Introduction
On the morning of 3 December 1945, 12 American-made Stearman training aircraft took off from Walton Airport in Lahore, British India.Footnote 1 Their destination was Kunming, China. In the following week, another 45 aircraft, mostly flown by Chinese pilots who had received their training at the Lahore Elementary Flying Training School (LEFTS hereafter), left Lahore for Kunming. On their way back, these light training aircraft had to stop at Cawnpore and Allahabad (both in Uttar Pradesh, India), Tulihal (in Imphal, India), Bhamao (in northern Burma), and Paoshan (in southwest China) for refuelling and maintenance before they landed in Kunming.Footnote 2 This air route had been opened for the Hump airlift during the Second World War when the Allies flew their military supplies to China to support its war against Japan. The Hump was widely known as one of the most dangerous air routes in the world because pilots had to fly their aircraft into the eastern end of the Himalayan mountains where violent turbulence, high-speed winds, and ice had proven to be extremely hazardous. For most of the time, the Hump was flown by experienced American pilots in long-range cargo aircraft. The flight of more than 50 small aircraft over the Hump in December 1945 was an endeavour that had never been tried before, and it was also the last mission along that route as the Second World War had come to an end months before.
Although this mission was very ambitious, it has never drawn any serious attention from historians. Questions concerning the backdrop of this mission have been neither raised nor answered. Why did the Chinese send their pilots to Lahore for training? What was the background of the LEFTS? Given the fact that the Hump route was very dangerous and the war was already over, why were the Chinese in such a hurry that they elected to fly their aircraft over the Hump?
The questions above cannot be addressed without referring to the political crisis that occurred across Asia during and immediately after the Second World War. Scholars have long argued that the Second World War did not end in Asia after August 1945. Instead, it lingered in the form of a range of intense and bloody wars, both civil and against a revived European colonialism.Footnote 3 More often than not, historians tend to study these conflicts and wars either within fixed regions, such as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, or specific countries such as Indonesia, China, and Korea. For this reason, there are studies on the Indonesian War of Independence, the Chinese Civil War, the First Indochina War, and the partition of India.Footnote 4 Although practitioners have been trying hard to promote the perspective of transregional connections in the context of the global Cold War in recent years,Footnote 5 the political crisis that broke out in Asia between the final stages of the Second World War and the fully fledged Cold War period have been explored largely within the realms of national history.Footnote 6
In India,Footnote 7 the period during and after the Second World War was a crucial moment as an abrupt and violent partition was looming over India's path to independence. Scholarly attention has largely been drawn to the political negotiations between the Congress Party, the Muslim League, and the British authorities.Footnote 8 In China, this period had the same significance, as the Communists and the Nationalists were preparing for a full-scale civil war.Footnote 9 For most historians of India and China, however, their research subjects—the end of the British Raj and the Chinese Civil War—are exclusive and irrelevant to one another.
Recent developments in historiography in modern India and China, and the critique of national history in particular,Footnote 10 have uncovered the multifaceted connections between the two countries during and immediately after the Second World War.Footnote 11 Issues such as Taixu and Dai Jitao's travels in India to reconnect the two nations through Buddhist exchanges, Chiang Kai-shek's visit to India in 1942 and his relationship with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and Tan Yunshan's nationalist activities in India have all been examined.Footnote 12 For scholars of India-China connections, the friendship between both countries’ elites in the early twentieth century and the cultural interactions between India and China in the post-war years gave way to political contention as the issue of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet emerged.Footnote 13 The disagreement between the Chinese Nationalist government and the interim Indian government over the status of Tibet was inherited by their direct heirs—the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India—and became one of the main triggers of the Sino-Indian War in 1962.Footnote 14
When the above India-China connections in the 1940s are discussed by scholars, however, they have mainly focused on high politics and social elites. Few studies have tried to explore how ordinary people took part in the connections and how these influenced their lives. Furthermore, the dominant political backdrops for India and China during that period—the chaotic ending of the British Raj and the Chinese Civil War—are generally untouched by studies of India-China connections. These problems can be attributed to the lack of appropriate cases from below and the demand for a framework that could integrate modern Indian and Chinese history into a single narrative.
