Diplomatic historians have grown accustomed to hearing that we need to employ more theoretical approaches to our subfield. Often, this implicitly means methodologies taken from the field of literary criticism and cultural studies. Such theory falls under the general rubric of postmodern/postcolonial theory, with its focus upon the construction and functioning of hegemonic discourses, that is, the critical study of ways in which modes of speaking and representation reflect and reinforce power relationships. Those who wish to see such critical methods applied to the grand sweep of United States diplomatic history now need look no further than Walter Hixson's The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy. Postmodern theory provides Myth of American Diplomacy with its analytical framework. Hixson seeks to demonstrate that U.S. foreign policy, “bolstered by a usable past, encompasses a vast realm of representation and linguistic discourse that has served to create, affirm, and maintain cultural hegemony” (9). In doing so, however, he has written a seriously flawed book. This review seeks to address only the broadest of these flaws, namely, philosophical and fundamental methodological issues.
One fundamental problem with the book is that its author gives no sense of having chosen postmodern methodology on the basis of an understanding of the underlying philosophical issues that investigations such as his will raise. A reader who approaches this book with some knowledge of Anglo-American analytic philosophy will immediately note significant conceptual problems, including confusion regarding ontology and a neglect of philosophy of language. With regard to ontology, Hixson purports to be a thoroughgoing social constructivist (though one who is unaware of, or at least uninterested in, the flourishing of constructivism in contemporary international relations theory: absent from the bibliography are names such as Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Martha Finnemore, and Peter Katzenstein). One of his assumptions, repeated in various permutations, is that “nations are not real but rather are imagined” (6). Hixson thus misunderstands Benedict Anderson's familiar description of nations as “imagined communities” as implying that they are also imaginary communities. He ridicules the idea that by “invoking the named community” one is using a word—a name—that “reflects an ontological status, a universally accepted state of being” (7). But what can Hixson mean? In fact, when one speaks of the “social construction of reality,” one perforce implies that there are “constructed social realities,” in the words of philosopher John Searle. Hixson neither adopts nor confronts Searle's distinction between “brute fact” and “institutional fact.” The reader thus encounters something of a sliding-scale ontology. Consider Hixson's assertion that despite the new republic's “national discourse of individual freedom … words could not transform the racial violence embedded within Euro-American identity” (39). The nation's sins emerge from these pages with a privileged ontological status; they are real, even though the nation that allegedly committed them is not.
Philosophy of language poses the next problem for Myth of American Diplomacy. This is too broad a criticism to be fleshed out in a review. I will just mention here what seems the most serious philosophical difficulty presented by the postmodern approach to diplomatic history, at least as encountered in Myth of American Diplomacy. Hixson has written a book that is fundamentally about the relationship of language to the world—the core of any postmodern critique of anything—but that, nevertheless, displays no familiarity with the hugely influential work on this topic by the Anglo-Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Furthermore, Hixson demonstrates no familiarity with the difficulties that the later Wittgenstein poses for the deconstructionist view of meaning. Wittgenstein emphasizes the need to understand the context in which language is used. The meanings of words are not indeterminate or unknowable, but rather depend upon the “language games” (Sprachspiele) in which they are employed.
The methodology of Myth of American Diplomacy loses significant credibility by failing to address this insight in a convincing way. To say that certain words are constructed as “gendered,” “racial,” or “hegemonic” is to leave open the possibility that there are frames of reference—”language games”—in which they are not so constructed. Hixson proclaims early on that “the cultural turn presents insoluble dilemmas to the empiricists” (5). In fact, the insoluble dilemma is Hixson's, and it is just one result of his failure to engage post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. Hixson would have historians move beyond empiricism and focus more on the social construction of the meaning of words. But how is one to determine the meaning of words used (as words invariably are) in a particular time and place, if not through an empirical investigation of the cultural context in which the words are used? Diplomatic historians, he alleges, suffer from a “preoccupation with archival sources and conventional methodology.” This leads them to miss the point that “what really matters is the interpretation” and not the “facts” (4). Left unaddressed is the question of how one can understand the interpretation that people in the past gave to their words if not through the traditional empirical research, and hence “facts,” that Hixson denigrates.
