1. Credo

The number of books and papers dealing with Squire Mèng (孟子)Footnote ¹ and the book Mèngzǐ (孟子) in recent times is impressive, and they contain contributions by many major sinologists.Footnote ² The main point of interest is easily identifiable: the question of human nature. The list of contributors to the volume of papers edited by Alan K. L. Chan constitutes a veritable roll call of the major voices in the most recent developments of this debate.Footnote ³ As I am no longer convinced of the validity of one of the main dogmas of these discussions, i.e. the uncritical assumption that Squire Mèng was a philosopher and that the views he handed down in the Mèngzǐ are thus to be interpreted in a philosophical context, I shall attempt neither to summarize nor criticize their individual findings in this context.Footnote ⁴ Nevertheless, it will certainly be helpful to point out the following two fundamental methodological issues which have given, and will continue to give, rise to serious differences as regards scientific intentions, approaches and opinions. By this, I do not intend to question the legitimacy of methods and approaches I happen not to adopt or sometimes even have reasons to dismiss.Footnote ⁵ I do, however, for the benefit of readers of this paper, intend to clarify my position and to chart the way through my reconstruction of a specific range of Mencian thoughts, thus preventing them from expecting insights I am neither willing nor able to deliver.

The first issue concerns the social context and the social role. As mentioned above, I doubt whether Squire Mèng should be classified as a philosopher. The main role that emerges from a close reading of the Mèngzǐ is that of a homo politicus, of an important and influential policy-making statesman and counsellor. It is true that our perception of historical figures and of their views is influenced by the social roles we attribute to them, and this becomes all the more critical when the associations we connect with these roles are based on our own cultural experiences.Footnote ⁶ Mistakes or preconceptions in this respect inevitably lead to wrong expectations as to the kind of ideas an author or his text offers. Based on the attitude of a close reader with philological interests (cf. the second issue below), this makes it imperative, on the one hand, to focus on the historical contextualization of the author and the text, and on the other, to pay great attention to the language and words he and his contemporaries were using.Footnote ⁷

The second issue concerns the attitude of the reader or researcher. In Lector in fabula, Umberto Eco draws an interesting and fundamental typological distinction between the reader of a text and the user of a text.Footnote ⁸ The reader, he states, is interested in finding out the intention of the author or compiler of a text. In this case the approach is hermeneutical and the result is generally a respectful interpretation of the ideas and intentions of the author and their manifestation in the text. The stance of the user is quite the opposite: here the text is used to set forth one's own ideas – the text is a mine for relevant data to support a theory that is currently debated and that usually has nothing at all to do with the text.Footnote ⁹ This is, of course, an absolutely honourable and legitimate way of dealing with a text, and in the Chinese context it comes close to the way traditional commentaries were conceived. The results of such approaches to a text (and classics lend themselves very readily to such endeavours) are examples of how texts could and still can be received (Rezeptionsgeschichte) and how they, divorced from their historical context, inseminate current debates. Such approaches are not intended to furnish the reader with an approximation of the historical reality of the author and his text(s) or the ideas current at that time, and they tend to translate texts and terminology in ways adapted to their own needs or to the needs of their prospective readers. Classifying Squire Mèng as a philosopher, therefore, naturally calls for philosophical renderings of the ancient Chinese terms, for selective reading, and presupposes or implies philosophers as the preferred readership.Footnote ¹⁰

2. The issues

Several transcripts of discussions between the Xuān-King of Qí (齊宣王) and Squire Mèng have been handed down in the book Mèngzǐ. In 1A.07, in many respects one of the most interesting dialogues,Footnote ¹¹ Squire Mèng claims that the King has the ability to become a true king.Footnote ¹² As evidence for this claim, he refers to an episode reported to him:

When asked why he felt pity for the ox and not for the sheep, the King:

Squire Mèng reassures the king and points out that he had, in fact, exercised a variety of the sense of humaneness necessary to become a true king – even though he harmed the sheep. The king:

This question calls for an explanation of the difference between being able to do something (néng 能) and actually doing it (wéi 為). That the King's kindness reaches animals but not the Hundred Clans means that he is simply not doing what he should as a king, not that he is unable to do it. According to Squire Mèng, the same explanation applies to his not becoming a true king:

After rejecting the items on a list of possible desires (food, music, comfort, etc.), Squire Mèng explicitly names the King's great desire – and severely criticizes it because of the obvious lack of (self-)reflection:

These passages from Mèngzǐ 1A.07 vividly set the scene for reflecting on the role of hearts, desires, and behavioural patterns within the debate on so-called “human nature” (xìng 性) in ancient China. To which degree menFootnote ¹⁶ could be assigned the properties “(by natural endowment) good” (shàn 善) or “(by natural endowment) bad” (bù shàn 不善 or è 惡) was intensely debated by several thinkers in the course of the Zhànguó period. This can be plainly seen from the lead given by Squire Gōng-dū in a passage where Squire Mèng explains his position in an ongoing debate:

Reading this list of positions the following question arises: what kind of basic concept or elementary image of the natural endowment xìng, what shared view could possibly give rise to these divergent positions and interpretations? How did thinkers of the Zhànguó-period conceive of man's natural endowment? The focus of my paper shall therefore not be the differences which have been so clearly enunciated in the excerpt above, but the common ground underlying the various positions, especially the two extreme ones put forth by Squire Mèng and Squire Xún, respectively.Footnote ¹⁹ As the sequel to the dialogue between Squire Gōng-dū and Squire Mèng shows, the question of the natural endowment xìng is intimately and importantly related to concepts of what is usually (not in an enlightening way) termed “heart” or “heart-mind” (xīn 心). In a rightly famous passage Squire Mèng asserts the following:

