In August 1963, I drove from Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to Washington, To begin the year-long Congressional Fellowship Program. In the orientations that followed, the fellows met with journalists, House and Senate members, lobbyists, and bureaucrats, among other Washington notables. But the most memorable person who talked to us was Theodore Sorenson, counselor to President Kennedy, and reputedly his most influential staff advisor.
On Thursday, November 21, 1963, 15 of us were escorted into the White House and, after a short delay, were led into Mr. Sorenson's office. He greeted us impassively, but spent the next 90 minutes responding to our questions with what seemed to me to be remarkable candor. He articulated administration aspirations in flat, midwestern tones, his voice rising and falling in increments almost too small to measure. When we rose to leave, he apologized for having kept us waiting, explaining he had been mulling over remarks President Kennedy would be delivering the next day in Dallas.
The following morning, the fellows went to the Department of Agriculture to learn how civil servants and members of Congress work with one another. It was while leaving the building we learned from a passerby that the president had been shot. My reactions were surely the same as those felt by tens of millions of others: from shock, to disbelief, to anguish, to anger, to hope—hope that the gunshot had not been fatal.
The hope was short lived, punctured when a car radio on Constitution Avenue blared that the president was dead. With two other fellows, I walked to APSA headquarters, believing that commiserating with other fellows and APSA staff would mitigate our collective grief. But APSA offices were all but deserted, with some having left early to begin the weekend and others having rushed home to be with their families during this time of national tragedy and to observe the unfolding of events on television.
The three of us left APSA headquarters with increasing awareness that the political cosmos had been transformed; that the earth had suddenly been jerked from its orbit and that sooner or later we would have to regain our bearings and adjust to a political universe whose trajectories would be defined by Lyndon Johnson—a president whose landslide victory a year later would nudge my own professional azimuth along an uncommonly trodden pathway.
I
Months before coming to Washington, I had considered using the fellowship year to gather material for my dissertation, which employed the “responsible party government” model as a framework within which to examine the role presidents played in midterm congressional elections. But the dissertation had been half-written by the time I left for Washington, and outlines for the final chapters had already been approved by my dissertation committee. It occurred to me that a promising follow-up to a study of how presidents affect midterm elections could explore the steps a House freshman took to increase the likelihood of re-election two years later. A freshman who won narrowly would be especially vulnerable and, by working in the office of a marginal first termer, I could observe the strategies the congressperson employed to win in a presidential year.
I looked at 1962 election results, determined which first-term House members had won by narrow margins, and identified five Democrats who had been elected by fewer than three percentage points. I visited the offices of each, explaining that I wanted to learn what a first-term congressperson does to assure re-election. Several offices expressed an interest in the project, but the search ended after three weeks when congressman Lionel Van Deerlin, a San Diego Democrat representing California's 37th congressional district, asked me to join his staff.
Van Deerlin had won his seat by 51.4% to 48.6% (3,361 votes). His vulnerability was further reflected in his never having held elective office, his two earlier unsuccessful efforts to win a House seat, and in the abiding strength of the Republican he had narrowly defeated and whom he would almost certainly face again in 1964. In 1952, Van Deerlin had lost 63% to 37% in one of the seven new districts California had gained following the 1950 census. He ran again in 1958 in an adjoining district against a three-term GOP incumbent, Bob Wilson, and, although Van Deerlin lost again, 55% to 45%, the improvement gave him reason to try again.
When the 1960 census endowed California with eight more House seats, one of them in San Diego County, Van Deerlin launched another campaign. His opponent was Dick Wilson, younger brother of the congressman who had beaten him in 1958 and the likely choice of many of the same voters in the new district who had been represented by brother Bob before redistricting. Although registration in the 37th district had a Democratic edge, the advantage was offset by a history of almost uninterrupted Republican success in San Diego County. Moreover, Dick Wilson would be back for a return engagement in 1964, bringing with him widespread name recognition, a robust campaign treasury, and the support of Southern California's military-industrial complex.
Mr. Van Deerlin's political vulnerability was not the only factor that suited my plans. I liked the fact that he had asked his staff to call him “Van,” as did I before long, an informality that reflected his desire to foster a close relationship between him and those who worked for him. But what clinched my decision to join his staff was Van's offer to share his private office with me for the duration of the fellowship. He proposed the idea during the second of two preliminary meetings.
