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From Rulings to Rules: The Formation of (Some) Halakhic Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2018

Yehuda Brandes
Yehuda Brandes*
Affiliation:
Herzog Academic College
*
brandes@herzog.ac.il

Abstract

It was the accepted practice to issue rulings in cases argued by Tannaim in the Mishnah and elsewhere on a case-by-case basis. Beginning in the time of Rabbi Yoḥanan, the manner in which rulings were given changed fundamentally, to jurisprudential rules. The new style of rulings brought with it a need to establish additional rules to supplement the basic principles produced by Rabbi Yoḥanan and his school. A highly surprising phenomenon that emerged from the demand for jurisprudential rules was the transformation of dicta specifying the law in specific cases into rules to be followed on a general basis. In this essay, I seek to characterize these specific jurisprudential dicta and to identify a number of legal principles that initially were nothing more than specific rulings, yet were then altered in significance and scope as a result of their inclusion in introductory works and compendia of jurisprudential rules.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
AJS Review , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , April 2018 , pp. 65 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Jewish Studies 2018 

Preface: From Targeted Rulings to Jurisprudential Rules

The accepted practice in the early amoraic period was to rule on cases argued by Tannaim in the Mishnah and elsewhere on a case-by-case basis, with a discussion of the issue at hand culminating in a determination.Footnote 1 Typically, a ruling was issued by one of the great authorities of the time, formulated in the style of a halakhic tradition, and from that point transmitted by scholars as an amoraic dictum. Beginning in the time of R. Yoḥanan, the manner in which rulings were given changed fundamentally, with jurisprudential rules coming into vogue as the means of deriving practical guidance from the Mishnah.Footnote 2 Two principal types of rules were conceived by R. Yoḥanan and his students: personal rules, which provided guidance for the provision of consistent rulings in mishnaic debates between the leading Tannaim, and methodological rules, which set out means of deriving a ruling based on the formulation of a tradition in the Mishnah or a baraita.Footnote 3 As the practice of ruling according to these principles gained sway, the prior mode of topical rulings based specifically on the matter at hand gradually diminished. The new style of rulings brought with it a need to establish additional rules to supplement the basic principles conceived by R. Yoḥanan and his school. Such new rules first appeared as early as the latter generations of the Amoraim, while more were developed in the time of the Geonim and Rishonim. These subsequently were consolidated in compendia and included in introductory works to the Talmud.Footnote 4 A surprising phenomenon that emerged from the demand for jurisprudential rules was the transformation of dicta specifying the law in particular cases into rules to be followed on a general basis. This essay will seek to characterize these specific jurisprudential dicta and identify several legal principles that initially were nothing more than targeted rulings, but then were altered in significance and scope as a result of their inclusion in introductory works and compendia of jurisprudential rules.

The Emergence of Jurisprudential Dicta

The sages had occasion to address themselves to halakhic questions in a variety of circumstances: sometimes during a discussion within the walls of the study hall, and at others when they found themselves in other locations, whether at home, in the field, or at court. It is the nature of questions of Halakhah to be brought to a scholar by individuals who required him to issue a ruling. Halakhic rulings thus may recapitulate a discussion previously conducted in the study hall, but equally may be transmitted as independent traditions attested by the solicitor or by an individual who was present at the time the ruling was made.Footnote 5

An example of the emergence of a halakhic tradition is afforded by the discussion in B. Pesaḥim of the blessing recited on the departure of the Sabbath or a festival. The Talmud describes a debate between Rav and Shmuel concerning the appropriate formula for the conclusion of that blessing. The discussion of that debate and a ruling on the subject, concluding with the words “but the law does not agree with him,” are followed by the following anecdote:

Ula arrived in Pumbedita.Footnote 6 Rav Yehudah said to his son Rav Yiẓḥak, “Go offer him a basket of fruitFootnote 7 and see how he says Havdalah.”Footnote 8 He did not go, [but] sentFootnote 9 Abbaye. When Abbaye came, he [i.e., Rav Yiẓḥak] said to him, “How did he say [it]?” He said, “‘Blessed is He who distinguishes between holy and mundane,’ and no more.” He came before his father. He asked him, “How did he say [it]?” He said, “I myself did not go. I sent Abbaye, and he told me ‘who distinguishes between holy and mundane.’” He said to him, “The master's pride and the master's haughtinessFootnote 10 have brought it on the master that you cannot stateFootnote 11 the tradition from his mouth.” (B. Pesaḥim 104b)

Rav Yiẓḥak sent Abbaye instead of going personally, and conscientiously reported to his father that it was Abbaye who had visited Ula and heard how he concluded the blessing. He thus forfeited the privilege of having the law stated in his name: the obligation to pass on the tradition precisely required that it be stated in the name of Abbaye.Footnote 12 The story demonstrates the way a halakhic dictum came about. Abbaye witnessed the behavior of Ula and transmitted this information, giving rise to a dictum attributed to Abbaye and citing Ula, and thus it would be transmitted in the study hall going forward.

Transmission of Jurisprudential Dicta

Word of rulings was passed between the academies and centers of rabbinic scholarship in Palestine and in Babylonia, as well as transmitted between the countries.Footnote 13 We come across such a transmission in the final chapter of B. Ketubbot, in the context of the talmudic passage on the settlement of the Land of Israel and the greatness of that enterprise. Subsequent to the discussion of the greatness of living in the Land of Israel, the Talmud tells of a letter sent by the brothers of Rabbah b. Naḥmani from Palestine to their brother in Babylonia, in which they sought to prevail upon him to migrate to the Land of Israel and become a disciple of R. Yoḥanan:

Rabbah {b. Naḥmani}’s brothers sent to him,Footnote 14 “Jacob knew that he was a thoroughly righteous person.…Footnote 15 But if you are not ascending, be cautious regarding three matters …”Footnote 16 And thus they [further] said: “Yiẓḥak, Shimon, and OshayahFootnote 17 expressed the same notion: the law is as R. Yehudah regarding [the mating of] mules.”

As has been taught:Footnote 18 “R. Yehudah says, ‘If a female mule is in heat, one mates it not with a horse or a donkey, but with its own species.’”Footnote 19 Rav Naḥman b. Yiẓḥak said, “Yiẓḥak {mentioned here}Footnote 20 is Rav Yiẓḥak Nappaḥa. Shimon is R. Shimon b. Pazi (some say: “Reish Lakish”Footnote 21). OshayahFootnote 22 is R. Oshayah Berabbi.” (B. Ketubbot 111b)

The missive contains three sections. The first consists of an aggadic statement in praise of living and being buried in the Land of Israel, followed by a call for Rabbah to migrate to the land and settle there. The second section begins with the words “if you are not coming up,” and contains a dictum that belongs to the quasi-halakhic traditions of personal conduct. Finally, the third section contains a short halakhic dictum attributed to those who first stated it: “Yiẓḥak, Shimon, and Oshayah expressed the same notion: the law is as R. Yehudah regarding mules.”Footnote 23 No reason is given for the inclusion of the halakhic dictum in the letter, and there is no indication of any relationship between it and the main content of the communication.Footnote 24 The amalgamation of the dicta in a single letter may have been a matter of mere coincidence: the ruling was publicized at the time the communication was sent, and its authors thus provided their brother with this bit of news from the Palestinian study hall.Footnote 25 The ruling was sent as an independent dictum, unassociated with consideration of the topic in the study hall, and reflects a summary of the legal guidance formulated by the greatest Palestinian Amoraim of the time.Footnote 26

Attribution

The accustomed formula of halakhic dicta includes the name of the decisor and that of the author of the endorsed opinion: “Rav X said, ‘The law is as R. Y.’” This is the form taken by hundreds of talmudic rulings, their preponderance given by the early generations of Amoraim, before the advent of the rules, and the vast majority given in the name of the greatest scholars of those generations: Rav and Shmuel of Babylonia, R. Yoḥanan of the Land of Israel, and a limited number of other Amoraim.Footnote 27 Talmudic discussionsFootnote 28 commonly take pains to establish what need there was to include the topic or the opinion, rather than make do with a dictum of the briefer variety, with only the name of the scholar who originated the opinion—thus evidencing that the default formula excluded the subject.

The name of the decisor is required to give the ruling force and authority. The name of the scholar who originated the view in question is required in order to provide appropriate attribution. In the view of Rav Naḥman, to transmit a rule without crediting its author is to commit an act of piracy.Footnote 29 Attribution is listed among the virtues by which the Torah is acquired. This argument is supported with the aggadic statement that “one who says something in the name of its author brings redemption to the world, as is stated: ‘Esther reported it to the king in Mordecai's name.’”Footnote 30

Notwithstanding, a ruling is sometimes cited without any indication of the originator of the endorsed view.Footnote 31 The generally accepted explanation in these instances is that these were questionable traditions regarding the originator of the halakhah and therefore if only the name was provided it was not possible to know the correct halakhah.Footnote 32

Formulation of Juridical Dicta

When a halakhic ruling is formulated in the context of its source text in the Mishnah or a baraita, or at the conclusion of an amoraic debate, it need contain no more that the name of its author and that of the sage in whose favor he ruled. However, where a ruling appears separately from the relevant sources, the reporting party and the author of the endorsed opinion are accompanied by an indication of the topic on which the ruling was issued, as Rabbah's brothers wrote in their letter to him: “The law is as R. Yehudah regarding mules.”Footnote 33 Such a reference was sufficient for Rabbah to infer the context. In the Talmud, the dictum is accompanied by an explanatory addendum in the form of a citation of the baraita in which the debate appears. In a later generation, Rav Naḥman b. Yiẓḥak further identified the Yiẓḥak, Shimon, and Oshayah who had authored the ruling for the benefit of those to whom these were not familiar friends, but important rabbinic figures of generations past.Footnote 34

