It all ended in cheers. The British granted India independence on 15 August 1947 amidst tumultuous crowds in New Delhi.Footnote 1 The former Viceroy Mountbatten recorded that
never (had) such crowds been seen within the memory of anyone . . . Apart from the usual cries of ‘Jai Hind’ (Victory to India) and ‘Mahatma Gandhi ki jai’ (Victory to Mahatma Gandhi) a surprising number shouted out ‘Mountbatten ki jai’ (Victory to Mountbatten) and ‘Lady Mountbatten ki jai’ (Victory to Lady Mountbatten) and more than once ‘Pandit Mountbatten ki jai’.Footnote 2
The British were similarly feted in Calcutta. James Murray who ran a family business in Old Court House Street Calcutta selling clocks, thermometers, marine and surveying instruments recalled that ‘Trains were stopped at stations and everybody turned out onto the platforms. European and Indian alike, and there was hand-shaking and arms flung round our shoulders. In the streets it was the same, massive crowds everywhere and we were stopped and the same enthusiastic embracing and comments exchanged.’Footnote 3 Less than eighteen months earlier, hostile crowds in New Delhi had marred the Victory celebrations and Europeans had been the victims of random assaults.
A month into his viceroyalty, Mountbatten took time out from sounding Indian political opinion to discuss the security of British residents with his provincial governors. By this stage, the concerns stemmed from fears of a general breakdown in law and order and Hindu–Muslim conflict rather than nationalist assault. Detailed plans were developed for a sea-borne evacuation. In the event, the only Britons who were evacuated were those airlifted from Srinagar in November 1947 as they were in the path of an invasion of Pakhtun tribesmen from Pakistan. Despite the detailed examination of the British departure and its aftermath, little has been written about either the Kashmir airlift episode, or the broader strategic planning for European evacuation. The paper will focus on this neglected corner of the history of the transfer of power. Before doing so, it will briefly look at the threats to the security of Britons in 1945–6. The anxieties these aroused, however, can only be fully appreciated in the light of events in wartime Burma and Malaya, just three years earlier.
The legacy of Britain's wartime Asian imperial crisis
Until the human tragedy of the 1947 Partition of India, the mass exodus of Britons and Indians from wartime Burma was the most traumatic flight in modern South Asian history.Footnote 4 Thousands perished as they attempted to cross the rain-drenched mountain passes into Assam. In all, as many as 80,000 people may have died from malnutrition and disease.Footnote 5 The scenes at Myitkyina airport including the bundling of the portly Governor Dorman-Smith onto one of the last flights out of North Burma were as harrowing, although not as publicised, as the US Operation Frequent Wind in Saigon in April 1975. Thousands of ‘women and children were stranded without food, water or medical supplies’.Footnote 6
With the closing of the North Burma airports, the fate of refugees worsened. One British evacuee who escaped on foot across the hills reported that the conditions were worse than any he had experienced in the Mesopotamia Campaign during the First World War. He arrived in Calcutta in rags.Footnote 7 Claims that there was an easier ‘white’ overland route as opposed to the ‘black’ route which claimed so many Indian lives laid bare the racism at the heart of the Asian Empire. It had been displayed earlier at Rangoon when Indians had been denied berths so Britons could flee.Footnote 8 While Indians died in vastly greater numbers, ‘last-ditcher’ Britons also faced horrendous jungle and mountain treks into northern Assam. Women and children perished en route. The Assam planters who assisted the arriving refugees were shocked to see Britons arriving emaciated and in rags.
The earlier flight of Britons in the Malay Peninsula to Singapore, while marginally less harrowing, had also been a chaotic and undignified scramble; stories of Japanese atrocities at the fall of Hong Kong added to the panic. Again, racial hierarchies were cruelly exposed in the commandeering of boats and other available transport. From Perak to Singapore, a sorry spectacle was witnessed of an empire literally in retreat. As one British evacuee from Penang recorded, the manner of the British withdrawal was ‘a thing which I am sure will never be forgotten or forgiven’.Footnote 9 Singapore brought no safe haven as the ‘impregnable’ fortress surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942. Last-minute flight often sealed the fate of Britons whose boats were sunk by Japanese dive bombers. Survivors faced a period of harrowing internment in remote areas.
British prestige never recovered in Burma or Malaya from its Asian Dunkirk. Chaotic flight which revealed the racist imperial underbelly was more damaging than military defeat and even the fall of Singapore. Both on humanitarian grounds and because of the need to maintain prestige in the wider world, London could not countenance a chaotic repetition at the time of the handover of power in India, especially as this was occurring in peacetime. The response was the attempt to assess the risk facing British civilians and the drafting of detailed contingency plans for evacuation. While uncertainties arising from communal conflict persisted in April 1947, the general political situation was much less menacing than it had been just eighteen months earlier.