Given the prominence and role of the word xīn “heart(s)” in this and similar cardinal passages devoted to discussing “human nature”, the undeniable relevance of the phenomena designated with this word, and the complex psycho-physical functions of this organ (or these organs), the prevailing attempts to define xīn and offer translations for it appear surprisingly superficial and uninformed.Footnote ²⁰ The meaning and the functions of xīn, however, are essential for a deeper understanding of the concept – or concepts – of man during the Zhànguó period. In this paper, I shall try to shed light on these repeated references to the “heart”, i.e. to various or specific “hearts” (cf. the individualizing expressions shì xīn 是心, hé xīn 何心, and cǐ xīn 此心 implying the presence of other “hearts” in citations 1, 2, and 3 above), and on the relationship of these to desires and to certain patterns of behaviour. A first lead is contained in the following passage:

This passage from the Lǐ Jì 禮記, the Records of Rites, contains a great many of the major keywords to be discussed in the following: the list begins with yù 欲 “desire” and wù 惡 “dislike”; it adds to these the related category of size (dà 大 “major” – which implies that there are also xiǎo 小 “minor” or “small” desires and dislikes; cf. the big ox and the small sheep in citation 1); it introduces the notion of measuring (cè 測 “to fathom”, i.e. “to determine the depth”, and duó 度 “to measure”, i.e. “to determine the size”;Footnote ²¹ cf. citations 3 and 4); it mentions overt (xiàn 見 “visible”) and covert (cáng 藏 “hidden”) phenomena, the latter being interpretable with the help of minor symptoms or major indicators (duān 端); it comprises several instances of the word xīn 心, which quite obviously does not refer to the physical organ “heart” but rather seems to oscillate between several psychological and physiological meanings or references; it refers to “beauty” and “ugliness” (měi è 美惡), synonyms for “good” and “bad”; and the list closes the inventory with the word for “rites” or “ritual behaviour” (lǐ 禮).

In what follows I shall discuss such keywords as shed light on the role of the heart in the debate on human nature, especially in its relationship to desires and when it focuses on the question of “good” or “bad”. I shall raise the question of how to react adequately, when translating, to the polysemy of two of the words written with the character 心. As an interpretative backdrop and thought-provoking methodical instrument, a cognitive metaphor or image as an attempt to visualize and understand the relationship between various terms will then be offered.

3. The workings of desires or dislikes

Let me first focus on things termed desirable or distasteful. Squire Mèng repeatedly lists objects or happenings that can be taken as exemplifications of citation 8 (above) from the Lǐ Jì. A well-known selection is given here in an abbreviated paraphrase:

Squire Mèng still had the innocent choice between two apparently desirable dishes – for us, however, bear's palms are definitely out, and if we further maltreat the oceans, fish might also disappear from the menu. But besides this, let us carefully register what Squire Mèng is saying and consider the implications. First of all, he lists a good number of desires and dislikes:

1. (a) yù yú 欲魚 “desire for fish”;

2. (b) yù xióng zhǎng 欲熊掌 “desire for bear's palm”;

3. (c) yù shēng 欲生 “desire to remain alive”;

4. (d) yù yì 欲義 “desire to behave dutifully”;

5. (e) suǒ yù yǒu shèn yú shēng zhě 所欲有甚於生者 “among things one desires there are such that are more [desirable] than remaining alive”;

6. (f) wù sǐ 惡死 “dislike dying”;

7. (g) suǒ wù yǒu shèn yú sǐ zhě 所惡有甚於死者 “among things one hates there are such that are less [to be hated] than dying”.

Squire Mèng then grades these different desires. The desire for fish and for remaining alive, according to him, are lesser desires (xiǎo yù 小欲) compared with the cravings or greater desires (dà yù 大欲) for bear's palm or for dutiful behaviour.Footnote ²² In other words, for Squire Mèng, desires conform to a ranking. Some desires are worth pursuing and more fulfilling than others. Under certain circumstances, lesser and greater desires are simultaneously attainable, under other circumstances, only one or the other is attainable. In the latter case, it is normal – and proper – to choose a higher-valued desire.

Continuing our close reading and pondering of some of the broader implications, we gain further insights into Mencian psychology and anthropology: if, as stated in the passage from the Lǐ Jì, a specific desire – or dislike – is a telltale, outward sign of a corresponding “heart”, then simultaneous and non-excluding desires cannot but be discrete indicators (duān 端) of just such a number of specific “hearts”.Footnote ²³ Squire Mèng, whose desires have been listed above, must therefore have had at least seven “hearts”, e.g. one desiring fish (a) and one desiring bear's palm (b), one desiring to live (c) and one detesting dying (f), etc.

Having established that a desire or dislike is an indication of a corresponding “heart”, then, conversely, asserting that a certain “heart” exists must be related to a desire or dislike. This can be inferred from the famous situation construed by Squire Mèng where a person would certainly manifest a “heart” that is not unfeeling towards others should he suddenly see a young child about to fall into a well (Mèng 2A.06; cf. citation 33). Following this assertion, Squire Mèng himself offers a few desires and dislikes that do not count as triggers for this spontaneous demonstration of feeling: the wish to be held in good esteem by one's parents, the wish to win the praise of fellow villagers or friends, or dislike of the crying of a child. In a positive sense, we may add as possible triggers a dislike for seeing somebody innocently coming to harm or dying young. As we can see, the relation between “hearts” and desires or dislikes is neither unique nor uniform, i.e. a certain desire can be the trigger for different “hearts”, whereas one and the same “heart” can be moved by different desires or dislikes. The Lǚ Shì Chūn Qiū 呂氏春秋 therefore puts this relation between “hearts” and desires or dislikes in very general words and simply says: xīn suí yù 心隨欲 “a ‘heart’ defers to a desire” (LSCQ 20/8.1).