Incorporation of Rulings: Classification and Specification

The formula “Rav X said, ‘The law is as R. Y regarding Z’” is an expanded version of the basic formula that was employed to identify juridical dicta transmitted outside of their academic context. It stands to reason that when such a dictum, including an indication of the topic it concerned, arrived in the study hall, it was incorporated within the studies underway at the moment and formulated as a part of the discussion at hand: those present would discard the topical heading of the dictum and make do with noting the name of the sage whose view was thus codified. The cases in which the ruling statement includes the topic of the ruling as well are rare, and therefore the Talmud needs to explain why the expansion was necessary or why it was not removed when it was inserted into the sugya. There are several types of circumstances in which the topic of a ruling must be detailed:

  1. 1. When a ruling refers to a source containing two debates, it must specify to which it pertains,Footnote 35 or else that it applies to both.Footnote 36

  2. 2. When a ruling conciliates opposing views by approving the view of one sage in a given circumstance and that of his opponent in another,Footnote 37 as much must be indicated within the ruling, namely, “The law is as R. X regarding A and as R. Y regarding B.”Footnote 38

    The Talmud recounts an entertaining example of a misunderstanding resulting from one scholar's giving a general ruling instead of including sufficient clarification of his intent: Rav Yosef b. Rava complains to his father that Rav Yosef “ridiculed” him by first telling him that the law regarding the number of recurrences required to create a legal presumption was in accordance with R. Yehudah ha-Nasi, and then that it was in accordance with Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel. Rava, however, explains to his son that the ruling is a conciliatory one: some presumptions have been ruled to take effect after two occurrences, in keeping with the view of R. Yehudah ha-Nasi, while others set in only after three occurrences, as argued by Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel.Footnote 39

  3. 3. In some instances, clarification is required when there was concern that the views of the parties to the debate were switched or in doubt, so that giving the name of the scholar whose opinion was sanctioned would not suffice to express the nature of the ruling.Footnote 40

With time, juridical dicta became a part of the traditions circulating in the study halls, themselves becoming the subject of debates, interpretation, and talmudic back-and-forth. Sometimes, when a short ruling with no indication of topic presented itself, it called for an interpretation defining its scope and limits.Footnote 41 Other times, when the ruling was more detailed, exegesis was required to justify such detail and the failure to implement the usual brief formula. Consequently, specifics regarding the dispute and the rationale and scope of the detailed ruling were clarified.Footnote 42 Occasionally, a ruling served as a source for discovering the nature and scope of a debate.Footnote 43 The expression “‘The law’? This indicates that they disagree!” signals instances where it is derived from a halakhic dictum that the point has been debated.Footnote 44

Collected Traditions

Juridical rulings were transmitted not only individually, but also in combination. We previously considered the example of a juridical statement appended to a letter concerning other matters. Most commonly, however, such traditions were assembled in collections of rulings. There is not always a clear commonality that caused the inclusion of several dicta in a single collection: sometimes a number of rulings were collated by coincidence, simply because they had been issued at the same time and place,Footnote 45 “and we have received [them] as one because they thus were issued at once in the study hall.”Footnote 46 Sometimes a scholar arriving from a different locale brought with him a collection of dicta that he had learned.Footnote 47 Yet there also are cases where the constituent dicta of a compilation do share a common denominator: the sage whose view is endorsed,Footnote 48 the name of the adjudicating authority,Footnote 49 or sometimes both.Footnote 50 Some collections enumerate the several cases in which the law was said to agree with a particular individual's view in a given field.Footnote 51 The technique of compiling halakhic dicta in sets is familiar from the style of the Mishnah,Footnote 52 and found its way to the time of the Amoraim, when these latter scholars needed to compose compendia of such traditions.Footnote 53

These compendia presumably then were unbundled, and each halakhic dictum studied in the study hall in its natural context. Notwithstanding, the dicta are attested to have been transmitted conjointly in the study hall,Footnote 54 and sometimes were studied as an integrated unit,Footnote 55 particularly when the rulings in the collection shared a common thread.Footnote 56

From Rulings to Rules

What was the process by which juridical rulings began to be considered rules? Such a thing cannot happen to a simple ruling containing only the decisor's name and that of the author whose view is endorsed, because a ruling of that sort is forever bound to the solitary source with which it is concerned. On the other hand, a complex juridical dictum that invokes the topic to which it pertains sometimes may be interpreted as the formulation of a rule. This phenomenon is linked to the emergence of rules in the academic culture of the Amoraim and ensuing generations. The jurisprudential rules had their start in the days of R. Yoḥanan, who, with his disciples, formulated two basic and, relatively speaking, quite simple sets of rules. One is a system of personal rules that runs the gamut of the leading figures of the Tannaim. The law follows R. Akiva in the Yavneh generation, R. Yehudah ha-Nasi in the concluding generation of the tannaitic period, and between the two generations are rules for settling debates between the major disciples of R. Akiva—R. Yose, R. Yehudah, R. Shimon, and R. Meir—whose opinions form the principal stratum of the Mishnah.Footnote 57 Parallel to these runs the system of methodological rules: the principle that the law is in keeping with a view left unattributed (stam) in the Mishnah, and the derivative rules, concerning a debate followed by an unattributed statement concerning the same point; an unattributed statement followed by a debate; an unattributed mishnah paralleled by a debate in a baraita; and an unattributed baraita paralleling a debate in the Mishnah.Footnote 58 The rules introduced by R. Yoḥanan are few in number, brief, and absolute, and in this lies their potency: a handful of principles suffice to derive halakhic conclusions from the lion's share of the Mishnah and other tannaitic literature. The additional principles later added to these are complex formulae endorsing the views of a given sage, but limiting the endorsement to a given field, for example, “The law is as R. Yehudah regarding ‘eruvin.” There is a misleading similarity between the formulation of a juridical dictum limited to one case that invokes its topic, for example, “the law is as R. Yehudah regarding mules,” and a complex jurisprudential rule expressing comprehensive halakhic advice and limiting it to a given field, as in “the law is as R. Yehudah regarding ‘eruvin.” Within the lists of rules are those rules that had their start as mere juridical dicta, but underwent a change in status and came to be broader principles.

The Transformation: Lists of Rulings cum Jurisprudential Principles

The origins of the phenomenon are evident as early as the Talmud itself, although the indications of it are yet sparse in that document.Footnote 59 For instance, the Talmud thus quotes a dictum of Rava that details a halakhic ruling: “Rava said, ‘The law is as Reish Lakish in these three [matters].’”Footnote 60

Rava's dictum is styled as a compilation consisting of three rulings with no evident implications for other issues debated by R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. At some point, however, it came to be considered a jurisprudential rule.

[Regarding] certain tender sinewsFootnote 61 that came before Rava, Rava said, “Why should we concern ourselves with them? First, R. Yoḥanan said, ‘Sinews that ultimately will toughen—one may subscribe to them [as his part of the paschal sacrifice] on Passover,’ and also ‘the Torah spares the resources of Israel.’” R. Pappa said to Rava, “R. Shimon b. Lakish [disagrees], and [there is] a prohibition of the Torah, and you've said, ‘Why should we concern ourselves with them?’” He [i.e., Rava] was silent.

Rava was inclined to rule leniently, in keeping with the view of R. Yoḥanan. R. Pappa, however, argued that because the prohibition concerned is one imposed by the Torah and the opinion voiced by R. Yoḥanan was countervailed by that of Reish Lakish, Rava ought to rule according to the more stringent view.Footnote 62 Rava did not respond, indicating acceptance of his colleague's argument and producing the following unattributed challenge and response on the part of the Talmud, “But why was he silent? Did RavaFootnote 63 not say, ‘The law is as R. Shimon b. Lakish in these three [matters]’?Footnote 64 This case is different, because R. Yoḥanan retracted in favor of R. Shimon b. Lakish, as he said, ‘Do not harass me: I recite it [i.e., that view] in terms of an individual [i.e., a minority view]’” (B. Ḥullin 76b–77a).

The words questioning why Rava was silent are a later addition to the discussion between Rava and Rav Pappa. The authors of the Talmud's unattributed comment saw the three-ruling dictum authored by Rava as a general jurisprudential rule endorsing the view of R. Yoḥanan rather than that of Reish Lakish, except the three instances specified by Rava.Footnote 65 Yet there is no inherent contradiction between Rava's comments in that case and his ruling here. Rava did not formulate a talmudic jurisprudential rule, but enumerated several rulings. This is why he quietly acquiesced to the objection of Rav Pappa.

Yosef b. Yehudah ibn Aknin

To demonstrate this phenomenon more broadly, let us examine a list of rules from the fifth chapter of Mevo’ ha-talmud by Yosef b. Yehudah ibn Aknin (ca. 1150, Barcelona, Spain – ca. 1220, Fez, Morocco).Footnote 66 The author draws a clear distinction between two types of rules. The fourth section of his book contains rules “pertaining to any of the figures of the Mishnah regarding whom they ruled that the law is as him in all things.”Footnote 67 In this chapter, he enumerates the personal rules that originated in the school of R. Yoḥanan.Footnote 68 The fifth section, as defined by the author, pertains “to anyone regarding whom they ruled that the law is as him—of the figures of the Mishnah—regarding specific things, and not regarding all,”Footnote 69 namely:

Wherever Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel taught in our Mishnah, the law is as him, except a guarantor, Sidon, and subsequent evidence.Footnote 70

The law is {not} as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals.Footnote 71

The law is as R. Eliezer in four [matters].Footnote 72

The school of Shammai and the school of Hillel—the law is as the school of Hillel, except four things, where the law is as the school of Shammai.Footnote 73

Wherever R. Yehudah taught regarding ‘eruvin, the law is as him, but specifically regarding an ‘eruv, and not regarding partitions.Footnote 74

The law is as R. Shimon of Shezor regarding a dangerously ill individual and regarding terumah of the tithe [that has been separated] from questionable produce.Footnote 75

Two things that Ḥanan said—the law is as him, and so too seven things that Admon said—there are some where the law is as him and as him who follows him, and there are some where the law is as him but not as him who follows him, and there are some where the law is as him.Footnote 76

Wherever Rabban Gamliel said “I approve the comments of Admon”—in two of them, the law is as him and as him who follows him, and in one the law is not as him, and in four the law is as him but not as him who follows him.Footnote 77

The law is as R. Shimon regarding mourning.Footnote 78

The law is as R. Shimon regarding something unintentional, but R. Shimon assents regarding “cut off its head but let it not die,” and the law is as R. Shimon regarding the Sabbath, in that he subscribes to mukẓeh only regarding dried figs and raisins, and the law is as R. Yehudah regarding festivals, in that he subscribes to mukẓeh.Footnote 79 Regarding all [things concerning] the Sabbath, the law is as R. Shimon, even regarding that which is set aside due to distaste.Footnote 80

The law is as R. Shimon regarding dragging …

The law is <not>Footnote 81 as R. Yehudah regarding an act of labor not required as such.Footnote 82

Marriage and lashes—the law is as Rabbi. Menses, and a bull against which testimony has been served—the law is as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel.Footnote 83

The law is as R. Yose regarding neither brine nor side posts.Footnote 84

The law is as Rabban Gamliel regarding a storehouse, enclosure, or ship.Footnote 85

The law is as R. Meir regarding his decrees [gezerot].Footnote 86

The law is as the lenient one regarding mourning.Footnote 87

The law is as R. Elazar regarding bills of divorce.Footnote 88

The law is as RabbiFootnote 89 regarding bills of divorce, even in the case of an individual [opinion] opposing [that of] many.