Anti-imperial disturbances: November 1945 – March 1946
The attempt to prosecute those army officers and men who had been captured in Singapore and subsequently joined the Japanese-sponsored Indian National Army (INA) provided the catalyst for widespread disturbances from November 1945 to February 1946. A final wave of protests was unleashed when the British attempted to restore prestige and ‘rally’ loyal soldiers against the ‘deserters’ with the Victory Day celebrations in New Delhi. The four months of disturbances were marked both by Hindu–Muslim cooperation and increasing attacks on British civilians as well as symbols of state authority. Congress grew uneasy as the protests spiralled out of control and enabled the Communist Party to renew its challenge for the leadership of anti-colonial struggle in India.
The cycle began with the protests arising from the announcement of the guilty verdict in 5/7 charges which had been brought against Captain Abdul Rashid of the 14th Punjab regiment. Calcutta which had a long revolutionary tradition and was the political base of the INA founder Subhas Chandra Bose was at the heart of violent protests on Abdul Rashid Day (12 February). Clashes between British troops and protestors resulted in eight deaths and over ninety injuries. Protestors attacked US Army lorries injuring three soldiers. US troops were confined to the barracks in which they had been based during the war against Japan after these episodes. Congress members joined arms with the Muslim League Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardhy and Communists in a mile long procession which paraded through Dalhousie Square on 13 February.Footnote 10 A couple of weeks later, thousands of students went on strike in Lahore in protest at the seven years’ sentence imposed on another INA officer, Captain Burhanuddin. The governor's car was stoned on the Mall and its windscreen smashed and the Union Jack torn from the bonnet.Footnote 11
The Royal Indian Navy (RIN) Mutiny in Bombay harbour was accompanied by a wave of strikes in the city led by the Communist Party. The British repression on 23 February according to the Communist Party mouthpiece People's Age was the most ‘notorious’ and ‘murderous’ since the 1919 Amritsar massacre; 270 people were killed and some 2,000 wounded.Footnote 12 Given the RIN Mutiny's immense repercussions, relatively little has been written about it.Footnote 13 The mutiny began with a strike on the vessel Talwar which was more about local grievances than nationalist demands. The strike spread to twenty other ships in the harbour and to twelve shore establishments. Ships in the harbour flew the Indian flag rather than the Union Jack. Gunfire was exchanged for seven hours between the ratings and British military personnel, but by far the greatest violence accompanied the strike in Bombay in support of the ratings. There was widespread looting, strikes by textile workers and the burning of trams, buses and post offices. The Congress and Muslim League sent out peace brigades to try to restore order.Footnote 14 The ratings decided to surrender their arms after the mediation of the Congress deputy president, the pugnacious Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.
There were nationwide protests in sympathy with the RIN ratings. Worryingly for the colonial authorities, some of these were directed against British civilians. The Sind police superintendent reported for example that, in Karachi, ‘Hoolganism by students and loafers had increased hourly.’ He went on to say that ‘Traffic was obstructed, Europeans, Anglo-Indians and government buildings stoned and people attacked and forcibly deprived of their hats and ties which were burnt on the spot.’Footnote 15 The latter type of incident was designed to humiliate British residents. It was recorded more widely at the time of the protests against the Victory Day Celebrations in New Delhi.
Daybreak in Delhi on 7 March revealed that the wooden victory arches had been torn down and Queen Victoria's statue was vandalised. Shortly afterwards, a fire had to be extinguished in the town hall which had been similarly attacked at the height of the 1942 Quit India movement disturbances in New Delhi.Footnote 16 The worst clashes between protestors and the police occurred in Chandni Chowk and in front of the Red Fort. Crowds were only dispersed after repeated firings and use of tear-gas. The procession route was free from violence, but the bystanders were heckling rather than cheering. The officer in charge of the Regimental Colour Party reported the hostile reception accorded to the Indian troops as they marched pass the commercial centre of Connaught Place. ‘In Connaught Place . . . the shouting was so loud to deaden the band and our step. Such cries as “Thrown down our Colours”, “You people are ‘be-iman’” (without honour) whilst serving the army “Jai Hind”and “Inquilab Zindabad” (Long Live Revolution) were heard.’Footnote 17 The participating soldiers ‘looked terribly depressed’.Footnote 18 Protestors vented their anger at British passers-by as well. ‘Crowds which collected on main roads and crossings, challenged and insulted men in English dress’, the deputy director of Central Intelligence noted in his report. ‘Their hats and neckties were taken off . . . a Bishop passing near the Fountain was stopped, his hat taken off and his coat burnt. The mob also chased Europeans who happened to go that way and threw stones on their vehicles.’Footnote 19
It is hardly possible to conceive a greater contrast with the Independence Day celebrations. What had happened in the ensuing months? Why had violence and hostility given way to mutual celebration? How much had the change resulted from British policy and how much did it owe to the Congress leadership? We will attempt to answer these questions in the next section.
