When Belize (formerly British Honduras) became independent in 1981, it inherited the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute over Belizean territorial and maritime boundaries. This dispute, which is now over 200 years old, appeared to have been resolved in 1859 by the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty signed in that year and ratified by both governments soon afterwards. Article 7 of the Treaty committed both sides ‘to use their best efforts, by taking adequate means[,] for establishing the easiest communication (either by means of a cart-road, or employing the rivers, or both united, according to the opinion of the surveying engineers), between the fittest place on the Atlantic Coast, near the settlement of Belize, and the capital of Guatemala’ (p. 16).
The imprecise language of this article persuaded both sides to adopt a Convention in 1863 in which Great Britain agreed to contribute £50,000 as its share of the building of a railway from Guatemala City to the Atlantic coast. However, the Convention was not ratified in time and what should have been a simple matter to resolve has become one of the longest-running diplomatic disputes in history.
The dispute has exercised diplomats and academics alike, including Professor Robin Humphreys, who published The Diplomatic History of British Honduras in 1961 shortly before becoming the first Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies in London. However, the dispute rumbled on and has now found a new and welcome history at the hands of Assad Shoman, a distinguished Belizean who knows more about the issue than anyone else alive.
Shoman has no doubt about British culpability for this sorry affair. As he writes on p. 29:
The man who negotiated the 1859 Treaty for Britain … made it clear to his government, both before and after signature, that in his view Guatemala was ceding some territory to Britain and regarded Article 7 as compensation for that cession, as he also did. Several British officials later considered that Britain had indeed contracted an obligation, certainly moral and possibly legal, to comply in some way with Article 7, and that the subsequent 1863 Convention and Guatemala's late ratification did not extinguish that commitment. But the British government, for financial reasons, consistently refused to honour that obligation.
Despite this, Guatemala continued to play along, albeit with reservations. In 1931, for example, it even reaffirmed acceptance of the 1859 treaty boundaries and was willing to complete demarcation of the boundary (begun in 1861) if the United Kingdom would address its Article 7 obligation. The United Kingdom refused and in 1940 President Jorge Ubico declared the 1859 treaty had lapsed due to the British refusal to meet its commitment. In 1945, after the fall of Ubico and following free elections, a new Guatemalan Constitution declared ‘Belice’ to be part of Guatemala. Schoolchildren would now be taught ‘Belice es nuestro’.
The dispute continued, but by now nationalists in Belize had organised themselves into political parties and demanded a presence in the negotiations. This is where Assad Shoman's contribution is invaluable, as he was a party to many of these discussions as well possessing a treasure trove of primary sources obtained from the participants in the long-running saga. He therefore witnessed attempts by both the British and US governments to force Belize into territorial concessions as well as the ambiguous stance of the Mexican government that finally dropped its own claim to Belize in the 1970s.
Belize's successful struggle for independence was therefore intimately bound up with the unsuccessful negotiations to resolve the dispute between Great Britain and Guatemala. This had still not been resolved by the time of independence, requiring the UK to provide a defence guarantee. Soon after that, Guatemala adopted a new Constitution that was less confrontational to Belize and in 1992 the Guatemalan government recognised Belize as a sovereign state. The United Kingdom then withdrew its defence guarantee.
Guatemala may have recognised Belize's independence, but it did not recognise its borders. The dispute therefore rumbled on, this time between Guatemala and Belize alone. After decades of fruitless negotiations, painstakingly documented by Assad Shoman, both governments agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Since rulings of the ICJ cannot be appealed, both countries agreed to hold a referendum on the question of going to the ICJ. Guatemala voted overwhelmingly to do so in April 2018 and Belize on present plans will vote on 10 April 2019. If Belize votes against going to the ICJ, the parties will at some point have to return to bilateral negotiations.
Shoman's book is meticulously researched. Although he was a protagonist and is strongly in favour of going to the ICJ, he has managed to write an account that is scrupulously fair through its attention to detail and mastery of the facts. He has interviewed many of the key players outside Belize involved in this dispute including British, Cuban, Guatemalan, Mexican and Panamanian officials. He has even managed to find documents that eluded Robin Humphreys nearly 60 years ago through his forensic use of the British and Guatemalan archives. All in all, it is a magnificent achievement.
