I. Transnational processes and republican political thought

The development of transnational forms of activism and democratic practice paralleling representative democracy raises a range of analytical and normative questions. Scholarship on the nature of transnational activism overwhelmingly begins with the assumption that contemporary transnational practices are imperfect and sporadic with respect to the pressing array of global problems (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011: 216). Consequently, in the last decade there has been considerable literature examining both the normative shortcomings of existing forms of global governance as well as the normative implications of emerging forms of transnational activism. The key question here has been whether or not this transnational activity ought to be the basis of a more coherent and structured form of global polity, and if so, how should this practice be further developed? There have been a wide variety of overlapping political theory positions developed in this literature – including liberal, cosmopolitan and deliberative approaches (see Stokes Reference Stokes, Leib and He2006; Goodhart Reference Goodhart2008; Brasset and Smith Reference Brassett and Smith2008; Brassett and Smith Reference Brassett and Smith2010). One key issue that runs through this literature is the differences in regard to whether transnational forms of democratic practice should be institutionalized. John Dryzek (2011: 211) articulates this question by referring to the existence of ‘soup’ (ad hoc forms of democratic practice), ‘society’ (democratic practices being underpinned by common norms) or ‘system’ (with democratic practices being formally organized). There is also the question as to whether transnational democratization can be seen to be being ‘intrinsically’ valuable in constituting global justice, or be seen to be instrumentally useful in addressing complicated global problems (Bohman Reference Bohman2007: 173–4; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011: 213–14).

Underlying these various reflections on transnational activism is a significant tension in political theory scholarship between constitutional perspectives on democracy, which advocate the creation of democratic structures with electoral and judicial components, and discursive perspectives on democracy, which advocate the cultivation of public deliberation detached from formal institutions in national or transnational settings (Goodhart Reference Goodhart2008: 398–9). Such an account of constitutionalism is overtly ‘normative’ and only contingently relates to the idea that forms of political constitutionalism are actually developing in contemporary world politics (Wiener et al. Reference Wiener, Lang, Poiares Maduro and Kumm2012: 7). A transnational account of the constitutional position is evident in David Held’s arguments for a ‘cosmopolitan democratic public law’ – a common legal structure that is entrenched across and within a range of ‘diverse political communities’ and ‘multiple citizenships’ (Held Reference Held1995: 233). This leads to the eventual creation of a global executive, parliament and the related paraphernalia of government with structures far different from the decentralized and inchoate structures of prevailing forms of global governance. The discursive position is evident in Dryzek’s argument for the creation of transnational spaces for genuine and inclusive dialogue which are not necessarily institutionalized or formally connected to authority, thereby nurturing the diverse array of political perspectives and institutions that are currently developing (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2006: 154). Dryzek’s account of discursive democracy refers to a context where there is the ‘dispersed and competent control over the collectively consequential engagement of discourses in the global public sphere’ (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2012: 115). This points to an acceptance of the unstructured and decentralized nature of emerging transnational democratization but seeks to infuse a reflexive deliberative culture into the deliberative activity of agents operating within this context (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2006; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2012).

It is important not to overstate the differences between these accounts. Dryzek does explore concrete institutional forums for deliberation (Dryzek and Niemeyer Reference Dryzek and Niemeyer2008), and Held (1995: ch 10) does acknowledge the importance of political participation in the global institutions he articulates. Nevertheless, the tensions between constitutional and discursive approaches is a substantial political choice with significant implications for how transnational activity should be considered and could be developed. It may be the case for example that attempts to constitutionalize emerging forms of transnational democratic practice could co-opt, silence or corrupt groups and individuals participating and constituting these transnational practices and thereby undermine its democratic potential. Conversely, refusing any effort to constitutionalize linkages between global governance and transnational democratization risks isolating and Balkanizing activists and civil society networks from formal efforts to address global problems. There is also the clear observation that the discursive nature of transnational activism also parallels the constitutional nature of national representative democracy.

Neo-roman republicanism is a political theory which has the potential to contribute to considering the significance of transnational forms of activism which has thus far been underdeveloped. Republican political thought has risen in prominence within the last two decades, but it is important to note there is no single account of republicanism. While republican ideas have been associated with a communitarian or ‘Athenian’ school of republicanism which focuses upon public participation within a political community, there is also the neo-roman school of republicanism which focuses on ‘independence under law’ (Dagger Reference Dagger2006: 153). This latter position has also been referred to as neo-roman republicanism and claims that a way of thinking about civic liberty and good government gained coherence in the Italian Renaissance and later in the revolutions in England, France and America. The central contemporary articulators of the neo-roman republican tradition are Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli and Richard Bellamy. These scholars have placed republican ideas closer to a liberal conception of individual liberty but in contrast to liberalism, claim that this liberty can only be collectively constituted by the laws and institutions of an appropriately empowered republican state which directly addresses various forms of domination (Skinner Reference Skinner1998; Pettit Reference Pettit1999a). The institutional perspective of this type of republicanism, which is the focus of this essay, offers important but not unproblematic insights into how liberty can be developed in a transnational context.