4. Different kinds of “hearts”

Having provided Squire Mèng with several different “hearts”, we can now turn to the manifold implications of this unexpected, but far from unusual lexicographical state of affairs:

This type of tiered structure could be the key to interpreting the following cryptic statement from the Guǎnzǐ:

And the Lǐ Jì pairs these moods with the corresponding “heart”:

Some tentative conclusions regarding the word xīn 心 can now be drawn. The textual evidence and the implications of the passages discussed show that this word refers to several lexically related, but separate entities: (a) to the physical organ named xīn, which we shall not deal with here; (b) to a global psycho-physiological organ – also named xīn – which acts as a storage place for comprehensive cardiac faculties; (c) to individual cardiac faculties or sets of related faculties stored in (b) and also named xīn, i.e. to the innate or acquired abilities constituting mental, perceptual, sensory, and psychic processes.

5. Translating xīn 心 – some thoughts on two cases

The short survey of the polysemy of the word xīn 心 given above inevitably raises the question of translations for the different words written with the same character, especially for the individual cardiac faculties. Gifted translators have, of course, always gone beyond the simplistic solution which uniformly offers one word for one character (e.g. “heart” or the current fad for “heart-mind”) and thus refuses to face textual complexities and the ubiquitous problem of homonyms and homographs. They offer pragmatic, contextually plausible solutions resulting in an impressive range of equivalents: propensity, mind, wish, sense, desire, reservation, opinion, longing, attitude – to name only some of the nouns offered as equivalents in translations. But this type of “lexicography by translation” does not systematically further our insight into the relationship between different “hearts” or cardiac faculties.

I shall briefly touch upon two cases which can be approached with methodical and systematic assumptions. Let me begin with expressions of the type āi xīn 哀心, which, in the context given above, is a genitive, and which I translated with ‘“heart’ for sorrow” – not: ‘“heart’ of sorrow”. Normally, we take genitives to be possessive in meaning, e.g. “the citizens of London”. Normally, too, we tend to disregard the appositive variant, e.g. “the city of London”. And this example shows how appositives occur and how they are to be analysed: “London” is a name and a city. These two categories make for two appositive constructions: “the city of London” or “the name London”.

Now “sorrow” (āi 哀) is in terms of category a sense (e.g. of loss upon the death of somebody), an emotional state or reaction, a feeling, a capacity, a faculty, etc. All these nouns qualify as heads of appositive constructions: “sense of sorrow”, “state of sorrow”, “feeling of sorrow”, etc. Thus, in citation 12, dealing with the stimulation of certain feelings, we can now exchange the rather graceless translation “‘heart’ for sorrow” by “sense of sorrow”. In the same way, the “hearts” for happiness, pleasure, anger, respect and resentment become more intelligible as “senses” of happiness, etc. The word xīn 心, when in appositive constructions with nouns of the type āi, can thus be translated by “sense of”, “state of”, “reaction of”, “feeling of”, “capacity for”, or “faculty to”.

Let us briefly return to the Mencian fishes. We could, for argument's sake, assume that the name of the heart corresponding to the desire for fish (yù yú 欲魚) should actually be named yú xīn 魚, instead of “‘heart’ that desires fish” (yù yú zhī xīn 欲魚之心) as suggested at first. In the possessive sense, the expression yú xīn would have to be translated by “the heart of a fish” – which, of course, is possible, but would certainly not do Squire Mèng justice. As an appositive, however, and remembering that Squire Mèng is talking about fish in the sense of a dish, of an appreciation of its savour, we can propose “a taste for fish”. This clearly means that in such cases we should browse intelligently through the “sensual” parts of the English (or German) lexicon.

Let me now turn to examples of the second type of expression I intend to discuss:

• • “his xīn of a baby” (qí chì zǐ zhī xīn 其赤子之心; Mèng 4B.12);

• • “the xīn of a dutiful son” (xiào zǐ zhī xīn 孝子之心; Mèng 5A.01);

• • “the xīn of a father or mother” (fù mǔ zhī xīn 父母之心; Mèng 3A.03);

• • “the xīn of a mín” (mín xīn 民心; ZGC 145/75/20);

• • “the xīn of a lord” (jūn xīn 君心; Mèng 4A.20), etc.

