This book, which originated as an article in Dutch that Willem Floor wrote in 1979 in response to a request for greater knowledge about Iran in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, offers a detailed narrative of events involving the relationship between the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Safavid court in the mid-17th century. Its focus is the conflict that erupted in 1645, early in the reign of Shah עAbbas II (1642–66), over a disagreement about the conditions under which the Dutch conducted trade in Iran, causing them to blockade Bandar עAbbas and attack nearby Qishm Island. This time is an episode in Iranian history that is at once minor and timelessly pregnant with significance for being an early example of the complexity of Iran's relations with the outside world.
The book's narrative addresses the conflict as part of a larger discussion of Dutch–Iranian relations from the beginning of VOC operations in Iran in 1623 until 1652, the year when the Dutch signed a new treaty with Isfahan. This treaty spelled out new conditions of trade, more specifically trade of silk, the main interest of the Dutch in Iran, thus ostensibly ending the dispute that had led to the confrontation in 1645. Six appendices present the translated texts of various Dutch reports on trade, the plan to attack Qishm, and VOC petitions to Shah עAbbas II. An addendum contains the transcribed Persian text of twenty-one (not thirty-one, as the authors claim in the preface) decrees written by Shah עAbbas II concerning the Dutch during the 1645 conflict. These documents constitute almost all that remains of what must have been a voluminous correspondence in Persian between the Safavid court and the VOC. As Floor notes, these documents are important not just for constituting rare documentation about the 1645 episode in Persian, all the more so because no references to the conflict are found in any of the Persian-language narrative sources, but also because they provide insight into titles used in official correspondence and the organization of Safavid bureaucracy.
The narrative of events is engaging if rather factual, with little consideration given to the workings of the Safavid government and the dynamics between Shah עAbbas II—at thirteen (not fifteen, as is claimed here) barely an adolescent in 1645—and his various court officials. What the book brings out most vividly is the fundamental incongruity between the premises and objectives of the Dutch and the Iranians, respectively. This begins with a different focus. Whereas the Dutch were concentrated on the coast and could not operate beyond the littoral for lack of manpower and military means, the Iranians, in the absence of a navy, were poorly equipped to control the Persian Gulf and its port cities. In addition, the entirely different assumption from which the two parties operated led to endlessly complicated negotiations, which for over a century revolved around the same issues: the Dutch wanted silk at cheap prices and with few political restrictions; the Iranians, meanwhile, were willing to concede privileges to the Dutch provided they remained tied to the court, paid prices set by the court, and provided services, including naval and protection services, to the court.
Despite their naval weakness, the balance of power in this interaction was heavily slanted in favor of the Iranians—who held all the important cards, including the right to renew or revoke trading privileges to foreign agents, thus giving the lie to all who want to see in the 17th-century activities of the East India companies—the Dutch as much as the English—a reach for geopolitical hegemony if not full-fledged imperialism. However, the ingredients of the later imbalance of power were there: in the absence of real military power, for the Dutch, blockading Iran's main port was their only option, but by doing so, they also throttled their own access to the Iranian market. The Iranians, lacking any naval facilities of their own, could do little to prevent and lift the blockade at Bandar עAbbas. Despite reciprocal diplomatic bluster, pragmatism thus prevailed and arrangements were made to end or at least defuse the conflict. There may be a lesson here for the present.
Better written than most of Floor's studies, the book is not free from awkward and mangled phrases, misspellings—“lend” for “lent” and “phase” for “faze,” to give just two examples—missing or superfluous apostrophes, and so on. The availability of a printed concordance that gives the corresponding VOC numbers for the old Koloniaal Archief ones in the Dutch archives, which since 2002 are to be abbreviated as Nationaal Archief rather than Algemeen Rijks Archief, should have made it unnecessary to switch back and forth between the two systems in the footnotes. One also regrets the lack of an annotated translation of the farmāns transcribed here.
