In his book, Damon Coletta claims that the centrality of science and technology (S&T) for creating power has changed the basic nature of international affairs and, along with it, international relations theory. Unlike in previous centuries, not only are S&T now major sources of power, but the time lag between scientific discovery and technological change has also shortened from decades to mere months, allowing for hitherto unseen rapid changes in the distribution of power. Coletta’s thesis is that “[i]f the United States now hopes to extend its international influence and fashion a second American Century, it will have to come to terms with relatively new sources of power that operate largely outside [traditional formulations]” (p. 2). His book argues that a cosmopolitan approach toward science is that new source of power. Coletta’s concern is that the United States is not embracing this new power source, mostly because Americans mistakenly conflate scientific progress with technological innovation. Americans also put far too much emphasis on technological change, and increasingly at the expense of scientific discovery.

The first chapter of Courting Science argues that it is science, not technology, that is the key to continued American hegemony in the twenty-first century. The links between science and international leadership have been underreported and undertheorized, and they matter for world history. Therefore, Coletta highlights several prominent ones. Science does not guarantee hegemony, but it “helps a powerful state’s case for hegemony by credibly signaling its government’s capacity to implement policy” (p. 12). Science is both an input to, and sign of, good administration, which is desirable in a great power because it can attract followers out of admiration, intimidation, or jealousy. Science also generates ideas about economic development for policymakers. Indeed, science itself is an input to useful technologies that can aid in economic development, military security, and solutions to national problems. Scientific achievement brings with it national glory. But it is a glory that has few cultural barriers, inviting all of the world’s nations to marvel at it. That is, “science . . . pursues a kind of truth that lies outside nationalism and translates across cultures” (p. 16). Science can also serve as a means of diplomacy, perhaps even influence, via international research projects, awards that are globally respected, joint scholarship, and the migration of skilled workers. Scientific knowledge reduces uncertainty. It creates the skills needed to address shared international problems: climate change, environmental degradation, arms control. The scientific mind set can be turned inward to solve domestic problems. And since international science can often require, or at least benefit from, international organizations, it de facto institutionalizes cooperation and shared commitments.

In contrast, technology locks us into thinking in terms of domination: The technologically strong do what they can, and the technologically weak suffer what they must. The collectivity and public goods nature of science leads us away from this, and toward international cooperation, often via international organizations.

The second chapter is concerned with how to govern science, for “[s]cience, as a cosmopolitan enterprise, must be courted, forever, and cannot be subordinated in fine or successfully micromanaged by the powerful state, particularly one with visions of international leadership” (p. 17). That is, if science is to guarantee American hegemony in the next century, then America must better support science. The problem is that science can be dangerous to the state because it speaks truth to power. Colleta reminds us that Athens executed Socrates, and did so at its own peril. Science today plays the same role as that doomed philosopher. Scientists and their findings can frustrate governments because they suffer from a principal–agent problem. The preferences of scientists with new, expert knowledge often do not conform with those of their government sponsors. As a result, governments that are jealous of their power often stifle science. Historically, this has been especially true of proud hegemons whose leaders perceive domestic disagreement or intellectual innovation as disloyalty. Meanwhile, nervous hegemons, those on the decline, fear scientific debate as a visible indicator of internal weakness.

Democracy further compounds the principal–agent problem. Voters want scientists to enjoy a long leash so that they can practice their craft; but voters also distrust scientists because of the frightening combination of expert information and unclear preferences that scientists possess. How can voters know that the science is reliable and in the national interest? So governments must regulate science. But they must also recognize the risk of stifling scientific agents in the process. In particular, scientists must be able to perform and discuss research without fear. Also, the government must distinguish between high-quality scientific research and domestic or foreign aid. The former requires high standards and costly inputs that may be compromised in the name of the latter. And in advising and consulting on transnational problems, the U.S. government should think of science and scientists as a form of soft power. A significant part of this chapter also consists of a historical survey of the interaction between science and the Western state, from ancient Greece through modern America.

In Chapter 3, Coletta asserts that despite post–Cold War claims about unipolarity, “the United States has been neither acting nor succeeding as a hegemon” (p. 39). This he blames on traditional conceptions of international relations theory, with their insistence on realist, material foundations for power, polarity, and hegemony. This chapter, based on an interpretation and application of Kenneth Waltz’s realism, and often juxtaposed against Bruce Russet’s Power and Conformity in World Politics (1974), takes these theories to task. Coletta argues that we are actually in a multipolar world in which the distribution of resources, both military and economic, is becoming more symmetric. Leadership in a multipolar world is difficult. The United States can no longer rely on material might alone, if it indeed ever could. Nor can it “bank on the stickiness of international institutions or the attractiveness of its civilization” (p. 59). It must instead find new forms of global influence. In particular, the United States must better advertise the benefits of American hegemony, partly by using its power to support cooperation in solving problems affecting the global community. And these are problems that can be best solved by the American lead in science.

The book’s three empirical chapters then survey different routes by which science can allow the United States to extend its hegemony in the twenty-first century. A case study on the Office of Naval Research illustrates the problems of technology worship, and how national enthusiasm for science, well embedded within the citizenry, can help America avoid technocracy. A case study of U.S. scientific diplomacy toward Brazil demonstrates how, even among competing powers, basic research can provide the incentives for cooperation. A third case study on space policy shows how the United States struggles with balancing its concerns as a self-interested Great Power against the need for global cooperation, engagement, and the open negotiations that come with them. These cases are meant to show how scientific prowess in the hegemon functions on the principle of attraction rather than intimidation. Coletta, therefore, sees a constructivist role for science, achieving power via problem definition and preference formation, rather than through a realist mode of influencing the cost–benefit calculations of ruthless competitors.

At core, Cotella makes a powerful claim that science, not technology, will be the basis for hegemony in the twenty-first century. But the empirical cases he uses to illustrate his theory so well are not as compelling as evidence for it. His argument that science can play a role in hegemony is convincing. So, too, is his concern that we tend to overemphasize technology at the expense of science. However, the argument that science is more powerful than technology as a vehicle for hegemony may need strengthening. For technology brings military and economic power in ways that science cannot. If anarchy is what states make of it, then if one state makes it about conquest, and acquires the technological capability to do so, then mere cosmopolitan science will be of little help to the rest of the world. That is, the causal mechanisms by which science leads to hegemony, and in ways stronger than (and different from) technology, need more pervasive and robust empirical support.

Finally, the book is written in grand style, with sweeping prose and ambitious coverage. For example, in the first chapter alone, we are introduced, in rapid and intermingled succession, to the theories of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Pericles, Richelieu, Napoleon, Metternich, Kennan, Kissinger, Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Leslie Gelb. A similar style is used throughout. However, in this flurry of ideas, it is admittedly tempting to get a bit lost sometimes. Also, the book assumes that readers possess considerable depth in international relations theory. It is therefore probably most fit for serious scholars, rather than for undergraduates or professional Master’s students. Finally, the author’s passion is clear. But at times, the arguments can sometimes slip into jeremiads or vague platitudes. Yet overall, Courting Science is a valuable attempt to insert S&T into the heart of international relations theory. This infusion is precisely what the field needs.