There are three core elements of neo-roman republicanism: a public conception of liberty understood as non-domination, an institutional conception of how non-domination is developed via an empowered state, and a political conception of citizenship and patriotism which enables the preceding republican elements to exist. The overarching goal from a neo-roman republican point of view is the constitution of a robust form of individual liberty conceived as ‘non-domination’: an institutionalized context where citizens are free from the arbitrary interference of others and free from the subordination or domination from the state itself or from other interests or actors in society (Pettit Reference Pettit1999a: 80). The instrumental aspiration of republican structures and policies is to constitute individual independence through publicly developed laws and policies which focus upon protecting individuals and dampening down the flows of power which adversely affect them and also encompass public efforts to augment the capacity of individuals to protect themselves from subjection (Pettit Reference Pettit1999a: ch 5). A republican state’s power is managed by procedural checks and balances with regard to democratic processes as well as ongoing citizen oversight and public deliberation as to the nature of the public good (Pettit Reference Pettit, Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón1999b). Such oversight is provided by citizens being motivated by an enduring culture of civic virtue and patriotism (Dagger Reference Dagger2006: 156). Republicans emphasize that patriotism is a historically developed love and sense of responsibility for the norms and institutions that make liberty possible in a specific state (Viroli Reference Viroli1995: 2).

Despite this focus on the state, contemporary republican scholarship has increasingly attempted to engage with questions relating to the international forms of cooperation and governance required for a republican state to be able to work in practice and also be able to address transnational forms of domination. Clearly the contemporary political context has increasingly significant transnational and global dimensions which undermine the idea that states are self-contained entities or able to address global problems without interstate cooperation and governance. However, there also exist various forms of transnational activism and democracy which cut across national forms of democratic practice. This opens up the possibility that these forms of transnational political activity can influence and possibly enhance the capacity of republican states to address various forms of domination. The position of critical republicanism seeks to identify and enhance this possibility.

II. Critical republicanism

There is broad agreement in contemporary republican scholarship that the institutional account of how republican states ought to work domestically influences republican support for an institutionally elaborate context beyond the state. This is because republican thinking has an international dimension which eschews the extremes of a world government or international anarchy (Pettit Reference Pettit2010: 80). While it is true that republicanism asserts the importance of a particularist political community and forms of patriotism and political responsibility that are located in a specific state, republicans do not generally believe that this means that republicanism defends a chauvinistic state which cannot articulate interstate cooperation or ignores the interests of those living in other states (Viroli Reference Viroli1995: 12; White Reference White, Bell and de Shalit2002: 258; also Slaughter Reference Slaughter, Hudson and Slaughter2007; Laborde Reference Laborde2010). Republican ideas could animate a range of international institutions which could assist republican states to promote the liberty of its citizens (Pettit Reference Pettit1999a: 152). Thus while an ascriptive global public in republican sense does not exist, various publics around the world could still direct their respective states to develop global forms of institutional collaboration to ward against domination, including efforts to moderate international insecurity. Furthermore, within a context of globalization and interdependence these institutions become increasingly crucial to address forms of domination which transcend a republican state. In particular there is a need for republican states to develop common rules and regulations of global capitalism which would include environmental criteria in order to enable individual states to make choices that are not overridden by powerful states or global market actors and are attuned with the liberty of people in other societies (Slaughter Reference Slaughter2005: 210–17; Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 58–60).

Despite this general agreement within republican thought, there are diverging views of the suitability, feasibility and breadth of these institutional possibilities which echoes the tensions between constitutional and discursive approaches noted earlier. Two notable contentions are those of Phillip Pettit whose argument rests primarily upon a constitutional line of argument which particularly emphasizes the nature and role of the state, and James Bohman who advances the argument that republican theory needs to be rethought along transnational discursive lines. The constitutional nature of Pettit’s conception is evident in his book Republicanism. In this influential text for the revival of the neo-roman conception of republicanism, Pettit (1999a: 239) articulates a ‘gas-and-water-works’ conception of republicanism which focuses upon a practical and institutional conception which ‘requires a regime under which constitutionalism and democracy rule’. This requires the publicly constituted and publicly checked power of a republican state to be developed. However, Pettit recognizes that this power of the state is going to require international institutions as well. Pettit claims (1999a: 152) that:

As such, this view seeks to draw a balance between the constitutionalism of the state and the development of global forms of governance. In ‘taking states as they are’, Pettit (2010: 70, 77–9) emphasizes the non-utopian nature of his approach, despite recognizing the international and transnational aspects of contemporary forms of domination and political action in his more recent writings.

There are some aspects of a discursive approach in Pettit’s recent work in his recognition of the importance of deliberation between states to create forms of international law able to ‘establish a culture’ to minimize domination (Pettit Reference Pettit2010: 83). Furthermore Pettit (Reference Pettit, Fishkin and Laslett2003) has attempted to illuminate the connections between republicanism and deliberative democracy. This also demonstrates that constitutional and discursive forms of democratic practice could relate to global governance. He advances the idea of ‘contestatory democracy’ where citizens of a putative republican state have both ‘authorial’ and ‘editorial’ powers in relation to government (Pettit Reference Pettit, Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón1999b: 180). Authorial power encompasses the public selection of representatives, while editorial power includes measures that maximize the presence of minority voices, promote dialogue, and keep the actions of government transparent and accountable in order to promote public interests. Pettit claims that when we look at democracy purely in a representative sense, the power of international institutions over the democratic state looks disruptive, but if we look at democracy in a contestatory way we can identify avenues which extend the opportunities for citizens to hold governments to account (Pettit Reference Pettit2005: 14–15). Not only could principles of deliberation and contestation be able to extend to government policies within global governance bodies, but contestatory democracy opens up the possibility that citizens could appeal to IOs or transnational NGOs when state leaders fail to uphold their declared obligations (Pettit Reference Pettit2005: 16–20).

