This book has a special prehistory in two respects. For one, its origins lay in a U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York verdict from 2000 that obligated the Austria Creditanstalt bank to establish an independent commission of historians to investigate the role Austrian banks played during the time of National Socialism. A two-volume publication in German resulted from this project, in which two contributions by Gerald D. Feldman regarding the Creditanstalt-Bankverein as well as the Länderbank Wien between 1938 and 1945 account for half of the content. That publication represented Feldman's last major study before his death in 2007. Secondly, the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., decided to publish an English translation of these two studies, in honor of the long-standing chairman of its advisory board, who was also one of the most distinguished scholars of German economic and social history of the twentieth century.

In the first part, which comprises three sections, Feldman addresses the Creditanstalt. In section 1, he describes in detail its shareholders, organization, and personnel in the time frame from 1938 to 1945. In doing so, he reveals the universal bank to have functioned as a holding company due to its financial participation in 142 companies from finance, industry, and trade, making the bank the center of the Austrian economy. Feldman describes the struggles over control within the Creditanstalt in great detail. By playing off the different Nazi power centers against one another, the executive board eventually managed, in 1942, to get its demands accepted despite opposition from Göring, achieving its preferred option of having the Deutsche Bank acquire a majority of its capital.

The second section of part 1 addresses the Creditanstalt's “Aryanization” policy. In several case studies, Feldman demonstrates that the Austrian universal bank proceeded far more radically than the banks in the Old Reich, resulting in far higher profits—not least because, for instance, Jewish companies were often entirely absorbed into the bank.

The third section dealing with the Creditanstalt addresses its expansion in eastern and southeastern Europe as well as its financing of defense and the war economy. Even against the interests of its parent company, the Deutsche Bank, the Creditanstalt was able to establish business in Poland, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, resulting in new scope for action in these countries. In addition, the bank not only maintained its position in Austria, but was even able to expand it by offering loans to and financially participating in armaments companies. The bank was thereby able to ward off attempts by the German corporations Continental and Phoenix to acquire their Austrian competitor, Semperit, enabling the Austrian tire manufacturer itself to expand.

In the second, much shorter part of the book, addressing the development of the Länderbank Wien AG between 1938 and 1945, Feldman focuses on its merger with the Mercurbank, a subsidiary of Dresdner Bank, which in turn allowed that large German bank to acquire the Länderbank. In addition, Feldman traces the new Länderbank's lines of business in both Austria and the foreign countries occupied by Germany until 1945. In contrast to the Creditanstalt, the Länderbank was unable to prevail against its parent company. The still-Austrian executive board was, however, able to preserve its interests in a number of cases, for example, in personnel decisions. Even though the Länderbank held far fewer shares in other companies than the Creditanstalt, it still took part in the financing of armament, often cooperating with the larger Austrian-based bank when it came to large exposures.

Altogether, the detailed study presented by Feldman reveals that the two Austrian banks were by no means entirely dominated and controlled by their German parent companies during the Nazi era. In fact, Feldman is able to show that the Creditanstalt and the Länderbank were neither “Germanized” nor externally controlled by the Berlin big banks. Instead, they pursued their own agendas, which at times were even contrary to the interests of the Deutsche and Dresdner banks. Even the Austrian banks’ participation in Nazi crimes was based on independent decisions made in their respective executive boardrooms, often resulting in consequences more radical and brutal than those in the German big banks.

But this book is not only an important addition to the previous research regarding German banks in the Nazi era (including the Dresdner and Deutsche banks, among others). It also signifies a change of perspective, as its focus is on the viewpoint of the Austrian executive boards. Here it is clear that both the sovereignty and the scope of action of the two Vienna banks were far larger than had previously been assumed. Aside from pure banking history, the approach furthermore allows for interesting insights into the Austrian balance of power after 1938 and especially into the interrelationship between big banks and industry. For example, for the very first time the close cooperation between Hermann-Josef Abs, the responsible member of the board from Deutsche Bank, and the Creditanstalt's director general Josef Joham regarding the economic penetration in Southeastern Europe has been systematically analyzed. Feldman's last work—well written, carefully researched, and sophisticated as ever—is more than a pure business history of two Austrian big banks in the Third Reich. This English translation constitutes a worthy commemoration of the author and represents an important contribution to both German and Austrian economic history.