The law is as the lenient one regarding ‘eruvin, even in the case of an individual [opinion] opposing [that of] many.Footnote 90

This ostensible list of rules is composed of rulings of various types. The rule that “the law is as the school of Hillel” is one that enjoyed consensus from the early days of the Amoraim. It appears in this rather than in the preceding chapter only because of the accompanying list of exceptions. The same is true of the endorsement of all mishnaic statements of Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel, although this latter rule is a less potent one. These are joined by rulings that do not represent rules, namely, that endorsing Rabban Gamliel in the case of a storehouse, enclosure, or ship;Footnote 91 the rulings pertaining to the debates between R. Shimon and R. Yehudah concerning the laws of the Sabbath; and the conciliatory ruling implementing the disparate views of R. Yehudah ha-Nasi and Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel on the question of legal presumptions. Each of these is a targeted ruling that specifies its particular subject. There are juridical compendia, that is, those enumerating topics where the views of R. Eliezer, R. Shimon of Shezor, Ḥanan, and Admon are adopted, and the two cases where the opinion of R. Yose is not followed. The author presumably found it appropriate to compile the various discrete or anthologized rulings in this chapter because they had a general aspect or a role to play in his introduction to the Talmud: had he believed them to be nothing more than limited, local rulings, their rightful place would not have been in such a work. To an observer unacquainted with the sources, all the rules appear similar.

We now shall turn our attention to development of the items remaining from the original list above: several pseudorules drawn from cases where rulings transformed into general principles with consequences for halakhic practice.

As Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel Regarding Torn Animals and as R. Shimon Regarding Mourning

This halakhic dictum was composed of two independent rulings, each invoking its particular subject: “The colleague of R. Abba b. Ḥiyya had a tradition from R. Abba—and who is that? R. Zeira (some say: ‘the colleague of R. Zeira from R. Zeira—and who is that? R. Abba son of R. Ḥiyya b. Abba’): ‘The law is as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding a torn animal,Footnote 92 and the law is as R. Shimon regarding mourning.’”Footnote 93

This dictum, which found its way from Palestine to Babylonia, is twice cited in the Babylonian Talmud: in Ḥullin, with reference to torn animals, and in Moʿed Katan, regarding mourning. The quotation of the dictum is followed by an interpretation indicating which law relating to torn animals and which law pertaining to mourning is intended by it. The passage containing this explanation is phrased in each tractate to suit the context: the law with relevance to the present context is defined as “the one that we stated,” while the part of the quotation belonging to the other tractate is illumined by quotation of the entire baraita from which it springs. Following the explanation, the story is told of an anonymous individual who migrated to the Land of Israel and there sought to obtain corroboration of the dictum from its ostensible source, R. Abba b. R. Ḥiyya b. Abba, who denies both parts of the dictum. Regarding the statement that “the law is as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding a torn animal,” he responds that he recites such a tradition as stating that “the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel,” while concerning the ruling that “the law is as R. Shimon regarding mourning,” he explains that there is a difference of opinion among decisors as to whether the law follows the view of that sage.Footnote 94 At the end of the passage, the Talmud gives a corrected ruling based on the conclusions of that story. The law concerning torn animals, in accordance with the correction by R. Abba, is not as argued by Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel. In the case of mourning, the law follows the view of R. Shimon—not by virtue of the dictum attributed to R. Yoḥanan, but on account of the rule, attributed to Shmuel, that “the law is as the lenient one regarding mourning”: “… and the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals,Footnote 95 and the law is as R. Shimon regarding mourning, as Shmuel said, ‘The law is as the lenient one regarding mourning.’”Footnote 96

The inclusion of these statements in a book of rules leaves the impression that they are intended as generally ruling according to R. Shimon in all matters of mourning and Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel in all questions pertaining to torn animals. Not only is this an erroneous understanding of the juridical dictum,Footnote 97 but it is contradictory to or rendered extraneous by two other rules in the same list, namely, “The law is as the lenient one regarding mourning,” and “Wherever Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel taught in our Mishnah, the law is as him.”

As R. Elazar Regarding Bills of Divorce

This rule, as presented, appears to establish that the law follows R. Elazar wherever his view is given on issues concerning divorce. Yet this statement is contradicted by that which immediately follows, according to which the views of R. MeirFootnote 98 are followed in the field of divorce law. The two rules are incompatible, and it is clear from the sources of this statement that it is intended strictly as a specific ruling. It originally appears as a conciliatory ruling on a mishnaic debate between R. Elazar and R. Yehudah as to whether contract forms prepared in advance, with space left for inserting the relevant details, may legally be used.Footnote 99 The Palestinian Talmud cites two opposing conciliatory rulings on the debate, both attributed to Rav, “R. Zeira [reported that] Rav Huna [said] in the name of Rav, ‘The law is as R. Yudah regarding bills of divorce and as R. EliezerFootnote 100 regarding contracts.’ … R. Ba [said] in the name of Rav, ‘The law is as R. Liezer regarding bills of divorce and as R. Yehudah regarding contracts.’”Footnote 101 It is clear from the discussion of the ruling in the Palestinian Talmud that it refers only to the debate at hand, while it is equally clear from the parallel passage in the Babylonian Talmud that it is only in the context of divorce documents that the ruling endorses the view of R. Elazar that “witnesses to transmission give force.”Footnote 102

As R. Meir Regarding His Decrees

This statement, attributed by Rav Naḥman to Shmuel,Footnote 103 appears in several compendia as a jurisprudential rule. The Talmud does not clearly define Shmuel's dictum in terms of its scope or in terms of the views held by R. Meir to which it refers.Footnote 104 There are only a handful of “decrees” described in the Talmud that are attributed to R. Meir and endorsed as law with reference to this rule, namely, the prohibition against issuing a marriage contract for a sum less than that prescribed,Footnote 105 the prohibition against letting one's wife be without a marriage contract,Footnote 106 and the requirement that all women, even those unable to conceive, wait three months prior to remarrying so that a pregnancy from the prior husband may be identified.Footnote 107 All of these decrees appear in B. Ketubbot. No other “decree” is attributed by the Talmud to R. Meir, and where a comparable requirement is attributed to him, the GeonimFootnote 108 and RishonimFootnote 109 classify it as a fine rather than a decree,Footnote 110 thus avoiding application of the rule.Footnote 111 From the relevant comments of the Rishonim, it appears that decrees is not a generalizable concept, but a rubric for several laws appearing in B. Ketubbot,Footnote 112 comparable to the numerical formulations “as R. Eliezer in four [matters]” and “as Reish Lakish in these three [matters],” discussed above. The phrase his decrees thus does not indicate a rule, but is a rubric indicating those topics in B. Ketubbot where Shmuel endorsed the view of R. Meir.Footnote 113

* * * * *

The Amoraim commonly, though not exclusively, formulated and transmitted halakhic rulings independently of their programmatic study of the Mishnah and the talmudic traditions attending it. These rulings typically were formulated to include the name of the Tanna or Amora whose view was endorsed, which sometimes was accompanied by an indication of the topic or the content of the ruling. In such instances, there commonly was an inherent need to specify the topic or content, for example, by way of explanation, to circumscribe the scope of the ruling, or due to the need to specify the intended mishnah or law because the dictum was transmitted independently of the relevant source. Discrete rulings often were compiled together even if they had nothing in common. Sometimes such amalgamation was a result not of the content of the halakhot concerned, but of the manner in which the rulings were received, such as in the case of concurrent transmission of several laws by a teacher to his students or a compilation of laws attributed to a single sage that were transmitted jointly.

Because the style and formulation of these rulings gave them the appearance of rules, some were understood by later scholars to reflect general principles. This phenomenon first emerged even prior to the close of the amoraic period, apparently owing to the dissemination of talmudic rules, and spread far more widely in the ensuing era, when various scholars worked systematically to compile rules that they found in the Talmud as well as to create new rules, ultimately producing the impression that numerous rules had existed as early as the beginning of the amoraic period and had been formalized by many sages of that time. In truth, however, these rules evidently were not originally intended as such, so that the list of authentic amoraic halakhic rules in fact is quite a limited one.

Any complex rule that both names the sage whose view it endorses and specifies its topic must be suspected to be no rule at all, but rather a ruling on a solitary case that came to be interpreted as a rule because of its misleading outward appearance. The inclusion of these rulings in compendia of talmudic rules was a development bound to have an impact on halakhic rulings, as discrete rulings developed into sweeping rules taken as germane to entire legal fields or tractates.