James Bohman’s conceptualization of republicanism synthesizes republican, cosmopolitan and pragmatic strands of thought and offers a counterpoint to the constitutionalism which underpins Pettit’s approach. Bohman (2008: 192–3; Bohman Reference Bohman2007) begins with the observation that cosmopolitanism and republicanism are not antithetical and that the capacity of republicanism founded on the state to address international and transnational forms domination is doubtful in light of contemporary globalization. He claims that if ‘citizens are to have the means by which to prevent the great evils of war and colonial expansion, then they should demand an international system of institutions that would afford such protections and limit the imperial ambitions of their own states’ (Bohman Reference Bohman, Laborde and Maynor2008: 196). Bohman (2008: 197; Bohman Reference Bohman2007: 55) claims that non-domination needs to be unlinked from constitutionalism and instead citizens need to have an active capacity to ‘create and modify their own obligations and duties’ rather than them be assumed and imposed from the republican state. This active capacity to initiate global political deliberation requires that some aspects of citizenship be global in scope and that there is greater awareness of humanity as a form of ‘transnational political community’ (Bohman Reference Bohman, Laborde and Maynor2008: 192) rather than the nation-state, and this means that questions about the significance of borders must be up for debate. This means that in order to avoid domination a republic ‘must hold open the possibility that its current boundaries and membership, the scope of those whose political rights creates obligations, remains open’ (Bohman Reference Bohman, Laborde and Maynor2008: 208). This is an intrinsic defence of the significance of transnational democracy (Bohman Reference Bohman2007: 173), and significant departure from the republican focus on constitutionalism located primarily in the state.

Despite some agreement between these two scholars this essay contends that there are problems with both these views with respect to the political possibilities and role of the state within a context of global governance and emerging forms of transnational activism. While Pettit’s constitutionalism is reaching towards transnational deliberation in the form of contestatory democracy, his treatment of the discursive aspects of democracy and citizenship needs further justification. In particular, his conception of domination appears to be too static and indeterminate. It must be said that Pettit himself has described liberty (understood as non-domination) in different ways. First he described the neo-republican conception of liberty as ‘anti-power’, then liberty as the absence of arbitrary interference and more recently liberty as the absence of ‘alien control’ (Pettit, Reference Pettit1996; Pettit Reference Pettit1999a; Pettit Reference Pettit2010). In all these descriptions Pettit advances an agential understanding of domination that does not appear to readily capture the ways citizens collectively evaluate and consider various sources and severity of domination bearing upon them (Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 54–8; Shapiro Reference Shapiro2012: 323), or consider how these evaluations can or should occur in transnational scales. Furthermore, in all these descriptions it is important to see an institutional response to domination in order to constitute liberty. But in defending the constitutional nature of the state there are strong possibilities that Pettit like John Rawls could trapped in a ‘Vanished Westphalian World’ (see Buchanan Reference Buchanan2000), in the sense that this defence of the state could take on a conventional cast which does not correspond with the current proliferation of various transnational dynamics and networks.

By contrast Bohman’s conceptualization of citizenship has a reflexive quality able to foster transnational deliberations to consider the contemporary nature of domination, but there is no manifest power able to respond to these various threats. There is a danger in seeing non-domination as being a global ideal – an almost abstract or metaphysical conception of liberty. However, merely extolling the virtue of non-domination does not in and of itself make anyone free. The key point is that republicanism does not advance an abstract conception of liberty; they have an institutional one. Republican articulations of non-domination are important to the extent that they lead to the creation of institutions enabled by publicly developed power. As a result of republicanism’s institutional conception of how non-domination is developed, a core element of this account is the state. This republican conception of the ‘free state’ is an active and empowered state which sharply departs from a liberal conception of a neutral or minimalist state. Important here is the way the republican state acts to prevent domination by the state itself or by other actors in society. So republicanism animates institutions that check the power of the state, as well as direct democratically authorized interventions into society in order to prevent domination by actors in society. It is important to emphasize that an appropriately powered and checked state is not a second order question for republican theory. Not only is an empowered state important to enabling liberty of its citizens but an unchecked state is an obviously important source of domination and injustice. Furthermore, it is also not clear where the publicly spirited citizens are in Bohman’s conception of transnational republicanism. Are the citizens those existing in states or global citizens? If citizens are not the agents who will put the republican institutional efforts in action, then who or what is? So the primary contention here is that in Bohman’s synthesizing of cosmopolitanism and republicanism, it is the case that some important elements of republicanism have dropped out. Despite this concern there can be no doubt that transnational reflection and action in regard to domination is required – as Bohman contends.

Consequently, the question here is how can we develop a republican state as well as further the development of transnational forms of activism and democratization? The contention developed here is that republican citizens need to do both in an era of globalization. Rather than Pettit’s primary focus on republican institutions and Bohman’s focus on transnational deliberations regarding non-domination, republican thought can also be seen to offer a pragmatic guidance on what citizens need to do to best promote their liberty. In the contemporary context this guidance ought to emphasize the importance of both developing a republican state and transnational forms of democratic practice. The political course of action to do this relies on a more radical interpretation of republican theory which Cécile Laborde has aptly termed ‘critical republicanism’. This position rests on the claim that Pettit’s conception of neo-roman republicanism is insufficiently comprehensive about how republican structures are created and developed, as well as being insufficiently radical in not sufficiently challenging forms of domination that stem from the status quo of particular societies (Laborde Reference Laborde2008; Laborde Reference Laborde2010; Bellamy Reference Bellamy2002; Shapiro Reference Shapiro2012). However, I contend that while this critical approach while more radical than Pettit and more congenial to Bohman’s position, it is also still has a clear concern about the nature of the state. Furthermore, unlike Bohman’s intrinsic defence of transnational forms of activism, the argument developed here presents an instrumental defence of transnational activism, as it claims that we need to engage with these forms of democratic practice in order to better identify and address global problems and transnational domination. Consequently critical republicanism sees both domestic and international political action as being crucial to realizing non-domination (Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 64).