A different war dance
The late colonial period was marked by rapid constitutional development, a convergence of Congress and British interests and intensifying communal conflict. The politics of anti-imperial protest were increasingly replaced by those of Hindu–Muslim conflict. The INA disturbances dispelled any lingering thoughts of reinforcing the Raj. Instead, attention turned to what would now be termed an imperial ‘exit strategy’. The Attlee administration's ‘new imperialism’ put good relations with independent India's future rulers at the heart of this. Archibald Wavell's inability to provide any prospect other than an ‘ignominious scuttle’ cost him the viceroyalty and it was left to Victoria's great-grandson, Lord Mountbatten, to bring down the curtain on the Raj. Mountbatten would only agree to take on the role of viceroy if a deadline was announced for the British transfer of power in India. The impending British departure improved relations with Congress, but it also raised the stakes in the struggle over Pakistan. The Muslim League's success in the elections held in India's provinces early in 1946 strengthened its hand and made the formation of a separate Muslim state a real possibility.Footnote 20 This increased tensions and violence in its future North Indian heartland of Bengal and Punjab. The new mood was seen in that Britons could move unmolested in areas torn apart by Muslim–Hindu rioting. ‘The start of a street fight was delayed to allow my wife to cross the road’, one British newspaper editor recalled with bemusement.Footnote 21
Communal conflict only claimed a handful of British victims who were unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Public responses revealed, however, that the contingency planning for mass evacuation in the event of a major collapse of order had not been an exaggerated response to the catastrophes arising from the uncoordinated British evacuation in Burma and Mayala in 1942.
British deaths prompted questions in parliament, which generated extensive correspondence between the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Delhi High Commission and the Indian authorities. Hence, while we know nothing of the circumstances of the countless Indians who were the victims of the ‘August madness’ attacks on the crowded refugee railway trains, it is possible to piece together the last journey of Medcalf, a British civil engineer who was murdered while travelling by train in East Punjab, as he travelled from Pakistan to take up a new posting in Calcutta.Footnote 22
The most celebrated British victims were Lt Colonel Dykes and his wife who died in the ransacking of St Joseph's mission in Baramulla as the first phase of the Kashmir dispute unfolded in November 1947 with the incursion of Pakhtun tribesman from Pakistan. These events became front page news in Britain.Footnote 23 The ‘hard-bitten’ Fleet Street journalist Sydney Smith broke the story as a personal account following his capture by tribesmen and incarceration in the hospital ward along with the survivors of the initial assault. Nehru sensing that the episode fixed Pakistan in international eyes as the aggressor in Kashmir visited the town which lay some thirty-five miles from Srinagar, four days after its capture by Indian troops. He memorably remarked of the devastation at St Joseph's mission that ‘nothing was left intact except the flowers’.Footnote 24 Margaret Bourke-White, the celebrated American photographer for Life magazine and recorder of the partition violence further publicised the Baramulla episode following her visit to the Mission.Footnote 25 The events, which tapped into fears of the violation of white women and tribal savagery deep in the imperial British psyche, inspired second-rate novels by the future author of ‘The Darling Buds of May’, H. E. Bates, and the former Observer Indian news correspondent Alan Moorehead.Footnote 26 The Academy award nominee producer and screen play writer Anthony Havelock-Allan even talked of a movie.
Tom Dykes, like a number of British officers, had stayed on after independence to oversee the reorganisation of the divided Indian Army, in his case the Sikh Regiment as it moved its headquarters from Nowshera in Pakistan to the Indian garrison town of Ambala. Ironically, these troops were to be the first to be airlifted into Kashmir to drive back the tribal invaders. Serving British officers had been shifted from Kashmir as tensions rose in the state in the aftermath of India's independence. Tom had returned to be with his wife, Biddie, who had recently given birth in the well-appointed Baramulla mission hospital. Like many British officers, Dykes had happy memories of Kashmir arising from houseboat holidays on the bewitchingly beautiful Dal Lake. His eldest son had been born at the same hospital just five years earlier. Their happy valley became a valley of death. When the tribesmen literally smashed their way into the hospital, Tom Dykes was shot. He suffered a lingering death. His wife's partly clothed body was discovered in a nearby well. The Dykes are buried alongside three other victims in the orchard graveyard on the far side of the convent.Footnote 27 Their three sons, including the two week old James, survived and were later evacuated to England.