It is obvious that the modifying expressions refer to social roles, e.g. father, son, etc. Now, the fulfilment of a social role is dependent on complex faculties, appropriate behavioural patterns – let us say, a specific mindset. And, in the context of ancient China, this leads us into the ramified discussion known by the well-known expression “rectification of names” (zhèng míng 正名). The designation of a social role, e.g. a nomen agentis like “father” (fù 父), is such a name (míng 名). This, inevitably, calls to mind the famous dictum of Squire Kǒng:

The predicate phrase in these commandments is composed of verbs referring to the realization (shí 實) of the related social role. The degree of realization can be assessed by comparing actual with prescribed behaviour. The statement from the Lǚ Shì Chūn Qiū 呂氏春秋 mentioned above (cf. p. 247) has an extension covering this very situation. It says:

“Serving” means acting out a social role. In such cases, the word xīn clearly refers to sets of faculties. This specific mindset, this mentality, is the basis for actions or responses within a prescribed social framework. Hence, when a father (fù 父) behaves like a true father (fù 父), he is able to do so because he is equipped with the specific mentality of a father (fù xīn 父心). Or to put it in a general formula:

Besides groups of faculties arranged by categorial term (e.g. different tastes), we have sets of abilities, i.e. mentalities, characterizing different, at times co-existing and even competing, social roles. The expressions listed above thus comprise the following mentalities: of a baby, of a dutiful son, of a father or mother, of a mín, or of a lord. The mentality of a father versus his son does not exclude the mentality of a dutiful son versus his son's grandfather. Neither are such sets necessarily fixed for all time: it is possible to change one's mind or heart, to assume a new outlook or mentality. The corresponding expression is biàn xīn 變心, i.e. to replace one mentality with another, as in the following paraphrased episode:

Apart from offering proof of the early existence of “dog whisperers” in China and a good example of a dog learning to conform to his social role, i.e. to behave like a true dog, this anecdote demonstrates what I would term a performative triangle (see Figure 1):

Figure 1.

A performative triangle

The three interacting corners represent: desire or dislike; cast of mind or specific mental faculty; and pattern of behaviour or action. A ruler feeling the urge (yù 欲) to swallow the empire will develop a framework or mindset upon doing so (yǒu tūn tiān-xià zhī xīn 有吞天下之心, ZGC 167/86/1), and this will translate into a spate of actions designed to fulfil this desire (cf. the mustering of soldiers in citation 4, or bringing Qín and Chǔ to wait at his court in citation 5). These actions, and the reactions they provoke, may modify the frame of mind or certain desires, thus triggering new or different actions, and so on and so forth.

6. The sense organs and their commanders

Of the cardiac faculties, we have already met one which functions as a critical faculty, as a power of reflective or self-reflective awareness. Squire Mèng called it “the sense of right or wrong” (shì fēi zhī xīn 是非之心), and asserted that not only do all human beings have it, but that it is also the starting point for intelligent or insightful behaviour (Mèng 2A.06 and 6A.06, cf. citation 7). The following passage shows that several such faculties are to be assumed, being paired with a corresponding organ. Its designation, xīn, is best discussed in conjunction with the sense organs (tiān guān 天官).Footnote ²⁴ In what follows, I shall term this the cardio-mental faculty or faculties, thus differentiating them from other cardiac faculties. Human beings by nature, and according to most listings, have five sense organs (wǔ guān 五官), which, says Squire Mèng, are linked to their faculties in a special way:

In the Xúnzǐ, we discover what amounts to the same concept and point of view:

The Lǚ Shì Chūn Qiū 呂氏春秋 confirms these remarks and expands on them:

In these three passages, presumably spread over the entire third century bc, we can observe that yù 欲 in the sense of “appetite” or “desire” is held to be the inherent trigger of constitutional power (lì 力) or behavioural pattern of a sense organ. Similarly, we have desires embedded in certain cardiac faculties, e.g. the sense of sorrow. These organs and cardiac faculties do not think, nor do they appraise what they are inclined to do. Doing the thinking for these sense organs and sensory faculties, judging the appropriateness of their actions, is a cardio-mental faculty, i.e. “the cardiac faculty that [judges whether something is] right or wrong” (shì fēi zhī xīn 是非之心). Whether action is taken or a behaviour practised, regardless of whether it be right or wrong, depends on the implementation of one's will or determination (zhì 志) (See Figure 2).

Figure 2.

The relationship between “desire” and “action” when steered by the embedded cardiac faculties, the commanding cardio-mental faculty, and will power

The psycho-physiological processes in the following excerpt take place within this structure:

The commanding position of the cardio-mental faculty or faculties approving or disapproving of certain actions (in our terms: of the mind), is explicitly discussed in the following passage from the Xúnzǐ:

Let us take note of the peculiar usage of the designations jūn 君 “lord (of a principality)” and zhǔ 主 “head (of a lineage)”. The former is in a higher position (normally the lord of a state, guó 國), the latter is subordinated to the first (normally ranking as the head of a dàifū-lineage, i.e. as a zǐ 子 “viscount”). This has interesting implications:

21

Figure 3.

Stratification of correspondences in terms referring to titles/functions, territories, and body/person

22

This confirms that the individual is lord over the cardio-mental faculty as well as the related perceptual faculties. The way he displays his leadership is by exercising his will and setting his priorities right. The cardio-mental faculty can, in the absence of determined or wilful interference or guidance, act as (uncontrolled) sub-commander; as soon as a person takes charge of the cardio-mental faculty and exercises his will or his determination to act (zhuān xīn zhì zhì 專心致志; Mèng 6A.09), the cardio-mental faculty as well as the sense organs or other cardiac faculties become lower-echelon commanders or instruments subjected to him, i.e. to the “mastermind”.