Before explaining the significance of critical republicanism for transnational activism and democracy, it is important to explain the main features of this approach. It is important from the outset to explain that critical republicanism is an interpretation that accentuates certain aspects of republicanism rather than rejects Pettit’s account. First, critical republicanism is even more sensitive as to the multifarious ways norms and discourses can result in the domination of specific groups in society than Pettit’s account (Laborde Reference Laborde2008: 16–19). Second, critical republicanism can be seen to be a transformational and egalitarian version of republicanism that seeks to actively alter the dominating effects of the status quo and address basic socio-economic impacts that reduce the capacity of people to resist domination (Laborde Reference Laborde2008: 18–19; Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 52; also Shapiro Reference Shapiro2012: 323–4). Third, critical republicanism emphasizes the dynamic nature of deliberation needed to identify the ways that domination affects particular groups and changes over time. Importantly, these forms of deliberation can and should occur in transnational contexts. Lastly, critical republicanism also has an outlook that is not only dynamic about considering and deliberating domination, but in also considering the dispositions required of citizens. While critical republicanism’s conception of citizenship embraces ‘solidaristic and egalitarian dimensions’ and seeks to develop the ‘appropriate skills to combat servility and domination’ (Laborde Reference Laborde2008: 24), it also identifies the need to be able to rethink and reconstruct the virtues needed by citizens to address domination in changing political contexts. However, while this hews close to Bohman’s position, the critical position described here overtly emphasizes that ‘institutionalized schemes’ are central to efforts to confront domination (Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 59).

The relationship between republicanism and critical theory rests on the sympathies that exist between the republican conceptualization of non-domination and the critical theory understanding of emancipation. But more importantly, critical theory impels republican theory to be more demanding in respect to the forms and extent of social change required for non-domination to be achieved. There is a sense that Pettit’s neo-roman account significantly understates the types of changes, especially with respect to the dispositions of citizens required, for non-domination to be realized in an era of globalization. Critical republicanism emphasizes the importance of citizens and institutions supported by publicly directed power. However, the critical underpinnings of critical republicanism emphasize the significance of seeing political communities as having the capacity to be transformed in ways that diminish unjust forms of exclusion and harm (Linklater Reference Linklater1992; Linklater Reference Linklater1998). Importantly this critical impulse is not just philosophical, but also sociological and praxeological in the sense that exploring the ways political practices change is engaged with the normative impulse of attempting to identify immanent forms of political transformation (Linklater Reference Linklater1992). Applied to republicanism, this impulse identifies the ways that citizens act within their state or in transnational networks to further attempts to promote emancipation and minimize domination. Such consideration of transnational forms of activism and democratic practice requires considerable political reflection to understand how these practices do actually work and how they could work to better promote non-domination.

III. Transnational activism and democratization

While transnational forms of activism and civil society have a long history, the last few decades has seen an escalation in the presence and activity of transnational NGOs and social movements which represent a wide variety of ideological positions (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2012: 102). While some accounts of critical theory see this activism in terms of having the potential of transcending or replacing the system of states, or reflecting a contest between sustaining or countering the hegemony of the status quo (Cox Reference Cox1999), the critical republican position here is that these transnational forms of activism relate to various public attempts to influence and contest authority (Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 61). These practices are conditioned by the persistence of the state but a recognition that states are incapable or unwilling to respond to many global problems or effectively enable accountability of IOs which are set up to address these problems. Indeed, a central problem facing republicanism is concerns about the vigour of representative democracy and claims even states with actual republican traditions are in a ‘post democratic’ context where representative democracy is little more than a ‘tightly controlled spectacle’ in light of the pervasive influence of private economic interests and neo-liberal ideology (Crouch Reference Crouch2004: 4; Dagger Reference Dagger2006: 156). As such, local and transnational forms of activism are an important counterpoint to the contemporary limits of representative democracy. From a critical republican perspective, transnational activism can be seen to be an incipient form of transnational democratization in the sense that these dynamics are indications of public efforts outside of representative democracy to represent people and interests as well as attempting to hold states and IOs to account.

To refer to these forms of activism and contestation as being a form of democracy is certainly contentious. These forms of transnational activism certainly do not have systematic qualities which relate to formal legal and political modes of election, representation and accountability where the rule of ‘the people’ is substantiated. However, it is the case that contemporary democratic scholarship focuses upon the discursive processes which mediate and contest authority, given the ways that formal representative structures within the nation-state are being paralleled by practices and networks of activists and the media which are also crucial to the ways in which people influence political decision-making (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2006; Bohman Reference Bohman2007, Bohman Reference Bohman, Laborde and Maynor2008; Bray Reference Bray2011; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011; Goodin 2010; Keane Reference Keane, Alonso, Keane and Merkel2011; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2012). It is also the case that many of these transnational practices are incipient attempts by groups of people to contest and influence decision-making processes in national and global forms of governance. As such, democracy consequently possesses both institutional and cultural aspects that vary across time and place, while acknowledging significant differences of opinion regarding the exact meaning of democracy (Scholte Reference Scholte2007; Erman Reference Erman2008; Goodhart Reference Goodhart2008; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011). The position of critical republicanism contends that democracy inherently refers to the various forms of public representation and contestation which may or may not fully correspond with formal elections and representation. Consequently, transnational forms of activism can be seen to be democratic in this broader sense.

