Wang Zhenping's latest work on Tang foreign relations adopts a multipolar model to explore the dynasty's “complex and multifaceted” relationships (p. 2). Eschewing the popular view of a glorious expansionist empire, Wang describes Tang foreign policy as a “realist” exercise of soft and hard power implemented according to the principle of “know yourself and your neighbors” (p. 8). Tang rulers contended with peer and smaller states that also actively sought to realize their own interests through diplomacy and war. The book comprises an introduction, four chapters providing narrative histories of Tang relations with neighboring regions, two analytic chapters on Tang decision-making and strategy of frontier relations, and a conclusion. Also included is one general map of Tang China that unfortunately lacks most of the place names mentioned in the text.
The four narrative chapters, based on an impressive breadth of meticulous primary-source research, collectively establish the validity of the multipolar model, but vary in the significance of their individual contributions to the study of Tang frontier history. Chapter 1 includes the most nuanced treatment in a Western language of Tang-Turk relations in the late 610s and 620s. During this period, Emperor Gaozu, faced with the task of consolidating power internally, pragmatically acknowledged the superiority of the Turks in interstate relations. The remainder of the chapter summarizes the Tang's conquest of the Turks in 630 and later relations with the Western Turks and Uighurs. There also is a cursory discussion of the Second Eastern Turk Empire, which overlooks its role as the Tang's major adversary from the 680s to the 710s.
Chapter 2 is the most comprehensive treatment in English of the Tang's relations with the Korean and Manchurian states of Koguryǒ, Silla, Paekchae, and Parhae. Silla's success at manipulating the Tang to destroy its rivals in the late seventh century offers clear support for the author's thesis that smaller states were “active players” in foreign affairs (p. 94).
Chapters 3 and 4 supplement previously published historical narratives, particularly Charles Backus's The Nan-chao Kingdom and T'ang China's Southwestern Frontier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Christopher Beckwith's The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). Wang's treatment is most notable for demonstrating how Tang, Tibetan, and Nanzhao rulers sent mutually understood signals with diplomatic gifts and correspondence. The case of Nanzhao, whose rulers switched alliances between Tang and Tibet several times in the eighth and ninth centuries, reinforces Wang's argument that smaller states used multipolar diplomacy to their advantage.
Chapter 5 investigates Tang decision-making in foreign affairs, which involved “dual management” by the court and frontier officials. Wang's research on court audiences is particularly valuable. He shows that emperors varied in their willingness to hold substantive policy discussions in daily audiences of the full court. The real business of government often was transacted at smaller informal meetings, sometimes without court diarists present. This has important implications for interpretation of the traditional Tang histories, and explains, for example, why relatively transparent emperors, such as Taizong, have more policy debates extant than secretive ones, such as Gaozong. The second half of the chapter discusses the role of frontier officials in managing foreign affairs. Wang follows the court-centered bias of premodern Chinese historians to argue that most provincial officials were of “inferior quality” (p. 219), and consequently tended to destabilize foreign relations due to their mismanagement, corruption, or tyrannical behavior. Though problems with provincial and frontier officials certainly increased after the An Lushan rebellion weakened central control, Wang overlooks the many positive contributions of competent Tang generals and officials to territorial expansion in the first half of the dynasty.
The Tang's foreign relations strategy is the topic of chapter 6. Wang argues that the Tang court adopted “pragmatic and utilitarian” policies (p. 245) according to a “guiding principle” of utilizing diplomacy or warfare “appropriate” to the changing balance of power in Asia (p. 301). Although Wang successfully demonstrates that Tang emperors modified strategies according to circumstances, this chapter never explores why they sometimes pursued seemingly imprudent actions. Perhaps the most pointed examples are the successive Sui and Tang invasions of Korean states that never posed a military threat to Chinese empires. As Wang acknowledges earlier in the book, Taizong's two failed campaigns against Korea were driven “by the desire for personal glory and by an urge to right the historical humiliation” of the Sui (p. 56). Even Gaozong's seemingly triumphant conquest of Koguryǒ in 668 proved to be a pyrrhic victory, leaving Tang forces overextended. When Tibetan incursions and Turk rebellions occurred closer to the heartland in the 670s, the dynasty did not have resources available to mount effective counterstrikes to the west, and withdrew from the Korean peninsula.
Although Wang's discussion of the Tang court and frontier officials could have been more balanced, he succeeds in providing an alternative to the China-centered model of foreign relations. He also deserves credit for deepening our knowledge of Tang foreign policy and Asian diplomatic practices.
