I. INTRODUCTION
Renewed interest (Niman Reference Niman2004; Hodgson Reference Hodgson2003) in Thorstein Veblen’s theory of capital as an important element in developing an evolutionary economics warrants a closer investigation into the origins of the concept. In his essay outlining the basic theory of capital, Veblen (Reference Veblen1908) makes explicit reference to the single taxers, and to the relationship between land as an unearned source of rent and the returns associated with capital. Yet, while Mark Blaug (Reference Blaug2000) reminds us that Henry George’s Progress and Poverty was the best-selling economics book in the nineteenth century, in Stephen Edgell and Rick Tilman’s (Reference Edgell and Tilman1989) long list of possible intellectual antecedents for Veblen, Henry George’s name is notably absent.
At first glance, one may not see a connection between George and Veblen because George was concerned primarily with the rent associated with land, and Veblen with the corresponding increment generated by capital. However, to dismiss the connection based simply on a preconception that land and capital are two different economic factors and hence represent an irreconcilable difference would be a mistake. If one considers Veblen’s anthropological approach to economics, then it becomes easier to see how, as society develops, capital in the form of community-based knowledge takes on the fundamental role previously played in an earlier era by land. Veblen’s theory of capital does not invalidate the earlier focus on land, but, rather, is one step further down the path of economic development.
Thus, it is perhaps surprising that little work has been done to look more closely at George’s work in connection with the institutional economics of Veblen.Footnote 1 That is not to say that George was the only or primary influence on Veblen. Rather, just as Tilman (Reference Tilman1985) found similarities between the work of Edward Bellamy (a populist reformer) and Veblen, Veblen’s theory of capital bears relation to George’s Progress and Poverty.
To trace this connection, we begin by looking at how Henry George influenced the young Thorstein Veblen. We then look at Veblen’s theory of capital and attempt to identify the defining characteristics of his theory. We show how the corresponding themes from George are consistent with Veblen’s theory. It then becomes possible to compare and contrast the fundamental differences between the two. The result is to generate new insights into what has been largely an ignored chapter in the history of economic thought.
II. THE GEORGE/VEBLEN CONNECTION
It may seem peculiar that Veblen scholars have not recognized a connection between the work of Henry George and Thorstein Veblen. For example, Wesley Clair Mitchell (Reference Mitchell1969) notes the influence that George had on Philip Wicksteed and John R. Commons, but does not include Veblen. The absence of a connection is surprising, given Joseph Dorfman’s (Reference Dorfman1949) reference to the fact that Veblen read Progress and Poverty as an undergraduate at Carlton College, where he apparently made it known that he “supported it.” His familiarity with the book is also suggested by John Diggens (1999), who tells us that Veblen read Spencer to his first wife, Ellen Rolfe, and she, in turn, read to him Henry George and Ruskin.
One possible explanation for why George’s influence has been overlooked may result from his position in the history of economic thought. As a self-taught student of economics and a vocal critic of academic economists, “Henry George was attacked during his lifetime by just about every leading economist in the USA and by many minor, now forgotten, economists and political commentators in both the USA and Britain” (Blaug Reference Blaug2000, p. 10). However, as Cord (Reference Cord1965, p. 244) tells us, George had a much more subtle influence as a “bridge in the transition from Social to Reform Darwinism, gradually converting the Mugwump spirit into full fledged Progressivism.” As such, while much criticized on one level, he inspired a new generation of economists (comprised of such notables as Frank Fetter) who developed an interest in studying economics after reading Progress and Poverty.Footnote 2
Yet, what is peculiar about all this is that while Veblenian scholars have largely ignored the George/Veblen connection, Tilman (Reference Tilman1985) in particular has explored the connection between Veblen and Utopian writer Edward Bellamy.Footnote 3 What is interesting about the connection with Bellamy is that Dorfman (Reference Dorfman1949) identifies both Bellamy and George as being part of the same intellectual movement, identified as “Popular Radicalism.”Footnote 4 Both used the concept of rent or what was to become known as the “unearned increment” to form the basis for their advocacy positions. Where George used it to construct the foundation for his concept of the single tax, Bellamy used it to “defend a comprehensive scheme of nationalizing industry” (Dorfman Reference Dorfman1949, p. 149). Thus, it would stand to reason that if the concept of the unearned increment can be shown to play an important role in the development of Veblen’s thought, and that Veblen read both George and Bellamy, then surely some influence can be ascribed to Henry George.
