Surveying the electoral landscape in 1856, newly minted Republican Abraham Lincoln offered his private assessment of the presidential race featuring Democrat James Buchanan, Republican John C. Fremont, and third-party Know Nothing candidate, former president Millard Fillmore. In a confidential letter, Lincoln wrote, “With the Fremont and Fillmore men united, here in Illinois, we have Mr. Buchanan in the hollow of our hand; but with us divided, he has us” (David Herbert Donald, Lincoln, 1995, p. 194). Lincoln was proved right: the split in the antislavery vote gave Buchanan both Illinois and the presidency.

Lincoln’s observation is prescient because it points to the importance of third parties in the nineteenth century. The Anti-Masons, Free Soilers, Know Nothings, Greenback, and Populist Parties helped define American politics for their times. Most famously, the merging of the Populist and Democratic parties in 1896 precipitated a party realignment that gave Republicans an even stronger grasp on power.

Bernard Tamas asks the vital question: What happened to such third parties in the twentieth century? Of course, third parties played a vital role in key presidential contests: Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond in 1948, George Wallace in 1968, and Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996. Even in close elections, such as the Trump–Clinton race in 2016, third parties made a difference. But in 2020, third-party candidates were relegated to their more customary role of perennial gadflies in presidential politics.

Tamas examines third parties and their fall from grace by collecting data on the presence of third parties in House races since the beginning of the twentieth century. The sheer volume of contests yields a statistically significant number of case studies. Tamas finds a steep drop in third-party participation, with a nadir occurring in 1962—a midterm election marked by the Cuban Missile Crisis and a desire to maintain the status quo (p. 5). One reason for the decline was a spirit of bipartisanship that helped minimize the polarization between the two major parties that developed in the aftermath of the Civil War. But today’s political polarization has led to a rise of third-party House candidates, with 70% of congressional districts having third-party candidates listed on the ballot (p. 5). The data prompt Tamas to ask two crucial questions: Why did this decline happen? And will this resurgence continue and grow stronger?

Political scientists have offered a litany of explanations for the lack of viable third parties. The most famous of these is Duverger’s Law, which argues that the single-member district system with its winner-take-all elections presents a nearly insurmountable obstacle to third parties (Duverger, Political Parties, 1954, pp. 216–18). Not wanting to “waste their votes,” voters gravitate toward one of the major party candidates. Other explanations also abound. V. O. Key postulated that a proliferation of party primaries meant that voters had an intraparty option to voice their grievances (V. O. Key, American State Politics, 1956). The rise of the Tea Party during the 2010s is a contemporary example. Likewise, today’s progressives have scored some impressive primary wins (notably Alexandria Ocasio Cortez). State laws—including hefty signature requirements that third parties must meet to be placed on the ballot—have also been blamed for the paucity of third parties. Finally, Tamas notes that nineteenth-century third parties were not candidate centered, but were grassroots social movements focused on causes that were bigger than any one personality. Today’s third parties, however, are driven more by personas than issues.

The major parties have followed a similar trend. Because they are candidate focused, and the proliferation of political consultants and television advertising makes them even more so, cash-starved third-party candidates have neither the money nor talent to advance their candidacies (p. 7). With the rise of television as a campaign medium, the ability of third-party candidates to purchase advertising or even secure a spot on a debate stage has weakened.

One important exception occurs in those states that allow for fusion (or cross-endorsement) candidacies. New York is the most prominent example, where third parties find sustenance because they can endorse a major party candidate. For decades, New York’s cross-party endorsement was vital to major party success. But, as Tamas notes, even in New York the number of third-party House races declined during the twentieth century.

All of these explanations are familiar. But the value of Tamas’s book is that he expertly disabuses the discipline of adherence to its conventional wisdom. Chapter by chapter, Tamas uses a combination of statistical argument and persuasive explanation to show that the theses offered by political scientists lack the power of prediction. Foremost among these is Duverger’s Law. In Canada, Britain, and India, where single-member district systems are the norm, the traditional two-party system has fractured. The New Democratic Party in Canada is now a major contender. The traditional two-party system in Britain has split along cultural and regional lines. The India National Congress no longer dominates. In each of these countries, the future of the two-party system is in doubt.

Today, Tamas believes that the polarization encouraged by the two major parties creates the potential for third parties to make a twenty-first-century comeback (p. 131). The polarity between the two major parties leaves a dissatisfied center that is often profoundly unhappy with its choices. Such a third-party revitalization may already be happening at a more micro level. In a separate work, Richard Davis finds significant third-party activity in several states where a disparate number of third parties have won ballot access and reinvigorated local politics (Davis, Beyond Donkeys and Elephants, 2020) If Tamas is right, then his challenge to our traditional nostrums is about to be called into question.

But as Tamas acknowledges, one important obstacle remains: money. The Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United (2010) has resulted in an avalanche of cash going to the major parties by engaged, polarized voters. The 2020 campaign was the latest example. During the month of August, Donald Trump raised $210 million, while Joe Biden pulled in a record $364 million. Such a pace put the two major party presidential candidates on track to raise amounts approaching $2 billion each. This is a huge obstacle for third-party candidates to overcome. If twenty-first-century politics remains candidate centered, money will continue to pose an insurmountable hurdle. However, should third parties develop around social movements, like those of the nineteenth century, third parties can enjoy a resurgence.

Tamas’s book is highly recommended for anyone who wants to examine what happened to third parties in the twentieth century and what may happen in the twenty-first.