In our first conversation, I was drawn to him by his charm, his wit, and his neediness. He greeted me with unfeigned pleasure, a trim, six-foot tall, 49-year-old with dark hair, a cleft chin, and clear-eyed good looks that fell just short of what Hollywood would have required for a leading man. He talked about his background and how he had used his experience as a journalist to penetrate the world of politics.
His grandfather had been an Episcopal priest whose politics were conservative, not unlike the orientations of his congregants. When, at age 10, he asked his mother, “Why are we all Republicans?” she replied it was because “all the best people are Republicans.” But then came the Depression and most of the best people did not support President Roosevelt's social welfare programs. Van became a Democrat.
During our second meeting we discussed how we could help one another. He told me he needed someone who knew something about congressional elections and allowed that we could both benefit from my having a desk in his office. He would give me access to his office conversations while I, in turn, would help him decode and attach strategic meaning to the messages communicated by his visitors.
II
In January 1964, I settled into Room 1641 of the Longworth Building. The staff had moved a desk, a swivel chair, a typewriter, and a telephone into the right rear corner of Van's office. When seated at the desk, I faced the rear wall, with Van's desk a few feet behind me and to my left. This arrangement allowed me to listen to Van's conversations, to push back a few feet and swivel to my left when he wanted me to join the discussion, or when, after the visitor left, he wanted to explore the implications of what had been said. Often I simply worked at my desk as if minding my own business, and when visitors by word or body language expressed curiosity about the strange figure sitting in the corner with his back to them, Van said: “Oh, don't worry about him. He's just a college professor doing research.”
The 37th congressional district was the most ethnically and racially diverse among the three districts in San Diego County. Almost one-fifth of its residents were either black (9%), or Hispanic (8%), or Asian (2%). Leaders of all three communities had endorsed Van in 1962, and he expected their support again in 1964. Van could also count on the AFL-CIO. Union votes had helped elect him and he knew he could count on workers in tuna canneries, fishing fleets, factories, and plants to turn out in even greater numbers in a presidential year.
But Van's largest constituency was active-duty armed-forces personnel, more than 30,000 strong, together with thousands of retired military men and women and Defense Department civilian employees. Of course, this was not a monolithic cohort. Republicans commanded the political preferences of most officers and civilian administrators, while enlisted men and blue- and pink-collar workers were Van's to lose.
On roll-call votes, Van departed from the course often charted by endangered first termers. Rather than positioning himself as an independent voice, often defying an “over-reaching” administration, Van embraced the agenda of a president with whom he would have to run in 1964. Congressional Quarterly found he voted with the administration on 97% of the roll calls on which the president had taken a position, and with the Democrats on 95% of the votes pitting a majority of Democrats against a majority of Republicans. His strategy, in short, was not as risk averse as it might have been. It was calculated to maximize his ties to his base within the district, but by embracing all the policy preferences of the majority party, he did not minimize opportunities for criticism that his 1964 opponent and the conservative San Diego Union would almost certainly exploit.
III
During the early months of the fellowship period, I spent many hours at my desk, even when Van was out of the office, drafting speeches he would be giving at trade association meetings, or preparing comments he would record and send to radio stations in the district. I also read a sampling of letters from constituents, along with copies of responses administrative assistant Sieg Smith had composed. I wanted to get some idea of constituent concerns and the ways in which Sieg addressed them. Familiarity with the language he employed to reach out to constituents later proved to be more valuable than I anticipated at the time.
I was at my desk one day in March when I received an unexpected phone call. The caller offered me a teaching job beginning in September. At the start of the fellowship period, I had had no idea what I would be doing after the year in Washington.
I was ABD at the time and believed I could finish my dissertation by summer. In the meantime I would rely on University of North Carolina political science faculty to help me find a teaching job for the fall of 1964. Faith in my mentors was well placed, for when I answered the phone, the chairman of Yale's political science department asked if I was interested in a one-year position for the coming year. I said that I was, and he told me he would mail out a contract the next day.
When I told Van I was going to Yale, he asked what I had decided to do during the last four months of the fellowship period, a time when fellows who started on the House side customarily worked in the Senate. But during the 1963–64 orientation, program director Don Tacheron told us that our class of fellows would be the first to be able to spend all eight months in a single chamber. I began to take the option seriously after my first month in Van's office; so that when he asked me about my future on the Hill, I told him I would remain in his office from May through August if he would have me. The next day he invited my family and me to dinner at his house to celebrate my Yale appointment and the prospect of four more months of our working together.