This article follows the recent trend of unearthing long-forgotten connections and interactions between India and China during the colonial period.Footnote 15 Different from previous studies that are still preoccupied with nation-bounded bilateral relations, it underscores the importance of integrating modern Indian and Chinese history into a single analytical framework to provide alternative perspectives and transcending exclusive national narratives.Footnote 16 Taking the establishment of the LEFTS and its evacuation by the end of the Second World War as a case, this study tries to tell a story that is able to link the chaotic ending of the British Raj with the Chinese Civil War. In so doing, it hopes to unearth the Chinese experience during the final days of the British Raj and bring to light an Indian aspect of China's war against Japan and the Chinese Civil War.
The origins of the LEFTS
In early 1942, the Japanese invaded Burma. By May 1942, the defence of the Allies in Burma had collapsed and the Burma Road that connected China with the outside world was cut off. After that, transportation of supplies of materials, equipment, and gas to China for use by the Chinese Air Force became increasingly difficult. Against this background, in June 1942 the Chinese government asked the Government of India to help transfer one of the Chinese flying training schools to India to facilitate easy access to supplies.Footnote 17
Indeed, the Americans had begun to take Chinese cadets to the United States for flight training as early as October 1941. These potential pilots were flown from Kunming to Bombay or Calcutta and then travelled by sea to San Francisco via Australia.Footnote 18 On arrival, it was found immediately that nearly half of them were either physically or mentally unsuitable for flying and, as a result, these cadets had to be sent all the way back to China.Footnote 19 To save time and resources, the Chinese government wanted the proposed flying training school in India to provide elementary training for the cadets. Only those who completed the training would be sent on to the United States for intermediate and advanced instruction.Footnote 20
The Government of India, however, declined the Chinese proposal initially. It pointed out that there was no training facility for the Chinese at that time in India. Even if the Chinese insisted on building a training institution from scratch, the process would be too slow to meet the demands of war. Furthermore, the Government of India could not provide any aircraft for the training school. For these reasons, it suggested that the Chinese should keep sending their pupils to the United States.Footnote 21
Almost at the same time as the Government of India declined the Chinese proposal, it found some 30 Ryan Trainer Aircraft in Allahabad that had been provided by the Americans to the Chinese and were supposed to be transported to China. However, due to the cutting off of the Burma Road, it was impossible to move them to China at the time. Intending to strengthen its own capability for flight training, the Government of India hatched a plan to take all these aircraft for its own use.Footnote 22
The news of the Ryan Trainer Aircraft in Allahabad, however, soon reached the Chinese who therefore asked to use those aircraft already in India for the training school.Footnote 23 Realizing that they had no sound reason to turn down the Chinese again, the British Foreign Office pressed the Government of India to accept the Chinese proposal based on the belief that the offer would greatly improve Anglo-Chinese relations and facilitate the operations of the Royal Air Force in China.Footnote 24 In August 1942, the Government of India finally agreed to let the Chinese set up an elementary flying training school in India and promised to provide the aerodrome, accommodation facilities, rations and daily allowance, and petrol and oil to the Chinese trainees and staff.Footnote 25
With regard to the location of the training school, the British mainly focused on northwest Indian cities such as Lahore, Ferozepur, and Cawnpore. Finally, the Walton Airport (Lahore Civil Aerodrome) near the city of Lahore was selected due to four factors.Footnote 26 First, it had been the Initial Training Centre for Indian pilots serving in the Royal Indian Air Force and so facilities for pilot training already existed there.Footnote 27 Secondly, although Lahore was very hot during the summer, there was an ample water supply close to the aerodrome. Thirdly, because there were bungalows next to the aerodrome, accommodation for the trainees and staff could easily be settled. Lastly, there was a satellite airfield for the Lahore Civil Aerodrome that could be used as a landing ground to avoid congestion in the main aerodrome circuit.Footnote 28