References

1. In the view of Zini, Eliyahu Rahamim, Rabanan savor'ai ve-kelale ha-halakhah (Haifa: Ofakim Reḥavim, 1992), 285–300Google Scholar, this approach was sustained within the world of Halakhah until the end of the geonic period. Though jurisprudential rules had begun appearing as early as the early Amoraim, these were applied only in exceptional cases.

2. For a general introduction and detailed discussion of amoraic jurisprudential rules referring to tannaitic literature, see Halivni, Ephraim Betsalel, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-talmud (Lod: Mekhon Haberman Le-meḥkere Sifrut, 1999)Google Scholar and Yehuda Brandes, “Re'shitam shel kelale ha-pesikah” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 2002).

3. Brandes, Yehuda, “Mahapekhat ha-pesikah shel Rabbi Yoḥanan: Kelale ha-pesikah,” in Be-darke shalom: ‘Iyyunim be-hagut ha-yehudit mugashim le-Shalom Rosenberg, ed. Ish-Shalom, B. (Jerusalem: Beit Morashah, 2007), 515–35Google Scholar.

4. The first compositions to offer such lists of rules are works of the geonic period: Hilkhot dayanin and Halakhot keẓuvot mi-bene ma‘aravah, which later were incorporated with Sefer halakhot gedolot (ed. Esriel Hildesheimer, 3:12, 17–18), and Seder tanna'im ve-’amora'im, which appears to have developed not as a book per se, but as several lists of rules that at a relatively late date were redacted as a book (Kalman Kahana, ed. [Frankfurt am Main: 1935]). This was demonstrated by Marx, Alexander in the introduction to his essay “Neue Texte des Seder Tannaim we-Amoraim,” in Festschrift zu Israel Lewy's siebzigstem Geburtstag, ed. Brann, M. and Elbogen, J. (Breslau: M. R. H. Marcus, 1911Google Scholar; also printed separately in pamphlet form), 1–8. It is clear from the various surviving textual variants of the book that it is not a single compilation that has come down to us in a variety of versions, but quite the opposite—a conglomeration of disparate compilations that were combined into one. It stands to reason that the material for these compilations was drawn from jurisprudential traditions practiced in geonic study halls.

For an overview of the relevant MSS and the present state of scholarship on this work, see Stampfer, Yehuda Zvi, “Hilkheta’ ke-batra'i (The Law Is in Accordance with the Later Sages): Various Approaches in the Geonic Period,” Jewish Law Annual 22 (2000/2001–2003/2004)Google Scholar: 418 nn. 6–7. Some of these rulings and principles made their way into transmissions of the Talmud during the savoraic or the early geonic period, as demonstrated by Zini, Rabanan savor'ai, 71–209, 281–366. See also Milgram, Jonathan, “Methodological Musings on the Study of ‘Kelalei pesak’: ‘Hilkheta ke-Rav be-’Issurei ve-khi-Shemu'el be-Dinei,’” Journal of Jewish Studies 61, no. 2 (2010): 278–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

The present essay is concerned not with these relatively belated rules, but with purely amoraic pronouncements concerning debates between Tannaim. For this purpose, the contribution of later compilations of rules is solely the collection of these statements within books of rules in a manner that facilitated their construal as rules per se, as opposed to rulings specific to a given discussion.

5. Urbach, Ephraim E. notes as much in his essay “Masoret ve-halakhah,” Tarbiz 50 (1981): 136–63Google Scholar (reprinted in idem, Me-‘olamam shel ḥakhamim: Koveẓ ma'amarim [Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988], 67–70). In his view, this approach was a continuation of Halakhah as long practiced, an “institutional” corpus that “continued to be formulated in the style of defined rulings, issued in accordance with the laws of the Torah.”

6. The introduction situates the story within the context of the halakhic ties between Ula and the sages of Babylonia. B. Niddah 20b notes that Ula refrained from examining blood samples when in Pumbedita, perhaps out of reticence to issue a halakhic ruling within the jurisdiction of Rav Yehudah, so that it was necessary to send Rav Yiẓḥak to discover what his practice was. We find in several instances that he was critical of the actions of the sages of Babylonia, or specifically those of Rav Yehudah and his son Rav Yiẓḥak (B. Shabbat 147a; B. Pesaḥim 88a; B. Kiddushin 71a), yet Babylonian Jews’ reactions to his comments (B. Niddah 20a) testify to their esteem for his rulings. See Albeck, Chanoch, Mavo’ la-talmudim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969), 302–4Google Scholar. For further discussion of the meaning of the term ’iklaʿ in the Babylonian Talmud, see Cohen, Avinoam, “Le-mashma‘ut ha-historit ha-gelumah ba-munaḥ ‘'iklaʿ rav ploni,’” Sidra 15 (1999): 51–64Google Scholar.

7. Refreshments of a sort commonly described by the Talmud as offered to guests or visitors; see B. Shabbat 74a; B. Eruvin 52a; B. Ḥullin 106a.

8. MSS Munich 6, Munich 95 add: “and come and tell me” (ותא ואימא לי).

9. MS Munich 95: “through the agency of Abbaye” (ביד אביי).

10. Numerous variants appear in the manuscripts. The printed version expresses criticism of the son's personal traits. The variant in MS Lunzer–Sassoon, “your authority and your rabbinic office” (שררותך ורבנותך), indicates that the son's rabbinic stature caused him to send Abbaye instead of going himself. The remainder of the manuscripts contain variations on and syntheses of these two basic possibilities. Throughout the preparation of the present article, I consulted MSS using the Sol and Evelyn Henkind Talmud Text Database of the Saul Lieberman Institute. This is the place to acknowledge the profound contributions of the database to the study of the Talmud.

11. MS Munich 6: “that the tradition will not be stated in his name” (דלא תיתמר שמעתא משמיה). MS New York – JTS Rab. 1608 (ENA 850): “that you cannot state the tradition in your name” (דלא תימא שמעתא משמך). MS New York – Columbia X 893 T 14a: “that the tradition will not be stated from his mouth” (דלא תיתמר שמועתא מפומיה), i.e., “will not be recited in your name.”

12. See discussion below of the importance of transmitting a tradition in the name of its author.

13. For examples of letters containing halakhic rulings, see B. Shabbat 115a: “A letter has come from the West in the name of R. Yoḥanan that it is forbidden”; B. Bava Batra 41b: “I can bring you a letter from the West that the law is not as R. Shimon b. Elazar”; B. Sanhedrin 29a: “We can bring a letter from the West that the law is not as R. Yehudah”; B. Shevuot 48b: “I can bring a letter from the West that the law is not as R. Elazar.” These missives were taken as decisive proofs in jurisprudential debates among the Amoraim of Babylonia. See Lifshitz, Berechyahu, “The Legal Status of the Responsa Literature,” Jewish Law Annual 9–10 (1981/1982–1982/1983): 279Google Scholar, and see notes there.

14. Thus MS Munich 95.

15. This comment, earlier attributed to Karna, explains that Jacob had his sons go to the trouble of conveying him to the Land of Israel for burial so that he would not suffer the pain of rolling through subterranean tunnels upon returning to life in the Time to Come. Following this tradition, the letter conveys the brothers’ demand that Rabbah migrate to the Land of Israel. They encourage him to come to study under R. Yoḥanan.

16. Ethical instructions sent to Rabbah by his brothers for him to follow if he chose not to come to the Land of Israel. For a possible link between these instructions and criticism of his remaining in the Diaspora, see Brandes, Yehuda, ’Aggadah le-ma‘aseh, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Beit Morashah, 2012), 272–75Google Scholar.

17. MS Vatican 130: “Yeshayah” (ישעיה).

18. The baraita appears to be cited here not as part of the halakhic dictum, but as a relatively late interpretive addition whose purpose is to explain what is meant by the word “mules.” Brief talmudic rulings unrelated to the passage at hand typically are accompanied by the source material to which they refer; see examples below.

19. See M. Kil'ayim 8:4; T. Kil'ayim 5:5. The Mishnah cites the view of R. Yehudah that the mare is the determining factor: any two animals to which female horses gave birth may be interbred even if the sires were jacks, and vice versa. Animals birthed by female horses, however, may not be interbred with animals birthed by jennies, notwithstanding the fact that all are designated mules. In the Tosefta, the sages disagree with Rav Yehudah, opining that all mules belong to a single species. The fact that these three Amoraim found it necessary to rule in accordance with the view of R. Yehudah attests that they were not yet familiar with, or else did not accept, the principles espoused by R. Yoḥanan for deriving legal conclusions from the Mishnah, although they were his contemporaries and were active in his study hall. The rule that the law follows an unattributed view in the Mishnah that is the subject of debate in a baraita may have been formulated later by R. Abbahu (B. Ketubbot 46b); see Brandes, “Mahapekhat ha-pesikah shel Rabbi Yoḥanan.” The passage in B. Ḥullin appears to indicate that Shmuel viewed the Mishnah as recording a view held exclusively by R. Yehudah and thus ruled in accordance with the sages cited by the baraita (B. Ḥullin 79a).

20. Thus MS Petersburg – RNL Evr I 187.

21. The words “some say: ‘Reish Lakish’” are absent in MS Vatican 113 and MS Vatican 130.

22. MS Vatican 130: “<Yeshayah—I do not know which> {Oshayah—Reish Lakish said, “This is Hoshayah Be-rabbi}” (ישעיה איני יודע איזהו) [אושעי' א”ר לקיש זה הושעי' ברבי). The anomalous version of the text in the MS appears preferable to the others, in accordance with the principle of lectio difficilior potior, as well as because Rav Oshayah's generation preceded that of the sages who appear in connection with the ruling and letter. The anomalous text of the MS also is buttressed by the entry on Yishmael b. Kimḥit in ‘Erke tanna'im ve-’amora'im.

