Oilcraft, the brief but dense and compelling new book from Robert Vitalis, is an exercise in myth-busting. In five short chapters, Vitalis attacks the assumptions informing views of oil and U.S. foreign policy. The biggest myth of all is the notion that the U.S. military presence in the Middle East has improved American energy security. The reasons undergirding the U.S. commitment to the Persian Gulf, set down by the Carter Doctrine in 1980 and supposedly illustrated by the special relationship with Saudi Arabia and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, range “from the crude to the complex and at times arcane,” reflecting a misunderstanding of resource markets and abundance stretching back to the nineteenth century (3).
Oilcraft is polemical, passionate, and pithy. It is written in an engaged and off-the-cuff style—a conversational read that you could imagine Vitalis delivering as a lecture. The “oilcraft” in the title equates to witchcraft, “a modern-day form of magical realism” regarding a commodity “the same as copper, coal, rubber, palm oil, [and] tin” (6). Policymakers and think-tank specialists form discreet vocabularies around oil, disguising a relatively simple global market in a complex mélange of geopolitical vernacular. “A veneer of references, footnotes, and quotations mask what is in essence an ideological construction,” one that Vitalis believes has taken over discussion of oil's place in international relations, particularly among intellectuals on the Left who have internalized oilcraft—arguing that the U.S. military controls oil prices, that its presence in the Middle East is meant to secure the region's natural resources, or that the invasion of Iraq was somehow meant to expand or consolidate hegemonic control over oil—to an extent that defies reason (5–6).
Examining the work of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century intellectuals, Vitalis unearths the original consensus used to justify imperial expansion predicated on the idea that overseas resources had to be “secured” for future use. A group of scholars that Vitalis dubs the “Columbia School” worked to discredit this idea by arguing that resources were both abundant and readily available through a global market. Skeptics echoed these critiques during the 1970s, when the concept of resource scarcity was reduced to “energy insecurity.” Vitalis regards the “Arab oil embargo” as a piece of “political theater” that did little to imperil oil consumption in the United States (61–63). The American people blamed major oil companies and the Arab leaders for long gas lines—disruptions that vanished, Vitalis notes, by the end of 1974 when oil was once again plentiful. Subsequent years have left us “more, not less, confused…because the highly contested and suspect belies of a half-century ago are now seemingly unshakeable truths” (61) passed down both in popular discourse and within scholarship.
Fears of scarcity are closely tied to racialized views of the developing world. A belief that native peoples of the resource-rich Global South were incapable of managing their wealth appropriately—what historian Megan Black has termed “resource primitivism”—compelled leaders in the industrialized West to support imperial ventures “to control the tropics and their resources” (124)Footnote 1. A similar pathology emerged in the 1970s, when the fear surrounding “foreign oil” energized the American response to rising oil imports. ‘“Foreign oil’ is, in fact, a euphemism,” writes Vitalis (who has done groundbreaking work on the role of race, both in the global oil economy and international relations), suggesting the inability of Arab or non-white races to control resources demanded by the industrial economies and militaries of the West (69).
In his demolition of these chosen myths, Vitalis is on sturdy ground. Though subject to occasional shortages, oil has never been scarce. The economist M. A. Adelman, whom Vitalis cites repeatedly, predicted in the 1970s that higher prices would drive companies to engage in more sophisticated forms of drilling. Adelman was proven right when supply expanded and prices collapsed in the mid-1980s. Similarly, the U.S. military intervention in the Middle East cannot be justified in purely economic terms. Political scientist Emily Meierding has offered a compelling case for why the “oil war” is fictitious.Footnote 2 If the oil fields of Saudi Arabia were to become inaccessible, more oil would become available elsewhere.
Why do critics of American capitalism and foreign policy accept such assumptions? Vitalis contends that it is to resolve “an anomaly in what was basically a degenerative research paradigm” (54). Oil's myths provide clarity for those in search of answers to why the United States has expended so much time, energy, money, and blood fighting wars in the Middle East to supposedly “secure” a resource that is otherwise available on a global market.
Which brings the reader to Vitalis's counterargument. For Vitalis, state intervention in the trade of commodities is unnecessary. If left to function without interference, market mechanisms ensure that scarcity never develops. Even without its “special relationship” with the United States, “Saudi Arabia can be counted on to sell its oil on the world market” (133). Oilcraft acts as a stealth endorsement of geopolitical libertarianism—Vitalis praises the Cato Institute, a center-right think-tank, for consistently rejecting oilcraft's myths (incidentally, Adelman was affiliated with Cato for years before his death in 2014).
Oilcraft adds to the growing literature casting doubt on the traditional explanation tying oil to U.S. military interventions in the Middle East.Footnote 3 Vitalis's argument that oil acts as a kind of camouflage for more pedestrian motives (arms sales, power politics, bureaucratic determinism) is compelling, as is his assertion that oil would flow just as easily without the presence of thousands of U.S. troops. Yet is belief in the market, in innovation, or the apparent abundance trapped within the earth folly of a different sort? In his final chapter, Vitalis concedes that the United States “cannot protect the world economy from regular if unpredictable supply disruptions,” noting that volatility and instability in oil supply “[have] not yet set the U.S. or world economy into a tailspin” (122). Vitalis is certainly correct to argue that billions in aid to Saudi Arabia and carrier group deployments in the Persian Gulf do little to strengthen American energy security. But that security cannot rest on an unregulated market left to proceed through booms and busts as it did in the past.
Vitalis provides a short but pointed critique of the United States’ misguided efforts to control oil from afar. The next step ought to be an examination of how the nation's dependence on oil can be reduced and the fossil fuels’ deleterious climatic impact mitigated. The final myth—that oil is necessary to sustain American society in the twenty-first century as in the twentieth—remains to be busted.