After several months’ preparation, in April 1943, the LEFTS was officially launched in the Walton Airport at Lahore. The school consisted of nine barrack blocks and was staffed by 108 Chinese officers and 112 Chinese mechanics with around 150 training aircraft.Footnote 29 In addition to these staff were 125 Chinese cadets enrolled in the first course of the LEFTS, who would undergo three months of training. Only those who qualified on all courses would be sent to the United States for further instruction.Footnote 30
The British concern over the LEFTS
In November 1944, a documentary on the daily life and training activities of the Chinese cadets in the LEFTS was shot by the No. 3 Royal Air Force (RAF) Film Production Unit. The documentary starts by showing three Chinese mechanics working on a PT-17 trainer aircraft and then briefly discussing how to fix some broken parts of the plane's engine. The shot then turns to a Chinese cadet. He has just received an order from his instructor and runs to his plane. With the help of two assistants, he climbs into the aircraft and starts up the engine. After a brief taxiing, his aircraft takes off into the sky. Later, a group of Chinese cadets marches into the school. They are newcomers who have just arrived from China. These new cadets are shown round the school and greeted by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Tseng, the Chinese commandant of the LEFTS, and Wing-Commander H. F. Bishop, the British liaison officer. Flight clothes and other equipment are issued to these new cadets. Tseng, Bishop, and other Chinese and British officers in the school then appear in the school's Liaison Office for a conference about the new buildings and projects at the school. The last shot of the documentary is an aerial view of the airport and training field. Cadets and instructors are on parade to salute their commandants while trainer aircraft take off and land on the circuit.Footnote 31
From April 1943 to June 1946, the LEFTS launched 25 courses and trained more than 2,000 Chinese cadets. Additionally, around 1,000 Chinese aviation mechanics also received their training at the LEFTS. On average, the duration of each course was three months. On arrival, cadets were given one week of ground instruction by Chinese instructors before they started the flight training.
Landing was particularly dangerous for the Chinese cadets. On several occasions they lost control of their aircraft and crashed.Footnote 32 Another challenge for them was the cross-country flying practice in which they needed to fly from Lahore to either Agra, Karachi, or Bombay and return. Accidents were not uncommon during the cross-country practice, and some cadets even lost their lives when their aircraft crashed.Footnote 33 In addition to flying instruction, bombing and navigation training were added to the courses from December 1944, which all cadets were required to take.Footnote 34
At the end of each course, American test pilots would be sent to Lahore to check the performance of the Chinese cadets.Footnote 35 The chance of being rejected for further training was quite high. For example, in the second course, 125 cadets were checked and only 87 passed the test.Footnote 36 The pass rate for the third course was even lower, at only 77 out of 126 cadets.Footnote 37 Those who were rejected for further training were sent back to China.Footnote 38
The Chinese in the LEFTS also had frequent interactions with local Indian troops and civil authorities. Indian Royal Air Force pilots were invited to the school to exchange flying experiences with their Chinese colleagues, while Indian and Chinese mechanics conducted cooperative exercises.Footnote 39 Furthermore, Chinese cadets also actively participated in several civil ceremonies. On 11 April 1944, 27 Chinese trainer aircraft took part in a fly past over the War Service Exhibition held at Minto Park in Lahore, which was greatly appreciated by local residents.Footnote 40 Three months later, Chinese aircraft joined the National War Front Meeting at Lyallpur, dropping garlands of flowers over the assembled crowds and demonstrating formation and aerobatic flying.Footnote 41
As the training course went into its second year, however, the British became increasingly uneasy over the activities of the Chinese in Lahore. One of the principal complaints they made was that they thought some unprofessional behaviour by the Chinese caused too much trouble for the British side. The British complained that the Chinese rarely forwarded them any information about the arrival of large numbers of Chinese personnel in Lahore. Sometimes, the British liaison officer in the training school only came to know of the new arrivals when they were already in the camps. The lack of communication in this regard caused chaos for the local British provision arrangement department. Consequently, uniforms, rations, and accommodation were often not able to be arranged for the Chinese due to the very short notice.Footnote 42