IV
As the year progressed, Van began to spend more time in San Diego. His re-nomination in the June primary was virtually uncontested, and he used the victory to officially launch his re-election campaign. As an incumbent, he could now take credit for legislation benefiting district residents even though his role in passing the bills was peripheral. At the same time, he associated himself with the Kennedy-Johnson record. In the fall, President Johnson flew to San Diego, met Van for a photo opportunity and, in front of a roaring crowd called for the re-election of their “superb congressman.”
The Republican opposition was, of course, less enthusiastic about their congressman and, after Labor Day, opponent Dick Wilson began attacks that included the claim that Van tolerated homosexuality. In the meantime, Van was getting warm responses at plant gates and market entrances. A month before the election he wrote that the Democrat's registration drive had produced a net gain of almost two percentage points and he predicted that 80% of registered Democrats in the district would turn out on Election Day. His optimism was warranted. He won 58% to 42%. Lyndon Johnson lost San Diego County but carried Van's district with 57% of the vote.
Four days before the election, Van had sent me a letter saying, “I have every expectation of sending you good news on Wednesday morning. If so, it will be in no small part because of the great help you gave me through much of the year.” When I called to congratulate him soon after the event, he was more effusive, telling me he might not have won without my help. Not knowing how to respond to his over-the-top praise, I said that he himself deserved much of the credit. But Van continued to talk about my “indispensable contribution,” and so I asked if he thought Lyndon Johnson's coattails had something to do with the outcome. Van reminded me that he had run ahead of Johnson, and insisted that I had “demonstrably” affected the outcome. Wishing to change the topic, I said: “Let's just agree that you won because of Lyndon Johnson and me.”
I was disconcerted by the importance Van had attached to the role I had played. More perplexing still was the realization that in trying to learn how a first-term House member attempts to win re-election, I had, from Van's perspective, contributed to the result I had hoped to explain. I had become an independent or at least an intervening variable. Van had been re-elected believing that I, more than Lyndon Johnson, had been responsible for his success. He never forgot what I had done to help him and, in the years that followed, as our personal and professional relationship grew stronger, my career pathway took and unusual turn. I would help him run his Washington office and he would permit me to study Congress with the access of an insider.
V
Van's absences from Washington during the summer allowed me to finish my dissertation. He returned to Washington briefly in August to celebrate the occasion, and hosted a going-away party for me, with invitations extended to Don Tacheron and the other fellows. It was a bittersweet moment; I was sorry to end what had been an extraordinary opportunity to observe a congressman's behavior, but was pleased that Van was sending me off with a catered affair.
We corresponded through the fall; Van keeping me abreast of his re-election campaign, me stressing to him the importance of turnout in an election characterized as “leaning Democratic,” and describing the rigors of teaching two courses I had never offered before. One was a seminar on Congress and, in a letter I wrote in September, I asked Van if, after the election, he would come to New Haven to meet with my class. He liked the idea of visiting a storied campus and we settled on a date early in December.
As planned, Van arrived bearing the halo of a winner, and helped me lead a discussion on the policy implications of the recent election. Before he left for the airport, he asked if I would like to extend my congressional fellowship. I asked him what he meant by that and he explained that he wanted someone like me to work for him during the spring and summer of 1965. He said he had asked Don Tacheron for a 1964–65 Congressional Fellow, but had not heard back. That means, Van said, “I'm stuck with you again.” He said his AA, Sieg Smith, would be taking a six-week leave in June and July and my familiarity with office routine and with Sieg's approach to constituency correspondence meant I would need little on-the-job training. I accepted the offer.
I began thinking about how I could use my time on Capitol Hill to pursue research interests while fulfilling my obligations to Van, and designed a project that once again focused on first-term House members. This time I would study ways new House members adjusted to the demands of serving in Congress. I was especially interested in decisions first termers made about committee assignments. There was already a burgeoning literature on the subject , but I thought some gaps could be filled.
