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STATVS THEORY AND CICERO'S DEFENCE OF TEACHING IN ORATOR 140–8

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2024

Rosalie Stoner
Rosalie Stoner*
Affiliation:
Yale University
*
rosalie.stoner@yale.edu
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Abstract

This article offers a structural analysis of Cicero's Orator, sections 140–8. Situating Cicero's defence of a form of educational activity in relation to his earlier denials that he is teaching anything, the article proposes an explanation for Cicero's apparent reversal of position rooted in status theory, the conceptual framework developed by Greek and Roman rhetorical theorists for schematizing the points at issue in a case and the corresponding lines of approach that a defender should take. Understanding the status-inspired organization of Cicero's self-defence affords readers smoother passage through a text that is often difficult and obscure. Furthermore, this analysis shows how Cicero deploys rhetorical techniques in defence of his educational endeavours both to support his claim to continued relevance and to exemplify the versatility of the ideal orator whom he portrays in the Orator.

Keywords

status theoryself-defencerhetorical teachingideal oratorCicero

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Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 73 , Issue 2 , December 2023 , pp. 693 - 698
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association

Cicero's Orator of 46 b.c.e. reveals the ousted king of the courts (Cic. Fam. 9.18.2 = SB 191) exploring new avenues for his oratorical gifts. In sections 140–8 of the text, a complex passage that has been called ‘a sort of “second prooemium”’ of the work,Footnote 1 teaching emerges as a fundamental—and fraught—concern for Cicero as he attempts to ingratiate himself with Brutus, the Orator's dedicatee.Footnote 2 Three times over the course of the essay Cicero explicitly denies that he is acting as a doctor or praeceptor of rhetoric, preferring instead to portray his recommendations as the work of an existimator or iudex.Footnote 3 In the passage spanning Orat. 140–8, however, Cicero abruptly changes tack to defend the activity of teaching, and his own activity in writing the Orator, against the carping of his imagined critics. Upon examination, the apparently contradictory positions Cicero adopts on teaching throughout the Orator map onto a general pattern familiar from status theory: the use of multiple lines of argumentation—including arguments that, strictly speaking, contradict each other—to support one's case.Footnote 4 Reading Cicero's defence of his own teaching activity in light of status theory helps us appreciate how the sidelined orator transposes his skills into a new venue, deploying a defence strategy based on rhetorical theory at the heart of a work about rhetorical theory.Footnote 5

OVERVIEW OF ORAT. 140–8

Looking ahead to the discussion of prose rhythm that occupies the Orator from section 149 to the essay's end, Cicero in section 140 anticipates criticisms from both his detractors and his admirers upon seeing a man of his worth devote his attention to such a dense and apparently trifling topic. In the following schematization of Orat. 140–8, I organize the passage in terms of its main lines of defence.

  1. I. Concern: Both my detractors and my admirers may think this detailed attentiveness to wordcraft unbecoming in a man of such political consequence as I once possessed (140).

  2. II. Response:

    1. A. If I were to give Brutus’ desire as my excuse, it would be enough to justify my work: I am satisfying the noble request of an excellent man (140).

    2. B. Even if I were to profess outright that I would teach eloquence to those who are desirous of learning, there would still be nothing wrong with doing so (141).

      1. 1. Eloquence holds first place in our city's affairs, followed by jurisprudence (141). Since teaching jurisprudence is considered honourable, teaching eloquence should be considered even more so: eloquence is more glorious and beneficial not only for private individuals but also for the whole commonwealth (142).

        1. a. Objection 1 (143): Teaching jurisprudence is established practice, while teaching oratory is newfangled.

          Response: Granted, but this is because jurisconsults can easily teach their profession while practising it: pupils can learn simply by watching jurisconsults deliver opinions. Orators, on the other hand, have such busy schedules that they have no additional time in which to teach their more demanding art.

        2. b. Objection 2 (144): Teaching lacks dignity.

          Response: Granted, if you mean common school-teaching. But there is nothing wrong with an advanced form of teaching in which an accomplished orator coaches and refines another who wishes to improve.

        3. c. Objection 3 (145): Even ignorant people profess the law openly, but the eloquent always pretend that they have no knowledge of eloquence—eloquence dissembles.

          Response (146): This is because people tend to distrust a skilful tongue. In reality, there is no need to be ashamed of having learnt eloquence or of teaching it. In fact, per my own example of dedication to this study, it should be a motive for pride.