The mission compound had attracted the tribesmen because of its prominent position on the Jhelum Valley Road. It provided opportunities for loot, as had earlier the Anglican church, club and Nedou's hotel at the hill resort of Gulmarg, where the raiders even stripped the coverings off the garden umbrellas. At Buniyar, they looted the bungalow belonging to Ronald Davis, head of the World Wide Evangelist Crusade.Footnote 28 By the time that his remains were discovered, dumped by the bank of the Jhelum River, an airlift had been organised to evacuate those British residents who wished to leave Kashmir. As we shall in the next section, contingency planning had been made for British evacuation throughout the subcontinent at the time of independence. It was, however, only in Kashmir that it had to be implemented.
Britons and independence
Surveying the community
Attlee's announcement that power would be transferred to Indian hands by the end of June 1948 prompted Lord Listowel, the secretary of state, to order an enquiry into the size and distribution of the European population.Footnote 29 Figures were obtained from the governors’ secretaries, the chief commissioner of Delhi and the British residents in the Princely States. Listowel dutifully reported to the India and Burma Cabinet Committee that there were around 80,000 Britons resident in the subcontinent. Almost a quarter of these lived in Bengal. Women and children comprised a high proportion of this population, accounting for around 50,000 persons. Two elements of the report rang alarm bells in London. First, the admission that the figures ‘were only a rough estimate’ and secondly, that about a fifth of the British residents lived in places where ‘they would be particularly exposed to danger in the event of serious disturbances’.Footnote 30 This resulted in the drawing up of contingency evacuation plans.
Mountbatten discussed at length the movement of civilians at a meeting with the provincial governors held on 15 April 1947, less than a month into his viceroyalty. It provides fascinating insights into official perceptions of the Britons in India at the end of the Raj and their likely response to independence. The governors revealed the highly differentiated characteristics of the British community which continued after independence. The Punjab governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, who was in the midst of increasingly serious communal disturbances, provided the most downbeat assessment. If all went well, he maintained, the 2,500 or so Britons would be safe, ‘but they were in fact already in some danger and that was liable to increase’. His advice was to reduce the number as soon as possible. Whilst he admitted that he had not yet sounded out European opinion, he felt that the time might come when the government would be faced with a really serious commitment and people ‘might have to be moved under great strain in a great hurry’, even if serious disturbances did not occur before June 1948:
After that date, whatever happened, the Punjab was likely to be equivalent to a foreign country and the only authority which would be capable of getting people out would be the FO working through the HC. No one would suppose that evacuation in these circumstances would be very easy or free from danger. Therefore it was for consideration whether, on some future date, it might not be necessary to compel people to evacuate through the issue of an ordinance.Footnote 31
Jenkins had some support from his Bengal counterparts, although the need was recognised to ‘keep commerce going’ in Calcutta and to not shock the various British associations in the province by suggesting anything along the lines of Jenkins's compulsory evacuation. Governor Burrows had more concerns about the 6,000 or so Britons living in ‘outlying areas’ than the 14,000 in Calcutta. The latter might have to be brought into the city if conditions deteriorated. The 5,000–6,000 officials and their families would in any case leave after independence. In Burrows's view, no ‘purposeful’ attack on Britons was anticipated, but, ‘if there were shortages of food Europeans and rich Indians would be a general target’.Footnote 32 The possibility of Communists organising agitations in Bengal's tea plantations was also noted, especially in the light of the planters’ lack of progress in improving labour conditions.
The governor of neighbouring Bihar, Sir Hugh Dow, also expressed concerns regarding the maintenance of law and order until June 1948 given the fact that the police in his province were ‘entirely unreliable’. There were only some fifty European officials. Dow, whose greatest administrative achievements had been in Sindh, believed that a large number of missionaries would doubtless stay. Most Britons, around 2,000 including their families were engaged in industrial enterprises. Dow somewhat cynically remarked that ‘So long as he (a businessman) was making money and all was quiet’, he would not consider leaving, ‘but a very quick change might be expected in his attitude once there was an interference with law and order on a wide scale.’Footnote 33
Sir Andrew Clow, who had served in India since 1914 and had informed Mountbatten that leaving would be a wrench, confirmed that by far the largest number of Europeans in Assam were planters.Footnote 34 More of them had their wives with them than ever before. They were mostly living in one of the least tense areas of the Province and the majority he thought intended to stay on. The missionaries would nearly all stay. The retired residents always talked of going home but never did so.
