Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2005
The importance of preserving trust in physicians and in medical institutions has received widespread attention in recent years. Primarily, this is due to the threats to trust posed by managed care, but there is a general and growing recognition that trust deserves more attention than it traditionally has received in all aspects of medical ethics, law, and public policy. Trust has both intrinsic and instrumental value. Trust is intrinsically important because it is a core characteristic that affects the emotional and interpersonal aspects of the physician/patient relationship. As an instrumental value, trust is widely believed to be essential for effective therapeutic encounters. It has been hypothesized or shown to affect a host of important behaviors and attitudes relating to care, including seeking care, disclosing private information, complying with treatment, and being satisfied with care. Moreover, trust may be a mediator of measurable clinical outcomes and a key factor in the mind–body interactions that underlie placebo/nocebo effects and the effectiveness of alternative medicine. It is no surprise, then, that preserving, justifying, and enhancing trust is the fundamental goal of much of medical ethics, and is a prominent objective in healthcare law and public policy. Discussions of trust and related concepts were commonplace in professionally based medical ethics prior to the 1970s.This research was supported in part by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, under its Patient-Provider Relationship Initiative. Several colleagues contributed to the development of these ideas, including Elizabeth Dugan, Ph.D., Douglas Levine, Ph.D., Beiyao Zheng, Ph.D., Raj Balkrishnan, Ph.D., and Charles Rawlings, M.D. This article is based in part on a prior article and book chapter.Hall MA. The ethics and empirics of trust. In: Englehardt TH, Bondeson W, eds. The Ethics of Managed Care: Professional Integrity and Patient Rights. Amsterdam: Kluwer;2003:109–26.Hall MA. Law, medicine and trust. Stanford Law Review 2002;55:463–527.
The importance of preserving trust in physicians and in medical institutions has received widespread attention in recent years. Primarily, this is due to the threats to trust posed by managed care, but there is a general and growing recognition that trust deserves more attention than it traditionally has received in all aspects of medical ethics, law, and public policy. Trust has both intrinsic and instrumental value. Trust is intrinsically important because it is a core characteristic that affects the emotional and interpersonal aspects of the physician/patient relationship. As an instrumental value, trust is widely believed to be essential for effective therapeutic encounters. It has been hypothesized or shown to affect a host of important behaviors and attitudes relating to care, including seeking care, disclosing private information, complying with treatment, and being satisfied with care.3
Hall MA, Dugan E, Zheng B, Mishra A. Trust in physicians and medical institutions: What is it, can it be measured, and does it matter? Milbank Quarterly 2001;79:613–39; Rhodes R, Strain JJ. Trust and transforming medical institutions. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000;9:205–17; Safran DG, Taira DA, Rogers WH, Kosinski M, Ware JE, Tarlov AR. Linking primary care performance to outcomes of care. Journal of Family Practice 1998;47:213; Thom DH, Ribisl KM, Steward AL, Luke DA. The Stanford Trust Study physicians. Further validation and reliability testing of the Trust in Physician scale. Medical Care 1999;37:510–7.
Basmajian JV. Debonafide effects vs. “placebo effects.” Proceedings of The Royal College of Physicians Edinburgh 1999;29:243–4; Caterinicchio RP. Testing plausible path models of interpersonal trust in patient–physician treatment relationships. Science and Medicine 1979;13A:81–99; Kirsch I. Specifying nonspecifics: Psychological mechanisms of placebo effects. In: Harrington A, ed. The Placebo Effect: An Interdisciplinary Exploration. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1997:166–86.
O'Neill O. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press; 2002; Pellegrino ED, Thomasma DC. Fidelity to trust. In: Pellegrino EC, Thomasma DC, eds. The Virtues in Medicine. New York: Oxford University Press; 1993:65–78; Rogers DE. On trust: A basic building block for healing doctor–patient interactions. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 1994;87:2–5.
Mechanic D, Schlesinger M. The impact of managed care on patients' trust in medical care and their physicians. JAMA 1996;275:1693–7; Mechanic D. The functions and limitations of trust in the provision of medical care. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 1998;23:661–86.
A physician should not be forward to make gloomy prognostications, … [f]or, the physician should be the minister of hope and comfort to the sick; that … he may smooth the bed of death, revive expiring life, and counteract the depressing influence of those maladies which often disturb the tranquility of the most resigned in their last moments. The life of a sick person can be shortened not only by the acts, but also by the words or the manner of the physician. It is, therefore, a sacred duty to guard himself carefully in this respect, and to avoid all things which have a tendency to discourage the patient and to depress his spirits.
