The story of Dubai's success over the first decade of the 21st century has been the subject of numerous books and articles (academic and otherwise) in recent years. Most offer a simplified narrative of the making of Dubai as the city that sprang from the kindred imaginations of the paternalistic Al Maktoum rulers and genius brand-name architects, before it all came crashing down with the 2008 financial crisis. Ahmed Kanna's book Dubai, The City as Corporation offers a valuable corrective to this clichéd image by scratching below the surface of Dubai's shiny façade and interpreting the city's urbanism and the creation of its built environment over the past decade in relation to diverse sociopolitical realities. In Kanna's telling, Dubai is the outcome of certain historical, urban, and cultural processes and contestations, and not simply the brainchild of Rashid Al Maktoum and his sons. Without denigrating the Al Maktoum family's achievements (p. xii), he emphasizes that Dubai is not and has never been a tabula rasa unburdened by history or tradition, as described by so-called “starchitects” like Rem Koolhaas (the world-famous Dutch architect who designed the master plan for Dubai's currently suspended 1.5 billion sq. ft. Waterfront City) as well as some of its own citizens. Rather, like all cities Dubai is an ongoing process of social and political contestation. Engaging the work of French urban theorist Henri Lefebvre in expert analyses of the production of space as a social process, and the spatialization of state and culture as an exercise of power, Kanna complicates the rags-to-riches narrative permeating much of the literature on Gulf cities by incorporating the voices of those marginalized in Dubai's historiography, such as nonelite Emiratis, women, middle-class expatriates, and migrant laborers.
Dubai the city-state is simultaneously an Al Maktoum family corporation; as Kanna puts it, it is a family business with an appearance and some functions of a state (or a “family-state”) (p. 14). Kanna bases his argument on a reevaluation of the so-called “ruling bargain”: the political pact governing Dubai (and most Gulf polities) in which citizens give up all political rights in exchange for extensive welfare goods distributed by the state (p. 47). What Kanna reveals is that this exchange was no bargain at all and was instead achieved by the Al Maktoum rulers, first through the forceful repression (with British assistance) of a 1930s to 1950s reformist movement seeking rights-based citizenship and political participation, and then, with the coming of oil wealth, by financially co-opting the reformist merchant leaders. As part of this process of “popular deactivation” (p. 110), the Al Maktoums constructed a new homogeneous conception of Emirati identity—one that shifted its emphasis from transnational hybridity to ethnic purity within a defined national space—with the family-state being the principal protector of Dubai's boundaries and cultural identity (the latter now replacing Dubai's historically Indian Ocean character with a more exclusively Arab one). This “politics of protection” (p. 65) then allowed the rulers to establish “total territorial control” over Dubai (p. 27), whereby the family-state's exclusive vision of modernity became the primary force shaping the city's urban development from the late 1990s onward. This vision became legitimized in the spatial representations of “New Dubai” conceived by the city's elite “urbanists,” Lefebvre's term for all those involved in the spatial and discursive construction of the capitalist (and in this case neoliberal) city: planners, development firms (most of which are Maktoum-owned in Dubai), global starchitects, and journalists, among others (p. 4). The city was thus depoliticized as all trace of struggle and diversity was removed from the landscape and replaced with the neoliberal global city of Mohammed Al Maktoum's grand design.
Much has been written about the role of the “ruling bargain” in Dubai's social and political development (e.g., in the works of Christopher Davidson and Abdulkhaleq Abdulla), as well as on Dubai's spectacular urban and architectural growth in recent years (e.g., by Yasser Elsheshtawy). What makes Kanna's book original is that he brings these two scholarly streams together to show that the Al Maktoum family-state's depoliticization of time (through the creation of an ahistorical, ethnolinguistically pure Emirati identity as opposed to Dubai's traditionally pluralist identity favored by the old reformists) and space (through the construction of a global city) has been key to the establishment of political legitimacy and popular demobilization in Dubai. Most intriguing is Kanna's argument that this process has created a somewhat precarious and paradoxical situation whereby the Al Maktoums must balance their roles as protectors of an “authentic” ethnonational Emirati identity and as visionary leaders of Dubai's globalized, neoliberal, and cosmopolitan modernity. In this context, it is not surprising that competing views of what Dubai should be exist among the city's diverse residents, who are not framed here solely as passive citizens pitted against victimized foreigners, as is common in many studies on Dubai and the Arab Gulf.