This conception of transnational democratization should not be confused with arguments for cosmopolitan democracy. While David Held (Reference Held1995) and other cosmopolitan democrats argue for the creation of a unified global democratic legal and electoral system, transnational democratization refers to various existing disaggregated practices where public groups influence and contest power, attempt to be represented in political life or indeed create civil political spaces in transnational scales. Democracy in this sense does not just refer to electoral democracy, as it refers to the various ways individual citizens can influence collective decision-making processes and monitor power in national and transnational settings (Keane Reference Keane, Alonso, Keane and Merkel2011: 212). While it is the case that the prospects for electoral democracy at a global level are not strong (Macdonald Reference Macdonald2010: 111–13), there are signs of changing and increasing forms of public engagement with global and regional forms of governance. These incipient forms of public engagement are democratic in this broader sense of attempting to influence and hold authority to account (Goodin Reference Goodin2010; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011; Keane Reference Keane, Alonso, Keane and Merkel2011). As Bob Goodin (2010: 179) elucidates:

Examining the process of global or transnational democratization does not imply a teleological or inevitable view of global institutionalization but it does widen our perspective to see democracy as a gradual and ongoing process at a global level where while the actors may not intend democracy, it may be the case that their activity has democratic effects. In this sense transnational democratization is understood as an incipient process of governance which ‘is going to look very different from democracy within the state’ (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011: 214).

Consequently we can presently observe a variety of democratic elements understood in the sense of democracy developed here. The growing number of CSOs with various ideologies and agendas, as well as global forms of media and communications have created political spaces beyond any one nation-state where states, IOs and other actors often explain and give reasons for their decisions (Dryzek and Niemeyer Reference Dryzek and Niemeyer2008: 491). In these spaces deliberation, contestation and the significance of competing discourses have become prominent components of political life which open up a broader array of issues to public attention (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2006). Some of these dynamics are artfully captured by John Keane’s conceptualization that current modalities of democracy are best understood as a form of ‘monitory democracy’ where democracy since 1945 has become to mean much more than electoral or representative democracy (Keane Reference Keane2009: xxvii; Keane, Reference Keane, Alonso, Keane and Merkel2011: 213). Monitory democracy refers to a messy array of governmental, quasi-governmental, civil society and media mechanisms for holding power holders to account which run parallel to electoral forms of representation. These public mechanisms and processes are not territorially ‘confined’ and operate across both national and transnational contexts (Keane, Reference Keane, Alonso, Keane and Merkel2011: 218). While the mechanisms of transnational democratization are diverse and difficult to categorize, there are some identifiable components emerging.

The first element of transnational democratization is the impact of CSOs and NGOs which encompass faith-based organizations, interest lobby groups and non-governmental advocacy and research groups. However, in reality CSO and NGOs often operate in networks with other NGO or social movements and often include some governments and some IOs – rather than operating in isolation. As such, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 8) argue that NGOs with shared values operate in transnational advocacy networks that are focused on a particular issue which ‘plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition’ with the aim of changing the behaviour of states or IOs. These activist networks have a wide variety of techniques which points to the contestatory and monitory nature of transnational democratization. Such contestation often seeks to radically problematize contemporary political structures and policies and engage in the ‘politics of disclosure’ which is concerned with creating a ‘discursive space with the aim of establishing the ‘‘grounds’’ on which decisions can and should be taken in the first place’ (Weber 2009: 438). This activity also introduces new discourses and strategies into global politics – including into global markets and the supply chains of corporations (Macdonald and Macdonald Reference Macdonald and Macdonald2010). Indeed political institutions of states and IOs rarely author new discourses – although they often end up following or using discourses articulated first by NGOs, social movements or think tanks (Keane Reference Keane, Alonso, Keane and Merkel2011: 226). CSO activity encompasses the development of autonomous political spaces, active forms of protest, as well as the constructive interaction between NGOs, interest groups and states as well as IOs in the form of consultative meetings (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011: 215–16).

The high-profile nature of contemporary political action by CSOs also indicates that a global public sphere is another key element of transnational democratization. A public sphere refers to a civil space of communication and dialogue enabled by various technologies, media actors and frameworks, as well as the activity of CSOs and social movements with an array of political agendas. This indicates the way that contemporary world politics is media-saturated and ‘message saturated’ via a plethora of media technologies and actors (Keane Reference Keane, Alonso, Keane and Merkel2011: 234). Such a public sphere is also connected to notions of global or transnational civil society. The idea of an imperfect global sphere or transnational civil society also demonstrates the possibilities for this communicative space to be an educational, affective and experimental space. Although this sphere is far from universal or undistorted, the existence of these communicative forms offers an opportunity for a wide range of actors to be able to play a role ‘educating publics about the nature and terms of dominant discourses’ (Brassett and Smith Reference Brassett and Smith2010: 418). However, this global public sphere includes multimedia and visual components which emphasize that this realm is not just a realm of information and rationality but is also as an ‘affective arena’ able to shape perceptions of key global issues by virtue of the diversity of political perspectives within this arena (Brassett and Smith Reference Brassett and Smith2010: 418). In such context the role of leaders in transnational NGO networks are important representatives of causes and issues (Bray Reference Bray2011). Furthermore, within this sphere specific forms of civic practice can emerge with distinct and contending ideological and cultural specificities in physical or virtual political spaces. Examples include the World Economic Forum and World Social Forum with their contending conceptualizations of globalization.