The situation was very different in Orissa with its tiny British population of just 132 people. Its Indian governor, Sir Chandulal Trivedi, optimistically reported that he did not anticipate any communal conflict or breakdown in law and order. Sir Frederick Bourne gave a similar report with respect to the Central Provinces. He believed most of the small population of a few hundred Britons would stay. Sir Francis Mudie, whose sympathies for the Muslim League were later to earn him the governorship of the Pakistan Punjab, reported that there were very few Britons in Sind outside Karachi. There had been no talk of Europeans leaving except in the services. His ministry would be horrified at the thought of the European business community leaving.Footnote 35
The erudite Sir Olaf Caroe, whose position was threatened by Congress claims of his partiality for the Muslim League, confirmed that the majority of Englishmen in the North-West Frontier Province were missionaries, bankers, officials and their wives. The situation in his opinion ‘was very shaky’ but might improve. He pointed out first that whatever happened in Punjab would have a major impact on the Frontier and secondly that when considering evacuation, it should be remembered that this ‘was the province furthest from the sea’.Footnote 36
Madras, because it was removed from the communal conflicts of North India, was not seen as presenting a problem by its governor, Sir Archibald Nye. He divided the British population into four main categories – officials of whom the majority would leave before June 1948; missionaries who would nearly all stay; businessmen of whom the majority would stay. Out of a total of 5,000 he thought 4,000 would remain. Francis Wylie, a former political adviser to the viceroy and now the governor of the United Provinces, followed suit. He believed that missionaries and the majority of businessmen would remain, while officials and most of the commercial community of Cawnpore would depart.
British evacuation
Mountbatten had called the conference because he was already apprehensive not just about the security situation, but the practical issues of coping with a large migration of Britons from India. The latter concerns were prompted by the British government and were in keeping with its need to dispel any sense of chaos and lack of control in the winding up of the Indian Empire. There was to be no repetition of the wartime chaos in Burma and Malaya. The shipping issue revealed in fact how difficult it was for the outgoing rulers to coordinate policy matters when they no longer retained control of all the levers of power. This was because a Plan A for movement of Europeans had to be considered alongside a worst case Plan B scenario situation of emergency evacuation. The latter contingency involved military movements of civilians to a holding transit camp in Bombay. Plan B had been originally conceived before the creation of the Indian-led interim government. Its existence raised the spectre that further planning and execution would have to have the ‘prior knowledge and agreement’ of Baldev Singh, the defence member of the interim government.Footnote 37
The shipping issue had surfaced because of concerns in London early in 1947 that civilian morale in India might be affected by lack of passenger berths. The increased demand was attributed to the growing communal disturbances in the Punjab and British residents’ anxieties about the impact on access to hill stations such as Simla in the forthcoming hot season.Footnote 38 Extra ships were made available, but the British cabinet in return wanted assurances that there would be a planned shipping operation over the next fourteen months. It suggested that Mountbatten in discussion with the governors, but not significantly the members of the interim government, should consider its coordination. If necessary, he was granted permission to reintroduce the wartime controls on passage.Footnote 39
Mountbatten had responded that the projected civilian requirement of passages from India up to the end of June 1947 was in fact only slightly higher at 12,294 than had been the figure for the corresponding months of 1937 and 1938. He had also confirmed that the services requirement stood at over 10,000.Footnote 40 Most importantly, he had maintained that the military contingency plan (the Movement Control Board) would only operate openly in conditions of widespread disorder and confusion.Footnote 41 Mountbatten shortly afterwards agreed to the provision of reports on each ship sailing for England showing the number of empty berths and the reasons for them. This followed irritation in London that extra ships had been diverted from other purposes, but had not in the event been required as a result of the cancellation of some 900 passenger requirements.Footnote 42
The ensuing discussion in New Delhi resulted in a proposal for a Civil Passages Control Plan to minimise the effects of speculative bookings and late cancellations. This involved a system of registration at the provincial level overseen by the governors who would draw up priorities. They would allocate passages under a monthly quota system based on the decisions of a Central Committee overseen by the viceroy.Footnote 43 It would assess the demands on berths and allocate passages bearing in mind the provincial proportions of European residents. This cumbersome machinery was never implemented as the rush of events following the decision to advance the date of independence terminated concerns about the logistics of civilian passages. It was only after independence, at the outset of conflict in Kashmir, that a large-scale movement of European residents took place.
Evacuation of British residents from Kashmir
The narrative of the evacuation of British residents from the state of Jammu and Kashmir awaits its historian. Indian writers have focused on the destruction at Baramulla and the heroism of the first military martyrs in the long Kashmir struggle. The sadistic killing of the pro-Indian activist Maqbool Sherwani inspired a slender novel by the left-leaning author Mulk Raj Anand.Footnote 44 The airlifting of British residents sits uncomfortably with such accounts, as it seems a throw-back to an imperial past. The episode is in fact historically significant because of the light it throws on the impact of the presence of British civil servants and army officers on developments in Kashmir. It is thus about far more than the evacuation of cantankerous British citizens from the beleaguered city of Srinagar.