7. A cognitive image of the psycho-physiological heart

This mastermind must be operating when Squire Mèng states that desires and dislikes can be graded as lesser (xiǎo 小) or greater (dà 大), and that reaching a decision necessitates “weighing” (quán 權) and “measuring” (duó 度) operations, also in the case of cardiac faculties or senses (cf. citation 4). Squire Xún basically resorts to the same notion:

For such operations, there is a need for a tertium comparationis, i.e. we need predetermined values with which we can compare. In the following citation, the Lǚ Shì Chūn Qiū puts the relationship between cardiac faculties and norms in the following words:

We can measure different dimensions, but in contexts related to cardiac faculties or senses, the concept of “weighing” is most prominent.Footnote ²⁸ The metaphorical power of this process strongly suggests choosing a balance as an appropriate cognitive image (in ancient China, most probably not a balance but a steelyard). On one side, we shall imagine a vessel for a liquid (a basin-like pán 盤, or a cauldron, dǐng 鼎), on the other a counterweight serving to balance the “cardiac” vessel. The fact that the heart or cardiac faculties are said to be “balanced” or could be “brought into balance” (píng 平), furnishes the main visual element of the cognitive image as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4.

Weight and counterweight within a cardiac faculty

Put simply, a cognitive image serves to visualize a more or less complex phenomenon. It may generate related metaphors. For example: at an early stage of particle physics, our solar system served as a model for understanding the construction of atoms, composed of a nucleus (the sun) and of electrons surrounding it (the planets). This type of image is not merely descriptive or stative – if well chosen, it can also be highly productive in the sense that it tempts us into thinking further by following the leads and implications of the image. This I shall demonstrate further below with an early version of this model I had to discard (cf. the last two paragraphs of section 0).

Excessive sorrow would tip the left arm of the balance downwards, a deficient expression of sorrow would let it rise. In a strongly ritualized society, both of these expressions or movements are publicly undesirable, even when they would seem personally appropriate and perfectly understandable. In everyday operations (e.g. when weighing fruit in the market), the counterweight is manipulated in order to balance and indicate the actual weight of the goods. Social norms acting as counterweights, however, generally have a fixed weight and position.Footnote ²⁹ They therefore remain in balance, i.e. in accord with the prescribed norm, or travel out of balance, i.e. the upward movement would signal that, for the bereaved, the rites fail to match the depth of his personal sorrow, the downward movement would signal a substandard degree of sorrow. A cardiac faculty or sense in such a state would be termed “biased” or “unbalanced” (xié 邪). This implies that the balance has no built-in checks on the range which the arms could possibly travel, i.e. the more intense a desire or hatred, the further up or down the arms can travel.

The cognitive image also suggests that the norms or rules that supply the basis for gauging a cardiac faculty, i.e. the counterweight, are a fixture of the corresponding cardiac faculty. Squire Mèng designates some of them as inherent to the faculty:

What if certain cardiac faculties or senses with the related norms are not part of the natural endowment? These can be acquired by learning (xué 學) and enquiring (wèn 問; Mèng 6A.11). This is also the case when a cardiac faculty is stunted or disappears completely – and this can even happen to innate faculties; Squire Mèng says: “Anyone letting the senses of empathy and compassion disappear is not a human being (wú cè yǐn zhī xīn, fēi rén yě 無惻隱之心, 非人也; Mèng 2A.06)”. Movement of a cardiac faculty can in certain cases be positive, i.e. when it moves to a balanced position, or negative, i.e. when it becomes unbalanced. The terms used for these are “to move the cardiac faculty or sense” (dòng xīn 動心; Mèng 2A.02) or “to fill/flood the cardiac faculty or sense” (chōng xīn 充心; Mèng 2A.06 or 7B.31). Squire Mèng states that the “fluid” or “liquor” or “stream of energy” that fills these vessels is the so-called qì 氣 (qì tǐ zhī chōng yě 氣體之充也; Mèng 2A.02) or “vital energy”, which is associated with will (zhì 志), i.e. with the mastermind. This can be deduced from the following passage, where Squire Mèng answers a question about “moving cardiac faculties or senses”, as follows:

But to which stimuli does a cardiac faculty or sense respond with a movement, if not to the will of the mastermind? According to Lǚ Shì Chūn Qiū 20/8.1, they are (also) stimulated by desires (xīn suí yù 心隨欲) – either in a steered way or like independent commanders. If desires are not limited by norms, their corresponding faculties will lack measure (dù 度). As a consequence, the objects of the world are divided up into two fundamental categories: things that may be desired (kě yù 可欲), and things that ought to be disliked (bì wù 必惡). We thus come full circle and see the Mencian choice between fish and bear's palm, between life in shame or death through dutiful service resurfacing. We perceive, or are taught, and thus – with the corresponding cardiac faculties – know, which things are better or higher-valued, and which are not. As a last resort, we can also choose to reduce our desires and hopefully escape from certain dilemmata. As Squire Mèng says: “For nurturing the psycho-physiological heart (yǎng xīn 養心), nothing is regarded as more excellent than reducing desires (guǎ yù 寡欲; Mèng 7B.35)”.

8. Human nature? A matter of keeping or setting hearts right

Let me try and summarize the concept of the ancient Chinese psyche as it is observed primarily in the extant texts attributed to Squire Mèng and Squire Xún. The overall impression we gather seems to point to an anthropological set-up with a strong penchant for, and the distinct marks of, a multi-layered bureaucratic organization: first, a hierarchy of authority, i.e. chain of command; second, a specialization of functions, i.e. different “departments” of cardiac faculties (e.g. sensory faculties, mental functions, etc.) or specialized, cross-departmental groups for certain tasks (e.g. mentalities); and third, adherence to rules (cf. the illustration in 21 above). In the same way the empire is brought into, or sustained in, balance (tiān-xià píng 天下平), the heart or the constellation of cardiac faculties is meant to reach, or remain in, an equilibrium (xīn píng 心平). Similar to the harmony (hé 和) established between mín (民), rén (人) and the Hundred Clans (bǎi xìng 百姓), the psycho-physiological heart or the orchestra of cardiac faculties is meant to achieve, or act in, harmony. This harmony is not based on equality; every instrument has to play its appointed part and to submit to the instructions of the director, alias the lord of the state or mastermind.