These features paint a messy picture of a range of actors, institutions and networks that operate in world politics and which seek to identify and address global problems. It is important to indicate that transnational democratization is not purely a non-state and civil society affair as some states or agencies within states often work with NGOs with respect to transnational advocacy networks as indicated by Keck and Sikkink and some IOs now have public consultation practices (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2011: 212). Importantly the ideological diversity of transnational activism is especially manifest with an array of progressive, conservative and corporate positions evident (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor Reference Anheier, Glasius, Kaldor, Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor2001: 7–10; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2006). The democratic effect stems from the presence and interaction of these diverse groups, rather than some common democratic purpose or progressive intent of these groups. It must be emphasized that from a critical republican perspective that these dynamics do not automatically intend a global electoral democracy and there is no telos or inevitability that these forms of representation, contestation and monitoring will become more comprehensive or stronger in the future. There are also key areas of world politics subject to weak, illegitimate, incomplete or non-existent forms of global governance (Scholte Reference Scholte2011: 111). There also remain serious democratic deficits in world politics where the promise of transnational activism is unfulfilled or frustrated (Scholte Reference Scholte2007: 24–5; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2012: 216). It is especially the case that despite significant progress most IOs still possess poor levels of accountability to those they affect. There are also questions about how reliably and consistently NGOs can represent groups or causes around the world. As Clifford Bob (Reference Bob2002) indicates there are a range of factors influencing why specific NGOs support particular causes but not others, and there are also questions as to whether the strategic interests of NGOs distort those causes they claim to represent. Despite these concerns, the term transnational democratization is apposite because these contending forms of activism seek to publicize the networks of national and global governance as well as promote transnational forms of deliberation and contestation about a broader array of issues.

From the perspective of critical republicanism, the most prominent political implication of transnational democratization is that in many respects, the dynamics of representation, accountability and contestation with respect to global politics are not located only within the representative democracy of a nation-state. Furthermore, a range of ‘local’ issues are now often being framed by transnational actors, information or discourses. Indeed there is often no easy way to disentangle the formal political practice of participating in national representative democracy and the monitory influence of transnational dissemination of activism and information within national representative democratic activity. It is also the case that transnational democratization offers potential benefits for people in non-democratic or fragile states who lack local channels for the responsive contestation of authority. While critical republicans see the efforts to develop democratic republican states as a crucial component of promoting non-domination, and thus support efforts to support local democratization as well as state building and peace-building efforts in other societies (Barnett Reference Barnett2006; Slaughter Reference Slaughter2009), it may be the case that transnational democratization offers the only means to highlight and contest the use of power against people in fragile and non-democratic states.

Because republicanism rests ‘not on the ideal of equal influence on, and direct popular participation to, power, but on the possibility of its effective contestation’, transnational activism and democratization is an important possibility (Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 61). As such, the critical republican perspective would concur with Colin Crouch (2004: 120) that transnational activism and the debates between various ideologies and discourses can be seen to be crucial ‘seedbeds of future democratic vitality’. However, the limits of transnational democratization are evident in significant differences with regard to the value and penetration of transnational activism into democratic life of particular nation-states as well as the fragility and ideological inconsistency of transnational activism. Obviously national representative democracy persists as a more powerful and institutionalized political dynamic than the transnational democratic practices noted above. Consequently it is the case that representative democracy and transnational democratic practices parallel each other and critical republicanism seeks to consider how representative democracy and transnational democratization can productively intersect to promote the ends desired by citizens.

IV. Republican citizens in a transnational age

The possibilities of transnational democratization offer significant opportunities for citizens to be able to identify and respond to various forms of domination. But this possibility could be enhanced by considering the critical interpretation of republicanism’s willingness to transform the practice of citizenship to be able to connect transnational deliberations to political action directed by republican states. This contribution focuses on identifying the ways citizens can consider these transnational forms of activism and deliberate about the nature of contemporary domination, and then bring these deliberations to ground for states to embed in domestic and international practice. While there is no sense that all actors involved in transnational deliberations intend to reduce non-domination or have a singular or progressive perspective about domination, these deliberations prove a useful addition to the political information which informs the actions of citizens. The republican state and its primary focus upon public interests and domination, offers an opportunity to act as a filter for the various agendas circulating transnationally. This filter focuses upon identifying gross and systematic forms of domination, and where possible, ideas as to how assistance can be provided to other states to enact non-domination. While a transnational public context where reasons and justification are deliberated cannot prevent domination in isolation from republican institutions backed by publicly directed power, this produces a dynamic context where domination can be more fully considered. Seen in this discursive light there is no unresolvable conflict between domestic and transnational forms of representation and democracy which have the effect of publicly contesting and questioning power. This insight is built on the postulation that the republican conception of liberty is widely attractive and feasible in the transnational context of deliberations about various forms of domination and injustice which have the capacity to enhance the capacity of citizens to ensure their states respond to these forms of domination (Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 60–1). Importantly the power of the ideal of non-domination rests on its ability to translate the significance of this ideal and the deliberation that results from confronting domination into institutional measures by republican states which are directed by an active and virtuous citizenry.