Kashmir's future was unresolved at independence. Its ruler had not joined either India or Pakistan. The autocratic Hari Singh had been troubled for some time by democratic movements led by Sheikh Abdullah, the self-styled ‘lion of Kashmir’. The logic of the two nation theory assigned Kashmir to Pakistan, but this had little appeal for a Hindu ruler. He also feared that accession to India would strengthen the hand of Abdullah who was a close ally of Nehru whose support for Kashmir's inclusion in India is well known. It linked family ties with the belief that an Indian Kashmir would be ‘a powerful lever for secular sentiment’ in a country whose birth had been scarred by communal massacres.
The incursion of around 7,000 armed ‘tribal invaders’ on 22 October marked the first of a series of attempts by Pakistan to use proxy forces militarily to wrench Kashmir into its grasp.Footnote 45 The extent to which British officers in the Pakistan Army were aware of the operation is one of a number of disputes surrounding the events.Footnote 46 In all probability, the use of tribal proxies was a means to keep British staff officers out of the loop. The policy placed European residents in the path of the ill-disciplined tribal irregular forces.
There was a constant exchange of telegrams between the High Commissions in India and Pakistan and the Commonwealth Relations Office in London as tensions grew in Kashmir. Pakistan blockaded supplies of fuel in order to put pressure on its vacillating ruler Hari Singh who still harboured thoughts that an independent Kashmir could be the ‘Switzerland of the East’. By the beginning of October, tension had increased to the extent that a military officer, Major W. P. Cranston, delegated to the British High Commission in New Delhi was sent to Srinagar to plan the voluntary evacuation of British citizens. From the first week of October, Cranston made frequent journeys between India and Pakistan to discuss transport arrangements for the movement of British civilians. His peregrinations led some people to believe that he was in fact working for British intelligence.Footnote 47 Cranston met mainly with the British officials and servicemen who had stayed on in Pakistan, including General Douglas Gracey and Sir Francis Mudie, the governor of the West Punjab. The latter on 16 October promised Cranston transport and security along the main Srinagar–Baramulla–Domal–Kohala–Murree road route. Gracey had also promised to help British evacuation ‘in any way he possibly could’, but had more circumspectly said he needed authorisation from the central Pakistan government.Footnote 48
Cranston reported to New Delhi that the bulk of the British citizens, which numbered around 200, were now living in Srinagar, the capital of the Princely State. A Miss Nancy Hotz, ‘who had driven an ambulance at the time of the London Blitz’, had collected the names of those who wished to leave. Hotz, together with a retired Punjab engineer, Mr Betterton, and Sir Alan Henderson, a Calcutta high court judge, were to play leading roles in the later evacuation. This was also assisted by William Nedou, the Swiss proprietor of Nedou's hotel Srinagar who transported evacuees to the aerodrome, eight miles out of the city, and provided free accommodation for those Britons who could not access their bank accounts.Footnote 49 Some residents, Cranston noted, were trying to leave by car, but were handicapped by the severe petrol shortage as a result of the government of Pakistan's blockade. He reckoned that at least 170 buses were standing idle because they had run out of fuel.Footnote 50
Cranston struggled to persuade Britons to leave their homes in Kashmir. A hint of frustration can be discerned in his report that ‘the people were rather out of touch with reality and did not realize the seriousness of the general situation in India nor the danger for possible disturbances in Kashmir’.Footnote 51 Despite a more imminent Japanese threat, some Britons had been reluctant to abandon their homes in Burma and Malaya in 1942. On 22 October, Cranston returned with further ammunition in the form of an official warning from Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith, the UK high commissioner in Pakistan, that residents should take advantage of the arrangements to leave Kashmir, ‘as it might not be possible . . . later to protect them in case of serious disorders’.Footnote 52 Even after the tribal invasion, some residents cavilled at the necessity for evacuation, especially if it meant that they had to leave their pets behind.
