For Better or Worse strikes new ground in the social and intellectual history of modern Egypt and speaks to an audience beyond the region. Kholoussy's central thesis is that “marriage was a site of contested national identity formation that attracted the growing social attention of the middle-class press and the legal attention of the Egyptian administration under British rule” (p. 3). Kholoussy argues that the middle-class perception of a “marriage crisis” served as a metaphor for larger issues facing the nation. Preserving the institution of marriage and warding off its antithesis (divorce) was seen as an act of national self-preservation. She frames her study between the years 1898, when the Islamic courts were reorganized, and 1936, when the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty was signed. According to Kholoussy, the combination of the new ruler (Faruq), increased independence, greater prosperity attributable to the end of the Depression, and increased worries related to the impending war all shifted attention away from the perceived crisis (p. 4).
Kholoussy lays out her argument in six chapters that focus on the groom/masculinity, the woman/wifehood, the problem of divorce, the problem of parenthood, and a conclusion that makes comparisons with the current marriage crisis in Egypt, in which couples are unable to marry because of a lack of financial resources. This logical sequence builds naturally on the significant and growing body of literature on gender, colonialism, identity, and nationalism in turn of the century Egypt, yet it makes new and significant contributions. Kholoussy's study is unique in the author's use of a large array of press resources to trace the evolution of the “marriage crisis” and examination of the practical application of personal-status law in the records of the Cairo Islamic Court of First Instance. She acknowledges the regional and class limitations of the discourse in the press; the cast of characters in her documents is more diverse with respect to class. Kholoussy contends that both “elite and nonelite Egyptians were forced to resort even more to the courts than their [19th-century] predecessors” (p. 18). The chapters on manhood/grooms/masculinity and womanhood/brides/femininity are meant to contrast one another and explain the two sides of the same coin spinning before the distorted mirror of the marriage crisis. Several elements feed into both chapters: popular gendered conceptions of (wo)manhood, education, public versus private space, and the role of marriage in advancing the cause of the nation in the face of British imperialism. The chapter on parenthood again ties together new gendered nationalist visions of adulthood that sometimes ran counter to prescribed norms in the law. The conclusion is shorter than the rest—more like an epilogue than a full-fledged chapter.
With respect to the grooms, some social critics saw them as hapless victims of economic circumstance—either the macroproblems related to Egypt's peripheral position in the world economy or the microproblems related to greedy brides and their fathers, who demanded dowers that were beyond the reach of ordinary government employees. Kholoussy cites LE 8 as the average salary of a government employee and LE 100 as the average (“outrageously high”) dower in 1935; however, the evidence upon which these figures are based seems slim. Such a minor point does not diminish her overall argument that “writers and readers used the dower as a trope to criticize the purportedly materialistic middle class, decry low government salaries, lament colonial economic domination and various economic crises, and lower society's expectation of middle class suitors” (p. 33). In reality (i.e., in court), the government forced the husband to fulfill material obligations to his wife, which included supporting her according to her social standing.
Other social critics blamed the prospective groom for not allocating his resources in the proper manner. They claimed young Egyptian men were spending too much time in coffeehouses playing games of chance, frequenting prostitutes, smoking, and engaging in other questionable behaviors. Furthermore, Kholoussy points out that by the 1920s and 1930s, the range of activities young men could choose had increased. Thus, according to these critics, instead of saving their money for a home and a bride and managing their libido in a licit manner, the youth of Egypt were squandering their wealth. Reformers even suggested a marriage tax on single men or paying married government employees a higher wage.
With respect to women, Kholoussy argues that writers in the nationalist press seemed most concerned about the questionable impact of education on the marriage crisis. Education and other societal changes brought women into the public sphere, which initiated a certain amount of social criticism. Nevertheless, companionate marriage depended upon an equal mate. Kholoussy's rich narrative would have benefited from an examination of some of the institutional studies of education, such as those of James Heyworth-Dunne, Amir Boktar, Ahmad ʿIzzat ʿAbdul Karim, as well as curricular studies, such as that of Barak Salmoni, rather than depending upon isolated statistics drawn from more theoretical works. In addition, her discussion of the discourse on education lacks chronological grounding, moving back and forth between the late 19th century and the 1930s. Although Kholoussy addresses the issue indirectly in a later chapter, a major problem with respect to education is that female teachers in this era were not allowed to marry. Thus, how could more women be educated unless there were women who chose not to marry or delayed marriage? In other words, the expansion of education did in fact contribute in some (small) measure to the “marriage crisis” as long as more women postponed marriage in order to continue their education or their career as educators. The marriage crisis that Kholoussy depicts is not an inability to marry but a surplus of unmarried men. Spinsters were of no concern to social critics.
In Chapter 5 Kholoussy states that the “middle class press rarely discussed working mothers, whether divorced or married, in debates over marriage” (p. 109). In court, judges protected a woman's right to work according to Islamic law. She argues that there was a consensus between jurists and the nationalist press that men were responsible for the child's religious identity, but women were responsible for national identity and the practical aspects of moral education and training. Although the nuclear family was the “bedrock of the nation . . . court records reveal . . . this neat nationalist ideal was not the prototype for many Egyptian families” (p. 122).
This dynamic text will become required reading for graduate students in modern Middle East history; it is short (only 127 pages of text) and accessible enough that it could easily be assigned in upper-division undergraduate courses as well. The book would work well in a gender-studies course or a more general course on women and the family. Its ease should not be a deterrent for specialists on modern Egypt, however. Kholoussy explains or translates terms that are specific to the field, but she does not provide a glossary for nonspecialists. The book is well written, carefully documented, includes a number of humorous contemporary press illustrations, and contains a sizeable bibliography and a useful index.
