Nadia Urbinati’s discerning review raises three important concerns. First, should a stronger claim be staked regarding the constitutional effects of these civic groups and movements? I agree that these groups are more than “influential.” But The Civic Constitution makes a far stronger claim: that revolutionaries, antifederalists, abolitionists, and suffragists “reinvented constitutional self-governance” in specific ways. Indeed, I use the concept of “civic founders” to indicate their profound roles in initiating and advancing some of the most important texts, institutional features, doctrines, and civic norms of modern constitutional democracy (pp. 5, 7–9).
Yet it is important to recognize the limits of civic actors’ capacities in a constitutional system. While these groups’ ideas and activities can be seen as necessary for initiating transformative shifts, such as women’s suffrage, they were not sufficient for obtaining them (nor could they control subsequent developments) (p. 6). Their influence was qualified by 1) political institutions, including challenges of gaining “official” allies and achieving reforms on a playing field with multiple veto points and players; 2) civic culture and public opinion, especially antagonistic views; and 3) economic and military pressures, such as financial interests and exigencies of war.
Second, how should civic founders be identified? My argument is that there is a historical/empirical and a normative component. The historical judgment is that those deemed civic founders “initiate revolutionary changes to constitutional essentials”—fundamental rights and liberties, the basic structure of governance, and citizenship and the body politic—reflected in the constitutional text and in laws, doctrines, and interpretations surrounding it. The normative judgment is that civic founders advance constitutional democracy “centered on a paramount principle of free and equal citizenship” (p. 222). Urbinati offers the friendly amendment to derive this judgment more clearly from “the principle of equal political liberty” that is fundamental to a constitutional democracy and that “demands to be expanded, not curtailed” (Democracy Disfigured, p. 15).
Urbinati also encourages adopting the notion of constitutional democracy as a “diarchy” in which institutional procedures and popular judgments/actions “influence each other and cooperate without merging” (ibid.). Although my book has a dualist conception of constitutional democracy, it offers the framework of “civic dialectic” to capture a more conflictual relation. Where Urbinati’s diarchy seems to stress an even balance or stable equilibrium between institutional and popular components, civic dialectic identifies civic actors’ challenges to quite stable—yet relatively undemocratic and unjust—equilibria between dominant public opinion and laws (Civic Constitution, pp. 7–8, 13, 20–22, 222–24).
Third, should a robust theory of civic founders or popular constitutionalism be purely procedural? I argue that questions of substance are also important for evaluating actors and agendas in a constitutional democracy (ibid., pp. 222, 237). This disagreement is partly definitional: Urbinati’s conception of “proceduralism” hinges on an ideal of equal political liberty whose contours have shifted, and it implicates substantive concerns and preconditions. Moreover, these case studies demonstrate that even as popular movements demand, use, and help constitutionally entrench more equal political liberty through democracy-enabling procedures—such as rights to speech, assembly, petition, and suffrage—they do so largely to promote substantive goals that they associate with a more just order. They advance constitutional democracy partly because they believe its procedures can and should be used to move public opinion and governing institutions toward wiser or more just outcomes.