Thursday 23 October had been earmarked for a road evacuation, but these plans ‘were upset’ when Sheikh Abdullah informed Cranston that the Jhelum Valley Road down to Rawalpindi was under fire. Armed tribesmen who had crossed over from Pakistan territory in military trucks had seized Muzaffarabad and Domal the day before and were advancing east on Kohala.Footnote 53 Cranston now began a hectic air shuttle between Srinagar, Delhi and Lahore. The initial plan was to evacuate residents via the 9,000 feet high Banihal Pass to Jammu and thence to Sialkot. When this passage over the ‘blizzard’ pass was deemed too risky for a large convoy, the only remaining option was air evacuation using the two RAF Dakota squadrons that could be moved to Rawalpindi from their Mauripur (Karachi) base. Just a matter of weeks earlier, the Air Ministry in London had discussed the withdrawal of the transport squadrons on ‘account of manpower shortage’ and economic ‘crisis in the UK’. This had alarmed Mountbatten as he thought that his York aircraft would also be withdrawn. ‘I need hardly remind you’, he wrote to Ismay on 9 October, ‘that the York may well be the only means by which we could evacuate our families in extreme necessity, though I sincerely hope that will not arise.’Footnote 54 In the event, the Air Ministry had decided to delay reviewing the situation until 1 December, meaning that the Dakotas were still available.
The British airlift was acutely sensitive as it was arranged on the cusp of Kashmir's accession to India and with its state forces retreating before the Pakistan supported Pakhtun tribesmen. The British government authorised the action, although Attlee underlined his concern that ‘the 2 RAF transport squadrons now in India and Pakistan should not be used to assist either Dominion, in any way in connection with disturbances in Kashmir’.Footnote 55 In the subcontinent, authorisation was given by senior British officials now in the service of the two states, including Sir Hugh Walmsley, the air marshall, and by the supreme commander-in-chief, the soon to be departed Sir Claude Auchinleck. In all the meetings and telephone conversations which Cranston records, only one senior South Asian official is named, V. P. Menon, in his capacity as secretary of the states ministry.Footnote 56 He informed the acting British high commissioner in New Delhi that it would be ‘prudent to arrange early removal by air of those persons who wish to leave’.Footnote 57
Cranston flew from Delhi to Srinagar on 27 October, the day that the Maharaja's signature of the instrument of accession was accepted in New Delhi. The specially chartered plane also carried Mehr Chand Mahajan, the prime minister of Kashmir, V. P. Menon and Sheikh Abdullah, who was to make the transition from political prisoner to chief minister in five weeks. Whilst he was making the final arrangements for the evacuation from Srinagar, Cranston was handed a letter by Mr J. E. Thompson, a retired army officer who now managed a timber company in Baramulla. This was the last communication from Lt-Colonel Dykes, asking for transport for his family to Srinagar. Thompson found his way to the mission hospital, but Kashmir Army headquarters refused permission to send a lorry when state troops were already in retreat from the town.Footnote 58
The fall of the state capital Srinagar was only averted by the airlifting of India's first Sikh battalion after Hari Singh acceded to India.Footnote 59 Mountbatten justified their induction as necessary to prevent the ‘pillaging’ of Srinagar and the massacre ‘of the couple of hundred British citizens in Kashmir’.Footnote 60 He advised the Indian Defence Committee which he chaired to go for the recapture of Baramulla, ‘regardless of casualties’.Footnote 61 It was, however, a number of days before the tide of battle turned. The limited landing facilities at Srinagar slowed the reinforcing of Indian troops. The Royal Indian Air Force was desperately short of planes and pilots. Just four of the ten transport aircraft in its No. 12 squadron were ‘serviceable’.Footnote 62 Troops were airlifted in modified civilian planes flown by British, Australian and American pilots. They sometimes had space for less than twenty servicemen and their equipment. If Pakistan troops had been committed at this moment as Jinnah intended, the Kashmir Valley might have been lost to India. Gracey and Mudie rowed over the phone, when the Pakistan commander-in-chief refused to order deployment without first consulting Auchinleck, the supreme commander in New Delhi.Footnote 63 It was to be another six months before Gracey ordered deployment, by which time Pakistan troops were needed to cling on to gains in Poonch, rather than ‘liberate’ the Valley.
The tribesmen's advance up the Kashmir Valley slowed as they spent time ransacking Baramulla. The town of orchards became a site of desolation. The looting bought the Indian forces precious time. As it was, the Afridis advanced to within a few miles of Srinagar and its aerodrome. Kashmir's capital bore the appearance of a frontline city. Its electricity was cut off following the destruction of the Mahura power plant. War correspondents and pilots congregated in the bar at Nedou's, while Sikh officers commandeered its map displays as they tried to plan troop deployments. The booze did not run out, but guests had to eat by candlelight and faced food shortages. ‘We never thought we would be in the siege of Srinagar’, one British resident, Gwen Burton, wrote home.Footnote 64 On 6 November, the tribesmen got to within five miles of the city. This was the extent of their advance, before a rapid retreat back along the Jhelum Valley Road. Within two days, Baramulla was ‘recaptured’ by the Indian troops. By the 12th, with the fall of Uri, the whole of the Kashmir Valley was in Indian hands as the tribesmen fled pell-mell towards Muzaffarabad, the present-day capital of Pakistan Azad Kashmir.
