Toby Huff brings together into one book a wide range of secondary sources, dealing with the question of scientific relations between Europe and the rest of the world, to reinstate the developmentalist approach to the history of science and to argue that the seventeenth century was ‘the great divide that separated Western Europe developmentally from the rest of the world for the next three and a half centuries’. In viewing science as a discovery activity of a human mind acting upon an objective nature that lies out there, Huff asks why this extraordinary pattern of discovery ‘did not happen elsewhere. Simply put, why the West? Why did the great civilizations of China, India and the Muslim Middle East, with their long records of growth and accomplishment, fall behind?’ (p. 3).
Huff openly rejects the ‘prevailing view that whatever happened culturally and developmentally in the West must have taken place elsewhere’ (p. 3), and dismisses major theoretical claims – that contingent conditions led the West to domination, that there is no singular path to the description of nature, that distinct periodical or regional demarcations are culturally constructed, that history is not necessarily ‘progressing’ linearly, that the human mind constructs the perception of nature and does not discover nature, and that there is value to scientific activity that does not necessarily lead to breakthroughs and discoveries. Instead, he stresses that whereas ‘not all those cultural universes are equally encouraging of scientific inquiry, neither are they equally supportive of original ideas’, and that the ‘reconstruction of European civilization in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in philosophy, law, institution building, and education’ inserted a quality of ‘curiosity’ that became intrinsic to European intellectual life (p. 4). Huff recasts Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, transforming it into an ‘omnipresent European ethos of science’ (p. 171, original emphasis), reducing the cause of scientific production to a singular quality – curiosity. The institutional transformations are important only for setting the conditions that nurtured such spiritual quality. Thus, since the thirteenth century, ‘curiosity’ ‘had been gestating in the universities and finally manifested in the seventeenth century in two forms: a fascination with studying natural phenomena’ and a ‘desire to establish new scientific institutions that could support hands-on experimental investigations’ (p. 172). An ‘infectious curiosity’ originated in ‘England and Scandinavia, swept the intellectual cultures of Italy and the Continent’ (p. 171), and culminated in the great Newtonian synthesis. The chief purpose of the book, then, is to prove the absence of curiosity in non-European cultures, placing it as the prime cause for the Great Divergence between West and East.
Huff grounds his argument in a comparative account of the reception of the telescope in China and in the Moghul and Ottoman Empires. No one in the non-European settings pointed the telescope to the heavens as Galileo did, nor did Galileo's writings prompt them to do so. These, for Huff, are clear evidence for the lack of ‘scientific curiosity’ and the reason non-European civilizations fell behind.
There is more than one way to question Huff's methodology – from the epistemological obstacle of proving the absence of a thing, through the teleological and deterministic understanding of scientific development that has to develop along a singular path, to the ontological difficulty of locating and determining an elusive notion such as ‘curiosity’ that has no practical manifestation. I would rather focus on a sample of his historical interpretations than on the ideological tenets to offer an alternative account.
The telescope case is one example. Huff argues that non-Europeans used the telescope for amusement or military purposes, instead of pointing it at the heavens in order to discover nature and science. Before Galileo had pointed his telescope at the heavens, however, dozens of telescopes circulated across Europe, handled as toys, pointed at the horizons, and used for military purposes. It was only Galileo who, to put it in Huff's terms, utilized the instrument for the ‘discovering of nature’, whereas the rest of the European intellectual culture exhibited a lack of ‘scientific curiosity.’
Huff uses Galileo's exceptional case of ‘curiosity’ to represent the culmination of a long institutional process. Accordingly, the medieval Christianization of Aristotle established a scientific curriculum that was taught in ‘autonomous’ institutions (i.e. the universities), which represented the womb that carried ‘scientific curiosity’ to its birth in the seventeenth century. A curious figure like Galileo, however, was exceptional in his surroundings, and not only because he pointed the telescope at the heavens. The rigid disciplinary division in the universities inhibited a ‘curious’ mathematician like Galileo from employing his mathematical skills in the study of physics. Galileo could not start and complete his interdisciplinary work on falling bodies within the university and had to leave the institution, setting free his ‘scientific curiosity’ as a court philosopher. In the university, scientific theological dogma and disciplinary rigidity actually suffocated curiosity. In fact, Galileo could lay the foundation for the Newtonian synthesis despite the university, rather than because of it.
Rather than there being a linear development, conflicting processes (the dissemination of print versus the rise of censorship, the centralization of state power versus traditional ecclesiastical institutions, theological–scientific dogma versus first-hand experience, etc.) clashed with one another, creating historical complexities that eventually led to the establishment of alternative scientific institutions, and of a new culture of science. In this sense, curiosity is not an intrinsic quality that develops within clear cultural demarcations. Instead, it reveals itself to be a constructed quality ignited by encounters with foreign people and cultural objects. Cross-cultural exchanges that delivered the telescope to non-European civilizations were not part of a linear cultural push from the centre (Europe) outward to the peripheries of the world. In fact, such exchanges instigated estrangement and stimulated curiosity. Thus curiosity was a product of reciprocal relationships between strangers and of exposure to the ‘other’, not their cause.
Instead of labouring to prove the absence of curiosity and asking why no ‘Galileos, Keplers, Leeuwenhoeks, or Newtons’ emerged in the non-European world (p. 166), it would be more beneficial to historiography to understand what actually was there in the scientific culture of the non-European.
