Why do we have economic history textbooks? In general, they provide a narrative that ties a course together and advance provocative ideas to engage students. Some instructors, especially economists, may be more comfortable with assigning journal articles and may not follow chronology; for them, historical textbooks may not be desired. Others, usually historians, may find that historical narrative provides coherence for students without a background in economics. The textbooks on European and World economic history under review, all written by prominent scholars, may fulfill these needs. All are outstanding, but do the job in different ways. The books on the World economic history by Stearns and Allen range widely in both geography and time, covering the globe from the 1500s to the present. The European texts are limited to that continent and chronologically to the nineteenth (Berend) or twentieth (Aldcroft and Morewood and Berend) century. They all tell stories, but Allen focuses on a single question: What has produced wealth in the modern era? This is also a concern of Stearns as well as Berend, who in his book on the nineteenth century, writes the elephant in the room is the Industrial Revolution (IR). In the twentieth century developments are more disparate—wars, depressions, booms, crises—so there can be no single focus.
Each scholar has different interests and predilections that shape his work. So Allen, the economist, has many sophisticated graphs while the other authors have only a few or rather ungainly ones. Aldcroft and Morewood write about international finance, exchange rates, and the like in their twentieth century history, whereas Berend has much to say about the successes and failures of socialism in eastern Europe. Stearns pays more attention to social life than do the others. They all have complete bibliographies and show awareness of recent developments in economic history.
Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction. By Robert C. Allen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xiv, 170. $10.40, paper.
Robert Allen's Global Economic History is not strictly speaking a textbook but one of Oxford's Very Short Introductions to a given subject. Allen, currently Global Distinguished Professor of Economic History, New York University, Abu Dhabi and previously Professor of Economic History at the University of Oxford, summarizes in 145 pages of text a wide sweep of history ranging over the entire world for the past 500 years. He relies more on economics than do the other authors, using concepts of relative prices and comparative advantage to explain why certain parts of the world developed while others did not. Throughout Allen uses the wage and price data assembled by the Global Price and Income History Group. His attention is solely on long-term growth so there is no mention of depressions or European unification.
Allen begins with the question: “Why are some countries rich and others poor?” (p. 1). He structures the book by examining how this question was answered by early and late industrializers, and by different regions of the world. He starts by showing that the divergence between Europe and the rest of the world preceded the industrial revolution by many years. That is the lesson of his “signature graph,” “the subsistence ratio for laborers,” (p. 11) in six world cities from 1325 to 1850. Central to widening the gap was the IR, which led to continuous growth. This, Allen believes, was basically a matter of technological change, encouraged by scientific culture and British institutions, though not those usually cited by the new institutionalists (such as Douglas North and his associates). Then he offers what might be called the Allen Thesis: the IR took place in Britain because of that nation's high wages and low cost of energy and capital. The remainder of the book explains why, because of similar or different relative costs, industrialization worked in some places but not in others.
Allen begins by discussing how the IR spread to the Continent and the United States. The process involved adopting “the standard development strategy,” (p. 41) which involved eliminating internal trade barriers, erecting an external tariff, creating banks, and establishing mass education. This strategy helped Europe and the United States catch up to Britain, but did not help those countries that remained poor. They could not adopt the technology of the rich because their relative cost of labor to capital was too low to make it worthwhile to substitute capital for labor. This is part of the story about why the Great Empires, notably India and China, failed to have an IR; the other part is that, at least in India, colonial domination prevented them from carrying out the standard development strategy. For China, Allen does not agree with the California school's belief that the Yangzi delta was as rich as the richest parts of Europe. He does accept their argument that China had effective markets and institutions but suffered from the absence of commerce and coal.
In the Americas, the United States applied the standard model of development and succeeded in becoming “the world's productivity leader” (p. 83). Latin America suffered from its geographical situation that made exports difficult. Mexico had some success in increasing income in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries but was hurt by its limited investments in education.