The nature of the relationship between Veblen’s theory of capital and Henry George’s ideas with respect to land centers on the notion of the existence of what Veblen identifies as the “unearned increment.” Veblen comments in his essay on the nature of capital that the contention of an unearned increment “seems to be sound and is commonly accepted” (1908, p. 337). However, the source of the increment is not only a function of growth in population, as identified by George, but also depends on the “state of the industrial art.” As Veblen tells us: “It is only within the given technological situation, the current scheme of ways and means, that any parcel of land has such productive powers as it has” (1908, p. 337).
If we were to evaluate a piece of land in the center of town, George would argue that it becomes more valuable because the concentration of factors of production lead to an expansion of the division of labor. Such an expansion enhances productivity and, as a result, creates additional wealth. Veblen does not challenge this basic premise, but instead is interested in how technology, along with location, can add to the value of a plot of land. He becomes interested in exploring the “ulterior implications that have not commonly been recognized” (1908, p. 337) with his position. Veblen’s point is that the gains from location do not depend entirely on the surface area of a piece of land. Technical knowledge and advances in building materials make it possible for buildings located in a prime location to be expanded either up or down in order to create additional buildable area. If a downtown location is desirable, improvements in construction methods would lead to the constant renewal of properties as owners attempt to maximize the value of their property by building higher and higher (or lower and lower) structures.
Veblen remarks that “Land becomes valuable because human beings have learned how to make use of it” (1908, p. 338). From his perspective, the unearned increment does not disappear with an expansion in the industrial arts, but, rather, increases in size, thereby becoming even more prominent. As a result, Veblen believed, “All this argument concerning the unearned increment may be carried over, with scarcely a change of phrase, to the case of ‘capital goods’” (1908, p. 338). Hence, it is important to understand how the concept of the unearned increment can be applied to capital and then, how George’s ideas formed the basis for Veblen’s theory.
III. VEBLEN’S THEORY OF CAPITAL
The foundation of Veblen’s theory of capital is rooted in the special position knowledge holds in society. Knowledge forms the basis for the productive use of natural resources and is a community asset that, at its most fundamental level, is not owned by a single individual. Thus, Veblen’s theory begins by laying the foundation for a system of property rights created to enable individuals to productively utilize knowledge that resides within the community as a whole. These property rights make it possible for the creation and ownership of capital in the form of industrial equipment. With growth in the scale and scope of the community comes the ability to monopolize a portion of the community’s asset for pecuniary gain. Monopolization then leads to a form of economic servitude that is similar to slavery.
To develop these ideas, Veblen begins by taking an anthropologic approach. He contends that in early societies, land preceded industrial equipment as the “stronghold of ownership and the means of engrossing the community’s industrial efficiency” (1908, p. 334). At this stage of community development, the scope of knowledge permitted only the use of rudimentary tools and methods to productively utilize factors of production such as land. However, as the pool of knowledge expanded, the development and use of industrial equipment became the common means for embodying the intangible knowledge of the community.
In contrast to conventional theories of capital that are founded on the productive labor of workers and described in individualistic terms, Veblen believed that the history of humanity is not the story of a collection of independent individuals, but, rather, is based on the collective contribution of the group. The group plays an important role because it is the group that forms the entity where knowledge is captured and stored (Niman Reference Niman2004; Hodgson Reference Hodgson2003). This intangible asset is held as part of the common stock that individuals draw from to productively use the raw materials found in nature to establish a livelihood. It resides in the group because the amount and the extent of the knowledge are greater than that held by the capacity of any single individual.