This understanding of the role of the psycho-physiological heart and the cardiac faculties within the heart (心 xīn) as the seat of government in the human body, besides being a rich source for metaphors, allows us to approach one of our key questions: what kind of concept did ancient Chinese thinkers associate with the term xìng 性 (generally translated by “human nature”; in this paper tentatively as “natural endowment”) and why could they, at the time of birth, plausibly assign to human beings the properties shàn 善 (usually rendered as “good”), bù shàn 不善 or è 惡 (usually rendered as “bad”)? The character xìng is a compound of 生 shēng, which refers to something at birth or still in the raw, and radical 61 (心 / 忄), thus inviting us to suspect that it does have something to do with the state of the psycho-physiological heart or the cardiac faculties at birth. My initial steps therefore led me to form the following preliminary image and working conception for xìng.

By natural endowment, man has complementary, paired cardiac faculties or senses (e.g. love vs. hate, seeing vs. not-seeing, being respectful vs. non-respectful, etc.). These, at first, I envisioned as arranged in the form of equal-armed balances. The extreme points of the arms (duān 端)Footnote ³⁰ of such pairs can, for emotions, be conceived of as weights in different counter-balanced positions or, for sensory faculties, as switches with two antithetical positions: “on” or “off”. The deeper one's sorrow, the more superficial one's happiness. Within this large array of functionally differentiated balances, the arm position of some of them has a fundamental influence on the functioning, or malfunctioning, of state and society. The more egotistic the inclination, the worse for society it is; the more altruistic, the better. Judging from the textual evidence, especially in the Mèngzǐ and the Xúnzǐ, xìng is the designation of this initial configuration of cardiac faculties:

This conceptual reconstruction of a complex cardiac configuration xìng offers a good and generalized explanatory basis for the various opinions set forth by ancient Chinese thinkers. It allows for the position that men can be formed into good or bad people, it allows for some people to be born good, some bad, and it does not even contradict the assertion that the categories “good” or “bad” do not apply to it – as Squire Gōng-dū states in the following re-wording of citation 6:

This reconstruction of the meaning of xìng accounts for all sorts of stabilized, original or acquired settings and typical combinations: a person may retain a pristine configuration (大人者不失其赤子之心者也 “people of the type ‘great man’ are such who do not lose their cardiac faculties/mentality of a new-born babe”; Mèng 4B.12), or it may acquire the configuration of a filial son (孝子之心 “cardiac faculties/mentality of a fililal son”; Mèng 5A.01) or of a lord (jūn xīn 君心 “cardiac faculties/mentality of a lord”; Mèng 4A.20),Footnote ³² or may even be subjected to configurational ups and downs (有/無恒/恆心 “have/not have constant cardiac faculties/mentality”; Mèng 1A.07).

Finally, this reconstruction of xìng, in an easily adaptable understanding, also makes sense in passages where the original nature of phenomena other than human beings are discussed:

The crucial question that now arises is: how is the xìng of human beings originally structured and equipped, i.e. which faculties or balances are present at birth, and which are their default positions. Are they fit for, or inclined towards, socially compatible or incompatible behaviour? The two extreme positions, “good” according to Squire Mèng, “bad” according to Squire Xún, can be explained by the position of the balance-arms: for the former, all dip to the compatible side, for the latter, all to the incompatible side. Other basic positions, such as that set forth in citation 6, can be explained within this conceptual reconstruction, which also lends itself to two other views put forward in the sinological debate, namely the static and the dynamic view of “human nature”. A person may be fixed or remain in a compatible or incompatible position, or it may develop into one or the other as he or she is subjected to configurational ups and downs due to the vicissitudes or contingencies of life.

Further investigation of the topic, however, showed that this preliminary reconstruction and the accompanying image not only contradicted textual evidence in decisive points, but also did not seem to furnish a convincing or plausible image of the observable psycho-physiological evidence in ancient Chinese times. For the first, the fundamental concept of complementarity – so reasonable and seemingly natural to assume in the ancient Chinese context – was wrecked when a text surfaced mentioning not the expected bipolar cardiac faculty for sorrowing and being happy (āi lè zhī xīn 哀樂之心), but two separate faculties, i.e. either a cardiac faculty for sorrowing (āi xīn 哀心), or one for being happy (lè xīn 樂心; cf. citation 11). As the necessity for this became clearer, it was easy to think of corresponding examples: one can feel sorry that a dear old uncle has passed away, but be quite happy he is leaving some money. Sorrow and happiness directed at the same time towards different objects could not be represented in the first design. And even more fittingly, the abstract entities, e.g. sorrow or happiness, were displaced by a situation, by the realization of a feeling directed towards a specified object, by a behavioural pattern – or in grammatical terms: by verb-object-structures.

