but did not have the disposition to be warriors. By contrast, Khalsa Singhs were soldiers who followed the commands of their Guru with unwavering faith and were prepared to kill and be killed without a second thought. Unlike the Khatris, the Khalsa warriors did not take calculated risks about life and death.

In several rahitnamas Khalsa Singhs were advised to avoid Persian speakers and even the Persian language. In the Daya Singh Rahitnama the author told the Singhs to avoid Persian speakers:

The author was clearly attacking the Khatris and other Persianate elites. He reiterated this point by stating ‘only hire Khalsa Sikhs for the positions of warrior (fauj), clerk (musaddi), minister (wazir) and treasurer (diwan), it will increase the faith (dharm)’.Footnote ⁹⁴ The Rahitnama of Bhai Sahib Singh advised: ‘Never learn Arabic and Persian; my Sikh does not do the service (naukari) [of Indo-Islamic court].’Footnote ⁹⁵ The Khalsa Singhs were forbidden to do the naukari of any lord other than the Khalsa Panth: in the Desa Singh Rahitnama it states a ‘[a Khalsa Singh] is a naukar only to the Khalsa’.Footnote ⁹⁶ Of course, this order to avoid Persian was not meant to be taken literally because many Khalsa Sikhs were learned in Persian, but it does show the disdain the Singhs had for Persianate civility and those elite Khatris who belonged to that Mughal world.

The Saraswat Brahman Khalsa Sikh litterateur, Kesar Singh Chhibbar, in his eighteenth century verse narrative of the Sikh Gurus and their families, Bansavalinama Dasan Patshahian Ka (Genealogy of the Ten Kings), explained that Guru Gobind Singh created the Khalsa identity with the intention that it would be separate from the Mughal (Turk) and, interestingly, Khatri identities:

Despite being a Brahman, Chhibbar condemned the practice of the tonsure rites, which he associates with the Khatris. In his opinion the Khatris, exactly like the Mughals, were separate from the Khalsa's nishani (appearance; symbol). Chhibbar, like the rest of the Khalsa literati of the period, knew of, either directly or indirectly, Sainapati's narrative regarding the Khatris’ reaction to the Khalsa in Delhi. As a result of that episode, the issue of bhaddar Footnote ⁹⁸ became centrally important for the eighteenth century Khalsa intelligentsia when explaining the uniqueness of their identity and their disassociation from Indo-Islamic civility and Brahmanical practices. In eighteenth century Khalsa literature the musaddi Sikhs became almost an enemy within the Sikh sangat; even though they were not a true reprobate group, as result of their early eighteenth century political loyalties, there was a lingering suspicion that they hated the Khalsa's distinctive nishani and political objectives.

The musaddi Khatris did not respond to these Khalsa accusations of meekness and untrustworthiness by objecting to the characterization. In Ganesh Das Vadhera's nineteenth century Persian history, Char Bagh-i Panjab, completed in 1849, he reflects upon the reasons why the Khatris rejected the Khalsa. This is particularly significant because Vadhera was from a family of Khatri administrators and had spent his career working as an administrator in his native Punjab. Importantly, Vadhera's account was partly composed of family reminiscences and arguably reflects a more general Khatri opinion on their caste's reaction to the Khalsa's formation in Punjab and Delhi. Vadhera wrote:

Vadhera refers to those Khatris employed in Mughal service. The Khatris’ emphasis on their ‘weakness’ and lack of courage can possibly be read from the perspective of any pragmatic retailer who might say ‘the customer is always right’. The Khatri community did not want to harm their goodwill with the Khalsa Sikhs—and here it should be reiterated that Vadhera had worked for Sikh states. However, read in the context of the changes experienced by the Khatri community after the decline of the Mughal empire it may reflect how the Khatris had re-examined their identity as the eighteenth century progressed. There was perhaps a conscious effort to move away from the Mughal-oriented culture of the ‘great sahu’ that had once featured prominently in the aspirations of elite Khatris; instead they might have begun to embrace a more frugal merchant culture. Bayly notes how the Khatris in late eighteenth century Benares partitioned their lives into Persian and Punjabi realms: ‘“Punjabi” dialect was used in the home, Persian outside; Persian court dress was exchanged for the dhoti at home; the outward magnificence of the haveli palace contrasted with the severity of its inner rooms; “Khattri” jewellery was kept separately from “Mughal” jewellery.’Footnote ¹⁰⁰ The separation of Punjabi and Persian perhaps reflected how the Khatris began to feel that Mughal civility was artificial, and that Punjabi or (more likely) a desi (native) Khatri culture was natural. It is possible that the emergence of Khalsa political power gradually felt more desi to eighteenth century elite Khatri sensibilities because Sikhism had continued to play an important role in Khatri bhakti practices—and after all the Sikh Gurus were Khatris.

The public debate that occurred in early eighteenth century Delhi shaped the Sikh community in a profound way for the rest of the century. It created a boundary between the Khalsa Singhs and the musaddi Sikhs. This boundary reflected the real transition experienced by ordinary Sikhs in the early eighteenth century as Sikhism became a coherent political bhakti tradition. The musaddi Sikhs were unable to move with the times, and the elite Khatri community subsequently had to reassess their relationship with Sikhism as the Khalsa grew in popularity and power. In addition, the decline of the Mughal empire resulted in Mughal civility losing its glamour in a marketplace occupied by the nouveau riche Khalsa Singhs. Accordingly the distinction between the Khalsa Singh and the musaddi Sikh gradually disappeared from nineteenth century Khalsa literature. So for the Sikhs of the late eighteenth century onwards, the public debate and persecution in Delhi, as recorded in the Sri Gur Sobha, became irrelevant and was remembered only in the text. And for the Khalsa literati the importance of bhaddar as a marker of the identity of a Singh lost its meaning, although the significance of having kes (unshorn hair) never disappeared.