Against this background Kanna analyzes Emirati citizens’ and South Asian expatriates’ everyday appropriations of the family-state's constructions of Dubai's urban spaces and cultural discourses, and their participation in the making of Dubai (the city and the image). It is in the second half of the book, where he reveals that the history of Dubai does not consist solely of the visionary stories of “big men,” be they rulers or starchitects (p. 16), that Kanna's extensive fieldwork (carried out in Dubai from 2002 to 2007) brings his narrative to life. Far from being the passive recipients of the ruling bargain, two main types of Emiratis emerge: “neoorthodox” citizens (p. 109) and neoliberal “flexible citizens” (p. 135). The former are nostalgic for Dubai's “traditional” village life of the pre-oil-boom era—imagining the multicultural port city as more ethnolinguistically homogeneous than it ever actually was—and thereby appropriate the Al Maktoum's own nationalist ideology as, perhaps paradoxically, a form of tacit critique of the family-state's embracing of Western neoliberalism. By contrast, “flexible citizens” embrace the neoliberal discourses and free market values of the state, rejecting neoorthodox nostalgia and subscribing to a definition of Emirati cultural identity characterized by entrepreneurialism and cultural flexibility rather than ethnic purity or family background. Meanwhile, Dubai's large and diverse South Asian community “straddles the contours” (p. 174) of the landscape that emerges out of the city's divergent yet mutually reinforcing ethnonationalist and neoliberal discourses. Middle-class South Asians participate in Dubai's free market economy and internalize its neoliberal values as much as its own “flexible citizens” do. Looking beyond these groups, Kanna explains how the large population of dispossessed migrant laborers bears the brunt of existing urban, economic, and cultural policies. One of the author's most insightful and persuasive arguments is that South Asian experiences of exclusion and victimization in Dubai are no more homogenous than are experiences of national belonging for Emiratis.
Without suggesting that this is the “definitive” book on Dubai's urbanism—since, as Kanna himself shows, there is no single understanding or belief about what Dubai was, is, or should be, despite all the rhetoric of the Al Maktoum vision—it will be difficult from this point on for scholars to write about any Gulf city, and not only Dubai, without engaging with the ideas Kanna puts forward in this convincing, balanced, and thorough study. Dubai, The City as Corporation is the best kind of cultural anthropology: cognizant of the limitations of its ethnographic data (in a city where nationals tend to keep their distance from foreigners and where migrant and domestic laborers are wary of speaking to strangers), and attentive to the value of the unconscious trivialities of the everyday lives of Dubai's residents in shaping a deep understanding of a place like Dubai. Though he admits that the book “is not meant to be a serious contribution to the historical literature on Dubai” as it focuses primarily on the first decade of the 21st century (p. ix), Kanna's historical depth is something to be appreciated. While it is not entirely surprising that starchitects might view a city like Dubai as a blank slate, it is too often the case that scholars also take an ahistorical approach to understanding the Arab Gulf's present-day social, cultural, and political realities. This book is different. Though his analysis is highly theoretical, Kanna's writing style remains accessible throughout. Furthermore, its theoretical analysis and critique of neoliberal urbanization (particularly its Lefebvrian grounding) make the book relevant to audiences well beyond those who study the Gulf or the Middle East. It therefore fits within an emerging body of Gulf studies literature that seeks to critically engage with broader theoretical debates and global cultural studies and, in so doing, to finally de-ghettoize the Gulf as a region of scholarly interest.