In the ensuing phase of rectification, I was also forced to introduce a new concept of the counterweight. Instead of my naive initial assumption that sorrow and happiness could be correlated manifestations of one and the same underlying feeling, i.e. of a single cardiac faculty, the texts offer the notion of norms, rules, standards, model persons, etc. for the counterweight. This, consequently, provided an authority for the approval or disapproval of behaviour, for judgement regarding its appropriateness. And this, I believe, offered a new and exciting look at the relationship between name (míng 名) and realization (shí 實) (cf. observation 16 above) – or to put it in grammatical terms: between agent subjects and their homonymous derived verbs of the type “father acts as true father” (fù fù 父父).Footnote ³⁵

9. “Good” or “bad”

Finally, a revision of the understanding of the keyword “good” (shàn 善) emerged. From the contexts of the debate about the qualities of men based on their initial configuration of cardiac faculties it is abundantly clear that this word has something to do with the functioning of society or the principalities. As is well known (and has been repeatedly mentioned in this paper), Squire Mèng and Squire Xún are the major representatives of two opposing positions in this debate:

The way this question has hitherto generally been posed and dealt with in the field of sinology, i.e. as a dichotomy of “good” and “bad” as a fundamental property of so-called human nature, inevitably leads to many thorny problems (cf. note 16). Most of these have already been endlessly debated by generations of (Occidental) philosophers and theologians. To put it very simply: if man were basically good because his nature is originally good (which is assumed to be the position of Squire Mèng), then the existence or the source of evil must become a problem; however, if he is basically bad because his nature is originally bad (which is assumed to be the position of Squire Xún), then the existence or the source of the good must become a problem. As these two thinkers, so far as I can see, fail to give us the slightest clue that such metaphysical questions had to be solved, it just might be that they did not have to tackle such problems in the first place! Sinology would then have been dealing with a pseudo-problem due to the unreflected imposition of occidental positions.

Two important circumstances may be responsible for this state of affairs:

1. (a) Misunderstanding xìng 性. If the reconstruction of the psycho-anatomical model of the heart and the consequences for the understanding of the word xìng is accepted, then we clearly do not need to ask whether man is naturally “good” or “bad”, whether adopting the first excludes the second. The basic constellation of his cardiac faculties, their complementary, antithetical, but independent settings, clearly show that for major ancient Chinese thinkers man is conceived as constitutionally disposed to both possibilities, to the good as well as to the evil, to social fit or misfit. The fundamental difference in the positions of the Squires Mèng and Xún resides in the fact that their views and arguments concerning the default positions of the natural faculties, concerning the initial configuration of the emotional, sensory, and perceptual array allotted to man by Heaven, are at variance. Squire Mèng argues that the multiple scales of the initial configuration all incline towards the compatible positions, Squire Xún assumes that they incline towards the incompatible.

2. (b) Misinterpreting shàn 善. The second question we have to ask is whether our understanding of the two predicates, shàn and bù shàn 不善 or è 惡, ought to be revised. Reviewing sentences with shàn, it becomes clear that this word is associated with the notion of excellence and adequacy, but it also emerges that it always implies a certain field of excellence or compatibility, i.e. good at what, or good for what?Footnote ³⁶ The field for which excellence is implicitly required in the debate between our two major thinkers is the field of social order. The initial configuration of human beings’ cardiac faculties is either a sound foundation (Squire Mèng's position) or a deficient foundation (Squire Xún's position) for building a well-ordered human society.

Both thinkers draw on one clear type of empirical evidence to render plausible their position concerning the initial configuration, namely on the type of unthinking and spontaneous behaviour people tend to in given situations. This is thought to reflect the behavioural default settings of the cardiac faculties. Squire Mèng takes up this line of argument as follows:

Squire Mèng observes how human beings spontaneously react in certain situations, and concludes from this that such unreflected behaviour clearly discloses the basically compatible default position of the heart's settings. The evidence he draws on is rightly famous:

This spontaneous reaction is, in certain key situations, judged an excellent positive reaction contributing to social order. Such evidence, and the concept of multiple scales presented above (scales that incline towards one side or the other), also sheds light on the manifold images with water in the Mèngzǐ. Especially revealing in relation to the image of scales is the following passage, in which Squire Mèng compares certain default behaviours of water to the default settings of human beings:

Given that human beings start from a compatible configuration, Squire Mèng's aversion to, and rejection of, the use of force in educational processes is self-evident. This is the topic of the following passage:

Two facts are interesting here: first, Squire Mèng does not contradict the assumption that the initial configuration of human beings’ cardiac faculties can be formed into something else, e.g. into a new configuration (cf. Squire Xún's use of wèi 偽 in citations 36, 38, 41, and note 38). The initial configuration is thus by no means a static constellation, fixed at the beginning and never changing. Second, Squire Mèng seems to accept that humane and socially correct behaviour is not fully developed from the beginning.

Squire Xún posits that the initial configuration of human beings’ hearts is incompatible with good social order. How does he, then, argue his position? Let us look at the following passage:

These two extremely different judgements on the soundness of the initial configuration as a foundation for social order inevitably result in different educational formulae for dealing with the corresponding situation. If the initial configuration of human beings’ cardiac faculties is judged a sound foundation, as Squire Mèng proposes, education must be based on “conserving, tending and protecting”:Footnote ³⁹

Squire Xún, naturally, prescribes quite a different therapy. In order to get people to behave in a socially adequate way, he is prepared to apply pressure and even force:

These few excerpts from the two thinkers show why, in Squire Mèng's opinion, men can incline towards socially unfavourable conduct or be tempted and seduced to do so. It is equally clear why Squire Xún should begin his book with an “exhortation to learning” (chapter 1) in order to encourage men to acquire as a second nature a sound new configuration modelled on the instructions of the sage kings of antiquity.