Critical republicanism’s focus on existing institutions emphasizes the continued role of the state. For one thing the state remains a powerful institution in contemporary globalization – an institution that could decisively undermine transnational forms of democracy and also undermine republican purposes. The contemporary role and significance of the state is dramatically understated in Bohman’s account and in many others. It is not the case that states have been overwhelmed by globalization. Many contemporary scholars indicate that globalization is shaped – if not constituted – by the largely neo-liberal policies of states (Cerny Reference Cerny1997; Sassen Reference Sassen2003; Sassen Reference Sassen2006). Saskia Sassen (2003; Reference Sassen2006) is keen to avoid the claims that the state remains unchanged in the face of globalization or that globalization represents the reduction of the state in the face of transnational dynamics. Sassen (2003: 242) uses the term ‘denationalization’ to emphasize that globalization is not something that merely exists outside of the state, or between states, but is a political project actually inside many states whereby outside flows of people and resources are given rights by the state, and in doing so leads to a ‘partial denationalizing of what had been constructed historically as national, including the exclusive territorial authority of the state’. This introduces the significant observation that the prevailing dynamics of globalization are very much created by the choices made by governments. This observation underscores the contemporary power of states and emphasizes the importance of the republican agenda to ensure that states are directed to the public goal of promoting non-domination rather than the current neo-liberal priority of private economic interests (Slaughter Reference Slaughter2005; Dagger Reference Dagger2006). While efforts to address private forms of power will also require cooperation between republican states, the state has the authority to regulate and redistribute economic resources in order to assist in minimizing individual vulnerability. The transformational edge of critical republicanism points to the need to reassert public efforts to actively address policies of the state that directly or indirectly promote domination.

But given the proliferation of governance and activism beyond the state there is a diminishing sense that public consideration of the state exhausts the political activity of citizens to obtain liberty. While the power of a republican state rests upon the activity of its citizens in checking and directing its power with reference to deliberations with respect to the public good, it is clearly the case that these deliberations are increasingly influenced by transnational influences. While republicans contend that liberty can only be anchored by the power of a republican state, there is a clear sense here that republican citizens ‘are committed to combating the evil of domination wherever it happens in the world’ and that ‘civically minded citizens will be motivated to make sure that they – or their state – do not dominate others; that they are not dominated by others; and that others are not dominated by others’ (Laborde Reference Laborde2010: 51). Consequently, this understanding is built on the recognition that the state is an instrumentally valuable institution in promoting non-domination domestically and ought not dominate other states or societies. But as republicans have argued, international institutions are required to create a moderated international context suitable for republican states (Laborde Reference Laborde2010; Pettit Reference Pettit2010). However, this enlarged republican institutionalization needs to be guided by transnational forms of democratic deliberation which engages the citizens of the states involved and intersects with state policy making and IOs. Bohman is right to argue for republicanism to engage with transnational deliberations but this should not come at the expense of development of a republican state or republican modalities of citizenship and political community.

This leads us to the other transformational edge of critical republicanism: the need to rethink and reconstruct the virtues of citizens. After all, the claim here that we need to combine constitutional and discursive aspects to address domination requires the explanation as to how this is going to be developed and who is going to conduct this activity. It is the case that democratic states are havens for incipient and explicit forms of citizenship and patriotism which could be further fostered along republican lines to create public responsibility for political life with a deliberative civil society of a ‘responsive republic’ (Pettit Reference Pettit1999a: 195). This point is made most clearly by James Maynor’s argument that non-domination is realized not just by political institutions in society but also by personal attitudes and relationships that respect the non-dominated status of each citizen. Maynor (2003: 204) claims neo-roman republicanism will develop a situation where people ‘will stand on an equal footing with others and be able to look them in the eye as modern republicanism alters the traditional power relationships between competing social agents and insists on recognition and civility’. While some criticize the confidence that republican citizens and the deliberation of social movements can consistently promote non-domination within a state (Shapiro Reference Shapiro2012: 325–6), there is a sense that this context of deliberation is actually being challenged by the forms of transnational democratization identified in the previous section of this essay and this engagement could be recognized and encouraged further as an immanent process which could assist in efforts to identify and minimize domination. However, while there is no doubt that citizens can, do and should act in transnational contexts, the question is what forms of virtues and dispositions are needed to enable citizens to operate in domestic and transnational contexts?

It is important to emphasize the republican conception of citizenship and patriotism which enables and directs a state able to promote non-domination. While republicanism does not require continuous direct participation, clearly republicanism rests upon citizens willing to be actively involved in political life and be willing to contest domination where it is identified (Pettit Reference Pettit1999a: 8; Pettit Reference Pettit, Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón1999b). This requires a culture where citizens are willing to deliberate the nature of public good required to develop a common and durable context of liberty. According to Montesquieu (1977: 478) virtuous citizenship is a ‘political virtue’ that is ‘the spring which sets the republican government in motion’. Patriotism in the republican sense is a political virtue which entails public involvement in political life and a willingness to contribute to the public good and liberty of a particular state. These virtues are socially encouraged values developed by educational systems, the media and the practice of representative democracy. It must be emphasized that while patriotism is a concrete lived virtue, it is not wholly nationalist in character. While nationalism may well be a ‘partial replacement’ for patriotism in the modern world (Miller Reference Miller, Hutchings and Dannreuther1999: 67), it is not sufficient for the active political participation embedded in the practice of patriotism. Patriotism and citizenship are ‘sustained by shared memories of [a] commitment to liberty, social criticism, and resistance against oppression and corruption’ (Viroli Reference Viroli1995: 13), not by ethnic or nationalistic norms. Republicanism invokes an ongoing ‘love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people’ rather than a love of a nation’s ‘cultural, linguistic and ethnic oneness’ (Viroli Reference Viroli1995: 1). Such a conception of republican patriotism and active citizenship is not in automatic conflict with international forms of solidarity and concern (Viroli Reference Viroli1995; White Reference White, Bell and de Shalit2002; Slaughter Reference Slaughter, Hudson and Slaughter2007), but does not animate a need to forge a universal cosmopolitan political community.