Trust has not always enjoyed this stature, however. Promoting the importance of trust fell into disfavor among ethicists with the ascendancy of patient autonomy as a governing principle and a focus on patients' rights.7
See note 5, O'Neill 2002. See also Churchill, LR. Trust, autonomy, and advance directives. Journal of Religion and Health 1989;28:175–83.
Sherlock R. Reasonable men and sick human beings. American Journal of Medicine 1986;80:2–4, at 3.
The tide is now beginning to turn. Two developments have brought trust back into focus: First, increasing skepticism about the suitability of a purely individual-rights orientation to medical ethics and law has allowed some questioning of strict autonomy principles without concern that the excesses of a paternalistic orientation will necessarily be reintroduced.9
Schneider C. Bioethics with a human face. Indiana Law Journal 1994;69:1075; Dworkin RB. Medical law and ethics in the post-autonomy age. Indiana Law Journal 1993;68:727; Tauber, AI. Sick autonomy. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 2003;46(4):484–95.
Scheffler S. Relationships and responsibilities. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1997;26(3):189–209.
The result has been a cacophony of conceptual and empirical work on trust.11
Clark CC. Trust in medicine. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2002;27:11–29; Goold SD. Trust and the ethics of health care institutions. Hastings Center Report 2001;31(6):26–33.
Pearson SD, Raeke LH. Patients' trust in physicians: Many theories, few measures, and little data. Journal of General Internal Medicine 2000;15:509–13.
Public policy can take three different attitudes or stances toward trust, which I label as predicated, supportive, and skeptical. In its predicated stance, public policy (which includes ethics and law) takes the existence of trust as a factual premise for imposing a particular obligation. The reasoning is often formal and deductive, not instrumental or empirical: Because trust exists, therefore physicians, facilities, or insurers should do X, refrain from Y, or be liable for Z. The obligations do not depend on any assumptions about how they affect trust, only that there is trust. Trust is the source of the obligation, not its object.
A leading example is informed consent. In the words of a leading judicial decision, “a patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms length transactions…. From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make [an informed] decision possible.”13
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
In contrast, the supportive stance is more proactive. Here, public policy seeks to promote trust with rules intended to maintain or increase trust where it exists, or to restore trust where it is threatened or diminished. Public policy can directly foster the psychology of trust by conveying to patients that they can and should trust physicians or medical institutions, or it can more indirectly create conditions that are conducive to trust by fostering trustworthy behavior. The confidentiality of medical information is a leading example. The massive federal rule on medical privacy known as HIPAA is premised not only on the intrinsic right to privacy, but also on the instrumental reasoning that “the provision of high-quality health care requires the exchange of personal, often-sensitive information between an individual and a skilled practitioner. Vital to that interaction is the patient's ability to trust that the information shared will be protected and kept confidential.”14
Department of Health and Human Services. Standards for privacy of individually identifiable health information. Federal Register 2000;65:82461–5, at 82462.
Contrasting with both of these stances is a skeptical attitude about trust, one that believes trust does not exist or cannot be sustained or justified, and so uses the absence or illegitimacy of trust as a premise for a regime that institutionalizes distrust. The regulation of managed care is a good case in point. Patient protection laws are in response to the widespread backlash against managed care, fueled by exposes such as Anders' book subtitled HMOs and the Breakdown of Medical Trust.15
Anders G. Health against Wealth: HMOs and the Breakdown of Medical Trust. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996.
These three stances convey different attitudes about the expected role that patients have in medical decisionmaking. The predicated stance assumes a more paternalistic relationship, whereas the skeptical stance encourages patients to question physicians' authority. The supportive stance is more nuanced because it depends on empirical assessments of conditions that are compatible with trust. Depending on the evidence, and depending on the variation in patients' own preferences and personalities, encouraging patients to take a more active role in medical decisionmaking may or may not be compatible with greater trust.