While it may be argued that the value of capital is tied to the productivity of the maker of the capital good, Veblen points out that “the maker’s productivity in the case was but a function of the immaterial technological equipment at his command, and that in its turn was the slow distillate of the community’s time-long experience and initiative” (1908, p. 339). Although human action is required to create the value associated with a physical piece of capital equipment, “These immaterial industrial expedients are necessarily a product of the community, the immaterial residue of the community’s experience, past and present; which has no existence apart from the community’s life, and can be transmitted only in the keeping of the community at large” (1908, p. 348). It is not labor that creates capital, but, rather, knowledge, as it works through the actions of the laborer who creates the pieces of equipment identified as capital goods. Raw materials become economic goods only when they “have been brought within the sweep of the community’s knowledge of ways and means” (1908, p. 329).
In primitive cultures this is essentially a non-issue, as the possession of capital goods is of “slight consequence,” given the commonplace technical knowledge and training that are widely available and part of everyday life. However, as the common stock of technical knowledge advances and becomes embodied in relatively large units of material equipment required for the “effective pursuit of industry,” then “property rights apparently begin to fall into definite shape, the principles of ownership gather force and consistency, and men begin to accumulate capital goods and take measures to make them secure” (1908, pp. 331–332).
Thus, in the case of land, “the preferential position of the landlord as a claimant of the ‘net product’ consists in his legal right to decide whether, how far, and on what terms men shall put this technical scheme into effect in those features of it which involve the use of his parcel of land” (1908, p. 338). However, in the case of capital goods, property rights come to the forefront because society owns the source of capital (knowledge), but it is the individual who uses that knowledge to produce capital goods.
Without individual property rights, there is little incentive in developed economies to make the large-scale investments required to maximize productive efficiency. Value is not inherent in the assets but, rather, in the rights conferred on that asset. Value is created by transforming these community assets into factors of production.
While the establishment of property rights represents a social institution required to transform the community asset (knowledge) into a private productive good, the establishment of property rights enables the individual to monopolize a portion of the community’s knowledge asset to realize greater pecuniary gains. Veblen says “it becomes worth while—this is to say, it becomes feasible—for the individual with the strong arm to engross, or ‘corner,’ the usufruct of the commonplace knowledge of ways and means by taking over such of the requisite material as may be relatively scarce and relatively indispensible for procuring a livelihood under the current state of the industrial arts” (1908, p. 332).
The ownership of industrial equipment becomes the institution that makes it possible for someone to corner the community’s intangible assets and achieve relative economic success.Footnote 5 For Veblen, the ability to monopolize a portion of the community’s industrial assets is the equivalent of the situation in earlier societies where select individuals were able to monopolize land—the factor of production that served as the wellspring for wealth creation. In such a situation, Veblen contends, the growth of ownership takes “the direction primarily of slavery, or of some equivalent form of servitude, so effecting a naïve and direct monopolistic control of the current knowledge of ways and means” (1908, p. 333).
Veblen introduces the concept of economic servitude in order to make the argument that individuals in industrial societies do not have the freedom of opportunity associated with the system of natural liberty imagined by those affiliated with the classical school. Just as the owner of land in previous societies controlled the standard of living enjoyed by the landless, in an industrial society, control over the capital required for production places the worker in a similar position of economic servitude. The ability to monopolize a portion of the social knowledge base limits the means by which others gain entry into the market or compete effectively. As a result, those who do not have the means or ability to gain a similar superior position must take whatever employment is offered in order to obtain the material means required for survival.
It is important to note that in earlier societies, this concept was associated with the ownership of land, but, of equal interest, that equating the structure of a system of property rights that permit the monopolization of community assets leads to some form of slavery. This, of course, raises the obvious question of where Veblen might have acquired such notions as: economic slavery; the assignment of property rights leads to the subsequent monopolization of community assets; and value is not intrinsic to what is commonly thought of as a factor of production, but, rather, is created by individual effort by way of community resources. These themes were prevalent in Henry George’s Progress and Poverty, a book that influenced the early development of Veblen’s economic way of thinking.