23. See B. Ḥullin 78a–79b. According to the Babylonian Talmud, the sages are of the view that “we do not concern ourselves with the seed of the father,” so that the sole factor to be considered is the species of the mother. R. Yehudah, meanwhile, opines that the species of the father also is of consequence. The Babylonian Talmud thus associates the debate concerning mules with the question of whether the prohibition against slaughtering a domestic animal and its parent on a single day pertains to the father. See Tosafot, B. Ḥullin 79a, s.v. ’ayyel li. The rubric “mules” might alternately have been interpreted to imply a distinction between the law in the case of breeding mules and that pertaining to slaughtering both an animal and its offspring, limiting the endorsement of R. Yehudah's view to the topic of forbidden mixtures, as opposed to the concurrent slaughter of animals. (For examples of such rubrics, see below.) As much may be understood from the comments of Yaakov b. Meir Tam in the Tosafot, ibid. Such a hypothesis, however, is inadmissible, because the linkage between the two debates is a contrivance of the unattributed text of the Talmud in B. Ḥullin, with which the early Amoraim apparently were unfamiliar. cf. Y. Kila'im 8:1 (31c); Y. Shabbat 5:5 (7b): “R. Yiẓḥak b. Naḥman [said] in the name of R. Oshayah, “The law is in accordance with the student. According to the sages, there is [but] a single species of mules.” See the lengthy discussion in Moses Margolies, Pene Mosheh, Mare’ panim, on the relationship between the Palestinian and the Babylonian transmission.

24. The synthesis of aggadic and halakhic dicta in the letter is surprising. It is possible that the combination was coincidental: the first topic represents the purpose of the communication, while the latter two happened to be current at the time of its dispatch. However, there are those who attempted to find a logical link between these disparate matters. See Sefer yoḥasin, essay 2, “Sequence of Amoraim,” § Resh, s.v. Rabbah b. Naḥmani; Yaakob Reischer, ‘Iyyun Ya‘ akov (commentary to ‘Ein Ya‘ akov), B. Ketubbot; Moses Schreiber, Novellae, B. Ḥullin 80a, s.v. ve-hine shilḥe ketubbot.

25. Rav Naḥman b. Yiẓḥak was a fifth-generation Babylonian Amora. Rabbah's brothers, who were contemporaries of these scholars, may not have needed to specify and indeed did not even invoke a rabbinic title in referring to them, because all were peers in the study hall of R. Yoḥanan.

26. On letters from the Land of Israel to Babylonia, see above. Aside from such dispatches, there is ample documentation concerning scholars who migrated from the Land of Israel to Babylonia or vice versa and brought with them dicta and sources: “When Rav Hoshayah came from Nehardea, he came and brought a baraita in hand” (B. Shabbat 19b, et al.); “When Ravin and all those who descended [from the Land of Israel to Babylonia] came, they said it” (B. Ḥullin 101b).

27. Brandes, “Re'shitam shel kelale ha-pesikah,” 225–26.

28. In invoking the Talmud, I refer to unattributed comments (stam), which generally are regarded as a source that postdates the text of the amoraic or tannaitic statements as such that are quoted within it. This approach is based on the prevailing scholarship in recent generations, which regards unattributed talmudic matter as postamoraic: Weiss, Abraham, The Talmud in Its Development [in Hebrew] (New York: Feldheim, 1954)Google Scholar; Halivni, David Weiss, introductions to the various volumes of his series Mekorot u-mesorot: Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud le-seder nashim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968)Google Scholar; Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud le-seder mo‘ed, 3 vols. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975–82)Google Scholar; Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud—masekhet Bava Kamma (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1993)Google Scholar; Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud—masekhet Bava Kamma (Jersualem: Magnes, 2003)Google Scholar; Friedman, Shamma, “A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction” [in Hebrew], in Texts and Studies, Analecta Judaica, ed. Dimitrovsky, H. Z. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1977), 275–441Google Scholar; Friedman, introductory chapters of Talmud ‘arukh: BT Bava Meẓiʿa perek shishi (Jerusalem: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1996)Google Scholar.

29. B. Yevamot 91a; also B. Ketubbot 19a and B. Bava Batra 133a.

30. M. Avot 6:6; cf. B. Ta‘anit 24a; Rashi, s.v., ’amar leh Rav Ashi.

31. B. Avodah Zarah 7b–8a, which records a trilateral tannaitic debate concerning the appropriate point for inclusion of personal requests in the Amidah, records Shmuel's ruling with the words: “Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel, ‘The law is, one prays for his [personal] needs only in [the blessing of] “who hears prayer.”’” However, Aḥa of Sabḥa, She'iltot (Va-yakhel, §75; ed. Mirsky, 210–11), reads: “Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel, ‘The law is in accordance with the sages.’” In the view of Naphtali Berlin (Ha-‘emek she'alah, § 46), the reading given by R. Aḥa is a purposeful deviation from the Talmud. Notwithstanding, Jacob Nahum Epstein opines that Rav Aḥa had before him a different version of the Talmud, and the discrepancy thus represents two disparate means of expressing a ruling.

32. B. Menaḥot 30b: “Then let the [contemporary] master say, ‘The law is as the [earlier] master,’ and the [other contemporary] master say, ‘The law is as the [other earlier] master!’ [It is not so] because some invert them [i.e., the names].” The Tosafot, s.v., ve-lema mar, note that this question is raised in certain cases, but left unasked in others, “and there is need to give a reason in those other places where it does not raise a challenge.” See also Tosafot, B. Shabbat 54a, s.v., Rav ’amar, where the halakhic ruling given ad loc. is questioned: “Let the master say, ‘The law follows the master,’ and explain, ‘Because there are those who invert [the names of] the Tannaim’!” In the view of the Tosafists, this answer is representative of the rule: wherever a ruling is given but the name of the particular sage who pronounced it omitted, there were discrepant versions of the given tradition that inverted the names of the scholars involved. See also the suggestion of the Tosafot, B. Bava Meẓiʿa 38b, s.v., ha-yored, aside from the problem of discrepant traditions, that “they had not heard the baraita,” i.e., they were entirely unaware that Tannaim had debated the issue.

33. B. Ketubbot 111b.

34. Concerning the formulation of amoraic traditions with reference to tannaitic sources, see Aminoah, Noah, “Signonot ha-shma‘ata’ be-talmudim ve-hashpa‘atam ‘al ḥilufe girsa'ot,” World Congress of Jewish Studies 3, no. 10, vol. 1 (1989): 77–84Google Scholar.

35. In B. Pesaḥim 100a the Talmud quotes R. Yoḥanan as stating that “the law is as R. Yehudah regarding Passover eve, and the law is as R. Yose regarding Sabbath eve.” This dictum may be construed as referring to either of two juxtaposed debates in the Tosefta, concerning the permissibility of eating on the eve of the Sabbath or a festival from Minḥah, and concerning whether individuals engaged in a meal must stop when the Sabbath commences (T. Berakhot 5:1–2; Y. Pesaḥim 10:1 [34d]). A discussion in B. Yevamot 91a, meanwhile, relates to two debates within a single mishnah: “And if you say, ‘If I said, “the law is as R. Shimon,” this would indicate [that it were so] even regarding the first [statement],’ then say, ‘The law is as R. Shimon regarding the latter [statement]’!”

36. E.g., B. Sukkah 11a: “Then let him say, ‘The law is as R. Yehudah!’ If he had said ‘The law is as R. Yehudah,’ I would have said [i.e., understood], this refers to a [regular] bed, as it is made for [the purpose of sleeping on] its back, but a canopied bed, which is made for its inside—I would say not. [Therefore] he informs us, R. Yehudah's reason is that a temporary tent cannot come and annul a permanent tent, no matter whether a [regular] bed or a canopied bed.” A similar dynamic is at play in B. Ketubbot 68a.

37. This style of adjudication, which forges a middle path between two polar opinions, is known as hakhra‘ah. Epstein, Jacob Nahum investigated the concept in Mevo'ot le-sifrut ha-tann'aim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957), 205–11Google Scholar.

38. Y. Bava Kamma 2:6 (3a): “Rav Yirmiyah [said] in the name of Rav, ‘The law is as R. Meir regarding an innocuous [animal] and as R. Yudah regarding deposition.’” B. Bava Kamma 24a cites two contradictory conciliatory rulings on this debate. A conciliation with relevance to a wider range of laws is offered to settle a debate between R. Yehudah and R. Yose concerning the status of the twilight hour: “Rabbah b. Bar Ḥannah said in the name of R. Yoḥanan, ‘The law is as R. Yehudah regarding the Sabbath, and the law is as R. Yose regarding terumah’” (B. Shabbat 35a).

39. B. Yevamot 64b.

40. Such a situation is described in Y. Kila'im 9 (32a): “Rav said, ‘It is forbidden, and the law is as he who forbids.’ Why then did he not say ‘as R. Eliezer’? There are Tannaim who recite inversely.” See Epstein, Jacob Nahum, Mavo’ le-nusaḥ ha-mishnah, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2000), 133Google Scholar. Thus in Y. Taʿanit 2 (66b), and widely elsewhere. At Y. Hor'ayot 3:4 (48b), concerning a tannaitic debate about the definition of “his master who taught him wisdom,” the Palestinian Talmud recounts that “R. Abbahu came [and said] in the name of R. Yoḥanan, ‘The law is as the one who says “Anyone from whom is the majority of his scholarship.”’ Why then did he not resolve it [by saying] ‘As R. Yudah’? There are Tannaim who recite and invert [it].” At B. Bava Meẓi‘a 33a and Y. Bava Meẓi‘a 2:13 (8d), however, the ruling is given in the accustomed, brief format: R. Yoḥanan rules according to R. Yehudah. The known parallel sources to this debate contain no indication that the names of the parties involved actually were ever inverted, suggesting that even in cases where inversion was not known to be an issue, it was logically induced that this was the reason for the change in formulation. On the inversion of sages’ names in tannaitic sources, see Epstein, Mavo’ le-nusaḥ ha-mishnah, 1:5–6, 123ff. At pp. 135–36, he discusses the subject of the present discussion, viz., transmission of a ruling by reference to its content rather than its originator due to habituated inversion. At p. 131, Epstein alludes to the possibility that there were times when inversion was used to make the names of the scholars in a debate conform to the jurisprudential rules. See Urbach, “Masoret ve-halakhah,” 136–37, and sources cited there. Occupation with inversions has brought several scholars to question the reliability of rabbinic traditions writ large. Yet the conclusion that follows from the texts cited here is quite the opposite: if it was found necessary in particular cases to indicate that an inversion may have taken place, then it stands to reason that the norm was to take pains to transmit the tradition faithfully, and inversions are but atypical exceptions to this rule.