These three attitudes do not function as independently as the cursory description so far suggests. Instead, multiple stances are typically encountered in particular public policy contexts. Disentangling these strands for separate analysis helps to clarify the distinct bases for trust-related positions, but it is also helpful to see how these three positions might operate simultaneously, or how they might produce different resolutions of a single problem. For example, financial conflicts of interest created by HMO payment methods might give rise to each of three trust-related responses. Because of the trust that patients repose in physicians, we might conclude that financial conflicts of interest should be avoided or must be disclosed in order to justify the level of trust that exists. In a predicated mode, these edicts would flow from the existence of trust, without regard to whether the disclosure or prohibition of incentives undermines or promotes trust. Alternatively, public policy might reason more instrumentally that conflicts of interest created by cost-containment incentives tend to weaken trust by causing patients, justifiably or not, to question their physicians' loyalty. This could prompt a ban or limitation of such incentives in an attempt to sustain or restore trust that is threatened or eroding. However, this supportive stance toward trust is unlikely to mandate disclosure of incentives, which would tend to diminish rather than restore trust. Mandatory disclosure might result, instead, from the third stance, one of skepticism regarding the possibility of legitimate trust in the face of conflicting incentives. Disclosure under this view would serve as a warning to patients, intended to put them on guard about how financial incentives might distort or corrupt their physicians' medical judgments.
Although there is some plausibility to each of these distinct arguments, articulating them is not meant to assert their validity, only to describe and categorize the nature and structure of their underlying logic. Each argument's validity depends on the accuracy of its factual assumptions, the force of its normative position, and the plausibility of the asserted connections between the two. Therefore, to probe the merits of various public policy positions with regard to trust, it is necessary to evaluate each of these three stances using a variety of examples from current public policy debates.
Starting from the premise of trust creates a strong predicate for public policy, owing to the very high level of trust that in fact exists. Voices are sometimes heard to say that trust in physicians is diminishing, but examination of the evidence reveals that this is not the case. On a 5-point scale ranging from strongly distrust = 1 to strongly trust = 5, the major studies find that the mean level of trust is near or well above 4.16
Hall MA, Zheng B, Dugan E, Camacho F, Kidd K, Mishra A, Balkrishnan R. Measuring patients' trust in their primary care providers. Medical Care Research and Review 2002;59:293–318; Anderson L, Dedrick RF. Development of the trust in physician scale: A measure to assess interpersonal trust in patient physician relationships. Psychological Reports 1990;67:1091–100; Safran D, Kosinski M, Tarlov AR, Rogers WH, Taira DA, Lieberman N, Ware JE. The primary care assessment survey: Tests of data quality and measurement performance. Medical Care 1998;36:728–39.
Lake T. Do HMOs make a difference? Consumer assessments of health care. Inquiry 2000;36:411–8; Gallagher TH, St. Peter RF, Chesney M, Lo B. Patients' attitudes towards cost control bonuses for managed care physicians. Health Affairs 2001;20(2):186–92.
Murphy J, Chang H, Montgomery J, Rogers WH, Safran DG. The quality of physician–patient relationships: Patients' experiences 1996–1999. Journal of Family Practice 2000;50(2):123–9.
These positive findings are robust across several different situations and study methodologies. Therefore, they suggest the possibility of an underlying truth about medical trust, especially trust in physicians: that it may be more resilient than is often realized, both in its ability to withstand various assaults, and in its glacial resistance to attempts to alter its course. The stability of trust can be explained on several bases. First, because trust arises and gains its strength from conditions of vulnerability, trust in physicians has an inherent basis in the universal condition of illness and the nature of medical care.19
Pellegrino ED. Trust and distrust in professional ethics. In: Pellegrino EC, Veatch RM, Langan JP, eds. Ethics, Trust, and the Professions: Philosophical and Cultural Aspects. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 1991:69–85.
Studies cited as showing lower trust refer to trust in the medical profession as a whole or to “leaders in medicine.”20
Blendon R, Benson J. Americans' views on health policy: A fifty-year historical perspective. Health Affairs 2001;20(2):38–46.
Buchanan A. Trust in managed care organizations. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2000;10(3):189–212.
Veatch RM. Doctor does not know best: Why in the new century physicians must stop trying to benefit patients. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2000;25(6):701–21; Davies HTO, Rundall TG. Managing patient trust in managed care. Milbank Quarterly 2000;78(4):609–24.
Zaner RM. The phenomenon of trust and the patient physician relationship. In: Pellegrino ED, Veatch RM, Langan JP, eds. Ethics, Trust, and the Professions: Philosophical and Cultural Aspects. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 1991:45–65; Hardin R. Trustworthiness. Ethics 1996;107:26–42.