Consider two examples. Chapter 2, “The White Man's Continent,” begins with a reference to the Founders as “men well schooled in the classics of Greece and Rome” who “viewed themselves as architects of a manly empire.” It then quotes Hamilton as referring to the United States as “Hercules in the cradle.” This classical allusion “foreshadowed” America's future as “the splendid, unchained embodiment of aggressive masculine power” (43). But anyone “well schooled” in the classics would have recognized that Hamilton was alluding not to America's power, but to its vulnerability; to a myth in which the jealous goddess Hera sends two serpents to kill the baby Hercules in his crib. If one reads the letter that is the source of this quote, Hamilton's preoccupation with America's vulnerability becomes obvious. In fact, it is his 1794 letter to Washington, urging him to send John Jay to London in order to seek peace—in a not-so-”manly” way, Hixson might say—with one of the serpents. Or consider that later in the same chapter Hixson quotes John Quincy Adams referring to the United States with feminine pronouns, thus feminizing the United States and “render[ing] it discursively incapable of aggression” (62). Yet even a cursory perusal of Adams's diaries reveals that he used “she” in referring to Great Britain and France as well. Had Adams thus construed the two great empires of Europe as incapable of imperial aggression? For both quotes, Hixson relies upon secondary sources. Yet empirical research in the relevant documents reveals better than any procrustean theory how the sources of the quotes constructed their meaning.
These examples point also to the danger of thesis-driven conclusions. As an example, take Hixson's treatment of the slave rebellion in what is now called Haiti. White Americans, one learns, were so horrified by the Haitian slave revolt that “the United States sided with the French planters” (46). Later, Hixson states bluntly that the United States “opposed the republican revolution against France” (118). Indeed this is what the “trope of race”—an important element in Hixson's “Myth”—dictates should have happened. Yet in reality, slaveholding Virginians Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison actually sent arms shipments and other aid to the black rebels. Their reasons had little to do with race, and much to do with the very national security concerns that Hixson treats dismissively. “Taking the cultural turn,” he confidently declares, “destabilizes realist interpretations of national security policy” (5). It is hard to see how it does this, however, if it demands interpretations of past events that are so at odds with the empirical evidence. Some of the book's factual errors, while distracting, are not fundamentally damaging to Hixson's thesis: for example, “slavery existed only in the South,” or “the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 forced the summit in Geneva” (57, 187). Others, such as the treatment of the Haitian slave rebellion, suggest a theory used, not to understand data, but to substitute for it.
Any attempt to devise a cultural reading of American foreign relations faces two related threshold questions. First, how does the cultural emphasis upon continuity over time deal with change, and especially abrupt changes to policy that can follow in the wake of unexpected events in the outside world? Second, in a more general sense, how does a methodology that explains American foreign policy in terms of domestic determinants integrate the rest of the world into its narrative of American international relations? On this latter question, The Myth of American Diplomacy provides little guidance, thus making an assessment of the first question impossible. Other nations appear in its pages not as counterparts with which American policymakers interact, but rather as a scenic background against which the United States moves and acts, or else as the victims of American action. The degree to which international and comparative history is missing from Hixson's survey of American international relations is quite remarkable. So, too, is his definition of postrevisionist scholars of the Cold War as “nationalist historians,” dismissing, as it does, the contributions of a legion of non-American scholars whom Hixson then leaves out of his bibliography (3). And absent from the index are the names Adenauer, De Gasperi, Bevin, Yoshida, Schumann, Monnet—even de Gaulle.
Perhaps in an attempt to anticipate such criticism, he states that international and comparative approaches to U.S. diplomatic history have tended to “deflect attention away from analysis of foreign policy rooted in domestic cultural identity” (3). But this simply presupposes as axiomatic the very question at the heart of the book, namely the extent to which cultural identity—as opposed to interactions with foreign actors who also demonstrate agency—determines foreign policy. Hixson understandably wishes to broaden the domestic, American side of international history beyond Washington policy elites. And without question, Myth of American Diplomacy makes a number of very controversial assertions. But one may well wonder how radical a study can be if it seeks to place domestic developments in the United States at the center of the world's contemporary history.
