In their book, Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe, Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Bernard of the RAND Corporation identify the “patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe,” defining radicalization as the “rejection of the key dimensions of modern democratic culture at the center of the European value system.” The book touches upon salient and timely issues such as the attraction of ISIS and the rejection of the West among those seeking Jihad. Rabasa and Benard provide the reader with detailed case studies (Pakistan, Central Asia, Yemen, and East Africa) and support their hypotheses with extensive statistical proof. EuroJihad is a well-written and extremely accessible book, and one that would be relevant for academics, students, researchers, policymakers, and the general public.
The authors stress that while only a small minority of European Muslims support violent extremism, “even a support level of just 1 percent in a national Muslim community of 3.4 million (Germany) or 1 million (Spain) represents a substantial and potentially dangerous level.” This describes the challenge that a small group of ideologically committed and mobilized individuals pose to modern nation-states.
European Islamists comprise a diverse group, spanning first-generation immigrants to second- or even third-generation immigrants who identify neither with their country of birth nor with their country of origin, and whose expectations may exceed their perceived opportunities. In Britain, terrorist suspects are often young British-Pakistani (Asian) men who feel isolated from the mainstream of society. In France, the threat comes from young, often-uneducated North African men (and women) who populate the banlieus outside of Paris. In Germany, the threat includes Germany's traditionally moderate Turkish community. Among those who returned to the United Kingdom, the authors find a substantial gap between education level (the majority attended some college) and employment (only a minority had skilled or professional jobs).
The authors endeavor to explore a variety of what would be considered “root causes” for radicalization, including alienation, lack of integration, and poverty. These also include personal feelings of disillusionment that may increase susceptibility to radical ideology in which the individual's disappointment is viewed through a prism of Islamist narratives of Western oppression of Muslims. These perceptions drive and justify the transition to violence. This assumption about root causes and motivation is somewhat misleading, as the authors conclude that a failure to integrate into the broader European society is not a strong predictor of radicalization, while at the same time they assert that segregation resulting from a lack of employment options is.
Further, the authors claim that abject poverty is not a good predictor of radicalization. They cite a German official who claims that a significant number of European jihadists are middle-class individuals who believe they deserve better from society and are drawn to a new empowering identity within the “worldwide Muslim community.” Other young men are motivated by their desire to be a “gangsta” with “street cred” among their friends.
The authors point to prisons as a breeding ground for alienation, anger, and radicalization. Yet studies of Muslim prison populations in the United States have shown no disposition toward radicalization, and thus some of what the authors determine as root causes may actually be specific to the country under review. The United States, with its so-called melting pot land of opportunity culture, has largely (but not entirely) found insulation from extremist ideological infection. Yet Eurojihad asserts that “foreign support for . . . apostate regimes and the insurgency in Iraq and invading Afghanistan and Iraq” are all key sources of inspiration. For this reviewer, this point poses a challenge. If US foreign policy (echoed by or allied with European states) ultimately inspires radicalization, why is the United States seemingly immune to the problem (at least to the same extent as Europe)? There are clearly intervening variables that explain why, in a specific European country, only a fraction of Muslims radicalize or join extremist groups even though all Muslims are subjected to similar levels of discrimination. Moreover, if US policy is the basis for the propaganda, why is the United States largely spared the same phenomena?
Patterns of radicalization within the Muslim communities in Europe reflect the historical experiences of European Muslims, particularly the existing links to the countries of origin, the extent to which militant groups exist in the native country, and the degree to which these can be transferred back to Europe. With the disproportionate numbers of European Muslims traveling to Raqqa to join ISIS, security services are alarmed at the prospect of returning foreign fighters and the potential threat they pose. Several European countries have initiated preemptive measures including the criminalization of travel to Syria or Iraq, cancellation of passports of those who go, or revocation of their citizenship.
The authors explore the role of social media in radicalization, pointing out that the European jihadists are active on sites such as Facebook (and other platforms) and primarily seek to broadcast their “purposeful courage.” The Internet provides a variety of uses for jihadists, including recruitment, propaganda, and transmission of training manuals. Most compelling for this reviewer was that the authors echo my own findings on how the Internet has “emancipated female activists by allowing them to communicate with male extremists without violating social and religious precepts” (p. 120), thus allowing for the participation of more and more women in violent extremist organizations.
The tone of the book is sobering, concluding that even with a small percentage of Muslims who subscribe to violent extremism, jihadi Salafi ideology will continue to pose a threat to European security. The authors’ ultimate conclusion is that the Untied States may be able to learn from the European experience and the “adaptation of their legal frameworks to deal with terrorist threats that may be of value” (p. 196). For Britain, intervention is the preferred approach rather than criminalizing the antecedent behaviors; Germany uses a more direct approach in countering precursor behaviors. The result is more surveillance, data sharing, privacy intrusions, detention without charges, and, perhaps more concerning than these already active features, the “special and harsher legal procedures” within separate courts. But Europe is only gradually figuring out possible solutions to preempt or deradicalize their Muslim populations.