      2. 2. Even so, I grant that the discussion [of prose rhythm] that I am about to embark on has less dignity than the earlier parts of my essay. People admire a tree's height but not its roots and trunk, and yet these latter are necessary foundations for the former: what I am doing here is underappreciated but necessary (147).

    3. C. Even if everything I have said above is not so, I deserve pity for my age and misfortunes, and sympathy for attempting to console myself through literary pursuits instead of giving in to laziness or grief (148).

    4. D. Furthermore, the larger literary enterprise in which I am engaged is so important that, if I can complete it, it will match the fame of my forensic achievements (148).Footnote 6

At this point, Cicero proceeds to the discussion of prose rhythm, the last major section of the text (149–236).

The elaborate justification of oratorical teaching that Cicero presents here, which seems to contradict his denials earlier in the Orator that he wants to teach anything, should alert the reader to three things. First, Cicero is deeply concerned about how his relationship with teaching will come across in the text.Footnote 7 Second, the essence of what Cicero wants to defend seems to be his own consequence: both the political importance he formerly held (140) and the importance he hopes he will continue to hold by means of his literary labours (148).Footnote 8 Cicero's concern that his discussion of rhetorical technicalities may compromise his prestige drives his elaborate defence in this passage towards its closing claim: that, far from vanishing into obscurity after his political marginalization, Cicero's oratory continues to be a credit to his own persona and a benefit to the Roman res publica. Third, the apparent contradiction between Cicero's disavowals of teaching in sections 43, 112 and 117 and his rapprochement with teaching in sections 140–8 is part of a unified rhetorical strategy of defence that can be grasped using the principles of status theory outlined below.

READING THE PASSAGE IN LIGHT OF STATVS THEORY

Cicero himself offers a simplified version of status theory in Orat. 45, where he lists the three possible questions at issue in a dispute as (1) whether something happened, (2) what happened and (3) what sort of thing happened (aut sitne aut quid sit aut quale sit quaeritur).Footnote 9 These questions correspond roughly to the three traditional major categories of issues.Footnote 10 A conjectural issue deals with facts (that is, whether an act happened or not).Footnote 11 A definitional issue hinges on what a particular act should be called (for instance, whether the theft of a sacred object from a private dwelling is also, properly speaking, a sacrilege).Footnote 12 An issue of quality, also known as a juridical issue, deals with the rightness or wrongness of an action: one could argue that the action was committed, but that it was justified, such as killing a traitor, or that it was committed under mitigating circumstances.Footnote 13 Constructing a defence involves deciding what sort of issue to present as lying at the heart of the matter and then building the case around it.Footnote 14 In some instances, multiple lines of approach can be used. In Institutio oratoria Book 3, Quintilian portrays a defendant saying ‘If I did the action, I did so rightly’, a quality-based or juridical claim, before adding ‘but I did not do it’, a conjectural claim (Quint. Inst. 3.6.10). Since denying the action outright is a stronger position than admitting and qualifying it, the outright denial should be the defendant's main support, if possible; if the action cannot plausibly be denied, other lines of defence must be adopted and may even be used to great effect.Footnote 15

If we revisit the outline of Orat. 140–8 in light of the considerations of status theory outlined above, Cicero's defence of his own teaching activity in the Orator begins to make better structural sense. Cicero has already denied outright that he is teaching (in sections 43, 112 and 117), a conjectural claim.Footnote 16 In sections 140–8, however, he shifts to using a multilayered juridical and definitional approach that justifies a form of advanced oratorical training. The ensuing arguments aim to prove that Cicero's enterprise is upright and praiseworthy (honestum, pulcherrimum, gloriosum) and thus that it befits a man of his dignity—a juridical claim.Footnote 17 One sub-argument (144) makes use of definition to redefine the problematic term ‘teaching’ (docendo): the sort of teaching Cicero is interested in is not the precept-giving that he portrays as taking place in a rhetorical school but rather a form of ‘mentorship’ for more advanced learners.Footnote 18 This sort of endeavour entails a greater degree of mutuality and collegiality than ‘teaching’ might otherwise imply.Footnote 19 Towards the end of the passage (148), he employs deprecatio (‘plea for pardon’), a juridical tactic further down in the status scheme that seeks to obtain leniency: even if none of his other arguments holds, it would be cruel to forbid a politically obsolete old man the enjoyment of literary pursuits, and readers should therefore judge him and his activity indulgently.Footnote 20 He soon supersedes this pitiful self-portrait, however, to claim that his literary labours will form a worthy counterpart to his achievements in the forum and so justify his activity more robustly—another (implicit) juridical claim (148).

