The term rogue states gained currency in the 1990s, and was applied by policymakers, pundits, and a few scholars to regimes worthy of moral condemnation and political-military coercion. The Clinton administration introduced the less offensive appellation “states of concern,” but the current Bush administration, not one to shy away from inflammatory rhetoric, brought “rogue states” back into use and made them a more central focus of its foreign policy. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba head the administration's list, and the charge also has been leveled against Syria, Yugoslavia, and Libya (before its recent about-face).
“Rogue state” is an effective rhetorical tool that has been used by politicians, journalists, and special interest groups to brand and isolate their least favored regimes. Miroslav Nincic prefers the term “renegade regime” (RR), which he develops as an analytical category and uses to evaluate various forms of coercive strategies in international relations. He defines RRs as governments that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), carry out acts of terrorism or support groups who do, conduct aggression against other states, and repress their citizens in ways that have international consequences. None of these regimes are democratic. He contends that leaders of RRs evaluate the consequences of domestic and foreign policies in terms of their implications for their hold on power. Leaders of RRs may expect to enhance their political security from confrontational policies with the outside world if they satisfy key internal constituencies on which they depend for support or stimulate a “rally round the flag” response by their publics.
Nincic identifies nine RRs (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Sudan) on the basis of his defining behaviors, dates their emergence as RRs, and charts their evolving status. Using the concept of deviance from sociology, he theorizes that true RRs pass through two stages: initial flirtation with deviance and adoption of a deviant lifestyle. In the latter stage, they are more difficult to influence by coercive measures because such measures may unwittingly improve their domestic standing, as external threats did against Slobodan Milosevic. They can also reconfigure leaders' incentives in perverse ways by making compliance appear more costly than resistance. Although he does not use these examples, Franklin Roosevelt's oil embargo against Japan and George H. W. Bush's threats against Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of his invasion of Kuwait are well-documented cases in point.
The two most interesting chapters explore the dynamics of sanctions and military measures against RRs. Nincic evaluates the results of comprehensive (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and North Korea) and partial (Pakistan, Sudan, Syria) sanctions, finding that they tend to reinforce rather than alter existing policies. They can strengthen the power of rent-seeking elites and reward recalcitrance by appearing to justify the “us against the world” rhetoric of leaders. Threats of regime change often fail for the same reasons, and because they are not perceived as credible even when they should be. Nincic documents his claims with mini case studies, and a particularly good one of NATO, the United States, and Milosevic's Yugoslavia. He also has a few thoughtful words to say about the difficulties of reconstructing countries after interventions to remove rogue leaders.
All definitions are approximations, and Nincic's is no exception. It relies on contributing behaviors (search for WMDs, terrorism, aggression, repression with external consequences), all of which are subjective, political, and not always self-evident, as we recently discovered in the case of Iraq and WMDs. By Nincic's definition, the United States is arguably a rogue regime. It has the world's largest nuclear arsenal, which it continues to modernize; has supported, and even conducted, terrorist activities in Latin America; has invaded two countries in the last several years; and has engaged in repression (i.e., Guantanamo) that has had important external ramifications. Much of the world considers George W. Bush's United States an RR or its equivalent, and opinion polls indicate that publics of even close allies consider it the greatest threat to world peace. It would have been interesting for Nincic to have analyzed the United States as an RR, and offer an assessment of whether it was merely experimenting with a deviant lifestyle or is a thoroughly committed RR, and what the consequences of this might be for its future behavior and efforts by others to restrain it.
To the extent that this work has a failing, it is inattention to the existing literature on economic sanctions and coercion (e.g., excellent studies by David Rowe and Daniel Drezner). Some of this literature builds on the same cases, and has interesting and important implications for Nincic's argument. Much of it addresses other cases, and not just RRs, and would allow some assessment of whether the negative aspects of sanctions are unique to RRs or a more general phenomenon, as I suspect they are.