Africa has long been the poorest continent. Allen rejects the argument that the continent's “unchanging tradition” (p. 93) was to blame and describing how farmers responded to new opportunities. Rather, low population densities and high transport costs limited specialization. Additionally colonialism created bad institutions and only adopted one feature, improved transportation, from the standard model. Low wages made adoption of imported technologies uneconomic.
Late industrializers—Russia, Japan, and twentieth-century Latin America—would each try to adopt the standard model with some success. Russia built railways, imposed tariffs on imports, attracted foreign capital, and expanded education. Yet it remained largely agricultural and behind the West. Japan adopted two of the elements of the model, expanded internal markets and education. Its most unusual accomplishment was its response to its factor prices—developing technology that economized on raw materials and capital. Under the influence of the dependency theory Latin America used elements of the standard model to develop “import substitution industrialization” (p. 127). The small size of markets in these countries coupled with the evolution of technology that required larger scales for efficiency meant that this type of industrialization lowered per capita gross domestic product (GDP). All in all these latecomers achieved growth but not enough to close the gap with the West.
The final examples of industrialization are those countries—the Soviet Union, Japan after 1950, and China after the Communist revolution—that tried what Allen calls “Big Push industrialization” (p. 131). Here everything is done at once, so planning is necessary to assure that producers and consumers will be there when investments are completed. The USSR was successful up to the 1970s because its institutions were able to build modern factories and because population growth was slow. After that, however, growth slowed down for a host of reasons. Japan grew rapidly, adopting the most modern technology and using its planning process to ensure that this technology had the necessary markets. Once it had caught up to the West growth inevitably slowed as it could only move as fast as the development of new technology. China's recent growth is usually attributed to the reforms of Deng Xiaoping. While Allen does not dispute their importance, he suggests that some earlier pre-reform policies may have played a positive role as well.
Allen concludes with questions. While many paths to wealth have been followed, can we know which features are the vital ones and which can be transferred to other states? “The best policy to effect economic development, therefore, remains very much in dispute” (p. 147).
The Industrial Revolution in World History. By Peter Stearns. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, (fourth edition) 2013. Pp. ix, 318. $35.54, paper.
Peter Stearns, professor of history at George Mason University, is a prolific author. His works show his path-breaking influence in global and gender history, as well as studies in consumerism, class relations in France, childhood, the lives of workers, and social history in general. As might be expected then, The Industrial Revolution in World History is at least as much social as economic history.
The book begins by defining the Industrial Revolution—“the most important single development in human history over the past three centuries” (p. 1)—as a revolution in technology and in the organization of production. Stearns wonders whether we should celebrate the benefits of the IR or concentrate on remedying its accompanying ills.
After this Introduction the book is divided into three parts, distinguished chronologically and regionally. The first part focuses on the west—Britain, western Europe, and the United States—between 1760 and 1880, with a chapter on impact outside the core area. The second part (1880–1950) concentrates on Japan and Russia, and the third (1950s–2000s) on the world as a whole. In the latter two parts Stearns circles back to the core to discuss its continuing development as well as special issues, such as the environment.
In his description of British industrialization Stearns marvels at the great expansion of output but also stresses the “stark misery” (p. 33) that accompanies it. His examination of its causes includes the usual suspects and suggests that all are incomplete, preferring, like many historians, a multi-causal explanation. Stearns examines the experience of workers, whose labor and family lives were transformed. In an interesting conclusion to Part I, Stearns shows how the IR influenced Russia, India, and China. The short-term effects left them further behind the West, but in the long run the seeds of industrialization were planted.
Part II, adopting an unusual periodization covers 1880–1950. It emphasizes the spread of the IR throughout the world. Russia and Japan each get a chapter with Stearns stressing the role played by government. While admitting “problems lurked” (p. 137) in Soviet industrialization, he generally admires the achievements of “one of the few full industrial revolutions in world history and certainly one of the most unconventional” (p. 138). Japan's industrialization was also solid; here Stearns pays particular attention to the labor force and reliance on women workers. For the western nations at the heart of the IR, the period saw a continued development in technology and organization. It also, in seeming paradox, produced leisure and the consumer economy and increased class warfare. Nations outside the West felt the beginnings of industrialization, but that often increased dependence on the West.