Another British complaint was about the overhaul of aircraft and vehicles. The British required that the engines of crashed aircraft in the training school should be stripped and sent to a specific RAF factory for repair. However, they found that the Chinese usually undertook the repairs themselves. As a result, some engines were completely damaged due to the lack of experience of Chinese mechanics.Footnote 43 Regarding the maintenance of vehicles in the training school, it was reported that more than half of them were constantly undergoing repairs due to the lack of elementary driving knowledge on the part of the Chinese. In 1944 alone, five vehicles were totally destroyed because of slipping the clutch instead changing the gears. The accident rate for Chinese vehicles was reported to be 200 per cent higher than that of any other military unit in Lahore.Footnote 44
Conflicts also occurred when the British tried to construct a new roof for the Chinese mechanics’ barracks. The British accused the Chinese of preventing the workers from entering the barracks as they did not want to be relocated to other temporary barracks. The construction work, therefore, was delayed for six weeks.Footnote 45
A later investigation revealed that most of these British complaints were groundless. More often than not, the Chinese would inform the British of the schedule and the number of new arrivals two weeks in advance. Indeed, the British liaison officer in the LEFTS was updated on the number of the Chinese in the school three times a week. In this sense, there was no reason for the British to attribute the chaotic arrangement of provisions to the Chinese.Footnote 46 Furthermore, the Chinese claimed that they tried to send broken parts from the aircraft and vehicles to the RAF factory for repair. However, it either refused to fix spares for the Chinese or significantly delayed the work. Consequently, the Chinese had to do the repairs themselves even if they were unfamiliar with the work. The Chinese admitted that it was the fault of inexperienced drivers that led to the damage of several vehicles but stressed that this was because the British ignored the Chinese requests for experienced drivers.Footnote 47 Regarding the construction of the roof of the barracks, the Chinese stated that they prevented construction workers from entering the barracks because they were not notified by the British that they had to evacuate their rooms beforehand. The delay to the roof project was, therefore, the fault of the British due to their failure to inform the Chinese beforehand.Footnote 48
The frequent disputes between the British and the Chinese shed light on the deep concern of the British over the existence of the LEFTS. They worried that the Chinese in India were using too many resources that were supposed to be supplied to the British war effort.Footnote 49 The British also assumed the Chinese would be their potential competitor, if not enemy, after the war and were therefore reluctant to give them their full support.Footnote 50 In a letter written by J. G. Bruce, the general officer commanding the Lahore District, to Air Headquarters at New Delhi, he warned that the Chinese would use the LEFTS to build up their own air force, which would be a potential threat to the British interests in Asia after the war.Footnote 51 More importantly, the British worried that the existence of the Chinese in Lahore would eventually add fuel to the fire of the Indian nationalist movement. It was reported that Chinese personnel in Lahore did not pay compliments to or salute British officers in public. This move was soon followed by local Indians, who also began to omit saluting the British. The British viewed this as a direct challenge to their colonial rule in India.Footnote 52 By the end of the war, the concerns and worries of the British had become so great that they decided to terminate most rations and provisions to the Chinese in the LEFTS and urged them to return to China as soon as possible.Footnote 53
A civil war needs the air force
In fact, as the Second World War came to an end, it was not only the British who wanted the Chinese cadets and officers in Lahore to leave immediately, but also the Chinese authorities in Chongqing, who had an urgent need for these personnel and aircraft.
The Chinese Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek formed a fragile alliance with the Chinese Communists during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Even though the war with the Japanese was still ongoing, however, clashes between the Nationalist and Communist forces broke out frequently. As the end of the Second World War approached, both parties set out to prepare for the seemingly inevitable civil war.