IV. HENRY GEORGE’S INFLUENCE
Henry George agreed with Thorstein Veblen that knowledge is an important component for greater productivity. “Mind,” he says, “is the instrument by which man advances, and by which each advance is secured and made the vantage ground of new advances” (1948, pp. 506–507). However, steeped in the world of the classical economists and their focus on land and labor as the source of value, George focused primarily on how labor could unlock the value inherent in land as a factor of production. Rather than emphasizing knowledge as being the community asset and labor as the mechanism for turning that asset into a source for pecuniary gain, George instead emphasizes land as the community asset unlocked by labor.Footnote 6 This serves as the foundation for our comparison based on the notion that the creation of a system of property rights gives the individual an opportunity to turn that community asset into a vehicle for individual gain.
To evaluate the connection between the two, we look at the following three propositions:
Proposition 1: Communal assets form the basis for individual wealth creation.
Proposition 2: A system of property rights generates an “unearned increment” by enabling the individual to monopolize a portion of the community’s asset.
Proposition 3: Monopolization leads to the creation of economic slavery.
These three propositions form the core of Veblen’s theory of capital. To make the connection to Henry George, we explore each one individually.
Proposition 1: Communal assets form the basis for individual wealth creation. The foundation of Henry George’s theoretical framework is that land belongs to the community as a whole and, therefore, the community is entitled to appropriate (through the way it allocates property rights or the manner in which it taxes those rights) the gains attributed to this jointly owned asset. To make his case, George begins by drawing a distinction between “things which are the produce of labor and things which are the gratuitous offerings of nature” (1948, p. 337). From his perspective, the former constitutes wealth and the latter what he calls “land.” Here land represents something that is given by nature and George uses the example of a house on a lot. The house, being a product of human exertion, constitutes what he calls “wealth,” while the lot itself is a gift from nature and, therefore, thought to be something entirely different.
To make this point clearer, he draws the following distinction:
The essential character of the one class of things is that they embody labor, are brought into being by human exertion, their existence or non-existence, their increase or diminution, depending on man. The essential character of the other class of things is that they do not embody labor, and exist irrespective of human exertion and irrespective of man; they are the field or environment in which man finds himself; the storehouse from which his needs must be supplied, the raw material upon which and the forces with which alone his labor can act (1948, pp. 337–338).Footnote 7
Such a foundation forms the basis for establishing the ethical position that “the rightfulness which attaches to individual property in the produce of labor implies the wrongfulness of individual property in land” (1948, p. 338). Individual property represents a “wrong” because it allows those who do not labor to appropriate the natural reward that resides in the community rather than in the efforts of the individual. Thus, George asks us to “Consider what rent is. It does not arise spontaneously from land; it is due to nothing that the land owners have done. It represents a value created by the whole community. … rent, the creation of the whole community, necessarily belongs to the whole community” (1948, p. 365–366).
Such a conception of rent is rooted in the belief that the bounty of nature should be available for everyone to share. While individuals should be entitled to the fruits of their labor, they should not be entitled by virtue of their efforts to take more than the fruits that they have produced. George proclaims: “If we are all here by the equal permission of the Creator, we are all here with an equal title to the enjoyment of his bounty-with an equal right to the use of all that nature so impartially offers” (1948, p. 338).
