Cicero is certainly a founder of European political and social thought; and Malcolm Schofield is just the right person to provide a full and judicious assessment. S. knows Cicero, and the tradition in which he worked, extremely well. He is a master of ancient philosophy and political thought. He also gives much attention to modern issues, especially the tradition of republican thought, which is a focus of the series in which this book appears. The result is a very rich, complex evaluation that deserves the attention of the reader on every page.

With the exception of the first, introductory chapter, S. frames each chapter with an issue that has modern relevance; in between, he develops an in-depth analysis by drawing on a great variety of sources, along with focusing on Cicero. This approach works especially well, it seems to me, in ch. 4, entitled ‘Cosmopolitanism, Imperialism, and the Idea of Law’. Here S. highlights Roman imperialism in a new way by setting it off against cosmopolitanism and, in particular, singling out Philus’ speech in book 3 of On the Commonwealth as a defence of imperialism. Along the way, S. engages in Stoic thought and as well gives a glimpse of the Academic Carneades. The entire sub-section on imperialism (‘Justice and Imperialism’, 125–35) is beautifully put together.

Inevitably, there is the risk that, by showing what is relevant to modern republicanism, an author may fail to give full weight to what is distinctive about Cicero's own importance as a political thinker. S. deserves much credit for striking the right balance; but, at times, there are signs of strain. Ch. 5, ‘Republican Virtues’, rightly aims to give an overview of Cicero's ideas on virtue, instead of dealing merely with on On Duties. Among other topics, the section on justice includes a very fine essay on Cicero's defence of private property (162–4). What drops out, on the other hand, is the full force of Cicero's argument on justice in book 1 of On Duties, including what we owe to others, as set out by the famous image of concentric circles (On Duties 1.53). S. gives attention to the image elsewhere in his book (111–12 and 189–90). But the overall effect of splitting up Cicero's own considered position is that he appears less as a political thinker than as a precursor.

In the discussion of another virtue, ‘greatness of mind’ (magnitudo animi), S. takes issue with A. A. Long for proposing that Cicero sought to ‘reform’ the ‘traditional honour code’ (168). Instead, S. suggests, Cicero sought a ‘restoration’ of traditional values rather than reform (169). What is missing here, as I see it, is Cicero's fundamentally new analysis of greatness of mind as the distinctive virtue of a political leader, whom Cicero construes, moreover, not merely as a military but also as a peace-time leader. As for the virtue traditionally known as temperance, S. identifies it as verecundia. One might object that this is just one of the components of the virtue, as opposed to the overarching importance, much reiterated, of ‘propriety’ (decorum, decus, decet). Schofield relates verecundia to republican ‘civility’, but this overlooks the rather un-republican importance Cicero assigns to social standing, or hierarchy.

Last, I turn to what S. presents as Cicero's most basic contribution to political thought: the definition of res publica as res populi, together with the definition of a ‘people’, populus, as a community united by ‘consent on ius and sharing in advantage’ (On Commonwealth 1.41). In S.'s words, the joint definition ‘supplies the foundational idea of popular sovereignty’ as well as ‘provides criteria for the legitimacy of a political system’ (65). He aptly translates res populi as ‘business and interests of the people’. He translates ius less aptly, in my view, as ‘justice’; for ius has a much broader range of meaning (roughly ‘right’) and there is a precise term, iustitia, which Cicero could have used if that is what he meant. Following Plato, I suggest, Cicero starts with a commonly agreed upon definition, which is superficially applicable to any political community, then develops an argument for the ‘greatest justice’ (summa iustitia, 2.70). This argument continues in On Laws and On Duties, so that one might well suppose that what Cicero himself considers his basic contribution to political thought is an alternative theory of justice to that of Plato.

The term ‘people’, populus, is deeply ambiguous. As S. himself points out, the term can mean the citizen body as a whole, or the ordinary people, as distinct from an aristocratic elite (34–5). Cicero uses the term in both senses. How close, then, does he come to an idea of ‘popular sovereignty’? S. provides a finely nuanced analysis of Cicero's best form of res publica: the so-called ‘mixed’ and ‘balanced’ res publica, as exemplified by Rome. What remains fuzzy from the ‘calibration’ that S. imputes to Cicero is the basic assumption of a highly hierarchical system. An example is Cicero's proposed law to retain the written ballot, but make it mandatary to show it to any dignitary (optimo cuique et gravissimo civi) who asks (On Laws 3.39). This law, Cicero says, gives the ‘appearance (species) of freedom’. S. (92) takes species to mean ‘symbolic guarantee’: but this, I think, is undermined by Cicero's own explanation that the ‘freedom’ bestowed by the law ‘consists in the very fact that power is given to the people to gratify (gratificandi) the good in an honourable way’. This is hardly the ‘real’ freedom Cicero promised earlier (On Laws 3.25) by retaining the tribunate.

In sum, S. provides a remarkably rich, admirably reasoned overview of Cicero's influence as a political thinker. Whatever one may miss or disagree with, he has given readers a supremely expert basis for making up their own minds.