Under the predicated stance, one could argue that physicians, hospitals, and health plans should perform at the level of actual trust; otherwise, an implicit fraud is occurring in allowing patients to harbor false beliefs about benevolent motivations and abilities. This simplistic solution should be resisted, however, for two reasons. On one hand, actual levels of trust are often so great that we cannot literally hold physicians to superhuman expectations. On the other hand, we should not automatically disabuse patients of their trust, because elevated trust and unrealistic expectations serve essential therapeutic purposes. Therefore, some measure of disjuncture is unavoidable between actual trust and trustworthiness. How large a gap should be tolerated is an age-old question that will continue to fuel debate. But, simply observing that actual trust exceeds trustworthiness does not automatically result in any particular rule or obligation.
These points are well illustrated by the professional standard of care enforced by medical liability law. The ability to sue one's physician for negligent mistakes is meant to punish violations of trust and to promote physicians' trustworthiness.24
Mohr JC. American medical malpractice litigation in historical perspective. JAMA 2000;283(13):1731–7.
Similar concerns lie behind judges' reluctance to introduce evidence of cost-containment incentives in malpractice trials against HMO physicians, and courts' rejection of suits for breach of fiduciary duty based on financial incentives. Courts have ruled that evidence of financial incentives would tend to unfairly inflame jurors,25
Shea v. Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. App. 2001).
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000).
Trust violations do not always produce a reaction of betrayal. Just the opposite, another hallmark of physician trust is the striking willingness to forgive mistakes or unfortunate results. Strong trust entails an optimistic view of physicians' benevolent motivation, which allows patients to view poor performance in the most positive light, as unintended or unavoidable isolated events that do not undermine patients' fundamental assumptions about intentions and abilities. Theorists have posited that trust in physicians consists of multiple domains or objects, such as physicians' competence, their character, and their ability to achieve desired results. In theory, each domain of trust could behave independently, such that patients might trust their physician in one arena but not another. However, researchers have found that trust in physicians has a strong global characteristic, such that trust or distrust tends to be undifferentiated across these domains. In psychometric terms, trust in physicians has a strong single factor construct. As a result, “even repeated violations of trust can be excused as personal quirks as long as the violations are confined to a particular domain and are not interpreted as threatening to ‘spill over’ into other domains … thus delimiting the perceived generalizability of the violation.”27
Sitkin SB, Roth NL. Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic remedies for trust/distrust. Organizational Science 1993;3:367–92, at 369.
In sum, due to the strength and emotional tenor of trust in physicians, patients are capable of extraordinary levels of forgiveness, but are subject to extreme feelings of betrayal once the limits of trust are breached. This dichotomized psychology explains why juries rule against physicians less often than other types of defendants, but when they do, they are prone to rendering occasional very large verdicts, reflecting the type of outrage that results when physicians appear uncaring or unrepentant.28
Saks M. Do we really know anything about the behavior of the tort litigation system—and why not? University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1992;140:1147; Vidmar N. Medical Malpractice and the American Jury. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1995.
Under the supportive stance, the determinants of trust are the most important issue because the goal of public policy is to support, enhance, or restore trust. Public policy abounds with positions explicitly reasoned on the need to promote trust. Sometimes, public policy simply mandates or prohibits a behavior that is relevant to trust. Other times, however, public policy acts in more of an hortatory or aspirational mode, in which it expresses an attitude or ethos of trust.
An aspirational strategy toward trust contemplates inherent tensions and outright contradictions between what public policy professes and what it actually requires. For example, we tolerate a stark dichotomy between physicians' professed adherence to a rule of absolute patient loyalty and the reality of myriad violations of the rule.29
Hall MA. Rationing health care at the bedside. New York University Law Review 1994;69:693–780.
Orentlicher D. The Supreme Court and physician-assisted suicide—Rejecting assisted suicide but embracing euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine 1997;337(17):1236–9.
The supportive stance necessarily entails empirical assumptions about what conditions and measures actually improve or diminish trust. Often, we make assumptions about patients' behaviors or attitudes that regard medical trust as much weaker or more fragile than it appears to be. For instance, there may be little empirical basis for the claim that patients would trust their physicians significantly less if physician-assisted suicide were legal.31
White BC. Assisted suicide and nursing: Possibly compatible? Journal of Professional Nursing 1999;15(3):151–9.