Proposition 2: A system of property rights creates an unearned “increment” by enabling the individual to monopolize a portion of the community’s asset. Because the actions of the Creator were for the benefit of all, all should enjoy the benefits associated with that act of generosity. However, human beings do not work for the common good, but to benefit themselves. As necessary incentives for individuals to work hard, they must be entitled to keep the fruits of their labor. As a result, George believed, society creates a system of property rights that enable the individual to retain what they have created.Footnote 8
The unintended consequence of the creation of such a system is that it enables the individual to appropriate income from land in the form of rent via the creation of a “fictitious right, the creation of municipal regulation, which is unknown and unrecognized by nature” (1948, pp. 419–420). As a result, it becomes challenging to draw a clear distinction between the rewards that accrue from individual effort and those associated with the appropriation of value that resides within the community as a whole. This is particularly evident with respect to control over individual pieces of land. Land often attains its value not because of any inherent productivity, but because of its location relative to other activities.
Land is more valuable in the center of town not because it is fertile, but because it is located in a place where people want to be. For workers in a factory, living in proximity to that factory creates greater value to where they live. Value in this sense is not associated with the resource value of the property, but, instead, in terms of its location relative to other activities that are taking place. Land tends to become more valuable as population increases, not because it is more expensive to produce food to meet a growing population, but, rather, because increases in number create more interest in adding value to a piece of land in a defined geographical location. “It is not the growth of the city that develops the country, but the development of the country that makes the city grow” (1948, p. 272).
What causes these land values to increase? They increase as the result of the “development of the country,” not from the efforts of the landowner. It is progress that owes itself to individual initiative, but generates a social benefit that resides in the community. The concentration of a population in a specific location enhances the division of labor and increases the productivity of all who work or trade together. Labor working shoulder-to-shoulder “brings out a superior power in labor, which is localized on land-which attaches not to labor generally, but only to labor exerted on particular land; and which thus inheres in the land as much as any qualities of soil … ” (1948, p. 235).
George views cities as a wellspring of productivity. However, these gains are specific to a particular location and not evenly dispersed among all parcels of land. As he writes:
All these advantages attach to the land; it is on this land and no other that they can be utilized, for here is the center of population-the focus of exchanges, the market place and workshop for the highest forms of industry. The productivity powers which density of population has attached to this land are equivalent to the multiplication of its original fertility by the hundred fold and the thousand fold. And rent, which measures the difference between this added productiveness and that of the least productive land in use has increased accordingly (1948, p. 241).
It is not the scarcity of land that generates rent, but the exclusiveness of the associated property right. Rent is a mechanism that redistributes income from labor to the monopoly rights held by landowners.Footnote 9 Rent is the outcome of the owner being able to exclude others from capturing the resource values associated with a piece of land and therefore able to lease those resource values to those who have been excluded. This leads to the conclusion that “it is not the abundance of capital or the productiveness of labor that makes wages high or low; but the extent to which the monopolizers of land can, in rent, levy tribute upon the earnings of labor (1948, p. 288).”Footnote 10
Proposition 3: Monopolization leads to the creation of economic slavery. The system of property rights that gives a single individual control over a portion of the community’s resources creates a form of economic slavery that is abhorrent in the eyes of Henry George. Ownership of the soil creates a type of slavery to which “the enduring pyramids and the colossal monuments of Egypt yet bear witness” (1948, p. 349).
In the chapter entitled “Enslavement of Laborers the Ultimate Result of Private Property of Land,” George makes the point that private ownership of land creates a form of economic servitude just as odious as human slavery. He begins with the parable of one hundred men trapped on an island. There is no substantive difference between one man as the absolute owner of the other ninety-nine and one man as the absolute owner of the soil of the island (1948, p. 247). Since the means for sustaining life arises from land, controlling the soil is tantamount to controlling the economic fortunes of the ninety-nine. Freedom is merely a chimera if the source for sustaining life rests in the hands of a single property owner.
For George, this creates an environment where the “strongest and most cunning easily acquire a superior share.” Here the rewards accrue from appropriating a portion of the efforts of others. The net result is that by becoming “lords of the land they become necessarily lords of their fellow-men. The ownership of land is the basis for aristocracy. It was not nobility that gave land, but the possession of land that gave nobility” (1948, p. 350). This create a form of slavery because “it takes from the laborer all he produces save enough to support an animal existence” (1948, p. 353).