Data for the study would be gathered primarily through interviews with as many freshmen as would see me. I also decided to expand the time frame and the universe, starting with freshmen in 1965 (the 89th Congress) and later continuing with first termers in 1967 and 1969. The research design assumed that Van would remain in office for at least three terms, and that he would hire me again in the summers of odd-numbered years, or at least allow me to work out of his office. When I described my plans to Van he raised no objections, adding he now had one more incentive to keep getting re-elected.
In June 1965, I returned to Washington for six weeks. Mornings were spent interviewing, with afternoons and evenings devoted to responding to constituent mail and case work. My status as a Hill employee and the use of Van's name opened doors that might otherwise have been closed, and encouraged a candor that even with the assurances of anonymity might have been withheld. Having a Longworth telephone number at which I could be reached, a staff of my own taking messages, an on-site base of operations to which I could repair to absorb what I had just heard, and ready access to Library of Congress materials all enriched my life as an embedded scholar.
VI
When I returned to New Haven in August 1965, I assumed I would not be seeing Van again until the spring of 1967, when I would begin my second round of freshmen interviews. But early in 1966, he called and asked me to come to San Diego at the end of the school year to help him campaign for re-election. He believed (rightly as it turned out) that the 1966 elections would produce nationwide Republican successes and he did not want to be one of the victims. The outsized Democratic vote in 1964 was likely to shrink in the midterm and, together with growing anger over the Vietnam War would leave defeated Democrats strewn all over the landscape. Now was the time, he said, when he needed the help of someone who knew something about midterm elections.
He invited me to bring my family, promised to find us suitable housing for the three months we would be in California, and offered the services of his children as babysitters. My role in the campaign would be up to me. But what he needed most, he said, was an analyst who could interpret daily events within a perspective local activists might not bring to bear. And so, a week after the spring semester ended, my wife and I loaded our compact car with two children, four suitcases, and a dachshund and we headed West.
I spent the first three weeks in San Diego meeting Democratic activists. I also attended public appearances of Van's opponent, agri-businessman Sam Vener, and tried to determine just how formidable a challenger he would be. A political neophyte, Mr. Vener's inexperience was palpable. His speeches were hesitant, self-conscious, and rambling. When pressed to address most issues, he seemed to run out of language.
I think Van sensed even before I had arrived that he would be re-elected, but a cautiousness fed by his earlier losses, along with the national trend favoring Republicans, induced him to seek all the insurance he could get. At the end of June, I told him he would win and that he really didn't need me. I assured him that I would understand if he asked me to cut short my stay and go back to Connecticut. He seemed bemused by the suggestion that he had brought me way out West for nothing, and said that since I was “already here” I should stay, take my kids to the beach, enjoy the delights of Balboa Park and the fabulous San Diego Zoo, do some sightseeing in the great Southwest, and luxuriate in the ideal weather with which San Diego was blessed. He also said I might want to conduct research on some aspect of California politics. During the next 10 weeks I did all of the above.
VII
Van's comment about studying California politics was intriguing because I had always been interested in the impact party activities have on election results. A handful of empirically based articles had been published assessing the electoral role of party organizations, but none had drawn a direct link between activities of precinct workers and the voting behavior of the specific individuals whom the workers had contacted. Instead, reliance had been placed on aggregate socio-economic indicators, aggregate registration and election totals, and multiple regression analysis.
The entrée Van had given me to Democratic Party workers made it possible to design an experiment that would more directly measure the impact these activists had on the enrollment of unregistered voters, and link their efforts to election outcomes. With their help, I selected six pairs of precincts, with the two precincts in each pair possessing roughly the same demographic and political characteristics. One precinct in each pair was designated an “experimental” precinct; the other served as a “control” precinct.
With Van running interference, I was able to persuade party workers to do all they could to register Democrats in experimental precincts, but to do nothing in the control precincts. They kept the names and addresses of all Democrats they had registered in the six experimental precincts and, after the registration books were closed in early September, they sent me the names of three sets of Democrats: (1) those who were registered between June and September by party workers canvassing experimental precincts; (2) those who registered in experimental precincts between June and September without having relied on the registration efforts of party workers; and (3) those who registered during the same time period in the control precincts but who could not possibly have been induced to do so by party canvassers.