Part III records the continuing global sway of industrialization from 1950 to the 2000s. Revolutions took place around the world. Exploitative relationships persisted in the less industrial world, but most countries had some development. Stearns ends with chapters on problems of the environment and of globalization.
Stearns's overall conclusions, as perhaps has been evident in the discussion of individual topics, are tentative: the IR has multiple causes; historical patterns help to predict the future, but major shifts can occur; most of us prefer to live in our industrial or post-industrial era, but the IR has had significant costs. He prefers to raise questions rather than promulgate certitudes. The book draws the reader along and would be appealing to many students, especially those without an economics background. Little use is made of economic theory or statistics, but he is the one author to use illustrations.
An Economic History of Nineteenth-Century Europe: Diversity and Industrialization. By Ivan Berend. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xviii, 521. $22.99, ebook; $27.93, hardcover; $40.29, paper.
Ivan Berend, Distinguished Professor of History at UCLA, has written two volumes on nineteenth- and twentieth-century European economic history. He structures his accounts by dividing the nineteenth century volume between the West and the periphery. For the twentieth century he focuses on the shift from laissez-faire to more regulated and planned economies and then, perhaps, a return to laissez-faire. Berend writes in largely narrative form with enough space to tell the stories of technologies, institutions, and regimes. Interspersed in the text are boxes on individual people and things, ranging in the first volume from Adam Smith, the Crystal Palace, and less obviously, the Danish Cooperative Movement, to Keynes, the Dnieprostrol hydroelectric station, and the Channel Tunnel in the second volume. Interspersed in the text are useful basic tables and graphs. As befits someone who has spent a good part of his academic career (until 1990) in Hungary, Berend devotes more of these volumes to central and eastern Europe than is common.
Berend begins the nineteenth century volume by laying out the basis for his work. He is writing economic history, “an empirical discipline, based on narrative descriptions of vast historical material,” rather than the new historical economics, “a kind of applied economics and the application of formal economic methodology to historical questions” (p. 15). While he recognizes the virtues of the new school and incorporates some of its findings in his narrative, his books are conceived of as history. He distinguishes in his comparative history four main types (or paths) of economic development, which are also four regions of Europe, joined with a fifth, which failed to modernize.
After the Introduction, the nineteenth-century book is divided into three parts: Part I on the development of the European economy from the early modern period through the industrial revolution, Part II on the successful industrialization of the West, and Part III on the partial success or failure of the periphery. He begins by placing Europe in relation to the rest of the world before the IR. Berend cites Pomeranz and others on the relative equality of Europe and China in 1800, but thinks that the divergence began earlier. After a thoroughgoing narration of Europe's commercial expansion and the IR, he concludes that the causes of the IR are “extremely complex” (p. 77). Berend privileges new ways of thinking—from the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution—and new practices in agriculture and pre-IR manufacturing as the essential sources of the IR.
At the start of Part II, Berend describes how new forms of thought spread through western Europe and how the entrepreneurial state encouraged economic development. Then he goes on to describe in general and for different countries the agricultural revolution, advances in water and land (railroad) transport, and the development of banks and joint stock companies. Institutions are important, but he finds the North-Weingast interpretation “one-sided and unavoidably simplistic” (p. 109).
