Academic writing about the process of law reform is all too rare. When it does surface, it is often from a former member of a law reform body and gives a fascinating insight into the mind – and frustrations – of a law reformer. This book is no exception. As the title suggests, the text deals with two particular themes, frequently viewed through the lens of Professor Horder's experience as a Law Commissioner (from 2005 until 2010). First, it deals with the question of who should be responsible for reforming the law of homicide. Secondly, it deals with the more substantive matter of how Horder believes the English law of homicide (including partial defences to murder) should be reformed. The overarching thesis of the book is – somewhat controversially – that the public should have more influence than at present over homicide law reform.

Part I considers the mechanics of law reform. In chapter one, Horder plots a history of various attempts at reforming the criminal law – from the failed codes of the nineteenth century, to the work of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, to the Law Commission's equally futile attempts at criminal codification. Based on these endeavours, who should reform the law of homicide? Horder concludes that a collective effort is required, and particular attention is needed to ensure that the public can make a “meaningful contribution” (p. 4). Attempts at public involvement are examined, from an early “crude” attempt in 1819 (p. 10), to the current Law Commission's more sophisticated consultations, which are conducted “openly and in good faith” (p. 34). Horder's frustration at the Ministry of Justice blocking further “crucial” public opinion surveys and wasting resources by duplicating consultations after a Commission project is evident (p. 49). He is critical of the Criminal Law Revision Committee's lack of public consultation, deriding it for its “reliance on its own opinion” (p. 41). This view sets Horder apart from many writers (such as Spencer) who are far less trusting of the general public being involved in law reform. Horder is adamant that members of the public are not the “wild-eyed retributivists” of tabloid headlines (p. 42). He derides the arrogance of scholars who consider themselves to be the best source of authority on moral or political arguments.

Horder endorses the automatic review of “morally controversial legal reforms”, such as abortion or euthanasia, every 15–20 years (p. 5). Public opinions change over time, and so such matters should never be taken to be permanently settled. This suggestion to ensure the law moves with public opinion is attractive in its simplicity. More complicated, however, is the issue of how best to engage the public in law reform, something Horder himself acknowledges is not “an easy matter” (p. 5, n. 6).

In chapter two, Horder critiques what he calls the “traditional-codificatory” model. This term, which may seem contradictory to those familiar with the common law/codification dichotomy, is employed to capture codification's concern with form over substance and consequent adoption of common law definitions, even where they have been heavily criticised. Horder refers to both the nineteenth century and Commission codes to demonstrate that in many cases, little changed from one code to the next (for example, in relation to the definition of murder). For Horder, one problem in splicing together the common law and a code is the increase in regulatory crime, such as corporate manslaughter and death by dangerous driving. Here, Horder thinks the fundamental conflict between two conflicting goals (securing future compliance with the rules (regulatory crime) and public condemnation (other homicide offences)) is an obstacle to codification. Furthermore, regulatory offences change frequently, in terms of the “nature, scope, and quantity of offences” (p. 78). Horder cites the frequent changes to road traffic death legislation as an example of this. Moving the law with changing social concerns is a positive thing for Horder, but it conflicts with the fixed nature of the traditional-codificatory model. Horder concludes by making it clear that he is not against the regulatory approach, but that it is fundamentally important both models are “mutually reinforcing” (p. 86).

Part II of the text gathers together some of Horder's previous essays on various aspects of homicide offences. There is, however, a new chapter on manslaughter arising from an intentional attack, and the chapter on corporate manslaughter has been much revised from its previous incarnation. In chapter three, Horder discusses the definition of murder, and, in particular, the Commission's proposals for homicide reform. The Commission recommended a controversial three-tier structure: first degree murder (intentional killings and killings from serious injury inflicted intentionally and with an awareness of a serious risk of death); second degree murder (deaths resulting from intentional serious injury; injury or a fear or risk of injury, inflicted intentionally and with an awareness of a serious risk of death; or where a partial defence to first degree murder has been secured) and manslaughter (deaths resulting from gross negligence or a criminal act intended to or likely to cause injury) in place of the current two-tier structure (murder and manslaughter). Horder argues that the “two-tier structure is no longer able to meet the increasing demands being made of it” (p. 91). These increasing demands, we are told, include the introduction of additional partial defences to murder over time, such as diminished responsibility. A person who secures one of these defences should not, Horder argues, necessarily have the same label as someone who has committed manslaughter, since the former may admit intending to kill, whereas the manslaughterer may have much lower culpability. This does beg the question, however, whether a person who killed intentionally, but with a defence, deserves the alternative label of “murderer” the Commission's proposals would have conferred. Horder feels that the Commission's solution is more “sophisticated” (p. 95) and replaces the current “all-encompassing jumble” (p. 96) of the definition of manslaughter. Horder responds to criticisms (from, for example, Rogers and Wilson) which were made during the Commission's consultation and which helped to shape the resulting recommendations. Criticisms on the final proposals are also answered.

In chapter four, the law on corporate manslaughter is examined. In a welcome addition to the existing literature, which tends mainly to discuss the liability of companies, Horder concentrates on the duties imposed on public bodies. The troubling question of, for example, liability for the deaths of NHS patients and prisoners, is surely deserving of consideration. Horder discusses the exemptions for public bodies under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and concludes that the very generous exemptions for the army and police in particular are “unwarranted” (p. 135).

