In Cutting the Fuse, Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman reiterate much of Dr. Pape's earlier work on the subject of suicide terrorism in Dying to Win (Random House, 2005). In Cutting the Fuse Pape and Feldman argue that the major focus of suicide attacks is aimed at American targets and insist that “over 95 percent of the suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation” (329). The authors argue that occupation (direct and indirect) breeds suicide terrorism and that the exponential increase in attacks over the period 2004–2009 has nothing to do with religion. However, the empirics do not support the authors' main arguments, as the targets of suicide attacks are increasingly Muslim civilians and not the forces of occupation. Sectarian attacks by Sunnis against Shi'a civilians constitute the majority of attacks in the period under review. Further, to substantiate their findings they miscode the data and aggregate attacks against Muslims into a general category of anti-American violence.
Dr. Pape has consistently argued that occupation is at the heart of all suicide terrorism, including an article last year in Foreign Policy that pithily summed up his position: “It's the Occupation, Stupid” (Foreign Policy, 18 October 2010). In Cutting the Fuse, Pape advances a thesis that emphasizes annoyance and resentment at being occupied rather than the strategic benefits of suicide terrorism as argued in Dying to Win. While violence against foreign troops is certainly one of the oft-cited root causes of terrorism, it is by no means a complete explanation of the phenomenon.
The book stresses that “the principle cause of suicide terrorism is resistance to foreign occupation, not Islamic fundamentalism” and that religion is no more than “a recruiting tool” (20). However, the increase in sectarianism is a manifestation of Takfiri ideology, which outlines legal loopholes to allow for the killing of other Muslims, something the Qur'an is explicitly against. This worldview is a distinctive characteristic of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Additionally, Pakistani militant groups' recent attempts to generate fatwas designating the Ahmadi community as non-Muslims (and subject to retribution) underpin the idea that for many of the Salafi jihadists, killing Shi'a is just as important, if not more, as killing American occupation forces. Thus dismissing out of hand the religious aspects of suicide terrorism misses how this tactic has been transformed in the past five years.
In Pakistan, there were 142 suicide attacks between 2002 and 2008, accounting for roughly ninety deaths per month (http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR84-Jeremie-Suicideterrorism.pdf ). Between 2007 and 2009 as many as 5,500 Muslim civilians died as a result of suicide attacks, many of which targeted Shi'a Mosques. According to the research conducted by the Agha Khan University, 97.9 percent of the casualties were civilians and the motives were mostly sectarian.
According to the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies, “In the first quarter of 2008, Pakistan even surpassed war-torn Iraq and insurgency-hit Afghanistan in term [sic] of the number of suicide bombings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq have primarily been motivated by the presence of foreign forces in the two countries. But the phenomenon has emerged in Pakistan though the country is not under foreign occupation” (Khuram Iqbal, “Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter-Strategies,” PIPS Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies 3, no. 1 [2010]: 1). Thus, characterizing as anti-American violence perpetrated by Sunni insurgents against Shi'a school children in Iraq or Shi'a Mosques in Pakistan is not particularly persuasive for anyone who understands the Takfiri ideology and the real hatred that Salafis bear the followers of Ali.
Among the strengths of the book are a few of the case studies that provide some interesting details about suicide bombing campaigns. The case studies include Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as well as attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda. Some of the case studies are more comprehensive than others and the book is somewhat uneven from one chapter to the next. Some chapters provide detailed historical context (chap. 10) and analyses while others offer far less depth (chap. 4). The occasional lack of historical context allows the authors to make some fallacious claims about the correlation between foreign occupation and suicide terrorism. The cases in the book fail to illuminate the actual connection between suicide terrorism and occupation. For instance, arguing that Iraq before 2003 did not experience any suicide terrorism (87) fails to consider the nature of the regime of Saddam Hussein where any opposition, let alone jihadi violent radicalization, would not have been permitted to exist. Iraqi dissident Kanan Makiya (writing under the pen name Samir Khalil) has described the multiple and overlapping security apparatuses of the state in which torture was routinely used to root out and quell dissent (Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq [University of California Press, 1998], 66), and Phebe Marr recounts that during that period even the trees in the parks had listening devices (The Modern History of Iraq [Westview Press, 2003]). All accounts of Iraq under Saddam Hussein portray this as a regime of terror able to suppress all rivals. Thus the reason why there was no suicide terrorism in Iraq seems obvious and intuitive, given the nature of the regime. While the presence of foreign troops, whether Americans in Iraq, Russians in Chechnya, or Israelis in Lebanon, provides access to a foreign military target, the conditions of occupation affect the entire population. Thus a better approach to connecting suicide terrorism with occupation requires a rigorous explanation for how and why suicide terrorism evolves at particular moments in time. Are there specific tipping points after which suicide terrorism becomes the preferred strategy?