Economic servitude results because of the “monopolization by some of what nature designed for all” (1948, p. 357). It is a question of natural rights:
The recognition of individual proprietorship of land is the denial of the natural rights of other individuals—it is a wrong which must show itself in the inequitable division of wealth. For as labor cannot produce without the use of land, the denial of the equal right to the use of land is necessarily the denial of the right of labor to its own produce. If one man can command the land upon which others must labor, he can appropriate the produce of their labor as the price of his permission to labor. The fundamental law of nature, that her enjoyment by man shall be consequent upon his exertion, is thus violated. The one receives without producing; the others produce without receiving. The one is unjustly enriched; the other are robbed (1948, pp. 341–342).
When an individual is given a property right that enables them to control a certain piece of land, they have the ability to appropriate the social gains that are created not from the individual efforts of the landowner, but, rather, by the fact that the land they control is particularly well situated. A system of property rights that enables the individual to appropriate the social benefits associated with increased economic activity becomes, for Henry George, the reason why poverty exists in the face of economic progress.
Since, for George, labor is the only source of value, such an expression of monopoly power can occur only by redistributing income from worker to landowner. Rents that are created by the community and appropriated by the landowner thereby depress wages and create hardship for many. He concludes that “The truth is, and from this truth there can be no escape, that there is and can be no just title to an exclusive possession of soil, and that private property in land is a bold, bare, enormous wrong, like that of chattel slavery” (1948, p. 358).
V. EXPLORING THE KEY DIFFERENCES
To this point we have been exploring the commonalities between Thorstein Veblen and Henry George. The normative question that both ask is: Should individuals, as the result of their efforts to further their own interests, be entitled to appropriate all or a portion of that which belongs to the community as a whole? While the structure of the problem provided by each bears a strong similarity, it is important to note that while their lives overlapped, they were, to a large extent, men of different eras and their answers to this important question contain significant differences.
Henry George’s ideas were steeped in classical economics where the focus was on economic growth and the distribution of income between economic classes, rather than on industrial efficiency. The first three books in Progress and Poverty deal with some of the problems that were central to the concerns expressed by the classical economists: the wages fund doctrine; the Malthusian population doctrine; and the distribution of income between land, labor, and capital. Thorstein Veblen, on the other hand, was very familiar with the fundamental changes in the theories of value and distribution that occurred with the rise of neoclassical economics. He read Marshall and other contemporary economists, and his economic theory served as a counterpoint to what was to become the next step in the development of economic thought.
If we were to use a modern lens to view the perspective developed by Thorstein Veblen, we would start with the businessperson’s ability to strategically alter the existing market structure from one that begins as competitive to one where prices rise substantially above marginal cost. The starting point for Veblen’s economic world is what he considers to be the desired outcome: an economy where economic efficiency drives each and every decision, and the production process is free and unfettered by the desires to subvert efficiency in order to achieve individual pecuniary gain. However, if the businessperson is able to appropriate a portion of the social knowledge base in a way that enables them to create a monopoly, then they would be able to reduce output (sabotage the production process) in order to raise prices. The difference between the old and the new becomes the source of monopoly profits, or what Veblen would call the “unearned increment.”
While Veblen identifies what he perceives to be a serious problem, he does not have a solution to the problem. In The Theory of Business Enterprise, he discusses, with some amount of disdain, the plight of the pecuniary disenfranchised business population who “in its revulsion against unassimilated facts turns rather to some excursion into pragmatic romance such as Social Settlements, Prohibition, Clean Politics, Single Tax, Arts and Craft, Neighborhood Guilds, Institutional Church, Christian Science, New Thought, or some such cultural thimblerig” (1966, pp. 351–352).” His criticism of the single tax, however, is not directed at the cause of the problem. Rather, his criticism is that the proposed solution is too “simplistic.” It does not effectively reach the heart of the problem: the tension between industrial efficiency and the desire for relative pecuniary success.