Then Berend describes “three distinct though often composite variants of Western industrialization” (p. 186, italics in original). The first distinction he defines as a close copy of the British pattern; the second distinction is based on new industries and technology; and the third distinction is based on specialized agriculture. He first analyzes the course of British economic change in the late nineteenth century and then Britain's followers, France and Belgium. Germany was the leading example of the second pattern with its research labs and advanced education. Denmark and the Netherlands followed the third pattern. But then it turns out that patterns were more complex with various countries fitting part of one pattern and part of another pattern. Scandinavia was “the only industrial and modernization success story outside the West European core before World War I” (p. 254). After 1870 the Scandinavian states all grew quickly using foreign capital, a knowledge base, and vigorous government activity (not far from Allen's standard model).
When Berend turns to the social consequences of the IR, he notes the “massive population explosion” (p. 263), which is attributed to improved health and greater food availability. He accepts recent findings in the standard of living debate—that there was little improvement until 1870, but considerable advance thereafter. Urbanization and altered family patterns are additional topics.
He concludes Part II with “The Europeanization of Europe,” that is, how Europe, or at least developed Europe, became a single entity in the late nineteenth century, but it is also about Europe's expansion in “a globalizing (but not yet globalized) world economy” (p. 295, italics in original).
Part III of the book, “The peripheries: semi-success or failure of modern transformation,” is the most original. In addition to describing in detail the economies of the poorer parts of Europe, often ignored in standard accounts, Berend makes the suggestion that in some environments poor regions benefited from being part of large empires.
Some of the peripheral “sleeping” (p. 317) regions that were part of large empires—Ireland, Poland, Finland, the Baltics, the eastern part of Prussia, and Hungary—took advantage of their position and used trade with the rest of the empire to move “halfway towards modern transformation” (p. 395). Independent backward regions—the Mediterranean (Spain, Portugal, and southern Italy) and Russia—achieved some agricultural and industrial advancement after 1890 but fell further behind western Europe. Finally in the Balkans and the borderlands of Austria-Hungary, hurt by low levels of human capital, corruption, and the reluctance of foreigners to invest, “modernization and industrialization failed” (p. 458).
An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe: Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization. By Ivan Berend. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xv, 356. $66.95, hardcover, $44.56, paper.
At the outset of his twentieth-century volume, Berend lays out what he intends to do: “concentrate… on the rise and fall of various economic regimes” (p. xv). The “central hypothesis” (p. 9) of the book, not always expected in a textbook, is that these regimes eventually moved toward a synthesis.
The book begins by summing up Berend's earlier volume with its division of Europe into advanced core and backward periphery and additionally stresses the place of laissez-faire ideology in the nineteenth century. Then he traces European history from World War I to about 1950. His theme throughout is the “Decline of laissez-faire and the rise of the regulated market system” (chapter 2 title). While providing a rich introduction to many of the highlights of the period, he narrates the major events of economic history, stressing how they brought more state intervention to the market. An extreme version of the “regulated market systems… based on protectionism and state intervention” was “economic dirigisme” (pp. 92–93, italics in original). Adopted by dictatorships, most notably Germany and Italy, but also Spain, Portugal, Greece, and other central and eastern European states, this system expanded intervention to absolute control and protectionism to self-sufficiency. Berend finds that these regimes (not so much the peripheral ones) achieved considerable growth until World War II.
Next chronologically—and on Berend's spectrum further away from laissez-faire—is “The centrally planned economic system” (chapter 4). His analysis is distinctive. He narrates the history of socialism in the USSR, emphasizing its belief in the absolute value of economic growth (p. 149). The policies that led to “miraculous” growth combined “forced capital accumulation, social mobility, educational revolution, central planning, and war preparation” (p. 150). In a very interesting section, Berend explains how the system worked in practice. Yet the crisis of the 1980s undermined its achievements, and the system collapsed.
Western Europe, after World War II, adopted an unusual mixture of state intervention and free trade. He naturally emphasizes the history of European integration, stressing more the political factors than monetary issues such as exchange rates. A counterpart to integration was the creation of the welfare state in a mixed economy, which “exhibited the best economic performance in modern history” (p. 239).