As a result of this omission, a crucial part of the story is missing that explains how something that affects everyone (occupation) only mobilizes a few. If suicide terrorism as tactic is as effective as the authors assert (53), there should be more people willing to carry out attacks. Further, if collective-action problems exist (63) to persuade individuals to perpetrate martyrdom operations, the authors need to explain why. This lack of enthusiasm for suicide terrorism has prompted many organizations to use duplicity and coercion of women and children in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and Sri Lanka into becoming bombers.
Structural conditions (whether occupation, poverty, or other traditionally cited “root causes”) for terrorism cannot explain variation over time. Pape and Feldman establish that the number of attacks from 2004 to 2009 increased exponentially; 2007 witnessed the greatest number of attacks in Iraq (32). However, the authors do not explain variation over time. It seems counterintuitive that adding more troops as part of the surge would increase the number of attacks in 2007 but decrease the number of attacks in 2008 when troops continued to arrive (Jason H. Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, “The State of Iraq: An Update,” New York Times, 22 December 2007 and 29 December 2008).
The drop in Iraqi suicide attacks in 2008 according to Pape and Feldman relate to the “Sunni Awakening,” in which Sunni communities were “empowered to provide for their own security and autonomy” (33). While this might be partially true, this is more a reflection of internal Iraqi politics than the presence or drawing down of foreign troops. Equally problematic are some of the interpretations of the data outside of Iraq.
While Feldman and Pape argue that suicide attacks in Afghanistan mirrored the increase in NATO's movement into and occupation of the Pashtun homeland, a more careful analysis of the attacks shows that they did not follow troop movements but rather the presence of the provincial reconstruction teams whose goal was to build Afghani infrastructure and improve economic conditions. Recent attacks against Afghan road workers in Paktia in May 2011 once again betray the underlying priority of the Taliban to ensure the population's compliance. As David Kilcullen cogently observes in his insightful work, “the Taliban begin where the road ends” (The Accidental Guerilla [Oxford University Press, 2009], 95). Thus the provincial reconstruction teams pose a real threat to the Taliban's control of the population and are targeted by suicide bombers and conventional forces.
While foreign occupation might be a necessary condition in terms of access to military targets, it is by no mean sufficient. Attacks in Pakistan began in 2002 before the invasion of Iraq. By the authors' own admission, the first attack in Afghanistan occurred two days before September 11th and months before the appearance of foreign troops. Further, in the eight years of Soviet occupation, the Afghan mujahidin never resorted to suicide terrorism although many mujahids were enthusiastic about martyrdom, as depicted in Lawrence Wright's The Looming Tower (Knopf, 2006). This is part of the larger methodological problem of Cutting the Fuse. By selecting on the dependent variable, Pape and Feldman are able to exclude counterfactual cases of occupation without suicide terror, such as the Afghan mujahidin in the 1980s, without explaining why some occupations lead to suicide terror and others do not.
One cannot convincingly make the case that occupation explains the universe of cases. The argument that Pakistan constitutes a case of “indirect occupation” (139) is likewise problematic. Without a more specified definition of what precisely constitutes an “indirect occupation” this category can mean anything, including any kind of alliance with the United States. In fact, Pape has never really explained what constitutes an occupation (for example, broken down by its political, economic, sociological, and ideological components). This umbrella concept, not adequately defined in Cutting the Fuse (or Dying to Win), allows the authors to assert that the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia constituted an occupation and generally makes untestable and unfalsifiable many of the empirical correlations between suicide terrorism and occupation.