Henry George, on the other hand, does offer the single tax as a solution because, from his vantage point (steeped in the inner workings of classical economics), it provides an effective solution to the problem. By turning the lens 180 degrees from the point Veblen uses to analyze the problem, Ricardo’s Theory of Rent provides the starting point for identifying both the problem and solution for Henry George.Footnote 11 In the Ricardian Theory of Rent, it is the marginal piece of land that establishes the market price. More productive pieces of land generate positive rents because of the additional output that can be produced when compared to the marginal piece of land.
For George, this additional productivity emerges because of the important role played by location in the division of labor. The gains from specialization enable a group of workers to generate more output than what could be achieved by a single worker. The reduction in cost per unit, when compared to the marginal producer in the industry, gives rise to rent. Rent is, therefore, the difference between the price per unit that prevails in the market, as determined by the marginal producer, and the lower costs associated with the gains from an enhanced degree of specialization. From George’s perspective, this rent belongs to the community because it was the community’s resource (land) that enabled the businessperson to realize a cost per unit of output that is less than that of the marginal producer in the industry.
In both cases, rent, or an “unearned increment,” emerges from the actions of the businessperson (either as the result of an effort to extend the division of labor beyond that of the marginal producer, or to restrict output). However, regardless of strategy adopted, in both cases it is the ability to use an asset that belongs to the community at large in order to create a corresponding rent (profit) that forms the source of the problem. Rent (profit) takes on the form of an unearned increment because the individual did not create the knowledge or land that formed the basis for individual gain. Instead, it was the ability to appropriate something that belongs to the community as a whole that gave rise to the above-normal rewards.
It is easy to see why George would have relied on the single tax to achieve his desired result. By imposing a tax on the unimproved portion of the land, differences in terms of the potential to extend the division of labor could be equalized, and the amount earned by each producer would be based on the value they added rather than on the value associated with the community’s asset. Within George’s framework, this would make sense because the superior attributes of a piece of land are created by the community and, hence, should be returned to the community as a whole.
One can also see, then, why Veblen would have a more difficult time solving a similar problem involving the tension between industrial efficiency and relative pecuniary superiority. On the one hand, the desire for individual pecuniary gain provides one motive for creating further increases in industrial efficiency. However, individual initiative left unfettered often leads to antisocial behavior (monopolization). The fundamental question, therefore, for Veblen was how to nurture behavior that promotes greater efficiency in production, while suppressing the jointly held need to achieve relative economic success that often undermines the foundations of industrial efficiency. A tax may help to correct a social wrong by altering the existing incentive structure. However, from Veblen’s perspective, it does not strike at the heart of the problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
Veblen’s theory of capital forms the basis for his broader theory of the business enterprise (Veblen Reference Veblen1996) that seeks to juxtapose the narrow pecuniary interests of the businessperson and the broader interest of efficiency for society as a whole. As a result, its importance cannot be ignored.
By looking at the concept of an unearned increment or rent, and how it has been used by both Veblen and George, one sees striking similarities. What emerges from such a comparison is not that Veblen’s concept necessarily eclipses that of George, but, rather, that Veblen is using the tools provided by George to look at a later stage of economic development. Land morphs into capital as technology replaces labor as the engine that powers the process of industrialization.
It might be said that Veblen’s essay on the nature of capital indicates a brief flirtation with George’s ideas, leading to the argument that as Veblen grew and matured as a scholar, those early influences fell by the wayside. However, such a conclusion demonstrates a limited reading of Veblen. In his last book, Absentee Ownership (1966), Veblen does indeed return to those early Georgian themes found in his theory of capital. It is the absentee owner who creates this tension between the individual and society by both directing the economy and sabotaging industrial efficiency in an effort to appropriate a larger share of the unearned increment generated through monopolization. Thus, Veblen’s last book, just as his earlier work, represents a return to George and the fundamental tension that exists between individual property rights and community interests.