41. See B. Menaḥot 31b–32a, where a ruling recited, credited by Ḥananel to Rav (“the law is as R. Shimon b. Elazar”), concerning the proper manner of writing a mezuzah scroll is circumscribed by the Talmud to apply to only one of two views attributed to R. Shimon b. Elazar, in order to justify the conduct of Rav Huna. The pursuant discussion, however, suggests that his view might be otherwise explained and the full scope of Rav's ruling thus preserved. The application assigned to a ruling thus is not always a part of the original dictum, but may be a circumscription added after the fact, and potentially subject to debate. The meaning of such a circumscription also is not always a matter of consensus. The ruling that “the law is as R. Yehudah b. Lakish regarding a corpse” is interpreted by Isaac al-Fasi as limiting the license to carry an object from the side to a corpse, “since a person is anxious over his dead” (B. Shabbat 43b–44a). Those Rishonim who disagreed with al-Fasi found it necessary to give an alternate explanation of the circumscription. See supercommentaries to al-Fasi ad loc.: Zeraḥya Gerundi, Sefer ha-ma'or; Naḥmanides, Sefer milḥamot ha-shem; Nissim Gerundi.

42. Examples of conciliatory rulings used to ascertain the scope of a debate include B. Shabbat 57b, where sages of the late amoraic period debate the formulation of a ruling on whether hairs and strands of wool constitute a barrier in ritual immersion, with one scholar stating that the law is as R. Yehudah and the other that the sages assent to R. Yehudah; ibid. 143b, regarding the juicing of fruits; and B. Sanhedrin 30b, concerning combination of testimonies.

43. In B. Berakhot. 33b, a ruling by R. Yoḥanan is given in the form “The law is as R. Eliezer regarding a festival that falls after the Sabbath,” based on which R. Zeira and R. Ḥiya b. Avin deduce that the tannaitic debate on the appropriate point to recite Havdalah in the Amidah of the evening service following the Sabbath (M. Berakhot 5:2) pertains as well when a festival follows the Sabbath, as explained in Y. Berakhot 5:1 (8c). In B. Shabbat 135b–136a, the Talmud raises the question of whether the sages disagree with the view of Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel in the definition of a stillborn person or animal, and deduces that the matter was debated based on a ruling transmitted in a dictum recited by Rav Yehudah, quoting Shmuel: “The law is as R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. ‘The law’? This indicates that they disagree! [You indeed can thus] deduce from it.”

44. B. Berakhot 33b; B. Shabbat 106b; additional sources cited in Mesorat ha-shas, ad loc. See also Mesorat ha-shas ha-shalem, B. Yevamot 91a.

45. B. Sukkah 34a: “R. Yose said in the name of R. Yoḥanan [in parallel at 44a: “citing R. Neḥunyah of the valley of Bet Ḥavartan”], ‘[The laws of] the ten plants, the willow, and the libation of water are laws [given] to Moses from Sinai.’” Rashi ad loc. comments, “Concerning these three [matters], they were asked what their source in the Torah was, and they responded that they are laws [given] to Moses from Sinai, and he who heard them committed them to memory in the order he had heard them.” The Tosafists (B. Mo‘ed Katan 4a, s.v., ’amar Rav Ashi), meanwhile, argue that these three traditions were given together at Sinai, so that logical deductions may be made on the grounds of their juxtaposition as if they were adjacent verses! According to Rashi, three unrelated statements may come to form a unit even during study: “These three traditions, <Mar> {Rav} Zutra heard them from Rav at once and committed them to memory” (Rashi, B. Shabbat 75a, s.v., ve-ha-yode‘a).

46. Yom Tov b. Avraham Ishbili, Novellae, B. Ketubbot 107b. The compilation there is of three rulings: one endorsing Rav, one Rav Huna, and one Rav Zvid. The first two concern a husband's obligation to provide alimony, a topic central to the chapter and the tractate generally, while the third relates to the purging of utensils of leaven on Passover, or else of wine used as an idolatrous libation at any time during the year.

47. One example of a collection of dicta that took form under special circumstances: “Rav Kahana said, ‘When R. Yishmael son of R. Yose took ill, Rabbi [i.e., R. Yehudah ha-Nasi] sent to him, “Tell us two or three things that you have told us in the name of your father.” He sent to him, “Father said thus …”’” (B. Pesaḥim 118b); cf. B. Shabbat 15a; B. Avodah Zarah 8b. The statements in B. Shabbat and B. Avodah Zarah parallel each other, while in B. Pesaḥim R. Yishmael is described as sending different dicta. Shmuel b. Meir, in his comments to Pesaḥim, considers whether all the sources describe a single incident and the dicta were scattered in different places, or else R. Yishmael took ill on multiple occasions. Even if the framework of the text is simply a literary format that was transposed from one location to another, the existence of that framework demonstrates that those who told the stories were familiar with such a means of transmitting dicta passed on by the sages.

48. E.g., Y. Avodah Zarah 1:1 (39b): “R. Shimon b. Karsana [said] in the name of R. Aḥa, ‘Regarding the Sabbath, mourning, and paganism, the law is as R. Shimon b. Elazar.’” Also extant are compilations beginning with the phrase “and the law” (ve-hilkheta’) that summarize amoraic rulings given in the Babylonian Talmud, e.g., “and the law is as Rav Yosef regarding a field, the subject, and a half” (B. Bava Kamma 114b), and “the law is as Abbaye regarding YAL KGM [a mnemonic]” (B. Bava Kamma 73a and parallels), but these statements are likely to be final touches of quite late origin that were appended to a redacted passage, and as such are beyond the scope of the present discussion, as demonstrated by Zini, Rabanan savora'i.

49. “They say at the school of Rav in the name of Rav, ‘The law is as R. Yose regarding a hermaphrodite and grafting,’ and Shmuel said, ‘Regarding protracted labor and forfeiture’” (B. Yevamot 83a). The Talmud specifies what subjects are intended, and discusses how Rav ruled in cases where Shmuel had ruled, and vice versa. The impression given is not that the joint presentation of the various rulings bespeaks a disagreement regarding the content, but that the material simply is a collection of rulings endorsing R. Yose. There may also be a mnemotechnical device at work here that associates protracted labor (koshi) and forfeiture (kiddush) based on the kof–shin sound pattern, while a hermaphrodite and grafting, each of which entails a combination of different types, may appear concurrently due to this intrinsic similarity. Meanwhile, other compilations of rulings in debates to which R. Yose was a party are phrased negatively: “Rav Yosef said in the name of Rav Yehudah, citing Shmuel, ‘The law is as R. Yose neither regarding brine nor regarding posts’” (B. Eruvin 14b). These rulings were laid down by the first generation of Babylonian Amoraim, before the introduction of R. Yoḥanan's rule that “the law is as R. Yose rather than a colleague of his.” The passage in Eruvin, noting the contradiction between these rulings and the preference for R. Yose on the grounds that “his rationales are evident,” later proceeds to a discussion of the rulings. See Henshke, David, “Ha-'elokim 'amarah?,” Leshonenu 60 (1997): 171–73Google Scholar, who examines the structure of the passage, ascertains the period when the sages involved were active, and rejects the proposal by David Weiss Halivni that the passage originated in B. Megillah.

50. “Abbaye said, ‘The master did all things as Rav except these three, which he did as Shmuel: one may light one lamp from another, one may detach [fringes] from one garment [and transfer them] to another, and the law is as R. Shimon regarding dragging’” (B. Shabbat 22a; cf. additional sources cited there). Abbaye, describing the conduct of his teacher, attests that Rabbah b. Naḥmani ruled in accordance with Rav in all matters but three. This statement is not a juridical rule, but a tradition concerning his teacher's conduct as attested by the Talmud.

51. E.g., “Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel, ‘The law is as R. Eliezer in four [matters]’” (B. Niddah 7b–8a); “Rava said, ‘The law is as Reish Lakish in these three [matters]’” (B. Yevamot 36a).

52. Weiss, Moshe, “Mishnayot ‘sefurot’ be-ro'sh masekhet,” Sidra 1 (1985): 33–44Google Scholar.

53. For a comprehensive discussion of halakhic compilations in the Talmud, see Weiss, Avraham, ‘Al ha-yeẓirah ha-sifrutit shel ha-’amor'aim (New York: Horeb, 1962)Google Scholar. On the creation of mnemonics corresponding to such compilations, see Avishai, Yorav, “Masoret ha-talmud—‘ha-simanim,’” Sidra 16 (2000): 59–80Google Scholar, and 73–74 in particular, concerning mnemonics for jurisprudential lists and rules.

54. The existence of such lists in the Talmud has been noted previously by Weiss, ‘Al ha-yeẓirah ha-sifrutit; Halivni, David, “Safkei de-gavrei,” Divre ha-’akedemiyah ha-’amerikanit le-made‘i ha-yahadut 46–47 (1980): 67–83Google Scholar. Some scholars have posited the existence of many such lists in the geonic period, a distinct type of material for study that was not included in the Talmud. Relevant sources to this discussion are provided by Danzig, Neil, Mavo’ le-sefer halakhot pesukot: ‘Im tashlum halakhot pesukot (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1999)Google Scholar. See especially chap. 1, nn. 26 (p. 7), 34 (p. 9).

