This book has many unique characteristics, from its subject matter to its style. It examines the history and development of the concept of superstition from the Hippocratics to the Christians in a comprehensive tour de force of ancient poetry, medicine, philosophy, history, and religion. The book is written in a delightful style that combines just the right amount of scholarly expertise and entertaining storytelling. It will be of interest to specialists in classics, religion, and philosophy, as well as to the general reader who is curious to have a peek into Greek and Roman daily and intellectual life.

In scholarship, the subject of superstition in classical antiquity is usually a part of larger studies of mythology, literature, science, religion, ritual, or magic. Naturally, this secondary treatment has deprived the subject of deeper understanding and more visibility. Martin's book breaks the ground of studying the concept of superstition in its own right as the forerunner of the important role the concept plays in the history of Christianity and, especially in its formative period, on the background of ancient paganism.

The book begins by introducing the concept of superstition in the context of Christian ritual practices and their misunderstanding by the officials in the Roman Empire. The second chapter discusses the difficulties of defining the meaning of “superstition” in antiquity. Unlike today, the term “superstition” with its closest Greek equivalent deisidaimonia had a conflicting spectrum of meanings, ranging from expressing piety and religiosity to expressing excessive fearfulness of the supernatural. The third chapter examines the presentation of the concept of deisidaimonia as excessive fearfulness of the supernatural in the fourth century b.c.e., in the Characters of Theophrastus, the pupil and successor of Aristotle in the Lyceum. The chapter offers an interesting glimpse of everyday life in Athens and its cultural conventions. The fourth chapter traces the origin of the concept in the Hippocratic writings and especially in the treatise On the Sacred Disease, which argues against laymen's supernatural explanation of epilepsy. The chapter also engagingly portrays the intellectual fervor with which medicine had to define itself as a separate discipline from philosophy, magic, and astrology. The fifth chapter analyzes the uses of deisidaimonia in Plato and Aristotle, with primary emphasis on the foundation of the critical assessment of myth in Plato and on the teleological systematization of the universe and human society in Aristotle. In opposition to the philosophers' rationalization of men's attitudes toward the gods, the sixth chapter reinstalls the notion of the ambivalence of the term deisidaimonia, as presented, in the first century b.c.e., in the works of Diodorus Siculus. Depending on the context, Diodorus uses deisidaimonia to mean “piety” or “superstition.” He provides an overwhelming number of examples for each interpretation and, most important, leaves the question of the particular meaning of the word open to his audience to decide. This free-interpretation approach stands in stark opposition to the philosophers' attempt at rationalization of men's relations with the gods. In chapter 7, this new approach opens the possibility for Plutarch, in the first century c.e., to reintroduce the question of deisidaimonia on the philosophical stage as laymen's “ignorance about the true nature of the gods” (95). In chapter 8, Martin brings his study back to the medical field, this time in the figure of Galen, who lived only a few decades after Plutarch. Contrary to the intolerant views toward superstition of his Hippocratic predecessors, Galen, true to the cultural and conceptual complexity of late antiquity, expresses both reverence and skepticism toward the gods. Chapters 9 and 10 shift the focus from the medical and private spheres to the strongly politicized fear of ill divine intent at Rome. In the truly Roman phenomenon of politicization, Martin finds the roots of the Romans' persecution of Christianity. Chapter 11 presents Origen's defense of Christianity from the Roman accusations of superstition by countering that all pagan worship is based on superstition and that all daimons are evil. The question of the status of daimons is the subject of chapter 12, which focuses on the Neoplatonic understanding of a complex hierarchy of daimons and the heightened superstitions of the late ancient philosophers. Martin rightfully perceives these changes to be a result of the shifting political, ideological, and philosophical paradigms of the times. The last chapter brings the investigation full circle by demonstrating how Christians in the second and third centuries c.e., in the figure of Eusebius of Caesarea, perceive Greek and Roman religious beliefs and cults as superstition. This circular thematic arrangement, from the Romans' charges of superstition against the Christians to the Christians' charges of superstition against the Romans, highlights one of the underlying theses of the book, that the history of the concept of superstition in antiquity explains the reasons for the failure of what Martin calls “the Grand Optimal Illusion” of ancient Greece and Rome. Ancient philosophy, according to the author, conceived of the universe, on the grand scale of things, as good simply because it “ought to be so” (227). This conception did not provide a persuasive rational explanation of the imperfect, and even at times capricious, nature of human existence in antiquity. It is also an illusion, Martin argues, because the ancient philosophers did not find an actual proof of their speculations. While I agree with Martin's assessment of the ancients' attempts at understanding the universe and men's relation with gods as grand and optimal, I am not convinced it is an illusion because of the lack of factual data. Don't we today also suffer from superstitions although we have all the scientific data to prove them insubstantial? Perhaps the answer to the question of superstition lies in humans' attempts at procuring divine good will or at least controlling the unpredictable events in life.

It is apparent from the above summary that the greatest achievements of the book are its encyclopedic wealth of information and Martin's pioneering work at reconstructing a concept that has a meaning that was, in antiquity, ambivalent at best. The clear and concise style of the book is also impressive. I must admit that the thematic arrangement of the chapters creates the notion of disjointedness in the beginning of the book. For example, the chronological beginning of Martin's analysis—the use of the concept by the Hippocratics—is not introduced until chapter 4, after the chapters that discuss the Roman perception of Christianity as superstition, the problems of definition, and Theophrastus's use of deisidaimonia. This chronological meandering may distract a reader who is not closely familiar with ancient history and literature. But Martin has set up an ambitious goal in this book, and he has achieved it meritoriously.