We might ask why Cicero avails himself of a juridical approach at all in sections 140–8 instead of relying strictly on the denials of sections 43, 112 and 117. If he really does not want people to think that he is teaching, why does he spend time justifying it, redefining it and excusing himself? status theory suggests an answer that lines up with other evidence: if something cannot be denied, it must be rationalized. And there are at least two reasons why Cicero cannot make a compelling case that he is not teaching: one external to the text, one internal. First, we know from Cicero's own letters that in and after 46 b.c.e. he was holding private declamation tutorials with several up-and-coming political figures: Aulus Hirtius, Publius Cornelius Dolabella (his son-in-law) and, later, Caius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus.Footnote 21 While in his private correspondence with Papirius Paetus and Atticus he jokes and complains about these declamation sessions, he is keen to ensure that Brutus and his wider readership interpret this activity as a small part of a larger literary project with philosophical aspirations rather than as a comedown.Footnote 22 Second, there are strong rhetorical motivations for including the defence at this point in the text. As John Dugan has noted, the technical nature of the prose rhythm section carries magisterial overtones, and this passage prepares the reader to understand the ensuing discussion in its proper context: not as a collection of rote precepts but as the expression of a master's judgement.Footnote 23 Cicero wants not so much to deny any sort of educational activity as to put forward a picture of it that fits within the consequential persona he wishes to maintain. Furthermore, justification affords him broad scope for embellishment and emotional build-up in a way that the outright denials of sections 43, 112 and 117 do not.Footnote 24 Cicero's appeal to readerly pity and his promise of greater works to come help to consolidate and reinforce emotional interest in his persona and his work before a particularly dense stretch of text.

By framing even his discussion of prose rhythm within a larger literary project,Footnote 25 one that encompasses tiny technicalities as well as grand political and philosophical themes, Cicero borrows the dignity of the latter to offset the apparent triviality of the former. In so doing, he showcases his virtuosity as a writer who, like the ideal orator he describes, can discuss small topics and great ones in the appropriate settings and can unite such disparate endeavours within the competence of a single persona. Cicero's use of the adjective gravis in sections 97 and 99 to describe the orator of the grand style is a verbal link with the characterization of his forthcoming philosophical works as graviora, by comparison with which his treatment of oratorical style in the Orator is punctilious. But the implicit parallel he draws between his own activity and the figure of the well-rounded orator in the Orator allows him to portray this minute attention to detail as complementing and balancing the ponderous themes that will follow it. The Orator is Cicero's attempt to show that in his writings he can paint with a fine brush, just as the ideal orator must be able to do in his speeches.Footnote 26 Recognizing Cicero's use of status theory enables us to read this passage of the Orator as accomplishing one of his foremost aims in writing ‘so many things about the craft of speaking’ (140)—namely, to prove that he remains master of the orator's art in theory and practice and, furthermore, that this art is still worth transmitting.

Footnotes

I would like to thank Peter White for his generous advice on this piece. I am also grateful to Christina Kraus, Clifford Ando, Christopher Faraone, Shadi Bartsch-Zimmer and the University of Chicago Classics graduate students who read and commented on drafts, and to the CQ editor and anonymous referee for their encouragement.

References

1 See Narducci, E., ‘Orator and the definition of the ideal orator’, in J.M. May (ed.), Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric (Leiden / Boston / Cologne, 2002), 427–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 437. Scholarly attention to Cicero's later rhetorical works tends to privilege the earlier dialogue Brutus over the monologic Orator. Three important exceptions are R. Kaster, Cicero: Brutus and Orator (New York, 2020); Dugan, J., Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works (Oxford, 2005), especially 251–332CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Narducci (this note). The following analysis supports the idea that Cicero situates the Orator within a larger project of ‘public service’ through literature (Kaster [this note], 212 n. 179). The Latin text of the Orator is from Westman, R., M. Tullius Cicero Scripta quae manserunt omnia. Fasc. 5: Orator (Leipzig, 1980)Google Scholar. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own, though I have drawn on Kaster (this note) and on H.M. Hubbell (transl.), Cicero: Orator (Cambridge, MA, 1939) for support.