Realizing that a strong air force would give him a great edge over the Communists, who did not have any air strike force at that time, Chiang Kai-shek asked the United States to hand over all American aircraft and logistic materials in India to the Nationalists.Footnote 54 In an effort to contain the Communists, the Americans accepted Chiang's proposal.Footnote 55 The aircraft and spare parts in the LEFTS, which were part of the American Lend-Lease policy, were among the equipment that was handed over to the Chinese Nationalists.Footnote 56 In September 1945, Chinese officers in the LEFTS formally informed the British that they planned to transport all aircraft, facilities, and cadets at the school back to China within one month.Footnote 57
The hasty action actually had its roots in China. After the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, the Communists had tried hard to expand their sphere of influence across the country. In August alone, the Communist forces had defeated the Nationalists in Yetaishan (Shanxi Province), Baoying (Jiangsu Province), Yongjiazhen (Anhui Province), and Tianmen (Hubei Province), and they occupied several important cities and towns in northern and central China.
The Nationalists, in turn, determined to eliminate the Communist threat by all available means. In this context, there was a growing need to use the air force in the battles against the Communists. In early October 1945, Communist forces laid siege to the city of Qinyang in Henan Province. Fearing that the city would fall into the hands of the Communists, local commanders asked Chiang Kai-shek to dispatch aircraft to bombard the Communist forces and drop supplies to the besieged Nationalists.Footnote 58 In the same month, the Communists also began to march into Inner Mongolia, intending to besiege Hohhot, the biggest city in the region. Local commanders urged Chiang Kai-shek to provide air cover immediately to deter the Communist offensive.Footnote 59 In late October, even Beijing was under the blockade of the Communist troops and support from the air force was again urgently requested.Footnote 60
The heavy demand for air support in battles against the Communists across the country exhausted the Nationalists’ air force. Chiang Kai-shek soon realized that he needed more aircraft, pilots, and mechanics to win the civil war. The trainer aircraft and pilots, even with only primary training at the LEFTS, were therefore regarded as substantial reinforcement.Footnote 61 However, the original plan of bringing the aircraft and pilots in Lahore back to China in the month of October 1945 failed.
Bringing the LEFTS back to China
Throughout October 1945, the Chinese in Lahore were in discussion with the British over how to transport the aircraft back to China. They asked the British to provide 500 crates for storing the aircraft. The British, however, stated that they were unable to make such arrangements because facilities in Lahore were insufficient.Footnote 62 By the end of the month, the deputy superintendent of the LEFTS, Lieutenant-Colonel K. S. Chen, was still unable to obtain any supply of packing cases for the aircraft and equipment.Footnote 63
Being pushed by the Nationalist government in Chongqing and realizing that the lack of packing cases would seriously delay the schedule, Chen proposed sending two aircraft to fly back to China from Lahore as a test flight. If it turned out to be successful, all available aircraft in Lahore would be flown to China directly instead of being packed into the crates.Footnote 64 The British soon sanctioned the proposal and agreed to provide refuelling facilities at every stopping point on the proposed route.Footnote 65
On 12 November 1945, two Stearman aircraft from the LEFTS left en route for China. One of them burst a tyre on landing at Cawnpore, while the other one landed safely in Kunming. Although the pilot reported that the trip would be extremely difficult if bad weather or high winds were encountered en route, the Chinese authorities decided to continue with flying all aircraft back to China directly.Footnote 66
Between 3 and 18 December, 57 aircraft from the LEFTS, flown by Chinese cadets, left Lahore for Kunming and 53 successfully completed the journey. Nevertheless, around 600 Chinese officers, cadets, and mechanics, as well as spare parts for the aircraft, were still in Lahore, waiting for ships that could take them back to China.