10. Closing remarks

To be “moral” in the societies of the Zhànguó-period, i.e. to be “good” or “bad”, meant to learn to behave in orderly ways, meant to conform to the customs (< lat. mos), regulations, and usages of kinship groups and of society, meant to conserve the traditions and achievements of the sage kings. A person excelling in his role (shàn rén 善人) as a member of society or kinship group qualifies as a good person. But when does a person “excel”, when is he or she a “good person”? Squire Mèng, when asked why he calls someone a good (shàn 善) and trustworthy (xìn 信) person, says:

Thus, a “good person” has expertise in judging the permissibility of desires (shàn yú kě yù 善於可欲), and the right desires will stimulate the right cardiac faculties (xīn suí yù 心隨欲). The ethical backdrop for this is the ideal of a functioning society and state. Earlier in this paper, I concluded that the objects of the world are divided into desirable (kě yù 可欲) and undesirable things (cf. after citation 27). This categorization not only presupposes that a person – by nature or by learning – knows how to assign objects to the correct category, it also lets thinkers avoid the metaphysical trap so prominent and difficult to deal with in Western philosophy, namely the tendency to posit “the good” and “the bad” as mutually exclusive absolutes. Again, we return to the Mencian emphasis on our ability, our cardiac faculty, to make the correct choice between fish and bear's palm, between life in shame or death through dutiful service. Squire Mèng gives a vivid example for the failure to make a correct choice:

This shift away from the heart as prime focus of interest reminds us of the capital importance already accorded by the Lǐ Jì to desires and dislikes: “Things that are desired or hated are important indicators of ‘cardiac faculties’”. And: “[True] beauty and ugliness both depend on [people's] cardiac faculties, but do not appear in their expressions” (cf. citation 8). But this still leaves us with a residual, but non-trivial problem. Which alternatives do we have when we cannot base the difference between Squire Mèng and Squire Xún on the simplistic image of balances tipping to one side or the other? Again, we have to shift our attention from the cardiac faculties to the desires and dislikes, to their outward signs. Desires or behavioural patterns that surface spontaneously, which are realized before the blessings of education transform and civilize us, would turn out to be most compelling evidence – and both thinkers build on evidence of this kind. Squire Mèng presents the unpremeditated reaction of a person seeing a child about to fall in a well, a reaction that cannot be related to an outward stimulus and that must therefore be due to an inborn desire (Mèng 2A.06; cf. citation 33). This reaction is also evidence for the person's innate ability to judge which action or behaviour is appropriate to the situation, i.e. it is an indicator of the mental faculty approving or disapproving of certain actions at work (shì fēi zhī xīn 是非之心). All this is evidently heartening news. Squire Xún, on the other hand, serves up the bad news:

Squire Xún, unlike Squire Mèng, does not rely on at least some of the innate desires being socially acceptable and therefore guaranteeing basic values of a functioning society and state. On the contrary, he qualifies all of them as despicable and unbalanced. Only education and learning can achieve a change and build what he calls new (acquired) anthropogenic configurations (wèi 偽). To this end, he employs the services of the mind, which is most probably identical with the mental faculty approving or disapproving of certain actions (shì fēi zhī xīn 是非之心) and which is subordinated to a master-mind.

As for one fundamental aspect, both thinkers agree: the overall importance of desires (cf. citations 5 and 29 above). Originally good desires can directly lead to, or support, a functioning society; the efforts of a government are therefore to be invested in preventing things from deteriorating, in conserving existent good values handed down from the ancients. The corresponding educational system seeks to tend and cultivate these good tender sprouts. By creating the right desires, originally bad configurations can be transformed; the efforts of a government are to be invested in creating the right stimuli and making things better by adopting norms that fit the actual historical situation. The corresponding educational system is aimed at reworking human beings and bending the warped cardiac faculties into new and useful forms. It comes as no surprise that desire, and not heart, is ultimately the keyword of the debate. The theory of human nature is only in the second place dependent on a theory of the psycho-physiological heart; in the first place it calls for a phenomenology of desires. All we need is a developed sense of what is permissible and what is not – either, as Squire Mèng asserts, as a natural gift, or, as Squire Xún asserts, as abilities acquired through learning.

The question of “human nature” – or, in my words, of the initial configuration and settings of human beings’ cardiac faculties, senses, and sensory organs, ought to be put on a new foundation in sinological discourse. It appears that the debate has become mired in a self-centred linguistic and cultural marshland as regards the questions asked, the concepts proposed, and the terminology used. It has spawned a phantom problem. It has repeatedly failed to recognize and acknowledge the complexity of the texts concerned, and it has often heavily relied on imperfect, inadequate translations to confirm arguments and ostensibly build theories – surrogate theories that mostly originate in current academic scenes or fashions rather than spring from a vital and independent historical interest in the problems which concerned ancient Chinese thinkers. The reluctance, or the failure, to submit the sources to the necessary close and comprehensive readings is actually quite depressing – despite the formulaic remarks in notes at the beginning of papers stating that “translations are the authors’”. The neglect of systematic lexicological studies is a concomitant symptom.

The study of the ancient Chinese concept(s) of “human nature”, of the natural constitution of beings both human and non-human, must be fundamentally renewed. It is at the root of many other important questions, and therefore still deserves ample attention – all the more as it is addressed in many of the bamboo manuscripts recently found.Footnote ⁴¹ One of the prerequisites for this renewal, I hope to have shown with my paper, is a deeper understanding of the concept of desires and of the heart(s), and of their roles and functions. All that seems to be needed is a developed sense for what is correct and for what is not – and that, Squire Mèng declares, all men (including sinologists) naturally have.