2 See Dugan (n. 1), 253–4 and 261–7 on Cicero's portrayal of his relationship with Brutus in the Orator.

3 The three denials of teaching are Cic. Orat. 43 nulla praecepta ponemus; 112 nihil nos praecipiendi causa esse dicturos atque ita potius acturos, ut existimatores videamur loqui, non magistri; and 117 quando autem id faciat aut quo modo, nihil ad hoc tempus, quoniam, ut supra dixi, iudicem esse me, non doctorem volo. See also Orat. 123 non quem doceam quaero sed quem probem. Dugan (n. 1), 259 describes how by means of these passages Cicero ‘places himself in the more prestigious and important role of doing work of broad cultural importance and not merely delivering lessons like some Graeculus doctor’, a persona that would be inappropriate to adopt in consideration of both Brutus’ erudition and the generally degraded social status of such teachers (see Suet. Gram. et rhet.). The character of Crassus evinces a similar desire not to be perceived as a magister in Book 1 of the De oratore (1.111), while in Book 2 Antonius pretends to be a schoolteacher and everyone laughs (2.28–30). See also Novara, A., ‘La dignité de l'enseignement ou l'enseignement et le dialogue d'après Cicéron, Orat. 144’, Annales Latini Montium Arvernorum 10 (1983), 35–52Google Scholar, at 38.

4 status theory (Greek στάσις) was a way of schematizing the various logical and legal issues at stake in a case. Developed in detail by the Greek rhetorician Hermagoras of Temnos (see D. Russell, ‘Hermagoras of Temnos’, OCD 5), it formed an important part of the construction and analysis of arguments in Roman rhetorical handbooks (e.g. Rhet. Her. 1.18–25, Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.10–19 and Quint. Inst. 3.6). Despite variations among theorists about how exactly to subdivide issues, the major elements are consistent: see Braet, A., ‘The classical doctrine of “status” and the rhetorical theory of argumentation’, Philosophy and Rhetoric 20 (1987), 79–93Google Scholar, at 83. Because Cicero himself presents different versions of status theory throughout his rhetorical works, in this article I follow the schematization he suggests in Orat. 45, supplementing it with terminology from his Topica of 44 b.c.e. and from the later Quintilian, who offers a matching account (Quint. Inst. 3.6.80–5). For a visualization of a slightly different but still useful status schema, see May, J. and Wisse, J., Cicero: On the Ideal Orator (New York, 2001), 33Google Scholar. For an alternative schematization, see H. Caplan (transl.), [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium (Cambridge, MA and London, 1954), xlvii. For an attempted reconstruction of στάσις schemes between Hermagoras of Temnos and Hermogenes of Tarsus, including an explanation of the variations within Cicero's own rhetorical works as a product of Cicero's ‘keeping up with the latest developments in theory’, see M. Heath, ‘The substructure of stasis-theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes’, CQ 44 (1994), 114–29, at 121.

5 See E. Gunderson, ‘The rhetoric of rhetorical theory’, in E. Gunderson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric (Cambridge, 2009), 109–25, at 113 for Quintilian's Institutio oratoria as a work that ‘exemplifies its own theory of rhetoric’.

6 See Kaster (n. 1), 18 for a connection of this passage with Cicero's interest during the mid 40s b.c.e. in casting his literary work ‘as a form of alternative “service to the state”’.

