Reflections on Constitutional Law is the fourteenth book in George Anastaplo's long and distinguished career (a fifteenth, Reflections on Freedom of Speech and the First Amendment, is still to come). Previous books include The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (1989), The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary (1995), and The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment (1971). These earlier works were massive tomes; The Constitutionalist runs 800 pages and includes large amounts of nonlegal materials. By contrast, Anastaplo's latest book is a brief 173 pages, comprising a series of “sonnets” about key cases and topics. The book is divided into two parts: generally part 1 concerns the design of government; part 2 addresses the nature of constitutional law and the specific role of the courts. Anastaplo assumes a reader who is already familiar with constitutional law, or perhaps someone who is currently studying the subject. Thus, the book might serve as a companion text to a somewhat idiosyncratic course of study.
Reflections on Constitutional Law is alternatively delightful and infuriating. The delight derives from the fearlessness with which Anastaplo makes sweeping claims and his absolutist focus on what he views as core issues, unmuddied by precedential history or doctrinal development. In its style, the book features a certain lightness of touch and the deft self-assurance of an author who is fully in control of his subject matter.
At the same time, however, there are problems with both the style and the logic of the argument. The infuriating elements of Anastaplo's style inhere in a number of very bothersome tics that, at times, interfere with the argument. For instance, Anastaplo is overly fond of assertions of obviousness and, conversely, flights of sheer speculation. So, on the one hand, Anastaplo asserts that “It must have been evident, at least to the more thoughtful Americans, that the Articles of Confederation arrangement was clearly provisional” (21), while on the other “Serious men and women all over the Country probably understood what was happening and why.” (31) Such assertions are offered in support of highly contentious historiographic claims. This is a nontrivial problem, as Anastaplo uses these moves to exclude consideration of alternative explanations to key elements of his argument. Similarly, Anastaplo's tendency to rely on barrages of rhetorical questions rather than actual arguments similarly forecloses discussion. In discussing the difference between the treatment of the army and navy in Article I, Anastaplo asks, “Does not the army-navy difference . . . suggest where threats to the liberties of Englishmen had come from?” (83) Again, maybe this distinction is true, or maybe the distinction represents the contemporaneous, political conditions of states that had already given up the prerogative of maintaining a navy. In English history, after all, the threat to liberty from French or Spanish invasion—to which only a strong navy could provide a response—was as genuine as any other.
As these comments about style already suggest, one basic problem with the substance of Anastaplo's approach is its nearly total ahistoricity. History, for Anastaplo, is nothing more than a series of “unpredictable (if not even incomprehensible) events” (69) As a self-proclaimed Straussian, Anastaplo wants to get readers to see that the questions and issues that the text addresses are timeless, while variations in the way the text has been understood are the products of “chance,” “personality,” and “historical circumstance.” For example, we ought not to take Madison's arguments in the Federalist Papers at face value, but rather to read them as a particular gloss on the “real” point, which shows up only intermittently but will be recognized by a reader trained to look for eternal verities rather than historical contingencies: “Is it not recognized . . . that that which was said by the authors of those papers in a particular historical situation might differ in critical ways from what they might properly have said in other circumstances?” (51).
Stripped of the baleful effects of focusing on contingent details and interpretations, the “real” point of the Constitution clearly becomes to recreate the British Westminster system of parliamentary supremacy, a system of government that, he insists, “is taken for granted by the Declaration” (83). Since parliamentary supremacy does not envision a government of limited powers, any reading of the US Constitution that would arrive at such a conclusion must be wrong. The Commerce Clause is a case in point. Anastaplo's position is that the Commerce Clause unambiguously grants the federal government essentially unlimited power, and that all readings to the contrary are the result of “distortions of the language of the Constitution” (68) and “judicial misreadings” (70) that result from the pressure of southern pro-slavery interests in the nineteenth century.
