Robert Lucas Jr. (Reference Lucas1988, p. 5) observed, “Once you start to think about … [the] consequences of human welfare involved in questions” related to economic development, “it is hard to think about anything else.” Indeed, what could be more important than improving human conditions and reducing misery? The book under review provides a concise intellectual history of the major theories in development economics. It is a slim volume, neatly divided into eight short chapters, and covers many grounds.
The first chapter focuses on the views of classical economists—those who supported the market economic system as well as the thinkers who opposed it. Among the classical economists, Adam Smith holds a prominent position for his contribution to development economics. In fact, his scholarly project revolved around creating wealth, raising living standards, and reducing poverty. Smith advocated “the obvious and simple system of natural liberty” in which individuals pursue their own ends as long as they observe “the laws of justice” ([Reference Smith1776] 1981, p. 687). Since this system is necessarily incompatible with coercive practices, Smith fiercely opposed slavery as well as colonization of other countries. Thus, it is puzzling that Khan states, “On balance he [Smith] thought that colonies did add to the prosperity of nations with empires” (p. 4). Even if we somehow dismiss the philosophical incompatibility, it is unclear how one can reconcile Khan’s statement with Smith’s argument that British colonial policies have sacrificed “the interest of the colonies” as well as “the interest of the mother country” “to the interests of … merchants” ([Reference Smith1776] 1981, p. 584). Smith branded these policies as “unjust” and “a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind,” for such policies prohibit people “from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves” (ibid, p. 582). Clearly, Smith opposed colonization, but even if he made a statement that could be interpreted as his support for colonization, an analyst should present the whole picture.
A noticeable omission in chapter one is the contribution of David Hume to development economics. Hume wrote nine essays on economics, at least three of which are relevant to development economics: “Of Commerce,” “Of the Balance of Trade” (both published in 1752), and, especially, “Of the Jealously of Trade” (published in 1758). Footnote 1 The significance of Hume lies in his impeccable logic on the errors of mercantilism and benefits of international trade for all countries. His advocacy of markets and the other institutions such as commercial contracts, which are conducive to economic prosperity, apply to both rich and poor countries alike. He argued for free trade and investment (among other reasons) on the ground that rich countries relocate their manufacturing plants in poor countries and help raise their incomes. This process would narrow the income gap between the rich and poor countries. Hume was a precursor of the modern convergence hypothesis. Footnote 2
Chapter two presents the theories of development that were advanced in the post-WWII era by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (who conceived the idea of “big push”), Ragnar Nurkse (balanced growth), Albert Hirschman (development planning), Arthur Lewis (the two-sector model), and Walter Rostow (take off theory). Chapter four covers certain other theories of development that were also advanced in the post-WWII era. The most influential theorists in this latter group include (but are not limited to) Raul Prebish, Hans Singer, and Gunnar Myrdal. With the possible exception of Lewis’s model, the theories of both groups of scholars, however, have become almost obsolete and nearly disappeared from any discourse on the economic conditions of the less-developed countries. Mainstream modern growth theorists generally regard these theories as irrelevant and even flawed. The main issue is that countries that formulated economic policies based on these theories did not experience the promised results. The primary reason for their failure is that they diminished the role of markets while enhancing that of the state with economic planning and imports substitution.
Khan covers neo-Marxist thinkers in chapter three. Although such views should be covered because they have an historical value, their policy application is highly questionable. Given the disastrous consequences of the experiment with socialism in the twentieth century, few policymakers, if any, take them seriously, while many intellectuals in rich countries still dream of a socialist economy. Chapter five, titled “Market-Friendly Heterodox Approaches,” covers the views of several thinkers, among whom Douglas North and Amartya Sen are better known and more influential. North stresses the critical role of institutions in development while Sen focuses on his thesis, which he calls “development as freedom” (the title of his 1999 book). For Sen, “Freedoms represent both the principal means and primary ends of development” (p. 89). He has tried to implement his ideas through international agencies.
Chapter six presents Peter Bauer and Deepak Lal as the defenders of classical liberalism. In the post-WWII era Bauer was almost a lonely voice in the field of development, advocating free markets while virtually all thinkers were promoting planning and import substitution. Khan also mentions William Easterly by noting “Deepak Lal and William Easterly assumed Bauer’s mantle” (p. 103). Quite likely, if Khan had the opportunity to read Easterly’s The Tyranny of Experts that was published in the same year as Khan’s book, he would have given him more space than a sentence and a footnote. Easterly now leads the economists who argue for free markets as the solution to the problem of underdevelopment.
Chapter seven appropriately covers the recent challenges to neo-liberalism. Here, Khan covers much ground but does not provide sufficient economic analysis. For example, he notes that South Korea’s government “limited entry into an industry to ensure economies of scale and effective diversification (economies of scope)” (p. 115). Khan could have pointed out that such action is unnecessary because scale economies endogenously limit the number of firms in an industry. Moreover, it is not clear how the state can determine the right number of firms in an industry, and if it gets the number wrong, the production will necessarily be suboptimal and subsidies will likely be required for the survival of the least efficient firms. In fact, in the same paragraph, Khan notes that “Chaebols competed fiercely for favors from the state based on delivering good economic performance, product innovation, quality, and exports” (p. 115). With respect to export-promotion policies, it should be noted, the success of such policies owes much, not to the state actions, but to the fact that export industries have to compete in world markets; that is, they are subject to the market test. This explains why export-promotion policies have been successful and import-substitution policies have not.
This chapter also presents Ha-Joon Chang’s argument that rich countries advanced economically because they protected their industries, but now they pressure less-developed countries to practice free trade. While it is true that rich countries had imposed high tariffs on imports in the past, from this fact it does not follow that protectionism caused their advancement. Consider the case of the United States. The economic historians Gavin Wright and Richard Nelson (Reference Nelson and Wright1992) have persuasively argued that the US economic leadership owes much to its abundant natural resources, the vast free trade area within its borders, and substantial investment in education and in research and development. If protectionism could lead to development, the living standards in poor countries would have been much higher. Consider Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson (Reference Lindert, Williamson, Bordo, Taylor and Williamson2003), who have surveyed the field and cannot find even one country
that chose to be less open to trade and factor flows in the 1990s than in the 1960s and rose in the global living-standard ranks at the same time. As far as we can tell, there are no anti-global victories to report for the postwar Third World. We infer that this is because freer trade stimulates growth in Third World economies.… (p. 232, emphasis added)
In the last chapter Khan offers a brief summary of his book and, in relation to development economics, describes (now widely read) Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Reference Acemoglu and Robinson2012). In the very last paragraph of the book, Khan writes, “One view of those writing in support of collective action in its various manifestations, with democratic safeguards for individual rights, is that this represents a move to a more compassionate and hence more advanced civilization” (p. 137). Apparently, Khan believes “collective actions” and “safeguarding individual rights” can co-exist. But does not an economic system, based on collective actions, limit (even eliminate) economic freedoms? In such a system, people may vote to elect their leaders but cannot own a business; individual initiatives are stifled.
Although I have been critical in this review, I believe Khan has made a valuable contribution to the history of thought, and I do not hesitate to recommend it to both students and scholars, particularly as supplementary reading in courses on development economics.