Berend's second volume concludes with the globalization of the late twentieth century. The new era of globalism was accompanied by a return to economic liberalism. Inequality and the environment are problems whose answers remain uncertain. Berend concludes with the image of “Europe [as] a rising economic superpower” (p. 320).
The European Economy Since 1914, 5th edition. By Derek H. Aldcroft and Steven Morewood. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. Pp. xii, 439. $200.00, hardcover; $63.95, paper.
Derek Aldcroft, University Fellow in the School of Historical Studies at the University of Leicester, has published updated versions of The European Economy Since 1914 in every decade since the 1970s. His latest, written with Steven Morewood, Senior Lecturer in International History at the University of Birmingham, extends the reach of these volumes to include the crisis of 2008. Aldcroft specializes in international finance, which is reflected in the text. The authors’ let their themes develop as they describe each period rather than attempt to provide overarching patterns.
The authors begin with World War I, concentrating on its consequences—high death toll, decline of the European economy, and the break up of economic connections. The post-war treaties were deficient so the 1920s did not start well, and any development of the European economy during the decade “took place against an unstable political and economic background” (p. 44). While the overall economic performance of Europe was “respectable” (p. 58), because of loans, its stability was an illusion.
The chapter on the Great Depression (1929–1939) begins with a table like many others in the volume comparing growth rates of GDP and manufacturing of 22 European countries plus the United States at four significant points between 1913 and 1938. The authors proceed to hand out marks to states for their success in overcoming the Depression. Britain recovered fairly well, though its financial policy contributed little. French policy was “disastrous” (p. 94). Germany had a strong revival, even before rearmament. The focus is on government action, which expanded during these years. The authors also discuss the fate of eastern Europe and the periphery. Most of eastern Europe stagnated and became dominated by Germany. The other peripheral states did poorly with the notable exceptions of the Nordics and Turkey.
The authors’ coverage of World War II deals with many of the questions that confront historians: Why were the Germans so successful at the start?; Why did they eventually lose?; and Why it take so long for them to do so? The answers that they give are a mix of politics and economics.
Aldcroft and Morewood begin their discussion of post-war recovery with the devastation caused by the war. Reconstruction was helped by aid from abroad and avoidance of the policies that followed World War I. The authors analyze, first for western Europe then for the East, the spectacular economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s. In the West, improvement in factor productivity was the source of growth. Governments became more active in the economy, but the authors doubt that high growth can be attributed to government actions. Then the authors turn to the successful performance of eastern European socialist regimes in the 1950s and 1960s when they grew at an average rate of seven percent. While this growth was miraculous, the system's lack of flexibility doomed it in the long run. “Central planning… just did not work” (p. 245).
Later on the course of western capitalism was less happy. The main cause of problems during the 1970s was inflation, which government policies were not effective in solving. According to the authors, governments were too lax in using monetary policy to control inflation and therefore were hindered in using fiscal policy to promote growth. Overall they have little good to say about government economic intervention. The 1980s were somewhat better: by the later part of the decade inflation had eased and growth returned, but structural rigidities persisted. Yet if the West did poorly, the East did much worse. After describing the collapse of the communist system, the authors conclude with the problems faced by the new regimes.
Their analysis of the 1990s, the first decade of the 2000s, and the euro-zone crisis sets itself aside by several characteristics: a focus on what now becomes the European Union, compared to the almost total absence of any discussion earlier; greater interest in eastern Europe; and more detailed attention to individual European leaders. The authors describe the path that led to the Euro. In the East, the transition to a market economy worked better for some—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—than for others. The first years of the new century saw prosperity for both East and West. But this was followed by the U.S. crash, which engulfed Europe. Aldcroft and Morewood are censorious of most of the actors, who were not able to overcome “the absence of financial discipline, poor levels of productivity and lack of competitiveness” (p. 393), and remain dubious about the future of the common currency and even the European Union itself. The book ends with questions about the future. As do many of the other works—perhaps this to be expected of textbooks written in the early twenty-first century.