Winer MF, Shuman DW. The privilege study. Archives of General Psychiatry 1983;40:1027.
Burris S. Driving the epidemic underground? A new look at law and the social risk of HIV testing. AIDS Public Policy Journal 1997;12:66.
Hall MA, Rich SS. Patients' fear of genetic discrimination by health insurers: The impact of legal protections. Genetics and Medicine 2000;2(4):214–21.
Hall MA, Dugan E, Balkrishnan R, Bradley D. How disclosing HMO physician incentives affects trust. Health Affairs 2002;21(2):197–206; Kao A, Green DC, Zaslavski A, Koplan JP, Cleary PD. The relationship between method of physician payment and patient trust. JAMA 1998;280:1708–14; Safran DG, Rogers WH, Tarlov AR, Inui T, Taira DA, Montgomery JE, et al. Organizational and financial characteristics of health plans: Are they related to primary care performance? Archives of Internal Medicine 2000;160:69–76.
These failures to document expected determinants of trust may be due to various limitations and flaws in the studies. In particular, these subjects were reacting to discrete and recent events whose full impact was not yet fully felt or realized. Public policy may relate to trust in a more global or climatic fashion that cannot be detected by focusing on isolated factors and interventions. Still, these negative findings are robust across several different situations and study methodologies. Therefore, they suggest the possibility of an underlying truth about medical trust, especially trust in physicians: that it may be more resilient than we often suppose, both in its ability to withstand various assaults, and in its glacial resistance to attempts to alter its course.
The stability of trust can be explained on several bases. First, because trust arises and gains its strength from conditions of vulnerability, trust in physicians has an inherent basis in the universal condition of illness and the nature of medical care. These intrinsic roots are deeper and stronger than the specific and contingent institutional arrangements or physician characteristics that may affect trust at the margin. Empirical evidence from several studies indicates that various patient characteristics have little or no effect on the level of trust.36
Kao A, Green DC, Davis NA, Koplan JP, Cleary PD. Patient's trust in their physicians: Effects of choice, continuity, and payment method. Journal of General Internal Medicine 1998;13:681–6.
Another explanation for the resiliency of trust is that trust in the system of medicine can survive even when individual professionals violate that trust.37
Luhmann N. Trust and Power. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons; 1973.
I do not mean to overstate the resilience of trust, only to note that its foundations are stronger than is often supposed. Nevertheless, threats to trust are real and should be taken seriously. As noted above, the stronger trust is, the deeper the sense of betrayal that can result when trust is violated. Once this occurs, it may be impossible ever to restore trust. Both trust and distrust have a self-generating or spiraling dynamic in which the starting attitude colors how people interpret particular events and actions, which then further shape the basic attitude that colors subsequent events.38
Murray SL, Holmes JG, Griffin DW. The self-fulfilling nature of positive illusions in romantic relationships: Love is not blind, but prescient. Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 1996;71(6):1155–80.
Finally, it is important to remember that all of these points are subject to a high degree of speculation and uncertainty, so there is no way to know in advance which threats to trust will prove to be real or imagined, or what the potential is for maintaining or restoring trust. Therefore, those who advocate supportive legal measures should not have to bear the burden of proving their case empirically.
Nevertheless, some caution is warranted in devising supportive measures. Not only may these efforts entail other costs and have no effect; they also can be counterproductive. Efforts to improve trust can, paradoxically, weaken trust. This is so because expressive or psychological effects can be complex, unpredictable, and multidimensional. Thus, efforts to improve the performance of physicians or medical institutions can backfire by conveying to the public an attitude of distrust and by reducing medical actors' motivations to behave in a trustworthy fashion. Davies, for instance, has noted this phenomenon in England, where he predicts that “the lack of confidence, shown by the UK Government in its physicians, will inevitably be followed by a lack of trust from the patients, particularly as a few physicians begin to behave less nobly” in response to the demoralization caused by excessive oversight.39
Davies AC. Don't trust me, I'm a doctor: Medical regulation and the 1999 NHS reforms. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2000;20(3):437–56, at 355.
We know from many situations throughout life that trust develops in a reciprocal fashion in which trusted parties respond to cues they receive about how they are expected to behave.40
Holmes JG, Rempel JK. Trust in close relationships. In: Hendrick C, ed. Close Relationships. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications; 1989:187–220; Kramer RM. Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. Annual Review of Psychology 1999;50:569–98.
Frey BS. Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing; 1997.