7 See Dugan (n. 1), 258–61.

8 See Kaster (n. 1), 18–19.

9 See also Cic. Orat. 121.

10 ‘Issue’ is the standard English translation for Latin status. H.M. Hubbell (transl.), On Invention. The Best Kind of Orator. Topics (Cambridge, MA and London, 1949), 20 n. a points out that Cicero uses the term constitutio in the De inventione but turns to status in his later rhetorical works. Cicero does not assign names to the three issues he specifies here in the Orator, but Quintilian, referring to Orat. 45 in Book 3 of the Institutio oratoria, suggests that their names are ‘well known’ (Quint. Inst. 3.6.44) and distinguishes them as ‘conjecture’, ‘quality’ and ‘definition’ (coniectura, qualitas, definitio, Quint. Inst. 3.6.66, cf. Inst. 3.6.80). In section 92 of the Topica, Cicero gives the same listing with slightly different terminology (coniecturalis, definitiua and iuridicialis, or ‘juridical’, an alternative way of describing ‘quality’, cf. Rhet. Her. 1.18 and 1.24). Quintilian's account also mentions a fourth major issue, the ‘legal’ issue, which can deal with the interpretation of laws or challenge the case on procedural grounds (Quint. Inst. 3.6.66, 3.6.83–5). In the Rhetorica ad Herennium, the three issues are distinguished as ‘conjectural’, ‘legal’ and ‘juridical’ (coniecturalis, legitima, iuridicalis), with ‘definition’ treated as a subset of the legal issue (Rhet. Her. 1.18–19).

11 See Rhet. Her. 1.18 and Quint. Inst. 3.6.73 for examples.

12 See Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.11 for the example of sacrilege, as well as Arist. Rh. 1374a and Quint. Inst. 7.3.10. On ‘definition’, see also Rhet. Her. 1.21.

13 Cf. Rhet. Her. 1.24–5, Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.69–109 and Quint. Inst. 7.4. Both Cicero and Quintilian classify the defence of Horatius, who killed his sister when he discovered her mourning the slain enemy to whom she was betrothed, as an example of a juridical or quality-based approach (Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.78–9 and Quint. Inst. 7.4.8).

14 Quintilian suggests ascertaining the issue by considering what line of defence the orator would pursue if he were allowed to choose only one (Quint. Inst. 3.6.9–10). Using different terminology, Cicero also treats the determination of the issue in the De inventione (Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.10–19).

15 Quintilian recommends using multiple lines of proof in a doubtful situation and praises Cicero for doing just this in his defence of Milo (Quint. Inst. 4.5.13–15).

16 Mutatis mutandis with regard to the timing of the action. In the Orator Cicero refers to actions in the present tense (i.e. ‘I am not currently teaching’), whereas trials refer to past events (i.e. ‘I did not do it’).

17 Cic. Orat. 142 cur aut discere turpe est quod scire honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est docere? The qualities of uprightness (honestum and cognates) and glory recur in Orat. 145 in opposition to the shameful (turpe).

18 See Kaster (n. 1), 182 n. 49.

19 The co- prefixes of cohortando and communicando in Orat. 144, as well as the idea of taking turns reading aloud (interdum etiam una legendo, audiendo), suggest an exchange that takes place between two colleagues rather than a unidirectional mode of instruction. See Novara (n. 3) for a detailed analysis of this passage. Peter White pointed out to me that Cicero's use of ludus in section 144 may be pejorative, a way of further ridiculing school-teaching and exaggerating his own remove from it.

20 See Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.104–7 and Rhet. Her. 1.24 for the deprecatio.

21 Hirtius and Pansa would become consul-designates for 43 (Cic. Fam. 9.16.7 = SB 190 and Att. 14.12.2 = SB 366). All these men were Cicero's juniors but were still old enough to hold office and be considered colleagues.

22 See Dugan (n. 1), 259. In a letter to Papirius Paetus written in mid 46 b.c.e. (Cic. Fam. 9.18.2–4 = SB 191), Cicero teasingly invites his friend to join him as an assistant teacher in a ludus that he playfully imagines as a project to occupy his forced inactivity. Compare Cicero's claim in Orat. 148 to be working on ‘weightier and more important things’ (graviora et maiora) with Book 2 of the Tusculanae disputationes, where he describes the schedule at his villa as involving rhetorical exercises in the mornings and philosophical discussions in the afternoons (Cic. Tusc. 2.9).

23 Dugan (n. 1), 258–9.

24 Quintilian says that ‘quality’ gives the orator the greatest opportunity for creativity and emotional impact (Quint. Inst. 7.4.23–4).

25 See Dugan (n. 1), 254–5 for Cicero's framing of his rhetorical works in relation to his forthcoming philosophical works.

26 An orator who does not know how to deal with minor cases appropriately (for instance by using the grand style to discuss minor water damage, as in Orat. 72) would be ridiculous (Cic. Orat. 99). The metaphor of art is Cicero's own: see sections 7 and 43 for his claim to be ‘shaping’ (fingere) the perfect orator and ‘sketching’ (adumbrare) outstanding eloquence, respectively.