So the question here is how can a republican conception of these core elements of virtue and citizenship address global forms of domination and operate in transnational forms of activism and democracy? Critical republicanism, as an alternative approach to Pettit and Bohman, enables a transformational view of republicanism which argues for adapting the virtues of citizens in order to better process the various forms of transnational democratization into political practices able to address domination. While active republican citizenship is motivated by a sense of expanded self-interest on the part of the citizen to address domination on one level, citizens are public-spirited because the institutions of the state and a culture of patriotism and virtue make it difficult to act otherwise. The virtues required to uphold the public good according to republicans are captured in Cicero’s formulation of ‘prudence, justice, courage and temperance’ (Skinner Reference Skinner, Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner1984: 214). Republicans readily recognize the importance of reinvigorating these virtues in contemporary public life (Dagger Reference Dagger2006: 156). These virtues are also highly relevant to the long-term and cautious view we need to take of the global forms of domination and the restraint individuals have to show in regard to their impact on other parts of the world. Critical republicanism seeks to utilize these virtues to not only direct the authority of the state to promote non-domination at home and abroad, but also to develop the personal relationships of ‘equal footing’ identified by Maynor that recognize and respond to domination occurring to people in other parts of the world.

Critical republicanism recognizes the need to adapt and alter the virtues traditionally associated with republican thought. In a sense, there are other practical virtues drawn from critical theory which we need to also nurture in the context of contemporary globalization. First, we need to expand on the virtue of justice and see cosmopolitanism, being engaged with global issues and the concerns for all human beings, as being necessary to realize liberty in a highly interdependent world. Here cosmopolitanism is a socially valued personal disposition not a political project. Indeed, critics of cosmopolitanism as a political project claim that:

Cosmopolitan virtue on the part of citizens does not demand such a political project and embeds the enabling of globally astute citizens and the global concern for non-domination into ‘national’ civic practice which leads to questioning the nature of the public good with respect to transnational forms of domination. Cosmopolitanism as a virtue also wards off elements of chauvinism and xenophobia (Turner Reference Turner2002: 60) as well as builds forms of reciprocity with citizens in other states. In short: a concern for global forces and a concern for people outside the republican state is increasingly necessary for constructing durable non-domination at home.

Second, we need to extend the notion of prudence to incorporate reflexivity and deliberation. In a world of rapid ecological changes and uncertain knowledge there is a requirement to be reflexive in respect to many global challenges where scientific and expert knowledge is constantly in flux and where activists come from various ideological positions. Being reflexive means willing to listen to the advice of experts and activists, as well as being willing to reconsider and alter the policies of the state in order to promote liberty at home and abroad. With reference to ecological challenges, while this falls short of ‘environmental patriotism’ (Eckersley Reference Eckersley2004: 231), and does not require efforts to embed these virtues into a formal constitutional amendment to direct governments to ‘include’ future generations in government policy making (Ekeli Reference Ekeli2007), the virtue of reflexivity is essential to promote non-domination with respect to a range of complicated and contested issues. Such virtue requires citizens to value education and open inquiry as part of political life. This reconstruction of the virtues of citizens means that being involved in networks of transnational activism would be socially valued and not contradictory to being a citizen in a specific nation-state. Such a perspective differs from deliberative and discursive models of democracy by asserting the continued importance of the state, and departs from cosmopolitan commitments to a global electoral and legal system.

These republican virtues have four main consequences meant to sharpen the capacity of the citizen to ensure that republican states promote non-domination through their policies at home and abroad. First, these virtues ward against personal and institutional indifference or paralysis by having a strong focus on core questions relating to the public good and issues relating to gross and systematic forms of domination. While transnational democratic networks have an array of agendas, those agendas and actors deliberating in terms relating to public interests and liberty would form the core of political life. Second, the critical interpretation’s rethinking of these republican virtues and considerations of the public good mean that transnational forms of information ought to be considered and questions must be asked about the impact of their state on the liberty of people elsewhere. Transnational forms of activism enable these questions to be asked adroitly and publicly. Third, this rethinking of virtues necessitates that citizens being involved in transnational networks would be a socially valued activity. If global problems are to be addressed it is going to require the actions of people acting as citizens who see these problems as a threat to liberty which generates political action on the part of the state and other transnational networks they operate within. Citizens need to be able to act within the networks of environmental and human rights movements, for example, and act with respect to keeping their state and powerful domestic actors in public view. Fourth, the arguments presented here impose a considerable responsibility on citizens to participate in politics when the state does not promote public ends. It requires a willingness to put public interests above private and partisan interests. While there are always questions about the feasibility of this account, it is clear that no other-worldly or metaphysical force is going to address domination. While this participation does not demand personal immiseration, clearly domination can now only be addressed by republican citizens willing to extend this concern for liberty in the state to global forms of governance to address transnational issues like global environmental degradation while still valuing the civic virtue which makes a republican state operate in the first place.