This is a fine book, written by a political scientist who has spent half a lifetime learning, doing, and sometimes disbelieving neoclassical economics. Jonathan Schlefer knows his economics well enough to navigate through the central assumptions of even the most intricate economic models without imposing a single line of Greek-letter algebra upon the reader. The book is consequently a model of concision and clarity from beginning to end.
Nearly a generation back (1987), the Santa Fe Institute organized a matchup between a team of high-level economists—Kenneth Arrow, Brian Arthur, and Larry Summers among them—and a squad of high-level natural scientists. Over the course of two weeks, they worked through a series of widely established economic models up to and including the celebrated Arrow-Debreu account of general equilibrium. Some of the natural scientists good-naturedly flagged the close resemblance between the math in those models and the math in physics textbooks from the World War I era. Newtonian equilibrium among heavenly bodies apparently parallels equilibrium in markets for wheat and oil. More interestingly, some were stunned by the unrealistic assumptions being embraced by the economists—shoppers with perfect information, everyone displaying formal rationality, so-called perfect competition in which no seller or buyer has power enough to move prices. As one scientist asked, “You guys really believe that?” What we have in The Assumptions Economists Make is a well-reasoned survey of some key assumptions that Schlefer does, and more relevantly does not, believe.
The last 30 years of Chicago School economics have been devoted to clearing away government regulations in order to make room for the efficiencies that are, in theory, achieved by decentralized, competitive markets. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and several central banks have carried that gospel into markets for products as diverse as clean water, investment capital, electrical energy, and airline tickets. In some instances, dramatic efficiency gains resulted, as with early airline deregulation in the United States. On several other occasions—many running together in the Great Recession of 2008—the forces at work bore little resemblance to the models that justified deregulation (where was Glass-Steagall when we needed it?). The impact of the Chicago-prescribed economic medicine on some developing economies has been brutal, far worse than the “pathologies” it was intended to cure. Many have, of course, pointed out that the now-advanced market societies supporting free trade for newcomers got where they are through the use of protectionist industrial policies over many crucial decades of their own development.
Capitalism, especially the part driven by very large joint stock corporations, has brought those of us living in the advanced economies cheaper, better, and sometimes safer products of virtually every kind. Think cars, so-called white goods, electronics, balloon-construction housing, pharmaceuticals, music, and (admittedly industrial) food. Like it or not, giant corporations—most of all Walmart with its 2 million workers, 110 square miles of parking lots, and 32 square miles of store space—have also played a central role in distributing these products cheaply. In virtually every such market segment, cheapness is achieved through economies of scale: As we go from hundreds of units to millions of units being produced and sold, cost per unit plummets. Sometimes—as with software and recorded music—marginal cost goes vanishingly close to zero. Sometimes, as with the Bonsack cigarette machine in the late 1800s, a truly dangerous product was produced and distributed so efficiently that millions were sickened or killed. More commonly, useful stuff gets out there at low prices. If there is even mild competitive pressure, much of the resulting benefit gets passed on to consumers.
Yet the conventional neoclassical models depend on the assumption that such economies of scale do not exist (Adam Smith, by the way, recognized and praised gains from scale). The models in question were developed in the last half of the nineteenth century, during the years when Carnegie was building U.S. Steel, Rockefeller was beating the world into submission before his Standard Oil, and the great American railroads were being given government land roughly equal in extent to all of New England. Why would an academic discipline populated by so many talented people choose to defy so dominant a fact as scale economies achieved by large firms? There are two main reasons. First, the “marginalist” models developed by W. S. Jevons and Léon Walras produce their elegant and well-behaved equilibria only if you first assume diminishing returns to scale (this instead of a messy and ideologically embarrassing race toward oligopoly and even monopoly). Second, those models support Smith's mythical invisible hand as a benign story about what happens when government leaves markets to do their self-regulating work. A not-so-recent New Yorker cartoon captures the point neatly, showing a Mom and Pop storefront being boarded up with a banner reading “Bitch Slapped by the Invisible Hand.” Slapped, that is, by big retailers imposing lower prices made possible by their returns to scale.
Joseph Schumpeter, always a troublemaker, took a very different view. He narrates the drift toward oligopolies and monopolies among firms exploiting powerful scale economies. He even feigns to fear for the future of capitalism as these coercive giants extract rents from defenseless publics. His thesis, founded on empirical observation, is that novel products, and novel ways of making or distributing old ones, constantly threaten incumbent oligopolies and monopolies with “creative destruction.” General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and the “Treaty of Detroit” come into the story for Shlefer. The arrival of Asian cars brought Schumpeterian destruction to that once-comfortable oligopoly. The oligopolies clustered around the U.S. Department of Defense these days look in some respects ripe for the threat that would be posed by the dark shadow of peace.
Most of Shlefler's attention falls on microeconomics, but he does forcefully take into account Milton Friedman's doctrine that models must rise or fall on the accuracy of their predictions and the efficacy of their prescriptions. Here is his account of the Great Recession of 2008 as it brings the weight of evidence on Friedman's own faith in the money supply as an instrument of policy: “[T]he 2008 financial crisis put Friedman's [monetarism] to the test, and it failed. He claimed that inept monetary policies, not unregulated financial markets, caused financial crises throughout the course of American history. [Ben] Bernanke espoused his theory, so presumably he tried to manage monetary policy in accordance with it…. The instability of private financial markets largely drove the crisis…. Let me set down as a criterion, then: models should not prove clearly inconsistent with historical or statistical experience” (p. 276; Schlefer's emphasis).
I myself have come to believe that economics is central to any humane reading of the past, and necessary to nearly any useful prescription for the future. Yet much of the most interesting and useful work to be done will be messier, less dependent on axiomatic thinking, and more attentive to human beings caught up in culture, seeing the world in ways that have often been erased by blackboard economics. By exposing the assumptions behind blackboard economics, and subjecting them to careful scrutiny, Schlefer's book is an important contribution to the indispensable project of rethinking economics.