The superintendent of the LEFTS, Colonel M. C. Liu, informed the British in November that he had secured a ship in Calcutta that could take all Chinese personnel and equipment to China.Footnote 67 However, this plan soon proved to be unworkable as the ship was said to be unable to get to Lahore.Footnote 68
As the aircraft had already been dispatched back to China, the Chinese in Lahore accelerated their move to work out a plan of return. In late December, Colonel M. C. Liu told the British that the whole Chinese unit in the LEFTS would go to Calcutta in January 1946 to await a ship there.Footnote 69 A Chinese advance party then went to Calcutta to set up a transit camp to accommodate the unit.Footnote 70
When the transit camp in Calcutta was settled, the Chinese informed the British that they would leave Lahore on 28 January 1946.Footnote 71 This plan, however, was again dropped on the grounds that the ship that was supposed to transport them was no longer available.Footnote 72 Worse still, the Chinese learnt that their return would be indefinitely delayed due to the shortage of ships.
After several months of waiting, on 1 May 1946, the Chinese received information that an American ship would be docking at Calcutta on 8 May en route for Shanghai. Since a British ship was still unavailable, the Chinese pinned great hopes on this possibility, even though their knowledge of the ship was rather scanty. It was decided to dispatch 100 personnel to Calcutta to await it,Footnote 73 but this decision agitated those who were to be left behind. To prevent a looming mutiny among the remaining personnel, the Chinese superintendent had to cancel the plan and promised they would all leave for China together.Footnote 74
Indeed, a risk of mutiny among the Chinese in Lahore was far from an exaggeration. Chinese senior officials in Lahore repeatedly warned the British that they were unable to maintain the discipline of their cadets in the school.Footnote 75 In the course of waiting for the transport, the morale of the Chinese in the LEFTS declined dramatically. As the war was over, they were in a hurry to return to China after being separated from their families for several years. Contrary to their expectations, they had been left behind for more than six months with very limited provisions and restrictions on their movements. The unhappy and disappointed Chinese even had fights with local Indian policemen for not allowing them to enter into an Indian village for entertainment.Footnote 76 The Chinese in Lahore were unable to understand why the British could not arrange a ship for them for such a long time.
The Royal Indian Navy Mutiny
On the morning of 19 January 1946, around 1,000 British Royal Air Force servicemen had gathered on the parade ground at Drigh Road Station in Karachi. They had been ordered to take part in a parade wearing heavy woollen uniforms comprising tunic and trousers (the blue uniform) before an inspection of their kit and equipment. On that morning, however, none of them wore the blue uniform but rather their casual khaki uniforms and they were not willing to parade.Footnote 77 When approached by officers, these men expressed their frustration over their delayed demobilization after the end of the Second World War and their grievances about not being able to return to Britain quickly.Footnote 78 A delegation of the Air Commodore in Delhi was dispatched to Karachi to address the crisis. The petition of these servicemen in Karachi, asking to forward their complaints over repatriation and demobilization to the Air Ministry in London, was accepted by the authorities.Footnote 79
After the Second World War ended in August 1945, most British servicemen in Asia had assumed that they would be demobilized and taken back to Britain to reunite with their families. This presumption, however, turned out to be wrong as they were told by the authorities that there were not enough ships for the repatriation mission. Although it was a fact that there was an extreme shortage of ships immediately after the war, few servicemen at that time accepted this explanation and tension and frustration increased day by day.Footnote 80
The Drigh Road incident was, therefore, the trigger for a series of strikes among the RAF servicemen in Asia in January 1946. News of the strike in Drigh Road and its subsequent success soon spread to more than 60 stations across South and Southeast Asia, such as the Negombo Station in Ceylon, the Cawnpore Station in Uttar Pradesh, the Dum Dum Station in Calcutta, and the Seletar Station in Singapore. Servicemen at these stations had their own strikes and raised similar demands—to have a fast demobilization and to be taken back to Britain as soon as possible.Footnote 81 Most of these strikes were successful in meeting their objectives, as large numbers of British servicemen had been demobilized and repatriated to Britain by February 1946.Footnote 82 The effort of transporting the British servicemen back to Britain, however, further burdened the already overworked shipping lines.