Following a reconnaissance of the restricted landing facilities, two RAF planes landed in Srinagar on 28 October. They brought over 1,000 gallons of petrol for the road transport which was being organised to take some of the British residents to Sialkot and then Lahore via the Banihal Pass. The first road convoy of five cars flying the Union Jack arrived safely in Lahore on 3 November, the second one containing the redoubtable Miss Hotz some five days later.Footnote 65 The final road convoy of three cars departed on 11 November. Just four days earlier, six trucks with two tanks and armoured cars in escort brought the eighty-nine Baramulla mission evacuees to Pakistan. They included a number of nuns and Anglo-Indians, the journalist Sydney Smith who had broken the news of the attack and the three Dykes boys.Footnote 66 Sir George Cunningham, the governor of the Pakistan North-West Frontier Province, had made the security arrangements. Ironically given the earlier events, the greatest danger was attack by Indian planes on what to all intents and purposes would have appeared a military convoy.
The British airlift began in earnest on Wednesday 29 October when ten sorties were made. By its completion, 136 persons along with 23,253 lbs of luggage had been safely transported to the Dakotas’ base at Chaklala in Pakistan.Footnote 67 Wisps of smoke could be seen rising from the surrounding villages as the planes banked out of Srinagar. There were fears that the tribesmen might down a plane or permanently damage the runway. An advance party got to within a mile of the aerodrome perimeter. The journalists Margaret Patton from Herald Tribune and Eric Britter from The Times had arranged seats on the first flight. When they reached the airfield and saw the newly arrived Indian spitfires and civilian transports, they realised the possibility for a major scoop and after interviewing pilots and crewmen returned to Nedou's.Footnote 68 The following day, a further three aircraft flew into Srinagar bringing another thousand gallons of petrol. The chaotic conditions prevailing around Srinagar meant that only ten Britons could be airlifted to safety. This left another sixty or so awaiting evacuation.Footnote 69
Cranston shuttled back to New Delhi on 2 November. Following discussions with Auchinleck, the high commissioner and the air commodore, the government of India agreed to the evacuation of the remaining British residents on the civil airlines that were operating between Srinagar and Delhi. Cranston returned on 6 November to Srinagar with the unpopular news that passengers would have to pay their fares. The Indian authorities did, however, provide an armed escort to the aerodrome. On the initiative of the British deputy quartermaster general, Indian Army trucks which had transported supplies to the front returned to New Delhi carrying the luggage and in some instances the pets of the residents. Cranston returned on 17 November from Srinagar on the last evacuee flight. ‘This left’, Cranston's report concluded, seventy-seven British people in Srinagar and thirty-one outside, the latter almost entirely missionaries who declared that they did not wish to leave Kashmir this winter; some would remain in Kashmir permanently and some would leave for England and other countries in the spring if conditions permitted.’Footnote 70
Conclusion
Concerns for the safety of British citizens in India prompted elaborate plans for their evacuation at the time of independence. In the event, the replacement of anti-European sentiment by communal conflict meant that large-scale evacuation was not required. This paper argues that the planning needs to be understood not just in terms of humanitarian concerns, but a desire to avoid a repetition of the loss of imperial prestige arising from the chaotic evacuation of Burma and Malaya in 1942.
Independence with Partition did not as was hoped solve ‘Hindu’–‘Muslim’ conflict in the subcontinent. Instead, it internationalised it. The conflict focused on the fate of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir which alongside its strategic value symbolised different visions of the nation building enterprise in post-colonial South Asia. The British residents of the state found themselves in the path of the first ‘proxy war’ launched by Pakistan. Their successful evacuation depended in part on the activism of civilian volunteers which was a legacy from the war years. The cooperation of the British High Commissions in India and Pakistan also helped. Most important, however, was their direct access to the shortly to be wound up supreme military headquarters in New Delhi. RAF planes were able to make repeated authorised sorties from Pakistan into Indian air space. They landed at an aerodrome whose primitive runaway and maintenance facilities were stretched to the limit by the need to rush India reinforcements from their bases in Amritsar and Ambala. In the event, the fledgling Pakistan Air Force was unable to take advantage of these chaotic circumstances.
The presence of British military commanders not only smoothed the airlifting of residents but also prevented further escalation of the military conflict between two members of the Commonwealth. Attlee's anxieties about the need for an even-handed British approach, however, continually resurfaced, as in the ensuing decades, Kashmir troubled both South Asian and wider Commonwealth relations.