The day after the election, I mailed sample ballots to all three groups on which respondents were asked to mark the names of the candidates for whom they voted in contests for four offices—governor, state treasurer, U.S. House of Representatives, and State Assembly. By comparing percentage registration changes in the experimental precincts with changes in the control precincts I was able to estimate the extent to which party efforts had increased Democratic registration. Also measurable was the extent to which Democrats who were registered by party workers actually voted for each of the Democratic candidates, as compared with the party fidelity of Democrats who had registered without having bee persuaded to do so by a party worker.
The experiment could not have been completed without Van's help. He made a few phone calls to talk up the project and encouraged cooperation. He let it be known that he was fully behind the study, assuring nervous Democrats that its findings would be shared and would provide valuable guidelines for future party efforts. Months after the election, I sent Van a draft of the article I was preparing, and he later cited its conclusions in conversations with the party faithful to reassure them of the value of their service. In the meantime, 1966 election returns contained few surprises. Van won with 61%, even though Ronald Reagan swept San Diego County on his way to Sacramento. Van sent me a note of thanks, adding that he looked forward to my return to Washington.
VIII
And return I did, intermittently over the next 12 years. I was in Washington so often that Van told me he had instructed his staff to answer the phone “Gertzog and Associates.” On some visits I stayed with Van and his wife in their house just off Connecticut Avenue, near Rock Creek Park. While driving to the office each morning, Van caught me up on California politics. I, in turn, filled him in on my research progress. He often suggested ways he could lighten my labors. When I was trying to discover how freshmen learn to adjust to the demands of their new responsibilities, Van arranged for me to meet with Congressional Research Service specialists who oriented new members to House rules. When I told him about my protracted search for materials in the Library of Congress, he helped me secure a limited stack pass to the library's inner sanctum.
In December 1977, I came to Washington on sabbatical leave to begin a study of women House members. By then Van was a subcommittee chairman and his seniority served me well. When I had difficulty persuading staffs in the offices of two female representatives to allow me to talk to their bosses, Van made two phone calls and interviews were granted the next day.
After the 1978 election, I asked him to be a guest speaker at western Pennsylvania's Allegheny College, where I was teaching at the time. He arrived during the April thaw, met with classes and delivered a public lecture on his pending bill to overhaul the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Years of technological advances, he said, had made the act obsolete and deregulation would encourage competition in telephone, radio, over-the-air television, cable, satellite telemetry, and multi-purpose computer terminals. Van's bill was subsequently approved by the House Commerce Committee, 35–7, during the closing days of the 96th Congress, but it was too late for Senate action. He shrugged off his initial frustration and told me he would try again in the 97th Congress. But the 1980 election intervened and shocked us all. Van's opportunity to shape telecommunications policy in America had come and gone.
IX
In the five elections between 1970 and 1978, Van Deerlin's margin of victory never fell below 70%, approaching or exceeding 75% in 1976 and 1978. As he turned to the 1980 contest, he believed he would win once again handily. A poll taken in September showed him ahead 65% to 22%.
But 10 days before the election, Van received an alarming call from his polling company. His Republican opponent, Duncan Hunter, was gaining momentum by attacking Van as weak on defense and as a free-spending liberal. Van was advised to start responding to these charges before it was too late. But it was too late and he lost by 9,000 votes (47%). Also defeated were three other California incumbent Democrats, all hurt by president-elect Ronald Reagan's huge margin in the state and by a Jimmy Carter concession speech delivered long before the polls closed on the West Coast.
I went to Washington in mid-December and met Van in an office cluttered with half-filled cartons, with furniture about to be carted away, and with a demoralized staff going through the motions like zombies. He acknowledged he had been blindsided by Hunter's campaign, and that he had become so accustomed to winning easily that he viewed the 1980 contest as little more than a formality. Now he was putting his house on the market, sending his papers to the San Diego State library, and getting ready to move back to California. His 18-year political career was over.
During the next quarter-century, Van and I corresponded regularly. I sent him drafts of books and articles I was working on and he sent me copies of the weekly columns he wrote for the San Diego Union-Tribune. He called me occasionally to get my take on unfolding political events he planned to address in his columns and, after I sent him a typescript copy of my book on congressional women shortly before it appeared in print, he devoted an entire column to its findings. In May 2008, Van died at age 93, days after completing his last column.
But I often think about our December 1980, meeting in an office being disassembled by a grieving staff. When they finished, none of us would return to Rayburn room 2408 and, after 17 years, my congressional fellowship had come to an end.