While addressing the RAF strikes, India's chief air marshal, Sir Roderick Carr, warned, ‘such actions can only encourage civil disturbances and may lead to grave consequences for everyone in India’.Footnote 83 And grave consequences did occur one month later.
During the Second World War, the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) was greatly expanded for the purpose of defending the Indian coastline from a possible Japanese seaborne invasion. By the end of the war, there were around 30,000 Indian officers, sailors, and servicemen in the RIN.Footnote 84 As the war was over, a large-scale demobilization of the Indians in the RIN was prioritized by the British authorities. Faced with uncertain futures and frustrated by their dismal treatment by the Navy (poor living conditions, inadequate pay, bad food, and discrimination by British officers), the agitation and anger spread widely.Footnote 85
On the afternoon of 18 February 1946, one month after the strike of the RAF in Karachi, Indian cadets and sailors in the signals school HMIS Talwar in Bombay refused to take their duties and took over the establishment on the grounds that they had been insulted by their British commander. A central strike committee was soon set up in Talwar, demanding better payment and allowances, improved living conditions and food quality, and good behaviour by British officers.Footnote 86
Since the HMIS Talwar was a wireless communications training school, the striking sailors there had been able to spread the news and they called for other RIN units to join the strike. Within a few days, Indian RIN sailors in Calcutta, Madras, and Karachi had responded to the appeal by either refusing duties or taking over navy ships and shore establishments.Footnote 87 Before the strike was finally put down by the British on 23 February 1946, a total of 10,000 servicemen and 60 RIN ships were involved.Footnote 88 Such a large-scale strike of the Navy in almost all important ports across the region greatly disrupted seaborne transportation in British India. British warships in Southeast Asia were dispatched to India's main ports to keep the defiance at bay, while civilian ships were restricted from leaving or approaching those ports in trouble.Footnote 89
On 21 February 1946, when the RIN strike was at its height, Colonel M. C. Liu, who had no knowledge of the strike at that time and was frustrated over the delay of the ship that was supposed to take the Chinese back home, went to Delhi in person to find out why there was no available shipping for the Chinese. The British did not give him any solid explanation, but only stated that there would be no ship for them in the foreseeable future.Footnote 90 Although the British authorities, the Chinese Nationalist government, and the Chinese cadets and officers in Lahore all desired an immediate return, their homecoming journey was repeatedly thwarted by the chaotic situation in India as the British Raj was coming to an end.
Conclusion
On 18 May 1946, the British authorities informed the Chinese in Lahore that a British ship in Madras would be available to take them back to China in early June.Footnote 91 Although there was considerable distance between Lahore and Madras, the Chinese were delighted to know that they had finally secured a ship and accepted this offer. On 28 May, around 600 Chinese cadets and officers, together with their heavy kit, boarded a train for Madras. They arrived on 3 June and embarked on the SS Chitral, which was bound for Shanghai.Footnote 92 With this, the LEFTS, after four years of operating, came to the end. While the Chinese were going home, the fate of the British Raj was sealed, with a chaotic and bloody partition looming. And what awaited them back in China was a full-scale civil war in which millions of people would perish.
The Second World War facilitated the cross-boundary mobility of personnel, supplies, and institutions through militarized corridors such as the Burma Road and the Hump. As discussed above, the Chinese cadets were brought to Lahore for flying training through the Hump. As the war ended, however, chaos across Asia disrupted the militarized transnational corridors and led to the delayed return of the Chinese in the LEFTS. The overstay of the Chinese in Lahore in turn showcases that the chaotic post-war events, such as the mutinies by the RAF and the RIN and the Chinese Civil War, can be studied within an integrated framework that transcends national boundaries. In so doing, this article contends that most events long-assumed to be national actually have transnational aspects and effects.