The disregard of history makes this argument difficult to assess. One has to wonder how the concerns that Anastaplo identifies in the first decades of the nineteenth century became dominant constitutional doctrine a century later. Subsequent to the Civil War, Anastaplo says, big business preferred local to national regulation, an attitude that he expects to change in the future. “The globalization of economies is likely to reinforce the desire for a reliable uniformity by which Big Business can take its bearings” (73). This reads like a newspaper editorial written in 1920—charming, quaint, but singularly uninformative as an historical account and certainly not to be taken as a description of current conditions. Moreover, it is exactly wrong on both points. Subsequent to the Civil War, “Big Business” did not favor local regulation; they tried hard to use the Constitution to strip states and localities of their traditional police powers by invoking the freedom of contract and private property rights. Where regulation was unavoidable, the larger business, in particular, preferred that it be national, in the form of regulatory commissions that could limit their exposure to legal liability, rather than relying on the traditional mechanisms of courts and legislatures. Similarly, globalization and the availability of outsourcing favor a combination of international financial control and local environmental and employment regulations, not the reinforcements of the authority of nation-states. This matters, again, because Anastaplo's breezy explanation for the “distortion” of constitutional doctrine is essential to his argument; otherwise, how do we explain how generation after generation of lawyers, scholars, and judges got everything so entirely wrong?
The second large theme of Anastaplo's argument has to do with the nature of “law.” Anastaplo especially and repeatedly bemoans the abandonment of federal common law in Erie v. Tompkins and the positive understanding of “law” as rules made by a sovereign (104). As a result, he insists, we have lost sight of the way in which “such cases raise a fundamental question, ‘What is law?’” (40), an inquiry whose answer is provided by an English magistrate in 1345: “Law is that which is right” (96). Thus, the Supreme Court has gotten its mandate exactly wrong by eschewing a role in shaping common law doctrine and embracing a role as referee in disputes among different branches and levels of government.
One hears echoes of Socrates' debate with Thrasymachus here. Just as the Constitution must be read to create the ideal (English) form of government, “law” must be understood as an appeal to universal principles of moral good if it is to serve its proper constitutional function. “[M]ust not might itself be ultimately in the service of what is right if the community is not to lose control of what it is doing?” (93). In other words, Ansastaplo views the American Constitution as a (relatively) recent statement of timeless principles connected to universal truths contained in natural laws; elements of the constitutional or related texts that contradict his reading can be dismissed as elements of “chance” that disguise the underlying truth.
Again, the first difficulty is the ahistoricity of the description. Although he does not quote it, Anastaplo seems to share the view of the English serjeant-at-law who in 1470 declared “the Common Law has been in existence since the creation of the world.” Anastaplo does not see fit to mention, for example, that the idea of precedent and the practice of maintaining written case records was itself a relatively late development. Moreover, Anastaplo's description not only contradicts legal historians' knowledge of common law development, it contradicts the view of the common law that was dominant among late-eighteenth-century Americans. In America in the late 1700s, in contrast to England, “common law” meant William Blackstone, but Blackstone was the leading exponent of the school of historical jurisprudence that emphatically situated common law in historical conditions as well as drawing on timeless custom and natural law as sources of authority. Moreover, common law doctrines were essentially procedural until the early decades of the nineteenth century. This historical background is critical for understanding what Justice Story meant, in Swift v. Tyson (1842), for example, when he described the common law as dealing with “questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages” (102).
These historical questions also matter because they directly inform the normative discussion of constitutionalism that is the heart of the book's argument. In Anastaplo's view, the responsibility of federal judges is to declare the meaning of common law doctrine, drawing on “the best authorities that may be available” rather than deferring to state authorities. Thus, contra Erie, federal judges should look for “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute” (103–4). As a constitutional matter, this becomes a mandate to enforce the substantive content of the Guaranty Clause. “[I]t is not likely that judges were ever expected, as a routine matter, to pass moral judgment on all the State statutes that come before them. But what about passing political judgment? . . . Can it—should it—be said that serious affronts to natural justice, especially if extensive and sustained, pose a threat to republican government?” (121).
The logic of this argument is not clear. It is not clear when judges are supposed to employ their moral judgment and when they are supposed to restrict themselves to the expression of political judgments; nor is it clear what the relationship might be between the two. Moreover, if the common law is the essential truth of law, why should it give way to statutes, which reflect nothing more than “will”? Conversely, why does the ruling in Erie v. Tompkins end the project of using common law judgments to achieve true justice? Can state courts not apply the rules of common law reasoning as well as federal courts? And the insistence on legislative supremacy at the national level sits very oddly, indeed, with the appeal to “natural” common law as the basis for judicial review.
These comments have focused on the weaknesses of a broad and sweeping argument that is burdened by a heavy weight of assumptions and suppositions. But Reflections on Constitutional Law is, nonetheless, an entertaining and thought-provoking work that raises important questions at a time when those questions need to be asked. A thoughtful reader is likely to find the experience of entertaining Anastaplo's questions more than worth any frustrations involved in the limitations of the answers.