Manslaughter by intentional attack is the subject of chapter five, where Horder defends the status of “one-punch” manslaughter (where death results unexpectedly from a trivial assault). Horder refers us back to the Commission's three-tier structure to demonstrate how it can better justify finding such actors criminally responsible. The importance of physical integrity is also used to necessitate the imposition of liability. Horder acknowledges that many theorists would disagree with him, but that judges, legislators and – most importantly for Horder – the public, would not. The assault must not, however, constitute a mere “trespass to the person” (p. 150). Importantly for Horder's central thesis, research (by Mitchell) suggests that the public do not think liability should be imposed for deaths resulting from a mere trespass (for example, a gentle push).

Chapter six considers the law on joint enterprise. Horder's disappointment here is clear, as he notes that the Government admitted the existing law was (and still is) plagued with problems yet failed to implement the Commission's proposals. He laments the lack of legislation given the “ambiguous and contradictory” common law (p. 165). Horder discusses the Commission's criticisms of the “fundamental difference” rule (where the test for liability is whether the other participant's actions were “fundamentally different” to what was expected). The Commission proposed that this be rephrased as a test which asked whether the action was “within the scope of the venture”. Horder provides his rejoinder to Sullivan's criticisms of the Commission's proposals, finding his alternative under-inclusive. Relating back to the overarching theme of the text, Horder notes that the public have shown “surprise and dissatisfaction” with the common law (p. 177, citing research by Mitchell and Roberts). Problematically, however, for Horder's theory, the public would prefer Sullivan's scheme. Presumably in this case, Horder would take on the “heavy burden” (p. 5) of departing from the public's view.

Chapter seven deals with the doctrine of transferred malice. Horder discusses the law where it is not only the victim who is unintended, but the mode of death (for example, victim B is killed not by a mis-fired gunshot aimed at victim A, but by a heart attack induced by the shock of the noise). Horder prefers the “remoteness principle” over the admittedly “attractively simple” (p. 184) argument that the causal link is broken in such cases (advanced by Simester and Sullivan). Remoteness of consequence, argues Horder, is a better argument than causal remoteness for establishing liability in such cases.

Finally, Part III consists of chapter eight, which deals with three related issues in relation to defences. First, Horder seeks to establish whether the limits to the defences to murder make the law more “civilized”. For Horder, this question “transcends the hallowed distinction between permission and excuse” (p. 207). Horder is obviously optimistic that publicly influenced law reform and “civilizing” law reform are compatible ideologies. He notes a “mid-twentieth century ‘civilizing’ process” (p. 200), which reduced the scope of both permission to kill (for example, by abolishing the death penalty) and excuses (for example, through the demise of the “chance medley” doctrine, where causing a death in a sudden and unpremeditated fight would be manslaughter rather than murder). This, says Horder, reflected the changed social norms of a society less tolerant of invasions of physical integrity. In relation to Horder's central thesis, therefore, it is vital to note that sometimes public opinion clearly does influence criminal law reform.

Horder then moves on to analyse the Homicide Act 1957 and the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) which preceded it. He is deeply critical of the 1957 Act, finding it to have reversed the “civilizing” trend by introducing into the law “distinctly uncivilized elements” (p. 229). For example, the 1957 Act removed the right of a judge to withdraw the provocation defence from the jury where the attack was instigated by a mere confession of adultery. This was later (partially) rectified by Commission proposals enacted in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

Finally, Horder looks at the defence of excessive self-defence (where some force would have been permissible, but the actual force employed goes beyond this). The Commission rejected a “loss of control” argument, favouring an approach which covered actors who overreacted with fatal consequences through fear as well as anger (better protecting, for example, victims of domestic abuse). Once again, Horder laments the fact that the Government chose to ignore these recommendations (the eventual legislation focussed on a loss of control test). Horder's overall emphasis during this section is that the law would be more “civilized” if partial defences had little place in the law of homicide, but that the continuing mandatory life sentence for murder prevents this. The Commission was prohibited from proposing the abolition of the mandatory life sentence in the reference which led to its report – clearly this caused some compromise in the recommendations Horder helped shape.

Overall, Horder seeks to “defend from attack” (p. ix) the Commission's proposals for the reform of homicide law. His writing hints at the disappointment that only some of the Commission's suggested reforms found their way onto the statute book. In the Lord Chancellor's Report on the Implementation for Law Commission Proposals (2011) (a new annual duty under the Law Commission Act 2009 to report on the implementation of Commission proposals), the Government has confirmed that it does not intend to take any of the unimplemented reforms forward. It is also interesting, however, to hear Horder's candid views on the Commission's proposed reforms and the ideology of codification. He believes that codification does not necessarily always lead to “better or even simpler” law (p. 107). Therefore, despite its “statutory duty” to consider codification, (p. 108) Horder does not think the Commission should prioritise such work, a view which has been shared by the last Chairman of the Commission. Horder puts forward both his proposals for how the law should be reformed and how such reform should be achieved. This text is therefore recommended to those (including more advanced students) interested in the process of law reform, as well as the substantive law of homicide. It is a valuable addition to both fields.