55. “Rav Yosef was sitting behind R. Abba, and R. Abba was sitting before Rav Huna, and he [i.e., Rav Huna] sat and said, ‘The law is as R. Yehoshua b. Korḥa, and the law is as R. Yehudah’” (B. Avodah Zarah 6b–7a; B. Bava Kamma 102a). It is clear from the response of Rav Yosef that the two rulings were recited at once and he reacted to both at once, despite the lack of any common denominator. In each of the tractates, the Talmud finds it necessary to cite the source of the debate from the other tractate in order to explain what topic is under discussion there.

56. The Talmud sometimes seems to attempt to draw an artificial connection between rulings that have been compiled together in a list. In B. Gittin 3:8 (45b), the Palestinian Talmud transmits the following dual rulings: “R. Ila, R. Abba, and R. Elazar [said] in the name of all the rabbis attending the study hall, ‘Regarding wine [that has fermented] and a needle [that has rusted], the law is as R. Yehoshua b. Levi.’” The Talmud explains the relationship between the two debates—”and these competing views come as those competing views …”—by noting that both involve maintaining the status quo of a thing no longer in its right condition. In the parallel in Y. Bava Batra, the discussion is put differently, suggesting that it is the rabbis attending the study hall who conceived the link between the debates. Thus, the joinder of the ruling concerning wine and that concerning needles appears to reflect not only a halakhic ruling, but also a statement regarding a common feature of the two debates (Y. Bava Batra 6:1 [15c]). Participants in the discussion in the Babylonian Talmud neither were familiar with the joint ruling nor considered there to be any rationale common to the two discussions (B. Bava Batra 96a). This example may be related to the amoraic tendency to propose abstract concepts, such as retrospective assignment (bererah), to construct a link between disparate laws and debates. See De Vries, Benjamin, Toledot ha-halakhah ha-talmudit (Tel Aviv: Avraham Tsiyoni, 1962)Google Scholar; Urbach, “Masoret ve-halakhah,” 123ff; Moscovitz, Leib, Talmudic Reasoning: From Casuistics to Conceptualization (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002)Google Scholar, views this phenomenon as typical of the later strata of the Talmud (see pp. 350–57 for a summary).

57. Y. Terumot 3 (42a); B. Eruvin 46b.

58. B. Yevamot 42b–43a.

59. Even a rule attributed to R. Yoḥanan may number among the principles that originated as lists: “Rabbah b. Bar Ḥannah said in the name of R. Yoḥanan, ‘Wherever Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel taught in our Mishnah, the law is as him, except a guarantor, Sidon, and subsequent evidence’” (B. Ketubbot 77a and parallels). The Talmud notes that R. Yoḥanan himself issued a ruling that did not accord with this principle, then explains that the disparity resulted from a discrepancy between traditions transmitted by two of his disciples: “They are [statements by different] lecturers, citing R. Yoḥanan.” Some commentators explain that the difference of opinion between the students of R. Yoḥanan came about because some understood him as expressing an absolute rule, meaning that the law follows Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel in all other cases, while others understood the dictum of R. Yoḥanan as only summarizing three rulings and irrelevant to the remainder of the Mishnah (see Mal'akhi b. Yaakov ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi, “Principles of the Talmud,” §308; cf. Yosef ibn Aknin, Mevo’ ha-Talmud, chap. 3, §51). Elsewhere (forthcoming) I raise the possibility that discrepant traditions attributed to R. Yoḥanan emerged because in his youth he followed his teachers’ practice of issuing rulings on a case-by-case basis, having not yet formulated his rules. In the Palestinian Talmud the principle is introduced with the attribution “there they say,” and depicted as an absolute rule: “R. Ami b. Korḥa [said] in the name of Rav, ‘Why then did they say, “In all instances the law is as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel”? Because he would state decided rulings on the authority of his court’” (Y. Bava Batra 10:14 [17d]).

60. B. Yevamot 36a; the three cases are enumerated there. At B. Ḥullin 77a and B. Bava Batra 129b, the Talmud records only a brief ruling, omitting the list of topics.

61. Assuming that a femoral fracture does not render an animal unfit for consumption (viz., terefah) if the bone is covered with flesh, the question is asked, are tender sinews considered equivalent to flesh in that function?

62. He apparently relied in this argument on the rule that one is to err on the side of stringency in applying prohibitions imposed by the Torah (B. Avodah Zarah 7a).

63. Printed editions read “Rabbah.” The reading “Rava” is in accord with all MSS and conforms with both the local context and parallel passages.

64. This implies that in the remainder of their disagreements, the law does not follow Reish Lakish and his view is not to be taken into practical consideration.

65. Rashi (B. Ḥullin 77a) interprets: “‘But why was he silent? Did Rava not say’ in B. Yevamot, in [the chapter] Ha-ḥoleẓ, ‘The law is as R. Shimon b. Lakish in these three [matters]’ alone: acquisition of usufruct, one who receives ḥaliẓah from a pregnant woman, and one who stipulates in the middle, all in Ha-ḥoleẓ? It follows that in this [matter], of tender sinews, the law is as R. Yoḥanan, because although they ultimately will toughen, at the moment they are like flesh.” Rashi observes that endorsement of Reish Lakish is limited to the laws discussed in the fourth chapter of Yevamot, giving further credence to the notion that the dictum was intended as a compilation of rulings on a specific subject, and not a talmudic principle. The Talmud, however, interprets the compendium as a rule, and this position was accepted by the Rishonim and further implemented in their rulings, notwithstanding a difference of opinion as to whether there are additional exceptions to the three noted above, such as instances where there is a tannaitic source to support Reish Lakish. Ha-Kohen (Yad Mal'akhi, §568) discusses this question at length, including the views put forward by the decisors among the Rishonim and in compendia of talmudic rules. Ishbili takes the narrowest approach in the rule's application: “And they already have explicated in B. Makkot that there are other [instances] in which the law is as Reish Lakish, because the passage is as him or a tradition has been taught that is as him, and the rules were stated only generally and typically, and therefore they said that we do not derive anything from them, even where it says except” (Novellae to B. Yevamot as in printed editions; MS is quoted by ha-Kohen). The Tosafists (B. Yevamot 36a, s.v., hilkheta’ ke-Reish Lakish) note an instance in B. Zevaḥim where Rava himself clearly rules in accordance with Reish Lakish on a different topic, and evidently have great difficulty attempting to resolve this problem. Based on the preceding discussion, however, the ruling is not problematic in the least: the other statement by Rava is not a rule, but a list of rulings pertaining solely to the fourth chapter of B. Yevamot, with no relevance to discussions in B. Ḥullin or B. Zevaḥim.

66. Yosef b. Yehudah ibn Aknin, Mevo’ ha-talmud, 8–11. The work was translated from the Arabic based on MS Paris and first published, with the addition of a preface, by Adolf Neubauer (Breslau: Krotoschin, 1872). A critical edition based on MSS was published by Itamar Metzger (Jerusalem: Mekhon Neve Asher, 1997). Regarding the identity of the author, see Baneth, David Hartwig, “Yosef ibn Shimon ha-talmid ha-ḥashuv shel ha-Rambam ve-Yosef ’ibn ‘Enkin,” Veẓar Yehude Sefarad 7 (1964): 11–20Google Scholar. See also further discussion in Perry, Hadar, “Demuto ha-refu'it shel Yosef ben Yehuda ’Ibn ‘Enkin,” Korot 19 (2009): 21–42Google Scholar, and the introduction to the Metzger edition, pp. 1–3. Metzger's inclination is to identify the author of the work as the famous disciple of Maimonides, rather than a different later scholar of a similar name, as argued by Baneth.

67. Aknin, Mevo’ (ed. Metzger), 34.

68. Accompanied by an inventory of atypical and exceptional cases.

69. Aknin, Mevo’ (ed. Metzger), 35.

70. This rule appears in B. Ketubbot 77a and parallels. The author gives a description of the three cases and is quoted by the compendia of rules. See Yosef ha-Levi, Yeshuah b., Halikhot ‘olam, section 5, chap. 1, §7 (ed. Portnoy, Shmaryahu [Jerusalem: Mekhon Sha‘ar Hamishpat, 1998], 237 and nn.)Google Scholar See also Halivni, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-talmud, 27–32.

71. Quoted from B. Mo‘ed Katan 22a; B. Ḥullin 50a. See discussion below.

72. Quoted from passage at B. Niddah 7b–8a. The author enumerates the four topics and comments, “but the preceding pertains [only] to the order of Taharot, while in other orders there are many,” thus indicating his awareness of the ruling's limitations. Ruling in accord with R. Eliezer is a complicated matter, due to his excommunication and ties to the house of Shammai. See Gilat, Yitschak D., Mishnato shel Rabbi ’Eli‘ezer ben Horkanus (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968), 320–33Google Scholar.

73. The author enumerates the four topics. Discrepant counts of the exceptional cases among the debates between the schools of Shammai and Hillel appeared in compendia of talmudic rules beginning in the geonic period; see ha-Levi, Halikhot, 236, and nn.

74. See the source of this rule at B. Eruvin 81b.

75. The author lists the two cases; see source at B. Menaḥot 30b and parallels. The rule is subject to a debate among Amoraim: Ze‘eri cites the circumscribed version in the name of R. Ḥaninah, and the same version is attributed to R. Yoḥanan (R. Yonatan in other versions; see Tosafot, s.v., ha’ ’itamar). Ula, however, attributes to R. Ḥaninah the more generalized version: “Wherever R. Shimon of Shezor taught in our Mishnah, the law is as him.” R. Ḥaninah of Sura goes still further, stating that the rule applies even outside the confines of the Mishnah. The discussion in that passage may reflect an early attempt at turning specific rulings into rules, and the rejection of the attempt; see Halivni, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-talmud, 57.

76. The source of these rulings and the next is in chapter 13 of B. Ketubbot, which contains a compilation of rulings issued by the judges Ḥanan and Admon. Their rulings are presented in Y. Ketubbot 13 (35d); Y. Bava Batra 9 (16d); B. Ketubbot 109a. The source in the Babylonian Talmud features an amoraic discussion of the meaning of this list of rulings and of the relationship between them and the instances in which Rabban Gamliel declared that “I approve the comments of Admon.”