This is not meant to be a per se argument against any form of regulatory control, however. The same points about crowding out intrinsic motivation tend to be true for incentive reward systems as well.42
See note 41, Frey 1997.
Hall MA. Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics, and Economics of Rationing Mechanisms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997; Lupton D, Donaldson C, Lloyd P. Caveat emptor or blissful ignorance? Patients and the consumerist ethos. Social Science and Medicine 1991;33:559–68.
These theoretical possibilities should not forestall all efforts to improve trust. Instead, realizing the potentially paradoxical nature of trust helps to better craft supportive or corrective measures in a way that is more likely to achieve their trust-related goals. Doing so may require broad standards rather than detailed rules, and it may counsel us to be nonpunitive and nondirective in our enforcement mechanisms. Kahan, for instance, observed that, in using criminal law to shape the behavior of ordinary citizens, “gentle nudges” often work better to galvanize public attitudes and authorities' willingness to enforce the law than do “hard shoves.”44
Kahan DM. Gentle nudges vs. hard shoves: Solving the sticky norms problem. University of Chicago Law Review 2000;67:607.
Finally, public policy sometimes bases positions on the absence of trust or on an attitude of distrust. This stance assumes that trust is diminished and cannot be effectively maintained, and therefore looks for substitute means to maintain medical relationships. This attitude can be seen in much of managed care regulation, which imposes oversight mechanisms that assume that health plans cannot otherwise be trusted to perform correctly. In one sense, these regulations might be thought of as restoring a measure of trust, but this is a more guarded form of confidence of the sort popularized by the Cold War slogan “trust but verify,” which Putnam referred to as “synthetic trust.”45
Putnam RD. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster; 2000.
Bigley GA, Pearce JL. Straining for shared meaning in organization science: Problems of trust and distrust. Academy Management Review 1998;23:405–21; Lewicki RJ, Mcallister DJ. Trust and distrust: New relationships and realities. Academy Management Review 1998;23:438–58.
Mishra A. Organizational responses to crisis: The centrality of trust. In: Kramer R, Tyler T. eds. Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications; 1996:261–87; Rousseau DM, Sitkin SB, Burt RS, Camerer C. Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy Management Review 1998;23:393–404; Govier T. Dilemmas of Trust. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press; 1998.
As previously noted, public policy can create conditions of distrust without necessarily intending to, or even by intending just the opposite. A managed care patients' “bill of rights” or “code of ethics,” which many proponents advocate as necessary or effective in promoting trust, serve as a good vehicle for illustrating these possibilities. A set of elaborate provisions telling patients their rights and regulating the behavior of managed care organizations could easily convey to patients the notion that HMOs and their physicians cannot be trusted. Correlatively, such measures can convey to physicians and insurers that they are not in fact trusted and are not expected to act out of intrinsically trustworthy motivation. On the other hand, these protections could also provide the assurances necessary to allow managed care to exist in its present form. Over time, satisfactory experience with managed care may lead people to form some greater level of trust.
In broad perspective, it is helpful to visualize a three-tier model of trust in which trust in an individual (physician or medical director) can be augmented or supplanted by trust in a specific institution (health insurer), which itself can be augmented or supplanted by trust in a different institution (e.g., an external review authority) or by trust in a social system (i.e., the courts enforcing the law).48
Heimer CA. Solving the problem of trust. In: Cook KS, ed. Trust in Society. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 2001:40–88, at 87; Shapiro S. The social control of impersonal trust. American Journal of Sociology 1987;93:623.
Public policy advocates often overstate their case when they argue that particular requirements are necessary to support trust. They assume a psychological basis for trust that is too fragile, and they sometimes adopt the simplistic view that faith in physicians increases in proportion to the constraints placed on their authority or independence. As Carol Heimer has observed, “many truisms about trust are simply false.”49
See note 48, Heimer 2001.
The greater concern, then, is trustworthiness rather than trust itself. This does not mean we should be cavalier about threats to trust. Once trust is lost, it is far harder to rebuild than it is to sustain. Therefore, efforts to preserve trust in an era of managed care are vitally important. Although this article lays out a number of competing theories and possibilities about trust, for the most part these are mere speculations that have not been demonstrated conclusively with rigorous empirics, and the opposite positions are often plausible. By considering the full range of possibilities, we will be better equipped to find those measures that can best create conditions conducive to trust and trustworthy behavior.