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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2005
Whether in 1870 or in 2003, reformers concerned with the global logic of capitalism have dreamed of effective international labor standards, imposed through a world body that would stop the downward spiral of wages and working conditions. Here Edward Lorenz offers us a history of US political debates over the International Labor Organization (ILO), founded precisely to stop that spiral. His study provides a comprehensive overview of the different big-level national interests who sought, alternately, to support, contain, or repress the ILO. It's full of enticing research leads and fascinating tidbits about US debates over the ILO. International Labor and Working-Class History (ILWCH) readers, though, will still be left frustrated in their efforts to understand US involvement in the ILO and, especially, organized labor's relationship to it.
Whether in 1870 or in 2003, reformers concerned with the global logic of capitalism have dreamed of effective international labor standards, imposed through a world body that would stop the downward spiral of wages and working conditions. Here Edward Lorenz offers us a history of US political debates over the International Labor Organization (ILO), founded precisely to stop that spiral. His study provides a comprehensive overview of the different big-level national interests who sought, alternately, to support, contain, or repress the ILO. It's full of enticing research leads and fascinating tidbits about US debates over the ILO. International Labor and Working-Class History (ILWCH) readers, though, will still be left frustrated in their efforts to understand US involvement in the ILO and, especially, organized labor's relationship to it.
The central drive behind the book is less a historical understanding of the ILO's effectiveness than a political scientist's argument about the US political system. The ILO's tripartite structure, Lorenz argues, in which government, labor, and business each have guaranteed representatives, reflects the US system's openness to incorporating civil society in the governing process. “Good societies need free institutions to speak for the outcasts and the vulnerable,” he writes, and the US political system provides “a check on the corruption of public life by the privileged” (6). The ILO, he argues, “globalized the American pluralist policy process,” (15) bringing non-elites into politics, and it thus offers a successful export model. At the same time it confirms the virtues of the US political system at home: “The periodic success of the labor rights movement shows the US system can be made to define justice for all” (16).
The main body of his text then outlines the history of the pressures aligned for and against US involvement in the ILO. Lorenz lays out the main players and sets them in motion with a welcome ability to keep a complex story clear, as he traces efforts by the National Consumers' League, reformist business interests, pro-labor academics, the American Federation of Labor, churches, and, as the story moves forward, New Dealers, anticommunists both within and outside the AFL-CIO, and free market economists.
The ILO was founded at the end of World War I as part of the Treaty of Versailles, which created a series of international bodies including the League of Nations, the World Court, and the ILO—all of which the United States government refused to join. A coalition of the National Consumers' League, Progressive academics in the American Association for Labor Legislation, and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) nonetheless lobbied hard for US involvement and kept pressure up for US involvement in the growing European movement for international labor standards.
Lorenz shows how that Progressive generation subsequently carried its concerns into the New Deal, in 1938 passing the Fair Labor Standards Act to harmonize labor standards across the fifty states. In 1934 they finally brought the US into the ILO. Meanwhile, certain business interests themselves started sniffing around about how international standards might be useful. One of the best nuggets in this book is the story of how New England textile manufacturers and their political allies, especially New Hampshire governor John Winant, became committed to labor standards as an answer to the textile industry's migration, first from the US North to the South, and then to Japan.
After World War II, the US was all for global institutions, and it wanted to run them. Winant became ILO president. The ILO quickly evolved into a useful instrument in the Cold War, as the US used it to attack the Soviet bloc's lack of “free” trade unions. For Lorenz, the best moment in the history of US involvement in the ILO was when it walked out of the organization in the 1970s in protest against labor standards in Russia and Eastern Europe. This demonstrated, he says, the democratic promise of US institutions and the effectiveness of the ILO. Lorenz ends by reflecting on the new potential of the ILO in the 1990s and the twenty-first century as a brake against unbridled free market liberalism.
Throughout, we get a strong sense of the players involved. Lorenz, to his credit, takes the church seriously as a player in the ILO debates, especially the Catholic Church, which was a steadfast lobbyist for the ILO throughout the mid-twentieth century. He also does a good job of tracing the waxing and waning influence of the National Consumers' League over the course of the century, in particular the generation of upper-class white women who came to their full power during the New Deal—and, he underscores, would not be replicated by a succeeding generation. They, in turn, overlapped with the academic generation that began with Progressivism and likewise peaked during the late thirties and early forties, in this case replaced, Lorenz notes, by a generation of social scientists that was narrowly focused, tightly bound by discipline, little interested in social reform, and that would eventually spawn the free market ideologues who attacked the ILO head-on beginning in the 1950s.
We also get a tantalizing, if ultimately undeveloped sense from Lorenz of the business stakes involved. More common than the textiles scenario was business interest in the ILO as a fig leaf eliding the need for actual effective labor standards. James Shotwell, a central academic proponent of the ILO, in 1930 wrote an article actually entitled: “The International Labour Organization as an Alternative to Violent Revolution” (98). Later, he dropped off copies of his work on every door in Congress. By 1944, as both the CIO and AFL swelled in power, Fortune magazine itself called the ILO “Revolution Insurance,” (126) and soon the US moved into high gear to take over the ILO. Lorenz, unfortunately, while he provides these juicy quotes dripping from the horse's mouth, doesn't ever quite follow up on how exactly the ILO might have helped avoid that revolution; he only lets drop near the end, almost as an aside, that, after a period in which free marketers attacked the ILO head-on, by the late twentieth century “International business came to like the ILO, a group that recommended standards but didn't enforce them” (217).
The book's treatment of the labor movement is entirely top-down, largely equating organized labor with Samuel Gompers, Philip Murray, and George Meany. While Lorenz lauds labor, like the church, as a body reflecting a broad grassroots membership, we don't have a discussion of the extent to which those men did or did not reflect that membership, nor do we learn of how labor's internal discussions of the ILO developed. His only mention of the CIO is to regret that the labor movement was divided during the 1940s, and thus spoke with a less unified voice than other sectors. Ironically, one of the most interesting parts of the book is his enthusiastic account of AFL-CIO president George Meany's anticommunist use of the ILO in the 1960s and 70s, when Meany was so rabid he even outflanked the US Chamber of Commerce.
In the end, Lorenz is perhaps his most useful in providing evidence that the ILO worked because it didn't work: it provided the illusion of international labor standards, but didn't cause trouble, and it could be useful in the Cold War. As his book shows, almost every time the ILO passed effective conventions—such as those on forced labor or maternity leave—the US refused to sign. After all, as Fortune figured out, the ILO was an insurance policy, not a reformer's dream.