77. The author enumerates the cases.

78. Y. Shabbat 1:8 (4a); Y. Avodah Zarah 1:1 (39b).

79. The author enumerates the categories of forbidden objects where the law does not follow R. Shimon and those in which R. Shimon agrees with the majority view.

80. The origin of the ruling is in comments by Rav Aḥa and Ravina at B. Shabbat 157a. Regarding the sources of the rulings in B. Shabbat, see nn. in Metzger ed.

81. The word “not” (אין) appears in the Neubauer ed., but is omitted by Metzger. If the author indeed was a disciple of Maimonides, then he certainly followed his teacher in ruling according to R. Yehudah.

82. The author proceeds to detail the difference between an inadvertence (davar she-’eno mitkaven) and an act of labor not required as such.

83. The author enumerates the relevant cases. The source of the ruling is B. Yevamot 64b; see below.

84. The author enumerates the relevant cases; his source is B. Eruvin 14b.

85. The author enumerates the relevant cases; his source is B. Eruvin 42b.

86. B. Ketubbot 57a; see discussion below.

87. B. Eruvin 46a.

88. See discussion below.

89. Metzger notes that he has not identified the source of this rule. The text apparently should state that “the law is as R. Meir regarding bills of divorce,” in accordance with Y. Gittin 1:2 (5a).

90. B. Eruvin 46a.

91. The view cited here belongs to a debate among the sages of Yavneh cited in M. Eruvin 4:1, concerning a person who arrives on the Sabbath from a place beyond the permitted travel limit and finds himself in a storehouse, enclosure, or ship. Rabban Gamliel and R. Elazar b. Azariah opine that he may move about the entirety of such a space, while according to R. Yehoshua and R. Akiva, he may move only within a range of four cubits. The Amoraim are divided regarding the halakhah. The Palestinian Talmud (Eruvin 4 [21d]) documents a conciliatory ruling: “Ḥananiah son of the brother of R. Yehoshua says, ‘All day they debated, these against those, until Father's brother came and conciliated them and established that the law would be as Rabban Gamliel and as R. Elazar b. Azariah regarding a ship, and as R. Yehoshua and as R. Akiva regarding a storehouse or enclosure.’” The Babylonian Talmud (B. Eruvin 42b) records a difference of jurisprudential opinion between early Amoraim: “Rav said, ‘The law is as Rabban Gamliel regarding a storehouse, enclosure, or ship,’ and Shmuel said, ‘The law is as Rabban Gamliel regarding a ship, but not regarding a storehouse or enclosure.’”

92. Thus in printed editions. MSS: “regarding torn animals.” One way or the other, the statement is intended to refer to a single specific law among those relating to torn animals, and not to all laws in that field. See Feldman, David, She'elot u-teshuvot lev David (Talne, Ukraine: 1884; Manchester, England: 1955; London: M. Feldman, 2000)Google Scholar, §25, who considers ruling according to this principle in the case of a cherry pit found in the body cavity of a chicken on the grounds that the term “regarding torn animals” refers to the entirety of the laws of torn animals.

93. B. Mo‘ed Katan 21a; a parallel modified to suit its context appears at B. Ḥullin 50a. In Y. Mo‘ed Katan 3 (81c), R. Yehoshua b. Levi rules in accordance with the view of R. Shimon.

94. The dictum is attributed to R. Yoḥanan, but the unidentified individual who migrated to the Land of Israel refers to R. Abba, but as the author of the dictum. As for the ruling that “the law is as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding a torn animal,” we may posit that he simply transmits what he learned from his teacher R. Yoḥanan. In the case of the second ruling, however, he states that “it is a [matter of] debate,” i.e., he affirms that according to R. Yoḥanan, the law follows the view of R. Shimon where mourning is concerned, but adds that R. Yoḥanan's position is contested, demonstrating a disparity between the views of R. Yose and the traditions that he transmitted from R. Yoḥanan. This story may have ramifications for our understanding of the creation and transmission of halakhic dicta, as previously discussed in the compositions on talmudic rules. For a thorough discussion, see ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi, §§74, 75.

95. The text of the rule as summarily given here is: “The law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals.” The same version appears in ha-Levi, Halikhot ‘olam, and is attested by MSS of Mevo’ ha-talmud (see Metzger, ed.). In the Neubauer ed., however, the rule is given as it first appears in the Talmud.

96. B. Mo‘ed Katan 22a; B. Ḥullin 50a.

97. The talmudic passage is thus understood by ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi, “Rules I,” §4, s.v., “the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals.” See criticism, ibid., of ha-Levi, in Halikhot ‘olam, for citing the statement that “the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals” as a general rule. Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel appears in several laws concerning torn animals and others discussed in conjunction with them (M. Ḥullin 2:6; 3:2; T. Ḥullin 3:7; 3:19), but it is not said explicitly there that the law follows his view.

98. The phrase “as Rabbi” appearing in the book most likely is a corruption resulting from the omission of a word, the correct reading being “as R. Meir regarding bills of divorce.” The statement that “the law is as R. Meir regarding bills of divorce” appears once in Palestinian Talmud (Y. Gittin 1:2 [43c]), as a circumscribed juridical dictum: the law follows R. Meir in that Acre is regarded as having the same legal status as the Land of Israel, but only in that one who delivers a writ of divorce need not declare that he witnessed its preparation and signature, because of the rule that rabbinic requirements are implemented leniently, but in general the law does not follow R. Meir's view that Acre has the same legal status as the Land of Israel (e.g., where such status is relevant to pentateuchal commandments found in Zera‘im that apply to the land). This ruling is cited as a rule by Moshe of Coucy, Sefer miẓvot gadol, affirmative commandment 50.

99. M. Gittin 3:2.

100. Mishnah, MS Kaufmann and MS Parma: “R. Lazar.” The interchange of Liezer and Lazar occurs in textual witnesses of the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Palestinian Talmud. The talmudic discussion appears to indicate that the scholar in question is R. Elazar (i.e., R. Elazar b. Shammuʿa, the individual normally intended by generic mishnaic references to R. Elazar). See Epstein, Mavo’ le-nusaḥ ha-mishnah, 1167.

101. Y. Gittin 3 (44d). See ibid. 9 (50b).

102. B. Gittin 86b; cf. B. Ketubbot 94a. See also Rashi, B. Gittin 71, s.v., hilkheta’ ke-R. Elazar, who specifies that the ruling applies “to this matter,” implying that it is not a rule. Ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi (“Rules of the Talmud,” §4), uses this example to prove the existence of specific rulings formulated as though they were rules: “and do not be surprised and wonder how, concerning a specific law, they used [the terminology] ‘the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals,’ in the plural, as we have seen such a thing at B. Gittin 86b, where it says ‘The law is as R. Elazar regarding bills of divorce’ regarding the specific law that witnesses to transmission give force.”

103. B. Ketubbot 57a; cf. additional sources cited there.

104. Halivni, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-Talmud, 54–56.

105. B. Ketubbot 54b.

106. Ibid. 56b–57a.

107. Ibid. 60b. Rav Pappi there quotes the rule in arguing against Rav Pappa and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, who have ruled contrary to R. Meir. Their response, lav ’a-da‘atin, indicates that either they were unfamiliar with the rule or they rejected it.

108. E.g., Aḥa of Sabḥa, She'iltot; Shimon Kayyara, Sefer halakhot gedolot; summary of views in Yosef Karo, Bet Yosef, Ḥoshen mishpat 52:1.

109. Tosafot, B. Beẓah 27a; B. Bava Kamma 30b; B. Zevaḥim 104a; B. Bekhorot 28a; B. Yevamot 34b, s.v., natan lah, from which it seems that the ruling does not apply even to laws closely related to those decrees to which Shmuel referred, meaning that the law in those cases need not follow the view of R. Meir; B. Eruvin 89a, s.v., kol gaggot, where it is stated that the law does not accord with R. Meir although the matter under discussion is explicitly identified as a decree.

110. The word here may best be understood as in the phrase “two judges of decrees” (shene dayane gezerot), denoting acts and rulings of a court. The term appears at B. Mo‘ed Katan 83a and T. B. Bava Batra 9:1, and is extensively discussed by the Talmud at the beginning of chapter 13 of B. Ketubbot (105a), which opens with the above Hebrew phrase. (The Palestinian Talmud and the MSS of the Mishnah have the reading “two judges of thefts” [shene dayane gezelot], also considered in the discussion in the Babylonian Talmud.) See nn. in Chanoch Albeck, Commentary on the Mishnah, B. Ketubbot (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1952–58).

111. See Karo, Beit Yosef, ’even ha-‘ezer 142:1, who cites sources questioning the force of the rule.

112. Y. Yevamot 4 (6a) has the reading “R. Meir concerned himself with bills of divorce,” an expression that may correlate with the term his decrees in the Babylonian Talmud, the concern evinced by R. Meir being the reason for his decrees.

113. Notwithstanding, there are those who took the ruling as a rule: in the discussion of rules in B. Gittin 47a, the Talmud asks why in a particular instance the view of R. Yose was endorsed instead of the opposing opinion of R. Meir, given the rule that the law follows R. Yose, and answers that the ruling was intended to indicate that another rule, that endorsing the decrees of R. Meir, is not to be followed in the present instance. For decisors who implemented the rule in discussions of other laws, see, e.g., Karo, Bet Yosef, ’oraḥ ḥayim 15:1, citing Haggahot Maymun ha-ḥadashot; Yoreh de‘ah 310:1, citing Kayyara, Sefer halakhot gedolot; ’Even ha-‘ezer 142:10, citing Barukh b. Yiẓḥak of Worms, Sefer ha-terumah; Yoel Sirkes, Bayit ḥadash, ’oraḥ ḥayim 629:5; yoreh de‘ah 64:4.